Abhai Pratap Singh And Another vs State Of U.P. And 3 Others
2019 Latest Caselaw 4535 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 

A.F.R.
 
Judgment reserved on 24.4.2019.
 
Delivered on 15.5.2019.
 
Case :- WRIT - C No. - 57443 of 2015
 
Petitioner :- Abhai Pratap Singh And Another
 
Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 3 Others
 
Counsel for Petitioner :- B.N. Mishra,R.V. Mishra
 
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Lal Ji Maurya,Vinod Kumar
 

 
Hon'ble Saurabh Shyam Shamshery,J.

1. Heard Shri R.V. Mishra, Advocate along with Shri Sachin Mishra, Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners, Shri Shailendra Singh, learned counsel for respondents No.1 to 3 and Shri Vinod Kumar, Advocate along with Shri Lalji Maurya, Advocate appearing on behalf of respondent No.4.

2. Facts of the case as evident from the pleadings before this court are as follows:

(i) The petitioners are working as Manager/Secretary and Principal of one College, namely Mahatma Gandhi Post Graduate, College, Fatehpur. This college is duly affiliated from Chatrapati University, Campus Kanpur. It has also been averred that the said College is in receipt of grant-in-aid from the State Government for the payment of salary to its employees which includes, teacher, Class III and Class IV employees also.

(ii) The respondent no.4, herein namely Rama Shankar was appointed as a short term daily wage labour on Cycle Stand in the said college on 01.5.1984. Later on, the services of the respondent no.4 were disengaged w.e.f. 30.4.1990 along with two other IVth class employees by the order passed by the Principal of the said college on 29.4.1990. There is no denial that the respondent no.4 had received the said letter.

(iii) After a lapse of 1 year and 5 months on 09.12.1991, the respondent no.4 raised an industrial dispute with the prayer for his re-employment as well as payment of salary before the respondent no.3. On the basis of the said dispute, reference was made by the respondent no.3 and it was referred to the respondent no.2. The said industrial dispute was registered as Industrial Dispute Case No.168/1992, (Rama Shankar Vs. Principal & Anr) on 06.1.1992.

(iv) The then Principal of the institution on 26.3.1993, filed objections before the Tribunal, wherein it was asserted that the respondent no.4 was kept as a seasonal daily wage labour on Cycle Stand of the College and was paid wages from the own resources of the Management. However, despite repeated requests of the Management, when the post of Class IV was not sanctioned from the competent authority, the Principal has no other option but to disengage the services of the respondent no.4. The then Principal of the College on 11.10.1995, entered into a compromise with the respondent no.4 on certain terms. This compromise has been termed as illegal compromise by the petitioner herein. For reference, the conditions of compromise are mentioned hereinafter:

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/kkjk&3 % ;g fd ;fn lsok;kstd }kjk mijksDrkuqlkj fu;qfDr u dh x;h rks mijksDr Jfed jke'kadj izFke [email protected] ekg ls gh lsok laca/kh ykHk osru vkfn ikus dk ik= gksxkA**

(v) On the basis of the said compromise, the Labour Court, Allahabad passed an award dated 20.10.1995. The relevant part of the award is as under:

"The learned representatives for the parties have filed the settlement (7/A) arrived at between the parties. This has been duly verified. I have gone through it carefully. In order to ascertain as to whether this settlement is a genuine one or not I put certain questions to the workman who was also present along with his representatives. He has categorically stated that whatever has been mentioned in this settlement is perfectly correct. Therefore, the settlement appears to be a genuine. In the result, the adjudication is case is disposed of in terms of this settlement (7/A) which shall form a part of this award.

There shall, however, be no order as to costs."

(vi) The Management has opted not to challenge the said award for about 20 years and by way of this writ petition for the first time the said award has been challenged in the year 2015.The said award dated 22.1.1996 was also published by the Labour Commissioner, U.P.

