Vikas Mishra vs State Of U.P.
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Allahabad High Court

Vikas Mishra vs State Of U.P. on 7 February, 2025

Author: Gautam Chowdhary

Bench: Gautam Chowdhary

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 


Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC:22181
 
Court No. - 90
 

 
Case :- CRIMINAL MISC. BAIL APPLICATION No. - 26613 of 2024
 

 
Applicant :- Vikas Mishra
 
Opposite Party :- State of U.P.
 
Counsel for Applicant :- Gaurav Kakkar,Sanjay Vikram Singh
 
Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.
 

 
Hon'ble Dr. Gautam Chowdhary,J.
 

1. वर्तमान दाण्डिक प्रकीर्ण जमानत प्रार्थना पत्र, आवेदक विकास मिश्रा की ओर से मु०अ०स० 11/2023, अन्तर्गत धारा 147/ 148/ 302/ 149/ 34 भा०दं०वि० थाना जफराबाद, जिला जौनपुर में जमानत पर मुक्त करने हेतु प्रस्तुत किया गया है।

2. आवेदक के विद्वान अधिवक्ता एवं विद्वान अपर शासकीय अधिवक्ता श्री चंदन सिंह को सुना तथा पत्रावली का परिशीलन किया।

3. यह आवेदक का द्वितीय जमानत आवेदन पत्र है, प्रथम जमानत आवेदन पत्र इसी न्यायपीठ द्वारा दिनांक 12.01.2024 को निरस्त कर दिया गया था।

4. आवेदक के विद्वान अधिवक्ता ने तर्क प्रस्तुत किया कि आवेदक को इस प्रकरण में झूठा फसाया गया है, उसने कथित अपराध कारित नहीं किया है, आवेदक को गलत व फर्जी तरीके से फसाया गया है। कथित घटना की प्रथम सूचना रिपोर्ट काफी विलम्ब से कानूनी विचार-विमर्श करके अंकित करायी गयी है, जबकि कथित घटना राष्ट्रीय राजमार्ग पर जफराबाद थाना से अधिकतम 1 कि.मी. की दूरी पर घटनास्थल है। इससे यह पूर्णतया परिलक्षित होता है कि रंजिशन व साजिशन आवेदक व उसके परिवार को अभियुक्त बनाया गया है। उपरोक्त मु.अ.सं. का वादी मुकदमा अवनीन्द्र नारायण मिश्र पेशे से अधिवक्ता है और सिविल कोर्ट, जौनपुर में वकालत करते हैं। कथित घटना के दिन भी वादी 10 बजे दिन सिविल कोर्ट, जौनपुर में वकालत के लिए आये और कथित घटना घटित होने के बाद सिविल कोर्ट परिसर से गये। उपरोक्त मु.अ.सं. से वादी कथित घटना के बाद जब अस्पताल पहुंचे तो मीडिया कर्मियों द्वारा हत्यारों के विषय में पूछा गया तो मुकदमा वादी द्वारा स्पष्ट कहा गया कि अज्ञात कार सवारो द्वारा हत्या की गयी। कथित घटना में आवेदक की कोई विशिष्ट भूमिका नहीं है। आवेदक निर्दोष है तथा वह इस प्रकरण में दि० 20.01.2023 से कारागार में निरुद्ध है इसलिए आवेदक को जमानत पर छोड़ दिया जाय।

