Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 11360 ALL
Judgement Date : 29 August, 2022
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD AFR Reserved On: 10.8.2022 Delivered On: 29.8.2022 Court No.58 Case :- WRIT - B No. - 3822 of 1985 Petitioner :- Gaya Din And Another Respondent :- D.D.C. And Another Counsel for Petitioner :- Yogesh Agarwal,Sanjay Singh,Vatsala Counsel for Respondent :- A.N.Bhargawa, ,Ashutosh Kumar Tiwari Hon'ble Chandra Kumar Rai,J.
1. Brief facts of the case are that Khata No.116 situated in Village- Sultanpur Khas, Pargana-Garwara, Tehsil- Machhali Shahar, District- Jaunpur was recorded in the name of petitioners' father, Kashi Ram son of Ram Tahal. Against the Basic Year Entry, one objection under Section 9A (2) of the U.P.C.H. Act was filed by Shri Ram and Others in respect of Plot No.728 area 38 decimal of Khata No.161 that Kashi Ram is wrongly recorded over the same so his name be recorded after expunging the name of the Kashi Ram. Another objection against the Basic Year Entry was filed by respondent no.2, Smt. Jairagi daughter of Smt. Mangri in respect of Plot Nos.663, 664, 686, 687 and 695 of Khata No.161 to record her name exclusively after expunging the name of Kashi Ram. Respondent no.2 has placed following pedigree in support of her case:-
Ram Lal
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________________________|______________________________
| | |
Sukhiya (daughter) Dukhiya (daughter) Mangari (daughter)
|
Jairaji (daughter) wife of Shiv Narayan
2. The basis of the claim of respondent no.2 (Jairaji) was that Ram Lal has executed Gift deed on 14.4.1950 in favour of his three daughters, namely, Sukhiya, Dukhiya and Mangri, who have died, as such, she is the sole-bhumidhar being daughter's daughter of disputed plots.
3. Another Pedigree has been mentioned in Para No.4 of the order of Revisional Court dated 11.8.1982 which is mentioned as undisputed, the same is as follows:-
Parson
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________________________|______________________________
| |
Ram Tahal Jokhu
|
Kashi Ram (petitioners' father) |
|
Ram Lal
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_____________________________________________________
| | |
Sukhiya (daughter) Dukhiya (daughter) Mangari (daughter)
|
Jairaji(respondent no.2)
4. Before Consolidation Officer following three issues were framed:-
(i) Whether Shri Ram is bhumidhar of Plot No.728 area 38 decimal.
(ii) Whether Smt. Jairaji daughter of Mangri is exclusive owner of plots in dispute as given in her objection.
(iii) Whether name of Kashi Ram is wrongly recorded over disputed plots.
5. Issue no.1 was decided in favour of objector Shri Ram as the same was wrongly recorded in 1360 fasli in the name of Ram Lal without any basis while earlier it was recorded in the name of ancestor of Shri Ram.
6. With respect to issue Nos.2 and 3 petitioners' father Kashi Ram and respondent no.2, Smt. Jairaji adduced oral and documentary evidences in support of their cases.
7. According to Kashi Ram his father Ram Tahal and father of deceased Ram Lal were real brothers, as such, Ram Lal was cousin of Kashi Ram. He further alleged that Smt. Mangari died first in the three daughters, Sukhiya died after Mangari and Dukhiya died after Sukhiya, all the three daughters were married in the life time of their father Ram Lal and all of them were residing in their in-laws house (Sasural).