(vii) In pursuance of that award, the respondent no.4 was allowed to work as a Class IV Employee however, the payment of Rs.3000/- per month was paid from their own resources of the Management. It has been mentioned in the writ petition that on 23.5.1996, the Management of the College has sent an application for sanction of the post of Class IV employee to the competent authority. However, no sanction was granted. The respondent no.4 on 21.7.2009 filed an application for execution of the award dated 11.10.1995 before the Deputy Commissioner, U.P. Allahabad demanding his salary from May, 1990 to September, 2007 amounting to Rs.8,15,244/- and by way of filing the second application demanded salary from the month of January, 1998 to March 2009 amounting to Rs.8,11,725/- as arrears of salary.

(viii) Respondent no.4 thereafter filed Misc. Case No.48 of 2009 before the Labour Court under Sections 6-H (2) of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act and 33-C (2) of The Industrial Disputes Act, along with calculation chart for commutation and to execute the Award dated 30.10.1995. It was mentioned in the application that despite recruitment process was held for 2 vacant posts in the year 2006, however, respondent no.4 was not appointed in terms of the Award.

(ix) Respondent no.4 had tendered resignation on 3.2.2010 w.e.f. from 1.2.2010. The said resignation was accepted and also intimated to respondent no.4 on 18.3.2010 after due endorsement of respondent no.4. The said communication has not been challenged by the respondent no.4.

(x) Petitioners filed objection to the applications. It was specifically mentioned that no recruitment process was undertaken before year 2006. Though after sanction was accorded by the Government, posts were advertised in the year 2006 but, respondent no.4 had not applied. After the award, respondent no.4 was appointed even without approval from Government and he was paid also from August, 2004 till he resigned in 2010.

(xi) The Labour Court U.P. Allahabad vide impugned order dated 10.10.2012 partially allowed the application of Respondent no.5 and directed that salary as mentioned in the chart annexed to application from July 2006 to March 2009 be paid. The relief was granted on the basis that though in the year 2006, vacant posts were advertised, however according to award respondent no.4 was not appointed and as per application chart/calculation has been filed till March, 2009 only.

(xii) Deputy Commissioner, Allahabad issued recovery notice dated 27.3.2014 for amount of Rs.14,71,000/-.Petitioners being aggrieved by the orders dated 10.10.2012 and 27.3.2014 filed instant writ petition. The award dated 30.10.1995 was also challenged.

3. Proceedings before this Court

This Court passed following orders on 08.10.2015 and 23.12.2015:

Order dated 08.10.2015.

"The petitioner is assailing the award dated 30 October 1995 after a lapse of 20 years, it is only when the award was put to execution, the Labour Court has directed the petitioner to deposit Rs.14 Lac, aggrieved, petitioner has approached this Court.

Put up this matter on 13 October 2015 as fresh to enable the learned counsel for the petitioner to satisfy the Court as to how the petition would be maintainable against a consequential order passed in pursuance of an award passed in 1995."

Order dated 23.12.2015.

"Heard Sri B.N. Mishra, along with Sri R.V. Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel appearing for the State-respondents.

While assailing the impugned award and the consequential orders passed under sections 33-C(2)/6-H(2) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereafter referred to as 'the U.P. Act') /Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereafter referred to as 'the Act') ,learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the agreement in between the parties is not executable, as the petitioners' Institution is a recognized Institution and the appointments are governed under the statutory rules and any appointment dehors the rule woud be void abinitio. It is also submitted that in view of the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka and Others Vs. Uma Devi and Others (2006 (4) SCC 1), the appointments on daily wage basis cannot be regularized in absence of Rule. He also submits that the consequential order passed under section 33-C(2) of the U.P. Act read with section 6-H(1) of the Act is without jurisdiction.

Learned standing counsel appearing for the State - respondents submits that the petitioner suffers from laches and further, it is the petitioners, none else, who entered into agreement, therefore, learned counsel for the petitioners cannot take stand that agreement is not executable. In his submissions, the inconvenience caused to the workman has to be compensated in terms of the agreement.

Matter requires scrutiny.

Issue notice.

Notices on behalf of respondent nos. 1 to 3 have been accepted by the office of learned Chief Standing Counsel. Therefore, notices need not be served again to the aforesaid respondents.

Issue notice to respondent no. 4 through registered post returnable at an early date.

Steps be taken within two weeks.

Counter affidavit, if any, may be filed by learned counsel for the respondents by the next date of listing.

