Heera Lal Yadav vs State Of U.P. Thru. Addl. Chief ...
2021 Latest Caselaw 6821 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
 
 

A.F.R.
 
Court No. - 9
 
Case :- MISC. BENCH No. - 13252 of 2021
 
Petitioner :- Heera Lal Yadav
 
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru. Addl. Chief Secy. Home, Lucknow & Ors.
 
Counsel for Petitioner :- Meenakshi Singh Parihar
 
Counsel for Respondent :- G.A.
 

 
Hon'ble Ramesh Sinha,J.

Hon'ble Vikas Kunvar Srivastav,J.

(Per Ramesh Sinha, J. for the Bench)

(1) The Court has convened through Video Conferencing.

(2) Heard Sri H.G.S. Parihar, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mrs. Meenakshi Singh Parihar, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Ms. Meera Tripathi, learned Additional Government Advocate for the State/respondents no. 1 and 2.

(3) The instant writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner, Heera Lal Yadav, challenging the First Information Report dated 27.10.2020 to the extent of petitioner registered as Case Crime No. 0013 of 2020, under Sections 120-B, 471, 468, 467 and 420 I.P.C., Police Station S.I.T., Lucknow.

(4) Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has submitted that earlier the petitioner has challenged the impugned F.I.R. before this Court at Allahabad by filing Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 12605 of 2020 : Heera Lal Yadav Vs. State of U.P. and 2 others, wherein, initially, a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court at Allahabad, vide order dated 14.12.2020, restrained the respondents from taking any coercive action against the petitioner in connection with the impugned F.I.R. and the same was continued from time to time, however, when the case was listed before another Co-ordinate Bench of this Court at Allahabad on 24.03.2021, the same was dismissed on the ground that this Court at Allahabad has no jurisdiction to hear the matter as the impugned F.I.R. has been registered at Police Station S.I.T., Lucknow and liberty was granted to the petitioner to approach the appropriate forum/court, if so advised. Thereafter, the petitioner has filed the instant writ petition, challenging the impugned F.I.R.

(5) It has been argued by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that the impugned F.I.R. has been lodged against eight persons including the petitioner. He argued that the petitioner has falsely been implicated in the impugned F.I.R. as the entire process of selection/recruitment were completed on the basis of the resolution of the Board of Directors of the Managing Committee/U.P. Co-operative Bank Ltd. Lucknow on 07.07.2015 and at that time, the petitioner was not working in the office of U.P. Co-operative Bank Ltd., Lucknow from 20.10.2014 to 22.04.2015.

(6) Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner further argued that at present, the petitioner is holding Class-I post and working on the post of Additional Commissioner-cum-Additional Registrar, Co-operative Society, U.P., Lucknow. On 20.10.2014, the State Government has appointed the petitioner on the post of Managing Director, U.P. Co-operative Bank Ltd., Lucknow. On 12.03.2013, the Commissioner-cum-Registrar Co-operative Societies, U.P., Lucknow wrote a letter to the Managing Director, U.P. Co-operative Bank Ltd., Lucknow for the direct recruitment on different post of Assistant Manager and Assistant Manager (Computer). On 7.5.2014, the Principal Secretary (Karmik), State of U.P., Lucknow wrote a letter to the Principal Secretary, Co-operative, U.P., Lucknow for the recruitment of the employee in the Co-operative department on the different post. On 05.12.2014,, the Commissioner-cum-Registrar, Uttar Pradesh, wrote a letter to the Principal Secretary, Co-operative Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow. On 30.01.2015, the petitioner being the then Managing Director, U.P. Co-operative Bank Ltd, Lucknow, sent a requisition for the recruitment/selection on the post of Assistant Manager/ Assistant Manager (Computer) before the Secretary, U.P. Co-operative Institutional Service Board, Lucknow. Thereafter, on 21.03.2015, the petitioner has proposed the educational qualification for the recruitment on the post in question, which was sent before the Commissioner-cum-Registrar Co-operative Societies, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow for its approval. Thereafter, the petitioner was transferred from the post of Managing Director, U.P. Co-operative Bank Ltd., Lucknow on 22.04.2015 and in his place, on the same day i.e. 22.04.2015, co-accused Rabikant Singh, Additional Registrar, Co-operative Society took the charge of the post of Managing Director, U.P. Co-operative Bank Ltd., Lucknow. He argued that after the transfer and posted as Additional Registrar, Co-operative and Additional Commissioner in the office of the Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh, the petitioner has got no concern with the further development/recruitment/selection/ appointment on the post of Assistant Manager and Assistant Manager (Computer) in U.P. Co-operative Bank Ltd., Lucknow.