8. From the side of respondent no.2, judgment of civil Court passed in Suit No.435 of 1959 (Sukhiya and Others Vs. Kashi Ram) was filed, the suit was for injunction, which was decreed on 10.11.1960 in favour of plaintiffs and Civil Appeal No.148 of 961 filed by Kashi Ram was dismissed. From the side of petitioners' father Kashi Ram, order dated 26.7.1957 passed by Naib Teshildar in Case No.3488 was filed before Consolidation Officer by which name of Kashi Ram was ordered to be recorded after expunging the name of Ram Lal. Smt. Jairaji filed a case in revenue Court on the basis of civil Court decree for injunction was dismissed by Assistant Collector by order dated 28.5.1962 and further the case under Section 33/39 of U.P. Land Revenue Act filed by respondent no.2 was also dismissed by Sub-Divisional Officer which proves that petitioners' father remained recorded over disputed plots in pursuance of the order dated 26.7.1957 till the basic year of consolidation. Operation, objection and appeal against the Basic Year Entry were dismissed by Consolidation Courts. Both parties filed revenue entries in support of their cases. Consolidation Officer considered the oral evidences and documentary evidence adduced by both parties. Consolidation Officer noticed the fact that Sukhiya, Dukhiya and Mangri in whose favour Gift deed is alleged to be executed on 10.5.1950 had not filed an objection before Consolidation Court, respondent no.2 claimed right on the basis of alleged Gift deed which was not proved even before Civil Court as mentioned in the judgment of civil Court. Consolidation Officer further held that judgment of civil Court passed in injunction suit will not operate as res-judicata in the proceeding initiated under Section 9A (2) of U.P.C.H. Act. Consolidation Officer further held that original of the Gift deed has not been filed which goes against respondent no.2 accordingly, Consolidation Officer vide order dated 24.11.1976 dismissed the objection of respondent no.2 and maintained the Basic Year Entry, the objection of one Shri Ram in respect to one Plot no.728 was allowed. Appeal filed by respondent no.2 under Section 11 of U.P.C.H. Act against the order of Consolidation Officer dated 24.11.1976 was dismissed vide order dated 13.12.1977. Respondent no.2 challenged the orders of Courts below before revisional Court under Section 48 of U.P.C.H. Act in which petitioners have put in appearance but on the date of hearing petitioners could not appear and the revision was allowed ex-parte vide order dated 11.8.1982 by which order of Consolidation Officer and Settlement Officer of Consolidation were set aside and further direction was issued to record the name of respondent no.2 over the disputed plots after expunging the name of petitioners. When petitioners came to know about the revisional order dated 11.8.1982, an application for setting aside the ex-parte order dated 11.8.1982 was filed on 21.8.1982, the same was dismissed by revisional Court vide order dated 22.2.1985 holding that earlier order dated 11.8.1982 was passed on merit hence this writ petition on behalf of petitioners challenging both the orders dated 11.8.1982 and 22.2.1985.
9. Learned counsel for the petitioners Shri Ravi Kant holding the brief of Mrs. Vatsala submitted that revisional Court has not afforded opportunity of hearing to the petitioners, as such, revisional order will be treated exparte against the petitioners. He further submitted that revisional Court has exceeded his jurisdiction while allowing the revision and expunging the Basic Year Entry which was continuing much before the basic year of consolidation operation. He further submitted that entire evidences (oral and documentary) as considered by Consolidation Officer and Settlement Officer of Consolidation have not been considered at all by revisional Court and the judgment of reversal has been passed. He next submitted that decree of Civil Court passed in injunction suit in respect of agricultural land will not operate as res-judicata in the title objection under Section 9A (2) of the U.P.C.H. Act, Consolidation Officer and Settlement Officer of Consolidation have rightly held that decree of injunction suit passed by Civil Court will not operate as res-judicata in the proceeding arising out of Section 9A (2) of U.P.C.H. Act but revisional Court has arbitrarily held that decree of Civil Court relating to injunction suit will operate as res-judicata in the title objection before Consolidation Court. He next submitted that original copy of gift deed dated 14.4.1950 has not been filed at all before Consolidation Court rather certified copy of the will-deed dated 10.5.1950 has been filed before Consolidation Officer without any explanation about the original Gift deed and the revisional Court arbitrarily relying upon Section 90 A of the Indian Evidence Act presumed its execution. He further submitted that oral evidences which were considered by Consolidation officer has not been taken into consideration and revision was outrightly allowed. He placed reliance upon AIR 1954 S.C. 340, Kiran Singh Vs. Chaman Paswan in which it is held that if the order and decree is ab initio void no reliance can be placed upon it at any stage, subsequently, counsel for the petitioner submitted written argument also in which it is mentioned that respondent no.1 mistakenly appreciated that unregistered Gift deed can be read as admissible evidence without considering the provisions contained under Section 17 (1) (a) of the Registration Act 1908. In point no.7 of the written argument, it is mentioned that respondent no.1 mistakenly appreciated that Section 90A of the Evidence Act does apply on the contrary certified copy of the Gift deed does not fulfil the ingredients of Section 74 and 76 of the Indian Evidence Act thus cannot be read as secondary evidence when there is no pleading or explanation about the original Gift deed.
10. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent no.2 Shri Ashutosh Kumar Tiwari submitted that revisional order dated 11.8.1982 was passed on merit and the Consolidation Court have no power of review in view of law laid down by full Bench of this Court reported in 1997 R.D. 562, Smt. Shivraji and Others Vs. D.D.C. Allahabad and Others. He further submitted that Civil Court has decided the injunction suit in favour of respondent no.2 as such the same will operate as res-judicata in consolidation proceeding relating to title matter. He further submitted that Ram Lal had full and absolute right to transfer his agricultural land through Gift deed to his daughter as the disputed plots were the Sharamuian Abog before the date of vesting. He next submitted that Gift deed has been rightly believed to be a genuine document by revisional Court as provided under Sections 61, 63, 65 and 74 of the Evidence Act. Learned counsel for respondent no.2 has also submitted written argument which has been perused by me in which the above mentioned points have been taken. He finally submitted that revisional jurisdiction has been rightly exercised in view of provisions contained under Section 48 Explanation-3 of U.P.C.H. Act as such, no interference in required against the impugned revisional orders and writ petition is liable to be dismissed.
11. I have considered the argument advanced by learned counsel for the respective parties and perused the records.
12. There is no dispute about the fact that Ram Lal was real nephew of petitioners' father and respondent no.2 was daughter of married daughter of Ram Lal, petitioners' father Kashi Ram was recorded in revenue record since 1957 by the order of Naib Tehsildar in respect of plots of Khata No.71 and the name of recorded tenure holder Ram Lal was expunged from the revenue records. The name of petitioners' father continued over the disputed Khata No.71 even in the Basic Year of the consolidation operation. Respondent no.2 although was not recorded in the revenue records filed a civil suit in the year 1959 for injunction in respect of Bhumidari disputed plots which was decreed in her favour by judgment and decree dated 10.11.1960 which attained finality by dismissal of civil appeal filed by petitioners' father by judgment and decree dated 6.7.1961. On the basis of civil Court's injunction decree, respondent no.2 initiated two revenue proceedings for recording her name over disputed Khata but both the revenue proceedings were decided against the respondent no.2 in the year 1962. Against the Basic Year Entry objection was filed by respondent no.2 for recording her name after expunging the name of petitioners' father Kashi Ram. Objection under Section 9A (2) of U.P.C.H. Act was dismissed by Consolidation Officer and appeal filed by respondent no.2 under Section 11 of U.P.C.H. Act was also dismissed by Settlement Officer Consolidation. Revisional Court allowed the revision filed by respondent no.2 under Section 48 of U.P.C.H. Act setting aside the order of Consolidation Officer and Settlement Officer of Consolidation, the Basic Year Entry was expunged and name of respondent no.2 was ordered to be recorded over disputed plots. This Court while admitting the writ petition stayed the operation of the revisional order dated 11.8.1982 and 22.2.1985 vide order dated 20.3.85. On the stay vacation application filed by respondent no.2 interim order dated 20.3.1985 was confirmed with further direction that whichever party is in possession of the disputed land shall not be dispossessed till further orders.
13. Since the civil suit filed by respondent no.2 was for decree of injunction although respondent no.2 was not recorded in the revenue record, the injunction decree cannot operate as resjudicata in the proceedings arising out of Section 9A (2) of U.P.C.H. Act but revisional Court has illegally held that injunction decree passed by civil Court will operate as resjudicata. The case law of Apex Court cited by counsel for the petitioners in Kiran Singh (supra) will be relevant on this issue. The revisional order passed on the first ground that injunction decree of Civil Court will operate as res-judicata in title proceeding before Consolidation Court cannot be sustained.
