Allahabad High Court
Smt. Sheela Singh vs State Of U.P. And 7 Others on 17 May, 2024
Author: Manoj Kumar Gupta
Bench: Manoj Kumar Gupta
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Neutral Citation No. - 2024:AHC:89936-DB
Court No. - 21
Case :- WRIT - C No. - 39886 of 2022
Petitioner :- Smt. Sheela Singh
Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 7 Others
Counsel for Petitioner :- Bipin Bihari
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
Hon'ble Manoj Kumar Gupta,J.
Hon'ble Kshitij Shailendra,J.
(Per: Kshitij Shailendra, J.)
1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Rajiv Gupta, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State-respondents and perused the record.
2. This writ petition has been filed challenging the order dated 25.05.2022 whereby the District Magistrate, Siddharth Nagar has rejected the representation of the petitioner filed by him in pursuance of liberty granted by Coordinate Bench of this Court vide its order dated 06.12.2021 passed in Writ-C No.25209 of 2020 (Smt. Sheela Singh Vs. State of U.P. and others). Further prayer has been made for directing the respondent authorities, either to remove the constructions from the petitioner's land bearing Gata No.22, measuring area 0.134 hectares and to handover possession of the land to her or to pay her compensation at the present market value. Third relief claimed is to rehabilitate the petitioner under the provisions of Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.
3. The case of the petitioner is that the aforesaid land was bhumidhari land of one Indranath son of Gabbu, who sold the same to her by executing a registered sale deed dated 07.09.2001, pursuant whereto, the name of the petitioner was mutated in the revenue records in the year 2002. It is pleaded that in the year 2018, when the petitioner visited her land, she found that Pasu Hospital and Administrative Office of Kshetra Panchayat and Administrative Building of its block office was under construction over her land. Thereafter, she obtained certain information from various offices of the State authorities and laid a claim for compensation but, when her request was not adhered to, she filed Writ-C No.25209 of 2020, which was disposed of by order dated 06.12.2021 permitting her to file a representation before the Committee constituted under the Government Order dated 12.05.2016 and with a direction to the Committee for consideration of the said representation. It is in pursuance of the said representation that the order impugned has been passed rejecting the claim of the petitioner to receive compensation.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that neither the previous owner nor the petitioner was ever paid any compensation and, hence, rejection of her claim is per se illegal. It has also been argued that since the award was made five years prior to commencement of the New Act and neither physical possession of the land has been taken nor compensation has been paid, therefore, the acquisition has lapsed in view of Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. It is further contended that the vendor from whom the petitioner purchased the land, also submitted an affidavit before the District Magistrate, Siddharth Nagar to the effect that compensation be paid to the vendee Sheela Singh, i.e. the petitioner. Learned counsel has also referred to certain consolidation proceedings in relation to the rights qua the aforesaid land.
5. Learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel, on the other hand, has vehemently opposed the writ petition by submitting that the petitioner's claim has been rightly rejected on the ground that the land was acquired in the year 1961-62, award was declared in the year 1962 and since the petitioner has purchased the land in the year 2001, the sale deed of an acquired land being void ab initio, she has no case.
6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, the admitted position which stands borne out from the record, is that notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued on 22.12.1961 followed by notification under Section 6 on 12.01.1962 and the award was declared on 07.08.1962. The possession of the land was also taken by the respondents in 1962. Therefore, the acquisition was completed under the old Act of 1894. The sale deed obtained by the petitioner in the year 2001 after issuance of notifications and declaration of award being void ab initio, the same would not confer any right upon the petitioner either to claim compensation or to pray for lapsing of acquisition proceedings on any ground whatsoever.
7. The Court may briefly refer to the law settled on the aforesaid aspect. The Supreme Court, in the case of State (NCT of Delhi) Vs. Manav Dharam Trust1, held that the person who purchases the property after issuance of notification is a "person interested in compensation" and his claim cannot be discarded merely on the ground that the land had vested in the Government. However, the judgment in State (NCT of Delhi) (supra) was specifically overruled by a Three Judges Bench of Supreme Court in the case of Shiv Kumar and another Vs. Union of India and others2. The Supreme Court in the case of Shiv Kumar (supra), after placing reliance on various authorities, held as under:-
"19. The Act of 2013 presupposes that a person is required to be rehabilitated and resettled. Such a person who has purchased after section 4 notification as sale deed is void under the Act of 1894, cannot claim rehabilitation and resettlement as per policy envisaged under the Act of 2013, as his land has not been acquired, but he has purchased a property which has already been acquired by the State Government, he cannot claim even higher compensation, as per proviso to section 24(2) under the Act of 2013. An original landowner cannot be deprived of higher value under the Act of 2013, which higher compensation was not so contemplated when the void transaction of sale had been entered, and right is conferred under proviso to Section 24(2) on recorded owners under Act of 1894. We have come across instances in which after notifications under section 4 were issued and, the property was purchased at throwaway prices by the builders and unscrupulous persons, such purchases are void and confer no right even to claim higher compensation under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 as it is to be given to the owner as mentioned in the notification.