5. विद्वान अपर शासकीय अधिवक्ता ने आवेदक के विद्वान अधिवक्ता के तर्को का प्रबल विरोध करते हुए तर्क प्रस्तुत किया किः आवेदक के विद्वान अधिवक्ता आज जो कथन प्रस्तुत  कर रहे हैं वही कथन/तर्क उन्होंने प्रथम जमानत पत्र में भी प्रस्तुत किये थे तथा उनके इन तर्कों को सुनने के पश्चात ही उनका प्रथम जमानत आवेदन पत्र निरस्त किया गया था। द्वितीय जमानत आवेदन पत्र उन्हें नये आधारों पर प्रस्तुत करना चाहिए तथा उन तर्कों को ही न्यायालय के समक्ष प्रस्तुत करना चाहिए। उनका यह भी कहना है कि प्रथम जमानत आवेदन पत्र में बयान साक्षी अजिताभ नरायण मिश्र ने अपने बयान में स्पष्ट किया था कि घटना दिनांक 18.01.2023 को शंकरगंज बाजार में महरूपुर गेट के पास गोली मारकर हत्या कर दी समय लगभग 11.15 बजे मैं अपने पुत्र एवं भतीजियों के विद्यालय के फीस के संबंध में पता लगाने विद्यालय गया था मैं महरूपुर गेट से लगभग 15-20 मीटर विद्यालय की तरफ था तभी एक कार सिरकानी की तरफ से आयी कार में आगे की सीट पर राजेन्द्र मिश्र का दूसरा पुत्र सुभाष मिश्र बैठा था कार के बायी तरफ बैठे दोनो लोग हाथ व गर्दन बाहर निकाले थे दोनों के हांथ में असलहा था मेरा भाई अमिताभ नारायण मिश्र जो कि बुलेट मोटरसाइकिल से घर से अपने आफिस जौनपुर की तरफ जा रहा था जैसे ही गेट के सामने अमिताभ नरायण मिश्र पहुंचे थे वैसे ही लक्ष्य करके असलहे से उसके ऊपर फायर करके विकास मिश्र व सुभाष मिश्र ने गोली मारी थी। थोडी आगे जाकर बैंक के सामने मेरा भाई सड़क के किनार गिर गया था। उस कार में राजेन्द्र मिश्र तथा उनका तीसरा बेटा संदीप मिश्र भी बैठे थे। उक्त जमानत आवेदन पत्र के निर्णय में आवेदक की मुख्य भूमिका दर्शित है। चूंकि आवेदक की ओर से द्वितीय जमानत आवेदन पत्र पर कोई भी नया तथ्य दर्शित नही किया गया है एवं प्रथम जमानत आवेदन पत्र के तर्कों को ही पुनः प्रस्तुत किया जा रहा है इसका अर्थ यह लगाया जाये कि आवेदक को जमानत पर मुक्त किये जाने के कोई नये आधार ही नहीं है, इस संबंध में उन्होंने न्यायालय का ध्यान माननीय उच्चतम न्यायालय एवं इस न्यायालय की कुछ नजीरों की ओर आकृष्ट करते हुए अनुरोध किया कि आवेदक के इस द्वितीय जमानत आवेदन पत्र को निरस्त कर दिया जाये।

6. उभयपक्षों के विद्वान अधिवक्तागण द्वारा दी गई दलीलों पर गहनतापूर्वक विचार किया एवं माननीय उच्चतम न्यायालय एवं इस न्यायालय की नजीरों का विहंगम परिशीलन किया। उक्त नजीरे निम्नवत् हैंः

7. महाराष्ट्र राज्य बनाम बुद्धिकोटा सुभा राव: 1989 सप्लिमेंट (2) एससीसी 605 के मामले में माननीय उच्चतम न्यायालय द्वारा यह अवधारित किया गया है कि यदि एक बार कोई जमानत आवेदन खारिज कर दिया गया हो तो उन्हीं आधारों पर द्वितीय जमानत आवेदन पत्र प्रस्तुत नहीं किया जा सकता है। पूर्व में प्रस्तुत किये गये तथ्य स्थिति में कोई बदलाव किए बिना द्वितीय जमानत आवेदन पत्र को मंजूर करना वस्तुतः पहले के फैसले को खारिज करने जैसा होगा, तथा यह एक ऐसा महत्वपूर्ण परिवर्तन है, जिसका पहले के निर्णय पर सीधा प्रभाव पड़ता है, न कि केवल औपचारिक परिवर्तन। इसे निम्नानुसार माना गया है:-