As an interim measure, without prejudice to right and contention of the parties, subject to deposit of Rs. 1,00,000/- by the petitioner before the respondent no. 3 within a period of two months from today, no coercive action shall be taken against the petitioner regarding recovery of the remaining amount pursuant to the award dated 30.10.1995 as well as the consequential orders passed under sections 33-C(2)/6-H(2) of the U.P. Act / the Act. The amount so deposited may be withdrawn by the respondent no. 4 without furnishing any security."

4. Respondent no.4 has filed counter affidavit and petitioners have filed rejoinder to the counter affidavit.

5. Submissions on behalf of the petitioners:

(a) The award dated 30.10.1995 was passed on the basis of compromise, which is non-executable. The said compromise was entered by the then Principle without any authority. Petitioners have no power to appoint respondent no.4 on regular basis as the College is an aided institution.

(b) Respondent no.4 had worked from September, 2004 till January, 2010 when by own will he resigned. During this period, respondent no.4 was paid by the College from their own resources and further though in the year 2006, post for the IVth Class employee were advertised, however, respondent no.4 has not applied for the same.

(c) Aided College such as petitioners College cannot appoint a regular IV class employee, without due process.

(d) The award being obtained on the basis of non-executable compromise can be challenged belatedly also. Section 2 (h) of Indian Contract Act, 1872 defines the term contract as an agreement which is enforceable by law and in the present case agreement is not enforceable as the terms of it are contrary to legal provisions.

(e) In the present case powers under section 33-C (2) of the Act cannot be exercised as it is settled law that proceedings there are in the nature of execution, which is based on an existing right, however in the present case there is no existing right.

(f) In support of above submissions, learned counsel for petitioners has placed reliance on following judgments:

(i) Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited Vs. The Workmen & Anr, 1974 (4) SCC 696,(Supreme Court) (paragraph 12)

"12. It is now well-settled that a proceeding under Section 33C (2) is a proceeding, generally, in the nature of an execution proceeding wherein the Labour Court calculates the amount of money due to a workman from his employer, or if the workman is entitled to any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money, the Labour Court proceeds to compute the benefit in terms of money. This calculation or computation follows upon an existing right to the money or benefit, in view of its being previously adjudged, or, otherwise, duly provided for. In Chief Mining Engineer East India Coal Co. Ltd Vs. Rameswar, AIR 1968 SC 218, it was reiterated that proceedings under Section 33C (2) are analogous to execution proceedings and the Labour Court called upon to compute in terms of money the benefit claimed by workmen is in such cases in the position of an executing court. It was also reiterated that the right to the benefit which is sought to be computed must be an existing one, that is to say, already adjudicated upon or provided for and must arise in the course of and in relation to the relationship between an industrial workman and his employer".

(ii) Writ-C No. 11653 of 2004, State of U.P. Thru. Superintending Engineer & Another Vs. Ram Sahai & Another, (this Court) (Paragraphs 9 and 10).

"9. Section 33 commences with the words "whenever a workman is entitled to receive from his employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money" the first condition which has to be shown to exist in order to attract Section 33-C(2) is the entitlement of workman to receive any money or benefit capable of computation in terms of money. The factum of its entitlement has to be an admitted fact but where the very entitlement is in dispute, Section 33-C(2), in my view, would not be attracted for the reason that further question that workman was entitled to receive the said amount but was denied would not arise.

10. In Union of India Vs. Kankuben, AIR 2006 SC 1784 the Apex Court referring to earlier decisions observed that the benefit sought to be enforced under Section 33-C(2) is necessarily "a pre-existing benefit or one flowing from a pre existing-right". The difference between a pre-existing right and benefit on the one hand and right and benefit which is considered just and fair on the other hand is vital. The former comes within the ambit of Section 33-C(2) while latter does not."

(iii) Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. Vs. Umadevi & Ors, 2006 (4) SCC 1, (Supreme Court) (paragraph 47):

"47.Coming to Civil Appeal Nos. 1861-2063 of 2001, in view of our conclusion on the questions referred to, no relief can be granted, that too to an indeterminate number of members of the association. These appointments or engagements were also made in the teeth of directions of the Government not to make such appointments and it is impermissible to recognize such appointments made in the teeth of directions issued by the Government in that regard. We have also held that they are not legally entitled to any such relief. Granting of the relief claimed would mean paying a premium for defiance and insubordination by those concerned who engaged these persons against the interdict in that behalf. Thus, on the whole, the appellants in these appeals are found to be not entitled to any relief. These appeals have, therefore, to be dismissed."