14. Revisional order passed on the second ground that certified Gift deed dated 14.4.1950 is more than 20 years old as such, in view of the provisions contained under Section 90A of the Evidence Act, the Gift deed will be presumed to be executed genuine. Revisional Court has failed to consider the oral evidence adduced by the parties before the Consolidation Officer which were taken into consideration while rejecting the objection under Section 9A (2) of U.P.C.H. Act filed by respondent no.2. Revisional Court has also failed to notice about the original Gift deed and there is no explanation or pleading about the non filing of original Gift deed either in the courts below or before this Court. Perusal of Section 64, 65, 74, 76 and 90 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 will be necessary to consider the arguments of respective counsel on the point of production of certified copy of Gift deed. Section 64, 65, 74, 76 and 90 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 are as follows:
"64. Proof of documents by primary evidence.--Documents must be proved by primary evidence except in the cases hereinafter mentioned.
65. Cases in which secondary evidence relating to documents may be given.--Secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition, or contents of a document in the following cases:--
(a) When the original is shown or appears to be in the possession or power-- of the person against whom the document is sought to be proved, or of any person out of reach of, or not subject to, the process of the Court, or of any person legally bound to produce it, and when, after the notice mentioned in section 66, such person does not produce it;
(b) when the existence, condition or contents of the original have been proved to be admitted in writing by the person against whom it is proved or by his representative in interest;
(c) when the original has been destroyed or lost, or when the party offering evidence of its contents cannot, for any other reason not arising from his own default or neglect, produce it in reasonable time;
(d) when the original is of such a nature as not to be easily movable;
(e) when the original is a public document within the meaning of section 74;
(f) when the original is a document of which a certified copy is permitted by this Act, or by any other law in force in [India] to be given in evidence; [India] to be given in evidence;"
(g) when the originals consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot conveniently be examined in Court, and the fact to be proved is the general result of the whole collection. In cases (a), (c) and (d), any secondary evidence of the contents of the document is admissible. In case (b), the written admission is admissible. In case (e) or (f), a certified copy of the document, but no other kind of secondary evidence, is admissible. In case (g), evidence may be given as to the general result of the documents by any person who has examined them, and who is skilled in the examination of such documents.
74. Public documents.--The following documents are public documents :--
(1) Documents forming the acts, or records of the acts--
(i) of the sovereign authority,
(ii) of official bodies and tribunals, and
(iii) of public officers, legislative, judicial and executive, of any part of India or of the Commonwealth, or of a foreign country;
(2) Public records kept in any State of private documents.
76. Certified copies of public documents.--Every public officer having the custody of a public document, which any person has a right to inspect, shall give that person on demand a copy of it on payment of the legal fees therefore, together with a certificate written at the foot of such copy that it is a true copy of such document or part thereof, as the case may be, and such certificate shall be dated and subscribed by such officer with his name and his official title, and shall be sealed, whenever such officer is authorized by law to make use of a seal; and such copies so certified shall be called certified copies.
Explanation.--Any officer who, by the ordinary course of official duty, is authorized to deliver such copies, shall be deemed to have the custody of such documents within the meaning of this section.
90. Presumption as to documents thirty years old.--Where any document, purporting or proved to be thirty years old, is produced from any custody which the Court in the particular case considers proper, the Court may presume that the signature and every other part of such document, which purports to be in the handwriting of any particular person, is in that person's handwriting, and, in the case of a document executed or attested, that it was duly executed and attested by the persons by whom it purports to be executed and attested. Explanation.--Documents are said to be in proper custody if they are in the place in which, and under the care of the person with whom, they would naturally be; but no custody is improper if it is proved to have had a legitimate origin, or if the circumstances of the particular case are such as to render such an origin probable. This Explanation applies also to section 81.
STATE AMENDMENTS
Uttar Pradesh.
(a) Renumber section 90 as sub-section (1) thereof;
(b) in sub-section (1) as so renumbered, for the words "thirty years", substitute the words "twenty years";
(c) after sub-section (1) as so renumbered, insert the following sub-section, namely:--
"(2) Where any such document as is referred to in sub-section (1) was registered in accordance with the law relating to registration of documents and a duly certified copy thereof is produced, the court may presume that the signature and every other part of such document which purports to be in the handwriting of any particular person, it is that person's handwriting, and in the case of a document executed or attested, that it was duly executed and attested by the person by whom it purports to have been executed or attested".