(7) Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that co-accused, namely, Rabi Kant Singh, Ram Jatan Yadav and Santosh Kumar and Rakesh Kumar Mishra, have approached this Court by filing writ petition Nos. 21793 of 2020 (M/B), 22257 of 2020 (M/B), 2561 of 2021 (M/B) and 3373 of 2021 (M/B), wherein interim protection has been granted to them. Therefore, the petitioner is also entitled to get similar protection as has been granted to the co-accused.

(8) Learned Additional Government Advocate, on the other hand, opposed the prayer for quashing the impugned F.I.R. and argued that interim protection has been granted to co-accused, namely, Rabi Kant Singh, Ram Jatan Yadav and Santosh Kumar and Rakesh Kumar Mishra, only on the ground that interim order dated 14.12.2020 has been granted in Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 12605 of 2020, which has been filed by the petitioner before this Court at Allahabad. Thereafter, as the impugned F.I.R. has been registered at police station S.I.T., Lucknow, therefore, Co-ordinate Bench of this Court at Allahabad, vide order dated 24.03.2021, dismissed the writ petition and granted liberty to the writ petitioner to approach the appropriate forum/Court, if so desire. He argued that while dismissing the writ petition filed by the present writ petition, Co-ordinate Bench of this Court at Allahabad has not extended or directed to continue the interim order dated 14.12.2020, meaning thereby after dismissal of the writ petition, the interim order dated 14.12.2020 has become redundant as it merges into final order.

(9) It has further been argued by the learned Additional Government Advocate that on the basis of the interim order dated 14.12.2020 passed in Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 12605 of 2020, which has been filed by the present writ petitioner, co-accused has sought interim protection, which was granted to them. Now, after dismissal of the aforesaid writ petition wherein interim order dated 14.12.2020 was not enforced as it merges into final order, the petitioner has come before this Court seeking relief to grant him the benefit of the interim order as has been granted to co-accused, which cannot be granted to the present writ petitioner.

(10) On merits, learned Additional Government Advocate has argued that in respect of the irregularities committed in selection held in the year 2015, number of complaints for corruption in the said selection was received in the office of Hon'ble the Chief Minister and other office of the State Department, whereupon an inquiry was entrusted to the S.I.T, who, after thorough enquiry, has found that the petitioner, who was the then Managing Director of U.P. Co-operative Bank, is responsible for making educational qualification for ten posts contrary to rules. Therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner has no concern with the aforesaid selection. He argued that from the perusal of the FIR, prima facie, it cannot be said that no cognizable offence is made out, hence, no ground exists for quashing of the F.I.R. or staying the arrest of the petitioner.

(11) Having heard the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the record, we find that initially, the petitioner has filed Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 12605 of 2020, wherein vide order dated 14.12.2020, following interim order has been passed :-

"As prayed, list in the additional cause list on 15.1.2021.

Till then no coercive action shall be taken against the petitioner in connection with FIR dated 27.10.2020 in Case Crime No. 0013 of 2020, under section 120-B, 471, 468, 467 and 420 IPC, Police Station S.I.R., District Lucknow."

(12) The aforesaid interim order dated 14.12.2020 was extended from time to time as is evident from Annexure Nos. 2 to 4 to the writ petition. Thereafter, co-accused Rabi Kant Singh has approached this Court by filing Misc. Bench No. 21793 of 2020 : Rabi Kant Singh Vs. State of U.P. and others, wherein following interim order dated 12.01.2021 has been passed :

"Heard Mr. H.G.S. Parihar, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Prashant Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner as well as learned A.G.A. on behalf of the State.