"7. Liberty occupies a place of pride in our socio-political order. And who knew the value of liberty more than the founding fathers of our Constitution whose liberty was curtailed time and again under Draconian laws by the colonial rulers. That is why they provided in Article 21 of the Constitution that no person shall be deprived of his personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. It follows therefore that the personal liberty of an individual can be curbed by procedure established by law. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is one such procedural law. That law permits curtailment of liberty of anti-social and anti-national elements. Article 22 casts certain obligations on the authorities in the event of arrest of an individual accused of the commission of a crime against society or the Nation. In cases of undertrials charged with the commission of an offence or offences the court is generally called upon to decide whether to release him on bail or to commit him to jail. This decision has to be made, mainly in non-bailable cases, having regard to the nature of the crime, the circumstances in which it was committed, the background of the accused, the possibility of his jumping bail, the impact that his release may make on the prosecution witnesses, its impact on society and the possibility of retribution, etc. In the present case the successive bail applications preferred by the respondent were rejected on merits having regard to the gravity of the offence alleged to have been committed. One such Application No. 36 of 1989 was rejected by Suresh, J. himself. Undeterred the respondent went on preferring successive applications ions for bail. All such pending bail applications were rejected by Puranik, J. by y a common order on 6-6-1989. Unfortunately, Puranik, J. was not aware of the pendency of yet another bail application No. 995 of 1989 otherwise he would have disposed it of by the very same common order. Before the ink was dry on Puranik, J.'s order, it was upturned by the impugned order. It is not as if the court passing the impugned order was not aware of the decision of Puranik, J.; in fact there is a reference to the same in the impugned order. Could this be done in the absence of new facts and changed circumstances? What is important to realise is that in Criminal Application No. 375 of 1989, the respondent had made an identical request as is obvious from one of the prayers (extracted earlier) made therein. Once that application was rejected there was no question of granting a similar prayer. That is virtually overruling the earlier decision without there being a change in the fact-situation. And, when we speak of change, we mean a substantial one which has a direct impact on the earlier decision and not merely cosmetic changes which are of little or no consequence. Between the two orders there was a gap of only two days and it is nobody's case that during these two days drastic changes had taken place necessitating the release of the respondent on bail. Judicial discipline, propriety and comity demanded that the impugned order should not have been passed reversing all earlier orders including the one rendered by Puranik, J., only a couple of days before, in the absence of any substantial change in the fact-situation. In such cases it is necessary to act with restraint and circumspection so that the process of the court is not abused by a litigant and an impression does not gain ground that the litigant has either successfully avoided one judge or selected another to secure an order which had hitherto eluded him. In such a situation the proper course, we think, is to direct that the matter be placed before the same learned Judge who disposed of the earlier applications. Such a practice or convention would prevent abuse of the process of court inasmuch as it will prevent an impression being created that a litigant is avoiding or selecting a court to secure an order to his liking. Such a practice would also discourage the filing of successive bail applications without change of circumstances. Such a practice if adopted would be conducive to judicial discipline and would also save the court's time as a judge familiar with the facts would be able to dispose of the subsequent application with despatch. It will also result in consistency, In their view that we take we are fortified by the observations of this Court in para 5 of the judgment in Shahzad Hasan Khan v. Ishtiaq Hasan Khan [(1987) 2 SCC 684]. For the above reasons we are of the view that there was no justification for passing the impugned order in the absence of a substantial change in the fact-situation. That is what prompted Shetty, J. to describe the impugned order as 'a bit out of the ordinary. Judicial restraint demands that we say no more.

8. सत्यपाल बनाम यूपी राज्य 1998 एससीसी ऑनलाइन ऑल 1224: (1998) 37 एसीसी 287 के मामले में इस न्यायालय की एकल न्यायपीठ द्वारा एक प्रश्न का जवाब देते हुए निर्णय किया था कि क्या एक नया तर्क जो पहले उपलब्ध था उसे दूसरे जमानत आवेदन में आगे बढ़ाने की अनुमति दी जानी चाहिए या नहीं, खण्डपीठ के समक्ष प्रश्न इस प्रकार थाः-

"1. The following question has been referred by learned single Judge to be decided by this Court:--

"Whether a fresh argument in a second bail application for an accused should be allowed to be advanced on those very facts that were available to the accused while the first bail application was moved and rejected","

The Division Bench held that a fresh argument in a second bail application cannot be allowed to be advanced on those very facts which were available to the accused at the time of the moving and rejection of the first bail application. The answer as given to the referred question is as follows:-

XXX

"9. XXX XXX XXX XXX Accordingly our answer to the question referred is that fresh arguments in a second bail application for an accused cannot be allowed to be advanced on those very facts that were available to the accused while the first bail application was moved and rejected."

