Allahabad High Court
Arish Urf Arish Pradhan vs State Of U.P. And Another on 29 August, 2025
Author: Shekhar Kumar Yadav
Bench: Shekhar Kumar Yadav
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
?Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC:152368
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 5637 of 2025
Court No. - 83
HON'BLE SHEKHAR KUMAR YADAV, J.
1. Heard learned counsel for the appellant, and learned AGA for the state respondent. Learned counsel for the opposite party no. 2 is also present.
2. The present appeal under Section 14-A(1) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 10.04.2024 passed by the learned Special Judge (SC/ST Act), Saharanpur in Special Sessions Trial No. 2386 of 2023, arising out of Case Crime No. 287 of 2023, under Sections 147, 323, 328, 376-D, 504, 506 I.P.C. and Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act, Police Station Deoband, District Saharanpur, whereby the application of the prosecution under Section 319 Cr.P.C. for summoning the appellant has been allowed and consequential coercive processes including non-bailable warrant dated 20.09.2024 and proceedings under Section 82 Cr.P.C. dated 06.05.2025 have been issued.
3. The prosecution case, in brief, is that an FIR was lodged alleging that the appellant along with other named and unnamed persons committed gang rape upon the victim. It is admitted that there was a delay of about two months in lodging the FIR. During investigation, the victim's statements under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. were recorded, wherein, according to the appellant, no clear role was assigned to him. On the basis of the investigation, the Investigating Officer did not submit charge sheet against the appellant.
4. After charges were framed against the charge-sheeted accused, the trial commenced. The victim was examined before the trial court as P.W.-1. In her deposition, she specifically named the appellant and attributed active participation to him in the commission of the gang rape. At that stage, the prosecution moved an application under Section 319 Cr.P.C., which was allowed by the learned Special Judge by the impugned order.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the summoning of the appellant under Section 319 Cr.P.C. solely on the basis of the examination-in-chief of P.W.-1 is unsustainable. It is urged that the victim did not name him in her earlier statements under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C., nor did other witnesses implicated him, and hence initially, the Investigating Officer rightly did not charge sheet him. According to him, the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. requires much stronger evidence than mere suspicion or possibility, and the order under challenge amounts to manifest miscarriage of justice. Reliance has been placed on Hardeep Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92; Brijendra Singh vs. State of Rajasthan, (2017) 7 SCC 706; Sukhpal Singh Khaira vs. State of Punjab, (2023) 1 SCC 289; and Dharampal vs. State of Haryana, (2014) 3 SCC 306.
6. Per contra, learned A.G.A. as well as learned counsel for opposite party no. 2 supported the order passed by the trial court. They contended that the victim, in her testimony under oath, has categorically implicated the appellant. Once such sworn testimony is available, the court is empowered and, in fact, duty-bound to summon the appellant to face trial.
7. The Constitution Bench in Hardeep Singh vs. State of Punjab (2014) 3 SCC 92 has explained the test under Section 319 Cr.P.C. in the following words:
"The power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. is a discretionary and extraordinary power which has to be exercised sparingly and only in those cases where the circumstances of the case so warrant. The degree of satisfaction required for invoking Section 319 Cr.P.C. is more than that at the stage of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if goes unrebutted, would lead to conviction." (para 95)
8. Further, the Court clarified:
"The word 'evidence' in Section 319 Cr.P.C. contemplates the evidence of witnesses given in court. It is not necessary that such evidence should have been tested by cross-examination. Even the examination-in-chief of a witness is evidence for the purpose of Section 319 Cr.P.C." (paras 91?92)
9. In Brijendra Singh vs. State of Rajasthan (2017) 7 SCC 706, the Supreme Court reiterated that:
"The trial court is duty-bound to see that while forming a prima facie opinion for summoning a person, there is much stronger evidence than mere possibility of his complicity. Such power is to be exercised sparingly and only when cogent evidence comes on record." (paras 13?15)
10. The principle emerging from the aforesaid decisions is that though the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. is extraordinary, once the court is satisfied that strong and cogent evidence appears during trial disclosing the complicity of a person not facing trial, it must exercise the power so that the real culprit does not go unpunished.
11. In the present case, a perusal of the testimony of P.W.-1 (victim) shows that she has clearly named the appellant and has attributed to him specific acts of participation in the commission of gang rape. This Court has perused her statement available on record. Once such categorical assertion is made under oath in court, it constitutes direct and strong evidence against the appellant.
12. The contention of the appellant that he was not named in earlier statements under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. or that the Investigating Officer did not charge sheet him, cannot outweigh the evidentiary worth of the testimony now adduced before the court. The very object of Section 319 Cr.P.C. is to empower the court to summon persons against whom strong evidence emerges during trial, regardless of the conclusions reached by the Investigating Officer.
13. The learned trial court, while passing the impugned order has referred to the law laid down in Hardeep Singh (supra) and found the victim?s testimony sufficient for summoning the appellant. The reasoning assigned is in consonance with the settled law. No perversity, patent illegality or jurisdictional error is demonstrated which may justify interference by this Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction under Section 14-A of the SC/ST Act.
14. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned order summoning the appellant under Section 319 Cr.P.C. is based on legally admissible and cogent evidence, and no interference is warranted.
15. The appeal, being devoid of merit, is accordingly dismissed.
August 29, 2025
RavindraKSingh