(iv) Rajpat Singh Vs. Veer Singh, Laws (All) 2009-10-63, (this Court) (Paragraph 5).

"5. In view of the decision of the Apex Court it is abundantly clear that while considering the delay condonation application the court has to see the merit of the case also as the law of limitation is not meant to take away the right of Appeal. The courts are known for imparting justice and not to scuttle the process of justice on technicalities. The length of delay is also not very much material if there is a substance on merit. Further once the discretion has been exercised in positive manner then it should not be interfered with unless it is perverse and based on no material."

(v) Vinod Prakash Chaturvedi Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court & Ors, (this Court) 2012 (8) ADJ 298, (paragraph 8)

"8. In another decision in D. Krishnan and another Vs. Special Officer, Vellore Coop. S.M. and another, 2008 (7) SCC 22, with reference to Section 33-C (2) the Court said that the proceedings therein are in the nature of execution and pre-supposses some adjudication leading to determination of a right which has to be enforced. By simply referring to certain documents a disputed claim cannot be allowed to be executed without any adjudication thereof. The Court referred to its earlier decision in State of U.P. and another Vs. Brijpal Singh, 2005 (8) SCC 58 wherein it had held as under:

"It is well-settled that the workman can proceed under Section 33-C(2) only after the Tribunal has adjudicated on a complaint under Section 33-A or on a reference under Section 10 that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified and has set aside that order and reinstated the workman. This Court in the case of Punjab Beverages (P) Ltd. vs. Suresh Chand held that a proceeding under Section 33-C(2) is a proceeding in the nature of execution proceeding in which the Labour Court calculates the amount of money due to a workman from the employer, or, if the workman is entitled to any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money, proceeds to compute the benefit in terms of money. Proceeding further, this Court held that the right to the money which is sought to be calculated or to the benefit which is sought to be computed must be an existing one, that is to say, already adjudicated upon or provided for and must arise in the course of and in relation to the relationship between the industrial workman, and his employer."

6. Submissions on behalf of respondents.

(a) The award dated 30.10.1995 was based on mutual agreement, therefore petitioners are bound to follow the same. The said award for first time has been challenged in the year 2015 by way of filing present petition after a delay of 20 years and such inordinate delay has not been explained, therefore, this petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches only.

(b) According to award, petitioners have to offer appointment on the vacant post and therefore, it is not mandatory for the respondents to participate in the procedure initiated in the year 2006, though he had submitted an application for participation.

(c) The averment regarding tendering of resignation and later on its acceptance is totally false and therefore denied. The respondent no.4 has also made a complaint to S.H.O. Kotwali, Fatehpur on 23.4.2009 in this regard.

(d) As there is already an adjudication on the issue therefore, executing proceedings under section 33-C (2) of Act are maintainable therefore the order dated 10.10.2012 and consequential order of recovery dated 27.3.2014 are legal.

7. Provisions of law involved

Section 33-C (2) of The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is reproduced below:

"(2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government; 1 within a period not exceeding three months:] 2 Provided that where the presiding officer of a Labour Court considers it necessary or expedient so to do, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend such period by such further period as he may think fit.]"

8. Considerartion

(i) Law on the preconditions of applicability of Section 33- C (2) of The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is well settled and for that following judgments are apposite:

(a) Fabril Gasosa Vs. Labour Commissioner & Ors, 1997 (3) SCC 150 (Supreme Court) (paragraph 19):

