Allahabad High Court
Jagat Singh vs State Of Up And 4 Others on 1 October, 2024
Author: Dinesh Pathak
Bench: Dinesh Pathak
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
?Neutral Citation No. - 2024:AHC:160638
Court No. - 49
Case :- WRIT - B No. - 3208 of 2024
Petitioner :- Jagat Singh
Respondent :- State Of Up And 4 Others
Counsel for Petitioner :- Ashish Rai,Om Prakash Rai
Counsel for Respondent :- Ayub Khan,C.S.C.
Hon'ble Dinesh Pathak,J.
1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Standing Counsel for the State-respondents No. 1 to 4, learned counsel for the caveator-resondent No. 5 and perused the record on board.
2. Instant writ petition has arisen from the restoration application. Grievance of the petitioner is that restoration application dated 14.7.2017 filed on behalf of the petitioner against the order dated 29.9.1984 passed by the Consolidation Officer has illegally been rejected by all the three consolidation courts.
3. Record reveals that the Consolidation Officer has passed order dated 29.9.1984 under Section 9A(2) of UPCH Act with respect to Khata No. 75 whereby objection filed on behalf of Matru alias Prem Chand has been allowed granting him co-tenancy and, accordingly, share of the parties has been decided. All the three consolidation courts have given categorical finding that neither the grand father of the respondent-applicant nor his father had filed any recall application or objection claiming their exclusive right and title over the property in question. It has been observed as well that Prabhu, grand father of the petitioner, had two sons namely Basanta and Jai Prakash. Basanta had died and is succeed by Jagat Singh, Samay Singh and Raj Singh. However, Samay Singh and Raj Singh as well as Jai Prakash have not made any endeavour to challenge the order dated 29.9.1984. Only one of the heir namely Jagat Singh (petitioner herein) has filed a restoration application at a highly belated stage on 14.7.2017 against the order dated 29.9.1984. Thus, predecessors-in-interest of the petitioner have allowed the order dated 29.9.1984 to stand and they have not shown their grievance against the said order. In the meantime, land in question had been acquired by the Noida Authority in the year 2014-2015. It appears that owing to said acquisition, dishonesty prevailed in the mind of the petitioner, who has filed restoration application on 14.7.2017. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has considered the application dated 30.9.1989 as well, whereby father and uncle of the petitioner have averred before the Land Acquisition Officer that they have no another land except the land situated in village Rampur Jagir. At the highly belated stage, the restoration application moved on behalf of the present petitioner is nothing but an abuse of the process of Court, who has deliberately filed the restoration application just to harass the parties and keep them involved in protracted litigation. This Court has also noted with utmost surprise as to how any party can keep mum and show his ignorance with respect to the order, which is adverse to his interest. Even otherwise, once the predecessors in the interest of the petitioner have not chosen to challenge the order dated 29.9.1984 then, being successor, petitioner has no locus to re-open the dispute with respect to the property in question. Even otherwise, there is gross negligence and deliberate inaction at the part of the petitioner in assailing the order dated 29.9.1984. Restoration application moved by him is nothing but an abuse of the process of Court which is sham, illusory and inspired by nefarious and vexatious designs and is liable to be dismissed at the very threshold.
4. In the case of Majji Sannemma @ Sanyasirao vs. Reddy Srivedi & Others reported in AIR 2022 SC 332, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has expounded that deliberate delay at the part of the applicant is not liable to be condoned. Relevant paragraphs no. 7 to 7.5 are quoted herein below:-
"7. At this stage, a few decisions of this Court on delay in filing the appeal are referred to and considered as under:-
7.1 In the case of Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal (supra), it is observed and held as under:-
In construing s. 5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light- heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chattappan, (1890) J.L.R. 13 Mad. 269, "s. 5 gives the Court a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words 'sufficient cause' receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fide is imputable to the appellant."
7.2 In the case of P.K. Ramachandran (supra), while refusing to condone the delay of 565 days, it is observed that in the absence of reasonable, satisfactory or even appropriate explanation for seeking condonation of delay, the same is not to be condoned lightly. It is further observed that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. It is further observed that while exercising discretion for condoning the delay, the court has to exercise discretion judiciously.
7.3 In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil (supra), it is observed as under :-
The laws of limitation are founded on public policy. Statutes of limitation are sometimes described as "statutes of peace". An unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation creates insecurity and uncertainty; some kind of limitation is essential for public order. The principle is based on the maxim "interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium", that is, the interest of the State requires that there should be end to litigation but at the same time laws of limitation are a means to ensure private justice suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening diligence and preventing oppression. The object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy."
