Allahabad High Court
Sobaran Singh And 2 Others vs Lakhan Singh And Another on 1 October, 2024
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
?Neutral Citation No. - 2024:AHC:160375
Court No. - 36
Case :- SECOND APPEAL No. - 682 of 2024
Appellant :- Sobaran Singh And 2 Others
Respondent :- Lakhan Singh And Another
Counsel for Appellant :- Anil Kumar Srivastava, Garun Pal Singh, Mahesh Sharma, Rakesh Kumar Verma, Syed Wajid Ali
Counsel for Respondent :- Arpit Agarwal
and
Case :- SECOND APPEAL No. - 687 of 2024
Appellant :- Sobaran Singh And 2 Others
Respondent :- Lakhan Singh And Another
Counsel for Appellant :- Anil Kumar Srivastava, Garun Pal Singh, Mahesh Sharma, Rakesh Kumar Verma, Syed Wajid Ali
Counsel for Respondent :- Arpit Agarwal
Hon'ble Kshitij Shailendra,J.
1. Heard Shri Mahesh Sharma along with Shri Arvind Kumar Verma, learned counsel for the appellants and Shri Arpit Agarwal, learned counsel for the respondents in both the second appeals.
2. These two appeals involve common questions of fact and law and, therefore, have been heard simultaneously and a common order is being passed.
3. The litigation between the parties began with execution of a sale deed dated 03.04.1974 by the father of the plaintiffs in favour of father of the respondents. Just prior to the sale deed, an Original Suit No. 6 of 1974 was filed by the defendants' father claiming a decree for redemption of mortgage. In the said suit, a compromise took place between the parties, according to which, the plaintiffs' father, who was defendant in the said proceedings, agreed to sell the property after depositing 20 times of the land revenue for a sale consideration of Rs.17,000/- over and above the mortgage money of Rs.8,000/- and interest. On the basis of the compromise, suit was decreed on 19.04.1974. There is no dispute about the fact that the said decree has attained finality and the sale deed dated 03.04.1974 was recognized in those proceedings.
4. It appears that in 1977-78, arising out of non-recording the names of vendee at the strength of the sale deed, necessity to institute proceedings under Section 229-B of Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act, 1950 was felt by the predecessor of present respondents. He instituted the said suit, which was decreed on merits on 09.03.1979. The decree was affirmed in first appeal by order dated 27.02.1980. Admittedly, no second appeal was filed and, consequently, declaratory decree in favour of the present respondents attained finality in the year 1980 itself.
5. These two appeals arise out of two different suits, one in the nature of a suit for cancellation of sale deed dated 03.04.1974 and the other in the form of an injunction suit filed by the respondents at the strength of the same sale deed as well as decree drawn by the revenue court under Section 229-B of the Act. Whereas the suit for cancellation of sale deed has been dismissed by both the courts below, suit for injunction has been decreed by them.
6. Assailing the judgements of both the courts below in both the proceedings, Shri Mahesh Sharma has vehemently argued that appellants' father being holder of Sirdari rights, the sale deed of 1974 was void and could not confer any title upon the vendee (respondents' predecessor) He further submits that though decrees drawn in the year 1974 and 1980 attained finality, the same would not adversely affect the rights and contentions of the appellants, inasmuch as, soon thereafter the consolidation proceedings began in the village and the appellants filed objections therein. It is not disputed that objections preferred by the appellants before the Consolidation Officer were rejected on 07.10.1985, against which an appeal was filed under Section 11 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, which was dismissed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation on 28.01.1988 and the revision under Section 48 of the Act was also dismissed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation on 14.09.1996.
7. There is on record an application filed in these proceedings, whereby prayer to add certain more substantial questions of law has been made. The questions substantially relate to filing of Writ B No. 17486 of 1996 (Chunni Lal vs. D.D.C. and others) by the appellants and arising out of orders passed by Consolidation courts and it is sought to be contended that since an order of status quo was passed by this Court in the said writ petition, the dispute is still alive and since the respondents also claim injunction, in the interest of justice these appeals be admitted and an order of status quo on the same lines be passed.