Learned A.G.A. was granted time vide order dated 9.12.2020 'to submit progress report of the investigation done so far and the evidence, if any collected against the petitioner regarding his involvement in the alleged crime'.

Learned A.G.A. has filed short counter affidavit. However, in the short counter affidavit no specific statement regarding progress report of the investigation done so far and the evidence, if any, collected against the petitioner regarding his involvement in the alleged crime. This fact has been noted by the court vide order dated 16.12.2020. The court thereafter had again granted time to learned A.G.A. to file counter affidavit.

Learned A.G.A. submits that the investigation is still pending and the averments made in the short counter affidavit are the only material available with the investigating authority regarding the investigation done so far.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that co-accused Heera Lal Yadav has been granted protection by this court at Allahabad vide order dated 14.12.2020, passed in Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.12605 of 2020, copy of the order dated 14.12.2020 has been placed before the court, same is taken on record.

We have considered the submissions made by parties' counsel and gone through the records.

Let detailed counter affidavit be filed by the opposite parties within three weeks.

List thereafter.

Till filing of counter affidavit or till filing of report under Section 173 (2) Cr.P.C. whichever is earlier no coercive action shall be taken against the petitioner in pursuance of impugned First Information Report dated 27.10.2020, registered as FIR/Case Crime No.0013 of 2020, under Sections 12-B/471/ 468/467/420 of IPC at Police Station SIT, District Lucknow. However, the petitioner will co-operate with the investigation."

(13) Subsequently, co-accused Ram Jatan Yadav has filed Misc. Bench No. 22257 of 2020, in which also following interim order dated 12.01.2021 has been passed :-

"Heard Mr. Balram Yadav, learned counsel for the petitioner as well as learned A.G.A. on behalf of the State.

Learned A.G.A. was granted time vide order dated 9.12.2020 'to submit progress report of the investigation done so far and the evidence, if any collected against the petitioner regarding his involvement in the alleged crime'.

Learned A.G.A. has filed short counter affidavit. However, in the short counter affidavit no specific statement regarding progress report of the investigation done so far and the evidence, if any, collected against the petitioner regarding his involvement in the alleged crime. This fact has been noted by the court vide order dated 16.12.2020. The court thereafter had again granted time to learned A.G.A. to file counter affidavit.

Learned A.G.A. submits that the investigation is still pending and the averments made in the short counter affidavit are the only material available with the investigating authority regarding the investigation done so far.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that co-accused Heera Lal Yadav has been granted protection by this court at Allahabad vide order dated 14.12.2020, passed in Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.12605 of 2020, copy of the order dated 14.12.2020 has been placed before the court, same is taken on record.

We have considered the submissions made by parties' counsel and gone through the records.

Let detailed counter affidavit be filed by the opposite parties within three weeks.

List thereafter.

Till filing of counter affidavit or till filing of report under Section 173 (2) Cr.P.C. whichever is earlier no coercive action shall be taken against the petitioner in pursuance of impugned First Information Report dated 27.10.2020, registered as FIR/Case Crime No.0013 of 2020, under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of IPC at Police Station SIT, District Lucknow. However, the petitioner will co-operate with the investigation."

(14) Thereafter, co-accused Santosh Kumar has filed Misc. Bench No. 2561 of 2021, in which following interim order dated 29.1.2021 has been passed :

"Heard Mr. H.G.S. Parihar, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Saharsh, learned Counsel for the petitioner, learned AGA for the State/respondents and perused the record.

The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner, namely, Santosh Kumar, seeking to quash the First Information Report dated 27.10.2020 registered as Crime No./F.I.R. No. 0013 of 2020, under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120B I.P.C., police station Special Investigation Team, District Lucknow with a further prayer to stay the arrest during the pendency of the investigation of the said case.