9. माननीय उच्चतम न्यायालय ने म.प्र. राज्य बनाम काजादः (2001) 7 एससीसी 673 के मामले में जोर देते हुए कहा कि यद्यपि क्रमिक जमानत आवेदन स्वीकार्य हैं, लेकिन बदली हुई परिस्थितियों में। इसे निम्नानुसार माना गया है:-

"8. It has further to be noted that the factum of the rejection of his earlier bail application bearing Miscellaneous Case No. 2052 of 2000 on 5-6-2000 has not been denied by the respondent. It is true that successive bail applications are permissible under the changed circumstances. But without the change in the circumstances the second application would be deemed to be seeking review of the earlier judgment which is not permissible under criminal law as has been held by this Court in Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa [(2001) 1 SCC 169: 2001 SCC (Cri) 113) and various other judgments."

10. इसके अलावा, माननीय उच्चतम न्यायालय ने कल्याण चंद्र सरकार बनाम राजेश रंजन : (2005) 2 एससीसी 42 के मामले में जोर देते हुए कहा कि यदि तथ्यों में परिवर्तन या कानून में कोई बदलाव होता है जो पिछले आदेश को खारिज कर देगा तो बाद में जमानत आवेदन पत्र दायर किया जा सकता है। न्यायालय ने इस तर्क को खारिज कर दिया कि लगातार जमानत याचिका ऐसे आधार पर दायर की जा सकती है जिसे पहले ही अदालतें खारिज कर चुकी हैं, इसे निम्नानुसार माना गया है:-

"8. On 23-9-2002 the accused-respondent moved the eighth bail application which came to be allowed by the High Court by its order dated 23-5-2003 solely on the ground that the accused-respondent had undergone incarceration for a period of 3 years and that there was no likelihood of the trial being concluded in the near future and an appeal filed against the said grant of bail came to be allowed [Ed.: In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, op. cit. fn. 2, above) on the ground that the High Court could not have allowed the bail application on the sole ground of delay in the conclusion of the trial without taking into consideration the allegation made by the prosecution in regard to the existence of prima facie case, gravity of offence, and the allegation of tampering with the witness by threat and inducement when on bail. This Court held [Ed.: In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, op. cit. fn. above] that since the above factors go to the root of the right of the accused to seek bail, non-consideration of the same and grant of bail solely on the ground of long incarceration vitiated the order of the High Court granting bail. This Court also observed that though an accused had a right to make successive applications for grant of bail the court entertaining such subsequent bail applications has duty to consider the reasons and grounds on which the earlier bail applications were rejected and in such cases the court also has a duty to record what are the fresh grounds which persuaded it to take a view different from the one taken in the earlier applications. This Court in that order also found fault with the High Court for not recording any fresh grounds while granting bail and for not taking into consideration the basis on which earlier bail applications were rejected. The Court also emphasised in the said order that ignoring the earlier orders of this Court is violative of the principle of binding nature of the judgments of the superior court rendered in a lis between the same parties, and noted that such approach of the High Court in effect amounts to ignoring or overruling and thus rendering ineffective the principles enunciated in the earlier orders especially of the superior courts. On that basis, the appeal of the complainant challenging the grant of bail came to be allowed cancelling the bail granted to the respondent. This order of this Court is reported as Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [(2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977]."

** "20. The decisions given by a superior forum, undoubtedly, are binding on the subordinate fora on the same issue even in bail matters unless of course, there is a material change in the fact situation calling for a different view being taken. Therefore, even though there is room for filing a subsequent bail application in cases where earlier applications have been rejected, the same can be done if there is a change in the fact situation or in law which requires the earlier view being interfered with or where the earlier finding has become obsolete. This is the limited area in which an accused who has been denied bail earlier, can move a subsequent application. Therefore, we are not in agreement with the argument of learned counsel for the accused that in view of the guarantee conferred on a person under Article 21 of the Constitution, it is open to the aggrieved person to make successive bail applications even on a ground already rejected by the courts earlier, including the Apex Court of the country."

11. उपरोक्त के दृष्टिगत, आवेदक का यह द्वितीय जमानत आवेदन पत्र स्वीकार किये जाने योग्य नहीं है।

12. तदनुसार वाद के गुण-दोष पर बिना कोई टिप्पणी किये हुए आवेदक का द्वितीय जमानत आवेदन पत्र निरस्त किया जाता है।

Order Date :- 7.2.2025

S.Mishra