"19. Section 33-C is in the nature of execution proceedings designed to recover the dues to the workmen. Vide Section 33-C (1) and (2), the legislature has provided a speedy remedy to the workmen to have the benefits of a settlement or award which are due to them and are capable of being computed in terms of money, be recovered through the proceedings under those sub-sections. The distinction between sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) of Section 33-C lies mainly in the procedural aspect and not with any substantive rights of workmen as conferred by these two sub-sections. Sub-section (1) comes into play when on the application of a workman himself or any other person assigned by him in writing in this behalf or his assignee or his heirs in case of his death, the appropriate Government is satisfied that the amounts so claimed are due and payable to that workman. On that satisfaction being arrived at, the Government can initiate action under this sub-section for recovery of the amount provided the amount is a determined one and requires no ''adjudication'. The appropriate Government does not have the power to determine the amount due to any workman under sub-section (1) and that determination can only be done by the Labour Court under sub-section (2) or in a reference under Section 10(1) of the Act. Even after the determination is made by the Labour Court under sub-Section (2) the amount so determined by the Labour Court, can be recovered through the summary and speedy procedure provided by sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) does not control or affect the ambit and operation of sub-section (2) which is wider in scope than sub-section (1). Besides the rights conferred under Section 33-C (2) exist in addition to any other mode of recovery which the workman has under the law. an analysis of the scheme of Sections 33-C (1) and 33-C (2) shows that the difference between the two sub-sections is quite obvious. While the former sub-section deals with cases where money is due to a workman from an employer under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chapter V-A or V-B, sub-section (2) deals with cases where a workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money. Thus, where the amount due to the workmen, flowing from the obligations under a settlement, is pre-determined and ascertained or can be arrived at by any arithmetical calculation or simplicitor verification and the only inquiry that is required to be made is whether it is due to the workman or not, recourse to the summary proceedings under Section 33-C (1) of the Act is not only appropriate but also desirable to prevent harassment to the workmen, sub-section (1) of section 33-C entitles the workmen to apply to the appropriate Government for issuance of a certificate of recovery for any money due to them under an award or a settlement or under the provisions of chapter-VA and the Government, if satisfied, that a specific sum is due to the workmen, is obliged to issue a certificate for the recovery of the amount due. After the requisite certificate is issued by the Government to the collector, the collector is under a statutory duty to recover the amounts due under the certificate issued to him.The procedure is aimed at providing a speedy, cheap and summary manner of recovery of the amount due, which the employer has wrongfully withheld. It, therefore, follows that where money due is on the basis of some amount predetermined like the VDA, the rate of which stands determined in terms of the settlement an award stands determined in terms of the settlement an award or under Chapter V-A or V-B, and the period for which the arrears are claimed is also known, the case would be covered by sub- section (1) as only a calculation of the amount is required to be made."

(b) State Bank of India Vs. Ram Chandra Dubey & Ors, 2001 (1) SCC 73 (Supreme Court) (Para 8).

"8.The principles enunciated in the decisions referred by either side can be summed up as follows:

Whenever a workman is entitled to receive from his employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and which he is entitled to receive from his employer and is denied of such benefit can approach Labour Court under Section 33 C (2) of the Act. The benefit sought to be enforced under Section 33 C (2) of the Act is necessarily a pre-existing benefit or one flowing from a pre-existing right. The difference between a pre-existing right or benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is considered, just and fair on the other hand is vital. The former falls within jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising powers under Section 33 C (2) of the Act while the latter does not. It cannot be spelt out from the award in the present case that such a right or benefit has accrued to the workman as the specific question of the relief granted is confined only to the reinstatement without stating anything more as to the back wages. Hence that relief must be deemed to have been denied, for what is claimed but not granted necessarily gets denied in judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding. Further when a question arises as to the adjudication of a claim for back wages all relevant circumstances which will have to be gone into, are to be considered in a judicious manner. Therefore, the appropriate forum wherein such question of back wages could be decided is only in a proceeding to whom a reference under Section 10 of the Act is made. To state that merely upon reinstatement, a workman would be entitled, under the terms of award, to all his arrears of pay and allowances would be incorrect because several factors will have to be considered, as stated earlier, to find out whether the workman is entitled to back wages at all and to what extent. Therefore, we are of the view that the High Court ought not to have presumed that the award of the Labour Court for grant of back wages is implied in the relief of reinstatement or that the award of reinstatement itself conferred right for claim of back wages."