20. Given that, the transaction of sale, effected after section 4 notification, is void, is ineffective to transfer the land, such incumbents cannot invoke the provisions of section 24. As the sale transaction did not clothe them with the title when the purchase was made; they cannot claim 'possession' and challenge the acquisition as having lapsed under section 24 by questioning the legality or regularity of proceedings of taking over of possession under the Act of 1894. It would be unfair and profoundly unjust and against the policy of the law to permit such a person to claim resettlement or claim the land back as envisaged under the Act of 2013. When he has not been deprived of his livelihood but is a purchaser under a void transaction, the outcome of exploitative tactics played upon poor farmers who were unable to defend themselves.
21. Thus, under the provisions of Section 24 of the Act of 2013, challenge to acquisition proceeding of the taking over of possession under the Act of 1894 cannot be made, based on a void transaction nor declaration can be sought under section 24(2) by such incumbents to obtain the land. The declaration that acquisition has lapsed under the Act of 2013 is to get the property back whereas, the transaction once void, is always a void transaction, as no title can be acquired in the land as such no such declaration can be sought. It would not be legal, just and equitable to give the land back to purchaser as land was not capable of being sold which was in process of acquisition under the Act of 1894. The Act of 2013 does not confer any right on purchaser whose sale is ab initio void. Such void transactions are not validated under the Act of 2013. No rights are conferred by the provisions contained in the 2013 Act on such a purchaser as against the State.
............
............
27. Thus, we have to follow the decisions including that of larger Bench mentioned above, laying down the law on the subject, which still holds the field and were wrongly distinguished. The binding value of the decision of larger and coordinate Benches have been ignored while deciding the Manav Dharam Trust case (supra), it was not open to it to take a different view. The decision in Manav Dharam Trust (supra) is per incuriam in light of this decision of this Court in Mamleshwar Prasad v. Kanahaiya Lal, (1975) 2 SCC 232, A.R. Anutulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602, State of Uttar Pradesh v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd., (1991) 4 SCC 139, State of B. Shama Rao v. Union Territory of Pondicherry, AIR 1967 SC 1480, Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur, (1989) 1 SCC 101, Narmada Bachao Andolan (III) v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2011 SC 1989, Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. v. State of Odisha, (2015) 2 SCC 189 and Sant Lal Gupta v. Modern Coop. Societies Ltd. 2010 13 SCC 336.
28. We hold that Division Bench in Manav Dharam Trust (supra) does not lay down the law correctly. Given the several binding precedents which are available and the provisions of the Act of 2013, we cannot follow the decision in Manav Dharam Trust (supra) and overrule it. Shri S.N. Bhatt, learned counsel submitted that in case this Court does not agree with the Manav Dharam Trust (supra), the case may be referred to Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India under the provisions of Order VI Rule 2 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013. He has relied upon the decision of this court in Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma (2019) 6 SCC 162 in which, in view of the conflict of opinion of two Division Bench judgments of this Court as to the interpretation of section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 the matter was referred to the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India, for constituting an appropriate Bench. However, in the instant case, the issue is different, whether we have to follow the decision in Manav Dharam Trust (supra) or the earlier decisions of this Court mentioned above. It is apparent that the decisions of the Three Judges Bench are binding on us, and in view of other consistent decisions of this Court, we have to follow them. It is not appropriate to refer the case to larger Bench under Order VI Rule 2 of Supreme Court Rules. We find no fault in the Judgments laying down the law that the purchase after section 4 is void as against the State. We are not impressed with the submission raised on behalf of the purchasers to refer the matter for the constitution of a Larger Bench to the Hon'ble Chief Justice. When decisions of Larger Bench and other Division Bench are available, the case cannot be referred to a Larger Bench."
(emphasis supplied)
8. The judgment in Shiv Kumar (supra) has been consistently followed in subsequent decisions of Supreme Court in Delhi Development Authority Vs. Godfrey Philips (I) Ltd.3 and Delhi Development Authority Vs. Damini Wadhwa and others4. In the said authorities, the Supreme Court has held that the sale deed obtained by a person after issuance of preliminary notification under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is void and would not confer any right in favour of the purchaser.
9. In the light of aforesaid discussion, when the Court peruses the order impugned, it finds rejection of petitioner's claim at the strength of a void sale deed 07.09.2001 perfectly in accordance with law. The Court further finds that, while rejecting the petitioner's claim, an observation has been made by the District Magistrate that payment of compensation to the person whose name was recorded in the revenue records at the time of issuance of notification would be as per law.
10. In view of the same, mere submission of an affidavit by the vendor of the petitioner in her favour would not confer any right in favour of the petitioner to claim compensation, when law is otherwise against the petitioner. Further, the affidavit filed by the vendor of the petitioner before the District Magistrate (Annexure No.11 to the writ petition) shows that even the name of the vendor came to be recorded in the revenue records, pursuant to an order dated 09.02.1995 passed by the Tehsildar which shows that on the date of issuance of notification in the year 1961-62, the name of the vendor Indranath was not recorded.
11. The order impugned also records that the possession of the acquired land was taken on 06.05.1962 and at the time of acquisition, the name of one Satya Narain was recorded in the revenue records. The order impugned further records devolution of interest in the property, step by step, over a number of years and that, lastly, the land was transferred in favour of the petitioner Sheela Singh on 07.09.2001.
12. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed, however, without prejudice to the right of persons lawfully entitled to receive compensation, as already observed in the order impugned.
Order Date :- 17.5.2024
AKShukla/-
(Kshitij Shailendra, J.) (Manoj Kumar Gupta, J.)