It has been argued by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that the impugned F.I.R. has been lodged against the petitioner with an oblique motive and just to harass the petitioner. He submits that co-accused, namely, Rabi Kant Singh and Ram Jatan Yadav have also approached this Court by filing writ petition no. 21793 (M/B) of 2020 : Rabi Kant Singh Vs. State of U.P. and others and writ petition No. 22257 of 2020 : Ram Jatan Yadav Vs. State of U.P. and others, respectively and a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, vide order dated 12.01.2021 has granted interim protection to co-accused, Rabi Kant Singh and Ram Jatan Yadav, a copy of which has been annexed as Annexure nos. 10 and 11 to the writ petition, respectively. Similarly, co-accused Heera Lal Yadav has also been granted protection by this Court at Allahabad vide order dated 14.12.2020, passed in Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.12605 of 2020, copy of the order dated 14.12.2020 has been annexed as Annexure no. 9 to the writ petition. He also submits that the role of the present writ petitioner in the impugned F.I.R. is similar to that of co-accused. Therefore, the petitioner is also entitled to get similar protection as has been granted to the co-accused.

Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, prima facie, a case of interim relief is made out.

Learned AGA has accepted notice on behalf of the respondents.

Let counter affidavit be filed within four weeks. Rejoinder affidavit, if any, may be filed within two weeks thereafter.

Connect with Writ Petition No. 22257 of 2020 (M/B) and 21793 of 2020 (M/B) and list thereafter.

Till filing of counter affidavit or till filing of report under Section 173 (2) Cr.P.C., whichever is earlier, no coercive action shall be taken against the petitioner in pursuance of impugned First Information Report. However, the petitioner will co-operate with the investigation."

(15) Thereafter, Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 12605 of 2020 was dismissed vide order dated 24.03.2021, which reads as under :

"Heard Sri O.P. Singh, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Indra Jit Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Amit Sinha, learned counsel for the State and perused the record.

The present writ petition has been filed with following prayers:-

"1. Issue a writ of certiorari calling for record of the case and quashing the impugned first information report dated 27.10.2020 registered as Case Crime No.0013 of 2020, under section 120-B, 471, 467 and 420 I.P.C., Police Station S.I.T., District Lucknow. (Annexure No.1) in respect of the petitioner.

2. Issue a writ, of mandamus commanding the respondent no to arrest the petitioner in pursuance to the impugned first information report dated 27.10.2020 registered as Case Crime No.0013 of 2020, under section 120-B, 471, 467 and 420 I.P.C., Police Station S.I.T., District Lucknow.

3. Issue any other suitable writ, order or direction which this Hon'ble Court may deem, fit and proper under the facts and circumstances of the case.

4. Award cost to the writ petition in favour of the petitioner."

At the very outset, learned counsel for the State raised a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the present writ petition at Allahabad. It is argued that the impugned first information report has been registered at District Lucknow for offence which was committed at Lucknow and as such this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the present writ petition and hear it. It is argued that on the own showing of the petitioner, the impugned first information report, the copy of which is annexed as Annexure-1 to the writ petition was registered at Police Station S.I.T., District Lucknow and as such this Court has no jurisdiction to hear and entertain the present writ petition which should be dismissed.

Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that the present writ petition may be transferred to the Lucknow Bench of this Court in view of the judgement of Sri Nasiruddin Vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal: (1975) 2 SCC 671. It is argued that since the first information report has been registered at Lucknow, this Court has powers to do so under Clause 14 of the United Provinces High Courts (Amalgamation) Order, 1948 and as such the same be transferred to Lucknow for its hearing.

Before proceeding to examine the matter on merits, we propose and consider it appropriate to deal with the preliminary objection raised by Sri Amit Sinha, learned counsel for the State.

The Apex Court in the case of Sri Nasiruddin (supra) has noted in paragraphs 12 and 13 as follows:-

"12. It is in this context that the following five questions were referred for decision to the Full Bench :

(1) Can a case falling within the jurisdiction of the Lucknow Bench of this Court be presented at Allahabad ?

(2) Can the Judges sitting at Allahabad summarily dismiss a case presented at Allahabad pertaining to the jurisdiction of the Lucknow Bench ?

(3) Can a case pertaining to the jurisdiction of Lucknow Bench, presented and entertained at Allahabad, be decided finally by the Judges sitting at Allahabad, without there being an order as contemplated by the second proviso to Article 14 of the U.P. High Court (Amalgamation) Order, 1948 ?

