M/S International Cycle ... vs The Commissioner, Commercial Tax
2019 Latest Caselaw 346 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 

Reserved/A.F.R.
 
In Chamber
 
Case :- SALES/TRADE TAX REVISION No. - 277 of 2018
 
Applicant :- M/S International Cycle Industries
 
Opposite Party :- The Commissioner, Commercial Tax
 
Counsel for Applicant :- Rahul Agarwal
 
Counsel for Opposite Party :- C.S.C.
 

 
Hon'ble Saumitra Dayal Singh,J.

1. The present revision has been filed by the assessee for the A.Y. 2012-13 under Section 58 of the U.P. Value Added Tax Act, 2008 (hereinafter referred to as the ''Act').

2. The following questions of law are involved in the present revision:

"(i) Whether the order of the Tribunal below in sustaining the remand of the matters for A.Y. 2012-13 (U.P.) by the first appellate authority despite the application dated 13.06.2017 moved by the revisionist for its withdrawal and without there being any request made by the department for enhancement of assessment is contrary to the provisions of Section 55 of the U.P. VAT Act and the principle of law laid down in R.R. Bricks Factory Vs. CST; 2004 STC (137) 294 (All) and Orissa Cement Ltd. Vs. State of Orissa and Others; 1988 STC (70) 254 (Ori.) ?

(ii) Whether the order of the Tribunal below in sustaining the direction of the first appellate authority that the assessment for A.Y. 2012-13 (Central) be also carried out once again by the assessing authority, despite the assessment order in A.Y. 2012-13 (Central) not being a subject matter of appeal is illegal and contrary to law ?"

3. The facts giving rise to the present revision may be noted first. The assessee/appellant is a manufacturer of bicycle spokes. On 21.01.2013 (during A.Y. 2012-13), the appellant's business premises were subjected to survey by the Special Investigation Branch of the Commercial Tax Department wherein certain documents etc. were seized. A show cause was issued by the Special Investigation Branch (SIB), to which replies were submitted. Subsequently, assessment proceedings were taken up against the assessee for the A.Y. 2012-13 (U.P.). Those were concluded by order dated 31.10.2014. The assessing officer rejected the books of account of the assessee and made additions under the heads: undisclosed purchase of raw material (Rs. 45,00,000/-); undisclosed purchase of packing material from unregistered dealers (Rs. 1,00,000/-) and undisclosed intra-state sale of bicycle spokes (Rs. 51,93,505/-). The said additions were subjected to tax @ 5% resulting in total disputed tax, Rs. 4,89,675/-. The assessee challenged the aforesaid additions in first first appeal No. 1092 of 2014. Some hearing also took place on 10.04.2017 and written submissions were also filed in that appeal on 29.12.2016. In such circumstances, while final the decision in the appeal was still awaited, the assessee filed an application on 13.06.2017 and prayed for that appeal to be dismissed as withdrawn.

4. The first appeal authority did not pass any order in the appeal, either on the merits or on the withdrawal application so filed by the assessee on 13.06.2017. In fact, he issued a notice dated 20.06.2017 described it to be one under Section 55(5)(2)(ii) of the Act. He took note of the application filed by the assessee to withdraw his appeal but required the assessee to show cause (on four points to determine whether the assessee had been under-assessed to tax), before any order may be passed on its application to withdraw the aforesaid appeal. The points on which the assessee was required to show cause are relevant to facts discovered by the SIB during the survey dated 21.01.2013.

5. At that stage, the assessee filed a second application on 05.12.2017, again praying to dismiss its appeal as withdrawn. In that application, it was also stated that the notice dated 20.06.2017 was not referable to any provision of law as there did not exist on the statute book, Section 55(5)(2)(ii).

6. Apparently, after receipt of such reply, the first appeal authority issued another notice dated 07.12.2017, describing it to be one under Section 55(5)(a)(ii) of the Act. The substance of the notice and its purpose remained the same as noted above, with respect to the earlier notice dated 20.06.2017.

7. In the meantime, the assessing authority responded to the earlier notice issued by the appeal authority dated 20.06.2017. By his reply dated 05.12.2017, the assessing authority stated, additions had been made in the original assessment in the case of the assessee on the basis of facts discovered by the SIB during the survey dated 20.01.2013. On the question of under assessment, the assessing officer stated, a final opinion may be formed only after reconciling the seized documents with the books of account of the assessee. Thus, the assessing authority did not take a stand as to the allegation of under assessment.

8. It is in such facts that the appeal authority decided on merits, the appeal of the assessee for the A.Y. 2012-13 (U.P.), by his order dated 14.12.2017. In that order, the appeal authority observed, the assessee had filed an application to not press his appeal after the first appeal authority had proposed to make enhancement on the basis of two documents seized during the survey dated 20.01.2013. In view of such fact, the application to not press the appeal, was not considered and notice under Section 55(5)(2)(ii) of the Act was issued to the assessee on 20.06.2017. While extracting the contents of that notice, the appeal authority referred to the notice dated 20.06.2017 as one issued under Section 55(5)(a)(ii) of the Act.