(emphasis supplied)

(ii) In the present case, award dated 20.10.1995 was on the basis of compromise entered between the then Principal and the respondent no.4 and for the first time it has been challenged in the present writ petition in the year 2015 i.e. after 20 years. There is absolutely no ground which has been canvassed by the petitioners to explain such huge delay and the petitioners have also failed to show that the Principal has no authority to enter into compromise, therefore, the prayer to challenge the award is rejected.

(iii) The issue left for my consideration is whether there is predetermined right which falls under the scope of Section 6H (1) (2) of the Act, 1947/Section 33-C (2) of Act, as per the law discussed in preceding paragraphs?

(iv) The terms of compromise can be summarised as follows:

(A) (a) First preference will be given to respondent no.4 for permanent appointment on the post of Class IV if vacant as on date.

(A) (b) if not, then whenever vacant post of Class IV is available.

(A) (c) if not, then whenever sanction is granted for Class IV post.

(A) (d) if not, then whenever there is surplus or exigency of work.

(B) Respondent no.4 will be appointed permanently within a month whenever situations as mentioned in (A) (a), (A) (b), or (A) (c) is available and to appoint immediately when situation mentioned at (A) (d) is available and later on will give priority to the respondent no.4 in permanent appointment.

(c) Despite availability of any of the above mentioned conditions, the respondent no.4 is not appointed, then he will be entitled to receive entire benefits after one month of such availability.

9. From perusal of such conditions as mentioned above, it is very clear that this is a one sided agreement. However, both the parties have entered into such agreement with open eyes and at this stage, the agreement as it is has to be acted upon. There is no dispute that the respondent no.4 has been allowed to work after the award was published and till he resigned on 03.2.2010 w.e.f. 01.2.2010 and it is also not disputed that the Management has paid for this period from their own sources.

10. Labour Court has proceeded to decide the application on the basis of averment that in July, 2006, two posts of Class IV were advertised and there is no evidence on record to show that respondent no.4 was not willing to join the said post and passed the impugned order.

11. In the pleadings before the Labour Court, the respondent no.4 has asserted that when in July, 2006, two posts of Class IV were advertised, he has applied for the same and thereafter he had also repeatedly communicated for implementation of the award, though no documentary proof in support of this averment has been placed on record.

12. Per contra, petitioners in their reply before the Labour Court have specifically denied the said assertion and mentioned that the respondent no.4 has not applied.

13. In the rejoinder affidavit filed before the Labour Court, the respondent no.4 has specifically stated that in the year 2006, respondent no.4 has not given any application. However, he has stated that he has given an application in pursuance of the advertisement published on 20.2.2006. However, in support of his assertion, no documentary proof has been submitted before the Labour Court. Therefore, there is no conclusive proof that he has applied towards the said advertisement. Findings arrived by the Labour Court that "apni niyukti mein uske anichhuk hone ka koi pramaan nahi hai" is not based on the pleadings as there is no documentary proof on record to substantiate the averments made by the respondent no.4 in this regard. Therefore, the entire basis of the impugned order being not based on the pleadings available before the learned Labour Court is not correct and as such the respondent no.4 is not entitled for any benefit arising out of the agreement, as the respondent no.4 has failed to comply with the conditions of the agreement.

14. From the law, as well as facts of the present case as discussed above in the preceding paragraphs, it is clear that there is no predetermination of right on the basis of the award as the respondent no.4 has failed to apply for the recruitment process initiated in the year 2006 and therefore, the learned Labour Court cannot execute the award under the power of Section 6-H of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Section 33-C (2) of The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Hence, the impugned order dated 10.10.2012 as well as notice dated 27.3.2014, which is consequential order are unsustainable in the eyes of law and hence liable to be set-aside.

15. The petitioners have deposited Rs.1 lakh in pursuance of the order dated 23.12.2015 passed by this Court wherein liberty was granted to withdraw the same by the respondent no.4 without security. In case the respondent no.4 has already withdrawn the same, it shall not be recovered from him and if the said amount is not withdrawn, the same will be returned back to the petitioners along with interest accrued.

16. In view of the above discussions, the order dated 10.10.2012 passed by the respondent no.2 and notice dated 27.3.2014 issued by the respondent no.3 are set-aside and the writ petition is partially allowed in terms of the above directions.

Order Date :-15.5.2019-SB

(Saurabh Shyam Shamshery,J)