(4) What is the meaning of the expression "in respect of cases arising in such areas in Oudh" used in first proviso to Article 14 of the High Court (Amalgamation) order, 1948 ? Has this expression reference to the place where the case originated or to the place of the sitting of the last Court of authority whose decree or order is being challenged in the proceedings before the High Court ?

(5) Whether this writ petition can be entertained, heard and decided by the Judges sitting at Lucknow?

13. The majority view of the Full Bench gave the following answers:-

(1) A case falling within the jurisdiction of Judges at Lucknow should be presented at Lucknow and not at Allahabad.

(2) However, if such a case is presented at Allahabad, the Judges at Allahabad cannot summarily dismiss it only for that reason. The case should be returned for filing before the Judges at Lucknow and where the case has been mistakenly or inadvertently entertained at Allahabad, a direction should be made to the High Court office to transmit the papers of the case to Lucknow.

(3) A case pertaining to the jurisdiction of the Judges at Lucknow and presented before the Judges at Allahabad cannot be decided by the Judges at Allahabad in the absence of an order contemplated by the second proviso to Article 14 of the Amalgamation Order, 1948.

(4) The expression "in respect of cases arising in such areas in Oudh" used in the first proviso to Article 14 of the High Court (Amalgamation) Order, 1948, refers to legal proceedings, including civil cases, criminal cases, petitions under Articles 226, 227 and 228 of the Constitution and petitions under Articles 132, 133 and 134 of the Constitution instituted before the Judges sitting at Lucknow and having their origin, in the sense explained in the majority judgment in such areas in Oudh as the Chief Justice may direct. The expression "arising in such areas in Oudh" refers to the place where the case originated in the sense explained in the majority judgment and not to the place sitting of the last court or authority whose decree or order is being challenged in the proceeding before the High Court.

(5) The Lucknow Bench have no jurisdiction to hear writ petition No. 750 of 1964 which gave rise to writ petition No. 3294 of 1970."

While, dealing with the said questions and the answers as given therein, the conclusions as drawn by the Apex Court are in paragraph 38 of the said judgement which are as follows:-

"38. To sum up. Our conclusions are as follows. First, there is no permanent seat of the High Court at Allahabad. The seats at Allahabad and at Lucknow may be changed in accordance with the provisions of the order. Second, the Chief Justice of the High Court has no power to increase or decrease the areas in Oudh from time to time. The areas in Oudh have been determined once by the Chief Justice and, therefore, there is no scope for changing the areas. Third, the Chief Justice has power under the second proviso to paragraph 14 of the order to direct in his discretion that any case or class of cases arising in Oudh areas shall be heard at Allahabad. Any case or class of cases are those which are instituted at Lucknow. The interpretation given by the High Court that the word "heard" confers powers on the Chief Justice to order that any case or class of cases arising in Oudh areas shall be instituted or filed at Allahabad, instead of Lucknow is wrong. The word "heard" means that cases which have already been instituted or filed at Lucknow may in the discretion of the Chief Justice under the second proviso to paragraph 14 of the order he directed to be heard at Allahabad. Fourth, the expression "cause of action" with regard to a civil matter means that it should be left to the litigant to institute cases at Lucknow Bench or at Allahabad Bench according to the cause of action arising wholly or in part within either of the areas. If the cause of action arises wholly within Oudh areas then the Lucknow Bench will have jurisdiction. Similarly, if the cause of action arises wholly outside the specified areas in Oudh then Allahabad will have jurisdiction. If the cause of action in part arises in the specified Oudh areas and part of the cause of action arises outside the specified areas, it will be open to the litigant to frame the case appropriately to attract the jurisdiction either at Lucknow or at Allahabad. Fifth, a criminal case arises where the offence has been committed or otherwise as provided in the Criminal Procedure Code. That will attract the jurisdiction of the Court at Allahabad or Lucknow. In some cases depending on the facts and the provision regarding jurisdiction, it may arise in either place."