8. Per contra, Shri Arpit Agarwal submits that once the decrees drawn in 1974 and in 1979-80 have attained finality, the appellants have no case. He also submits that disputed sale deed formed subject matter of consideration in the proceedings of Original Suit No. 6 of 1974 as well as the suit under Section 229-B of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act and, therefore, the suit for cancellation filed in the year 2008, i.e. after 34 years, was highly barred by limitation. As regards the consolidation proceedings, it is contended that the decree was drawn under Section 229-B of the Act by the Assistant Collector in the year 1979, which was upheld by the Commissioner in the year 1980, by which time notification under Section 4 of the Utttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 had not been issued and the same was issued in the year 1981 and, therefore, it would not affect the proceedings, which had attained finality prior thereto.
9. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, as regards Writ B No.17486 of 1996, certified copy of order sheet of the same has been placed before this Court. A perusal of the same shows that on 15.09.1999, an order of status quo was passed, which was made operative till 25.10.1999. Since 25.10.1999, dozens of dates were fixed but on none of the dates prayer for extension of interim order was made or if made, the same was not accepted. Rather, the order sheet reveals that for the last about 20 years, the appeal is being got adjourned at the instance of appellants herein, who are petitioners in the said writ petition. The order sheet of the writ petition after having been perused, has been returned to Shri Arpit Agarwal, learned counsel for the respondents.
10. As regards order of status quo, although it is sought to be contended by Shri Mahesh Sharma that since interim order has not been vacated so far, it would be deemed to be in existence, this Court is not in a position to accept the said submission in view of judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ashok Kumar and others vs. State of Haryana and another, 2007 (3) SCC 470, wherein the Apex Court held as under:
"11. The short question which arises for consideration in this appeal is as to whether the order of ad interim injunction granted by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Panipat, was operative till 09.09.1998 or 19.08.2000. We have noticed hereinbefore the nature of the orders passed by the learned Civil Judge. Although in its order dated 30.08.1997, the learned Civil Judge, used the term "In the meantime", which was repeated in its order dated 24.09.1997, but in the subsequent orders beginning from 29.11.1997, the expression used was "till then".
12. The term of the order of the learned Judge, in our opinion, does not leave any manner of doubt whatsoever that the interim order was only extended from time to time. The interim order having been extended till a particular date, the contention raised by the respondents herein that they were under a bona fide belief that the injunction order would continue till it was vacated cannot be accepted.
13. In our considered opinion, the purport of the order passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Panipat, in extending the order of injunction is absolutely clear and explicit. It may be true that the date was preponed to 28.07.1998, but from a bare perusal of the order passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, it is evident that the order of injunction was not extended. Even on the subsequent dates, the order of injunction was not extended. In fact, no order extending the period was passed nor any fresh order of injunction was passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, subsequent thereto.
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18. There is no warrant for the proposition, as was stated by the High Court that unless an order of stay passed once even for the limited period is vacated by an express order or otherwise; the same would continue to operate.
19. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained, which is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. In the facts and circumstances, there shall, however, be no order as to costs."
11. Even otherwise, the Court is not in a position to appreciate that the interim order, which was never extended after 1999, would otherwise confer any right upon the appellants to pray for an order of status quo in these proceedings when before this Court a decree for injunction concurrently drawn by the two courts and a contrary decree dislodging the claim for cancellation of sale deed, drawn by both the courts below, operate against the appellants and in favour of the respondents.
12. The Court further notices that both the courts below have dismissed the suit for cancellation as barred by limitation. Submission of Shri Mahesh Sharma that since sale deed was void, the question of limitation would not arose, when examined in the light of records, it stands revealed that while recording findings on issue No. 7, the trial court examined the contention of the appellants as regards period of limitation where plaintiff-appellant had stated that he came to know about the sale deed on 10.07.2008 on obtaining its copy. The said statement ex-facie is false, inasmuch as the parties were litigating in various previous proceedings, as disclosed above, and none of the proceedings were decided ex-parte. Hence, knowledge about the sale deed was very much there since 1974 and, therefore, the suit for cancellation was barred by limitation.
13. As regards claim for injunction, once the respondents are successors in interest of the vendee and sale deed has been recognized in all the previous proceedings, their rightful possession is well established on record and, therefore, the decree for injunction has also been correctly drawn. The Court may also notice implication of Section 43 of Transfer of Property Act as discussed by both the courts below and reads the said provision in favour of the vendees in the facts of the case.
14. In view of above discussion, the Court does not find any merit in both the second appeals.
15. No substantial question of law arises for consideration.
16. Both the second appeals fail and are, accordingly, dismissed.
Order Date :- 1.10.2024
Sazia
(Kshitij Shailendra, J.)