(d) After section 90, insert the following section, namely:--
"90A. (1) Where any registered document or a duly certified copy thereof or any certified copy of a document which is part of the record of a Court of Justice, is produced from any custody which the Court in the particular case considers proper, the Court may presume that the original was executed by the person by whom it purports to have been executed.
(2) This presumption shall not be made in respect of any document which is the basis of a suit or of defence or is relied upon in the plaint or written statement."
The Explanation to sub-section (1) of section 90 will also apply to this section; [Vide Uttar Pradesh Act 24 of 1954, sec. 2 and Sch. (w.e.f. 30-11-1954).]"
15. On the point of Section 90 of Indian Evidence Act as well as on the point of proof of Gift deed this Court in a case of Dr. Jeevan Bahadur Samaddar Vs. Govind Charan Samaddar and Others 2013 (120) RD 717 has held that if certified copy has not been placed on record after satisfying the requirements of Section 64/65 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the mere fact that it was a certified copy by itself, would not make it admissible in evidence since it is secondary evidence and can be adduced in evidence only as provided in statute and not otherwise. Paragraph Nos.36 to 42 of Dr. Jeevan Bahadur Sammaddar (supra) will be relevant to appreciate the present controvercy which is as follows:
"36. In view of above reasoning the Court upheld the view taken by High Court that presumption under Section 90 would not be available on the certified copy produced by defendants and, hence it was rightly declined. The Court also said:
"We may also indicate that it is the discretion of the Court to refuse to give such presumption in favour of a party, if otherwise, there is occasion to doubt due execution of the document in question."
37. The above view however has to be applied in U.P. with slight variation. The U.P. Amendment in Section 90(1) has made difference only of the period from 30 years to 20 years but for all other purposes, it is the same. A Division Bench of this Court in Om Prakash Vs. Bhagwan, AIR 1974 All 389 has also said that benefit of Section 90 of Indian Evidence Act, as it stood un-amended would not be available to defendants-appellants as the original was not produced in evidence. However, here the legislature has introduced sub-section (2) for drawing a presumption in regard to a 'certified copy'. An argument was advanced that in that case, by virtue of sub-section (2), as amended in U.P. the presumption would be available. This was also considered by Division Bench in Om Prakash Vs. Bhagwan (supra) and it said:
". . . . learned counsel relied upon the amendment made to Section 90 by the U. P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, which permits a presumption to be drawn when a certified copy of a document, which has been registered under the Registration Act, is produced in evidence. However, the U. P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act introduced Section 90-A also. Sub-section (2) of this new section lays down that the presumption shall not be made in respect of any document which is the basis of a suit or of a defence and is relied upon in the plaint or in the written statement. It is not disputed by the learned counsel for the defendants-appellants that the sale deed in question was the basis of the defence and was relied upon by the defendants in their written statement. Nothing therefore, in Section 90 or Section 90-A of the Evidence Act as amended by the U. P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1954 will come to the assistance of the defendants-appellants and the Court will not draw a legal presumption in favour of the defendants-appellants that it was executed by Smt. Reoti Devi."
38. Here the Court clearly misconstrued Section 90(2) by reading it alongwith Section 90-A, though both are independent.
39. The correctness of aforesaid decision was doubted. The matter was considered by a Full Bench in Ram Jas Vs. Surendra Nath, AIR 1980 All 385. It was answered by Full Bench by overruling the decision in Omprakash Vs. Bhagwan (supra). The Full Bench dealt with Section 90 and 90-A, both at length. The Court traced the history of amendment made by U.P. Legislature, felt necessary in view of decision of Privy Council in Basant Singh v. Brji Raj Saran Singh (1935) ALJ 847, whereby certified copies were not held entitled for presumption under Section 90 in respect of document which is over 30 years when the original are not traceable or lost. The Court also referred to the interpretation given to U.P. Amendment in Dalsingar Vs. Sitaram 1969 All.W.R.(HC) 188 observing that Sections 90 and 90-A both are independent and not controlled by each other. Sub-section (2) of Section 90, therefore, shall not create a bar for raising a presumption under Section 90. This view was reiterated in Risal Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, U. P., Lucknow, 1970 All.W.R. (HC) 634 and Deo Chand Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation 1971 All.L.J. 992. The Full Bench approving aforesaid three decisions and overruling Division Bench judgement said, when law permits presumption which a Court can draw under any provision of procedural law, in absence of any controlling provision available otherwise, such provision pertaining to presumption cannot be made inapplicable. The Court said that if presumption is available or would have been available under Section 90, it shall not be defeated by referring to Section 90-A, which is independent and does not control Section 90. The Court also highlighted distinction between Sections 90 and 90-A. Section 90 deals with documents which are more than 20 years old. Section 90-A is not confined to the documents which are more than 20 years old but it also includes documents from judicial record. The Court found that aforesaid provisions occupy different fields, different circumstances and permits different types of presumption.