The controversy as has been raised in the present case has been answered by the Apex Court in its conclusion which has been dealt with as the third conclusion therein. The same is at the cost of repetition being again extracted herein below:-

"38. ........................ Third, the Chief Justice has power under the second proviso to paragraph 14 of the order to direct in his discretion that any case or class of cases arising in Oudh areas shall be heard at Allahabad. Any case or class of cases are those which are instituted at Lucknow. The interpretation given by the High Court that the word "heard" confers powers on the Chief Justice to order that any case or class of cases arising in Oudh areas shall be instituted or filed at Allahabad, instead of Lucknow is wrong. The word "heard" means that cases which have already been instituted or filed at Lucknow may in the discretion of the Chief Justice under the second proviso to paragraph 14 of the Order be directed to be heard at Allahabad."

A perusal of the third conclusion of the Apex Court in the case of Sri Nasiruddin (supra) leaves no doubt that a case which has already been instituted or filed at Lucknow may in the discretion of the Chief Justice under the second proviso to paragraph 14 of the Amalgamation Order be directed to be heard at Allahabad but not vice-versa. This leaves with no doubt that a case filed or instituted at Lucknow can be directed to be heard at Allahabad but a case filed or instituted at Allahabad cannot be directed to be heard at Lucknow. The legal proposition is quite clear and specific.

Looking to the position of law as stated above and the facts of the present case, this Court comes to a conclusion that the preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the present writ petition at Allahabad as raised by the learned counsel for the State, has substance. The argument of learned Senior Advocate that the present case be transferred to Lucknow as per the dictum laid down in the case of Sri Nasiruddin (supra) is fallacious.

The present writ petition is dismissed on the ground that this court has no jurisdiction to hear the same.

However, the petitioner is at liberty to approach the appropriate forum / Court, if so advised.

The party shall file computer generated copy of order downloaded from the official website of High Court Allahabad, self attested by it alongwith a self attested identity proof of the said person(s) (preferably Aadhar Card) mentioning the mobile number(s) to which the said Aadhar Card is linked.

The concerned Court/Authority/Official shall verify the authenticity of such computerized copy of the order from the official website of High Court Allahabad and shall make a declaration of such verification in writing".

(16) It transpires from perusal of the aforesaid orders that co-accused has been granted the parity of the interim order dated 14.12.2020 passed in Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 12605 of 2020. Now, the situation is that the said interim order dated 14.12.2020 has not become enforced as it merges into final order dated 24.03.2021 passed in Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 12605 of 2020, whereby this Court at Allahabad, while dismissing the writ petition filed by the petitioner, granted liberty to approach the appropriate forum/court, if so advised. Thereafter, the petitioner has filed the instant writ petition, claiming the interim orders granted to co-accused.

(17) On due consideration, we are of the view that the petitioner cannot be granted the parity of interim order passed in the case of co-accused for the reason that the basis for passing the interim order in the case of co-accused, as quoted hereinabove, was the interim order dated 14.12.2020 passed in writ petition filed by the writ petitioner himself before this Court at Allahabad, which is in fact not enforced after dismissal of the said writ petition. Thus, the plea of the petitioner in this regard has no force and is rejected.

(18) However, on merit, it has been argued by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that the petitioner has no concern with the further development/recruitment/ selection/appointment on the post of Assistant Manager & Assistant Manager (Computer) in U.P. Co-operative Bank Ltd., Lucknow as he was transferred to elsewhere at that time, which was vehemently opposed by the learned AGA by saying that the petitioner was involved in making educational qualification for the selection contrary to rules, therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner has no concern with the said irregularities in the selection.

(19) We have minutely examined the contentions of the learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the impugned F.I.R.

(20) The legal position on the issue of quashing of FIR or criminal proceedings is well-settled that the jurisdiction to quash a complaint, FIR or a charge-sheet should be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases. The Courts should not ordinarily interfere with the investigations of cognizable offences. However, where the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint even if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, the FIR or the charge-sheet may be quashed in exercise of powers under Article 226 or inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.