7.4 In the case of Basawaraj (supra), it is observed and held by this Court that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case. It is further observed that the expression "sufficient cause" cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence. inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party. It is further observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of a party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. It is further observed that in case a party has acted with negligence, lack of bona fides or there is inaction then there cannot be any justified ground for condoning the delay even by imposing conditions. It is observed that each application for condonation of delay has to be decided within the framework laid down by this Court. It is further observed that if courts start condoning delay where no sufficient cause is made out by imposing conditions then that would amount to violation of statutory principles and showing utter disregard to legislature.
7.5 In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil (supra), it is observed by this Court that the court cannot enquire into belated and stale claims on the ground of equity. Delay defeats equity. The Courts help those who are vigilant and "do not slumber over their rights."
5. In recent judgment of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. & Ors. vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA), SLP (Civil) No. 31248 of 2018, decided on 08.04.2024, reported in [2024] 4 S.C.R. 241, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has expounded that discretionary jurisdiction to condone the delay should not be exercised in cavalier manner and laid down certain guidelines for condoning the delay. Relevant paragraphs no.16 to 26 are quoted herein below :-
"16. Generally, the courts have adopted a very liberal approach in construing the phrase 'sufficient cause used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act in order to condone the delay to enable the courts to do substantial justice and to apply law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Ors. v. Katiji and Ors. (1987) 2 SCC 107 - AIR 1987 SC 1353, this Court in advocating the liberal approach in condoning the delay for sufficient cause' held that ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late; it is not necessary to explain every day's delay in filing the appeal; and since sometimes refusal to condone delay may result in throwing out a meritorious matter, it is necessary in the interest of justice that cause of substantial justice should be allowed to prevail upon technical considerations and if the delay is not deliberate, it ought to be condoned. Notwithstanding the above, howsoever, liberal approach is adopted in condoning the delay, existence of sufficient cause' for not filing the appeal in time, is a condition precedent for exercising the discretionary power to condone the delay. The phrases liberal approach', justice-oriented approach and cause for the advancement of substantial justice' cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
17. It must always be borne in mind that while construing sufficient cause' in deciding application under Section 5 of the Act, that on the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for filing an appeal, substantive right in favour of a decree-holder accrues and this right ought not to be lightly disturbed. The decree-holder treats the decree to be binding with the lapse of time and may proceed on such assumption creating new rights.
18. This Court as far back in 1962 in the case of Ramlal, Motilal And Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd A.I.R. 1962 SC 361 has emphasized that even after sufficient cause has been shown by a party for not filing an appeal within time, the said party is not entitled to the condonation of delay as excusing the delay is the discretionary jurisdiction vested with the court. The court, despite establishment of a sufficient cause' for various reasons, may refuse to condone the delay depending upon the bona fides of the party.
19. In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. v. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and Ors. A.I.R. 1935 PC 8S, it had been held that the court cannot grant an exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship. The court has time and again repeated that when mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it ought not to condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone.
20. In this connection, a reference may be made to Brijesh Kumar and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Ors. 2014 (4) SCALE 50 wherein while observing, as above, this Court further laid down that if some person has obtained a relief approaching the court just or immediately when the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take the benefit of the same by approaching the court at a belated stage simply on the ground of parity, equity, sympathy and compassion.
21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. (2011) 4 SCC 363, where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the applications for condonation of delay, this Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its discretion in a reasonable and objective manner. High Court should have exercised the discretion in a systematic and an informed manner. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The Court observed that the concepts such as 'liberal approach', 'justice-oriented approach' and 'substantial justice cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation.
22. It has also been settled vide State of Jharkhand & Ors. v. Ashok Kumar Chokhani & Ors. AIR 2009 SC 1927, that the merits of the case cannot be considered while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal.
23. In Basawaraj and Anr. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer (2013) 14 SCC 81, this Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The expression 'sufficient cause' as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on equitable grounds.
24. It would be beneficial to quote paragraph 12 of the aforesaid decision which clinches the issue of the manner in which equilibrium has to be maintained between adopting liberal approach and in implementing the statute as it stands. Paragraph 12 reads as under:
"12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.
25. This Court in the same breath in the same very decision vide paragraph 15 went on to observe as under:
"15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature." (emphasis supplied)
26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:
(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally.
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision."
6. In this conspectus, as above, having applied the ratio decided by the Hon'ble Apex Court, as discussed above, in the given circumstances of the present case, I am of the considered view that no case is made out to exercise the discretionary jurisdiction in favour of the petitioner. He has not come with clean hands before this Court. No justifiable ground is made out to entertain the instant writ petition and interfere in the orders passed by all three consolidation courts, which are under challenge in the instant writ petition. There is no illegality, perversity or infirmity in the orders under challenge so as to warrant the indulgence of this court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. There is nothing on the record to demonstrate as to how the present petitioner is prejudiced, or if there is any likelihood of causing a miscarriage of justice to him, owing to the orders under challenge.
7. Resultantly, instant writ petition, being misconceived and devoid of merits, is dismissed with no order as to the cost.
Order Date :- 1.10.2024
vinay