40. Same view was reiterated by a learned Single Judge (N.N. Mithal, J.) in Smt. Vidya Devi and others Vs. Nand Kumar, AIR 1981 All 274 (para 17).
41.Thus presumption under Section 90(1) is attracted in respect of original document. However, sub-section (2) is applicable in respect of certified copies but it would be attracted only when certified copy has been adduced in evidence in accordance with procedure prescribed in law, or after satisfying the requirement of law, i.e., Sections 64 and 65 of Act, 1872 and not otherwise. Under Act, 1872 certified copy as such is not admissible in evidence being a secondary evidence unless the procedural requirement thereof is satisfied. It is only when a certified copy has been adduced in evidence in accordance with requirement of the statute, the question of presumption under Section 90(2) would be attracted and not otherwise. Section 90(2) cannot be read in isolation. It has to be read in harmony with other provisions of the Act, 1872.
42. The above discussion also leads to the inference that, (1) presumption under Section 90 is discretionary, though the discretion is to be exercised judiciously; (2) sub-section (1) of Section 90 (as amended in U.P. or otherwise) is applicable only in respect to original document and not copies or certified copies; (3) the document must be 20/30 years old and must have come from proper custody; (4) the presumption is in respect of execution and attestation of document as also the handwriting of person concerned; (5) sub-section (2) (as available in U.P.) is applicable to certified copies when the same are adduced in evidence in accordance with law, i.e., as per the requirement of Sections 64 and 65 of Act, 1872. "
16. In view of ratio of law laid down by this Court in Dr. Jeevan Bahadur Sammadar (supra) as well as considering the provisions of Sections 64 and 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 as well as Section 90 and 90A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the revisional order passed on the second ground that Gift deed is more than 20 year old, as such, on the basis of certified copy of Gift deed, right can be given to opposite party no.2 without examining anything cannot be sustained.
17. So far as revisional jurisdiction under Section 48 of Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act is concerned as argued by respective counsel for the parties, the decision of this Court in a case of Nathu Ram and Others Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation Varanasi and Others 2017 (136) RD 480 will be relevant in which this Court after considering the various amendment made in Section 48 of U.P.C.H. Act as well as the ratio of law laid down by Apex Court in Ram Dular Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation Jaunpur and Others 1994 RD 290 (SC), Sheshmani and Another Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation District- Basti U.P. and Others 2001 RD 210 (SC) and Sri Jagdamba Prasad (dead) through LRs and Others Vs. Kripa Shankar (dead) through LRs and Others 2014 (124) RD 1 (SC), has held that revisional power is not a power of first or second appellate Court, the finding recorded therein would be possible to be interfered under Section 48 of U.P.C.H. Act only on the grounds discussed in Ram Dular (supra), Sheshmani (supra) and Jagdamba Prasad (supra).
18. Considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case as well as ratio of law laid down by this Court, the impugned revisional orders dated 11.8.1982 and 22.2.1985 passed by Deputy Director of Consolidation, Jaunpur cannot be sustained and are liable to be quashed accordingly, the impugned orders are quashed.
19. The writ petition is allowed.
20. Since order of Consolidation Officer dated 24.11.1976 was passed after considering each and every evidence adduced by the parties on the point of injunction decree passed by Civil Court and Gift deed, as such, there is no need to remand the matter to revisional Court for any further consideration of fact and law. The order dated 24.11.1976 passed by consolidation office and order dated 23.12.1977 passed by Settlement Officer of Consolidation are hereby maintained.
21. No order as to costs.
Order Date :- 29.8.2022
Rameez
(Chandra Kumar Rai,J.)
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