(21) Recently, in Neeharika Infrastructure Private Limited vs. State of Maharashtra (Criminal Appeal No. 330 of 2021, decided on 13.04.2021), a three-judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the powers of the High Court while adjudicating a petition for quashing of the FIR under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. In Neeharika Infrastructure Private Limited (supra), the appellants challenged an interim order issued by the Bombay High Court, in a quashing petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and Article 226 of the Constitution. The Bombay High Court issued an interim order directing that "no coercive measures shall be adopted against the petitioners in respect of the said FIR". While examining the correctness of the said interim order, Hon'ble the Supreme Court in para-23 has held as under :

"23. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, our final conclusions on the principal/core issue, whether the High Court would be justified in passing an interim order of stay of investigation and/or "no coercive steps to be adopted", during the pendency of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in what circumstances and whether the High Court would be justified in passing the order of not to arrest the accused or "no coercive steps to be adopted" during the investigation or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of/not entertaining/not quashing the criminal proceedings/complaint/FIR in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, our final conclusions are as under:

i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into a cognizable offence;

ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences;

iii) It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on;

iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the ''rarest of rare cases (not to be confused with the formation in the context of death penalty).

v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint;

vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage;

vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary rule;

viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not to tread over the other sphere;

ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping;

x) Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences;

xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice;

xii) The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. After investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure;

xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court;

xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra), has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint;

xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR;

xvi) The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/or the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by the High Court while passing an interim order in a quashing petition in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, an interim order of stay of investigation during the pendency of the quashing petition can be passed with circumspection. Such an interim order should not require to be passed routinely, casually and/or mechanically. Normally, when the investigation is in progress and the facts are hazy and the entire evidence/material is not before the High Court, the High Court should restrain itself from passing the interim order of not to arrest or "no coercive steps to be adopted" and the accused should be relegated to apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. before the competent court. The High Court shall not and as such is not justified in passing the order of not to arrest and/or "no coercive steps" either during the investigation or till the investigation is completed and/or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. xvii) Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie of the opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant of interim stay of further investigation, after considering the broad parameters while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India referred to hereinabove, the High Court has to give brief reasons why such an interim order is warranted and/or is required to be passed so that it can demonstrate the application of mind by the Court and the higher forum can consider what was weighed with the High Court while passing such an interim order.

xviii) Whenever an interim order is passed by the High Court of "no coercive steps to be adopted" within the aforesaid parameters, the High Court must clarify what does it mean by "no coercive steps to be adopted" as the term "no coercive steps to be adopted" can be said to be too vague and/or broad which can be misunderstood and/or misapplied."

(22) Keeping in mind the aforesaid dictum of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, we find that in the instant case, it transpires from the impugned F.I.R. that specific allegation has been levelled against the petitioner in the F.I.R. with regard to making educational qualification contrary to rules and that too this fact came into light after thorough inquiry conducted in the matter by the Special Investigation Team, therefore, it cannot be said that prima facie, the petitioner cannot be involved in the instant case.

(23) It is well settled that this Court has to eschew itself from embarking upon a roving enquiry into the last details of the case. It is also not advisable to adjudge whether the case shall ultimately end in submission of charge sheet and then eventually in conviction or not. Only a prima facie satisfaction of the court about the existence of sufficient ingredients constituting the offence is required in order to see whether the F.I.R. requires to be investigated or deserves quashing. The ambit of investigation into the alleged offence is an independent area of operation and does not call for interference in the same except in rarest of rare cases.

(24) Keeping in view the aforesaid law and considering the submissions raised by learned counsel for the petitioner, we are of the considered view that the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner call for determination on questions of fact which may be adequately discerned either through proper investigation or which may be adjudicated upon only by the trial court and even the submissions made on points of law can also be more appropriately gone into only by the trial Court in case a charge sheet is submitted in this case. The perusal of the record makes out, prima facie, offences at this stage and there appears to be sufficient ground for investigation in the case.

(25) In view of the aforesaid, considering the allegations made in the FIR and material brought on record, it cannot be said that no prima facie case is made out against the petitioner, rather there appears to be sufficient ground for investigation in the matter. Accordingly, we do not find any justification to quash the impugned F.I.R.

(26) The petition lacks substance and is, accordingly, dismissed.

       (Vikas Kunvar Srivastav, J.)     (Ramesh Sinha, J.)
 
Order Date :- 30.6.2021
 
Ajit/-