9. While, response of the assessee to the aforesaid notice was also noted in the order being reiteration of the request to dismiss the appeal is not pressed, it was further noted that in response to the comments called from the assessing authority the non-commitant stand taken by the officer (as already noted above), was also recorded.

10. Thereafter, the first appeal authority observed, his predecessor had upon hearing the appeal discovered under-assessment in the case of assessee, for which reason, he had found the application filed by the assessee to not press the appeal to be unacceptable. Therefore he had issued the notice under Section 55(5) of the Act to the assessee. Then, referring to the stand taken by the assessing officer that clarification with respect to under-assessment may be made only after reconciliation of the seized material with the regular books of account of the assessee, it has been further noted that the assessee has not given any reply on merits on the four points noted in the notice issued under Section 55(5) of the Act.

11. After recording such fact, the appeal authority recorded its own conclusion that the question of under-assessment may be decided/determined only after examination of the material seized by the SIB along with regular books of account of the assessee. Thereafter, the appeal authority specifically referred to point no.3 of the notice issued under Section 55(5) of the Act being 'Parcha' no.4 with reference to seized Exhibit no.2 pertaining to transportation of 220 packings of bicycle spokes from Delhi to Vallabhgarh. The appeal authority noted that the said transaction had been accepted in the assessment proceedings for the A.Y. 2012-13 (Central) and that respect to which, there was no appeal filed by the assessee. In such fact, the appeal authority specifically recorded its finding that such transaction represented undisclosed Central sale made by the assessee and to that extent, there was under-assessment of Central Sales Tax.

12. The first appeal authority further observed, the assessee had not furnished any reply on the above count and the assessing authority had desired an opportunity to re-examine the issue. Therefore, referring to provisions of Section 29(9) of the Act, a direction was issued to the assessing authority to initiate proceedings under Section 29(9) under the Central Act for A.Y. 2012-13 (Central). However, with respect to the A.Y. 2012-13 (U.P.), the appeal authority allowed the assessee's appeal and remitted the matter to the assessing authority to pass afresh assessment order in light of the directions issued by him.

13. Against that order, the assessee filed second appeal before the Tribunal that came to be rejected by the impugned order. The Tribunal upheld the direction of remand on the reasoning that the assessee had failed to give any specific factual reply to the notice issued by the first appeal authority proposing to make enhancement while the assessing authority had prayed for opportunity to re-examine the seized material in light of the regular books of account of the assessee. The Tribunal therefore opined in such circumstance the direction for fresh assessment for A.Y. 2012-13 (U.P.) was wholly justified. It distinguished the decision of this Court in the case of R.R. Brick Factory Vs. Commissioner Of Sales Tax reported in 2004 (137) STC 297 (All) by stating, that was a case under the U.P. Sales Tax Act while the present case had arisen under the U.P. VAT Act, 2007.

14. It further observed that in the case of R.R. Brick Factory Vs. Commissioner Of Sales Tax (supra), no request had been made by the assessing officer while in the present case, the assessing officer had requested to be allowed an opportunity to re-examine the books of account of the assessee in light of the seized material. It distinguished the other decision in the case of Orissa Cement Limited and Another Vs. The State of Orissa and Others reported in 1988 (70) STC 254 (Ori.) and a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Bansal Wire Ind. Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. reported in 2011 NTN DX (46) 43 on facts.

15. Thereafter, the Tribunal also referred to 'Parcha' no. 4 with reference to seized Exhibit no.2 pertaining to transportation of 220 packings of bicycle spokes from Delhi to Vallabhgarh, on which, the first appeal authority had opined, it represented undisclosed turnover under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the ''Central Act'). Referring to Section 29(9) of the Act, the Tribunal specifically upheld the direction issued by the first appeal authority with respect to re-assessment required to be made for the A.Y. 2012-13 (Central). Consequently and on other reasoning, the assessee's second appeal was rejected.

16. Assailing the approach and the findings recorded by the first appeal authority as upheld by the Tribunal, the learned counsel for the assessee submits, in the first place, once the assessee had filed an application on 13.06.2017, the appeal authority had to allow that application inasmuch as on that date, there was no request pending before it by the Commissioner/competent departmental authority, to examine the legality or propriety of the assessment order that was under appeal before the first appeal authority.

17. Heavy reliance has been placed on the provisions of Section 55(5) of the Act to submit, option given to the assessee/appellant to withdraw his first appeal was nearly absolute and it was subject only to one limitation being, on the date of the application to withdraw the appeal being filed, there should not be found pending before the first appeal authority any request made on behalf of the competent departmental authority to examine the legality or propriety of the order under appeal.

18. Alternatively, it has been submitted, the first appeal was for the A.Y. 2012-13 (U.P.) and admittedly, no appeal had been preferred by the assessee for the A.Y. 2012-13 (Central). In absence of categorical finding being recorded, the order passed by the first appeal authority cannot be described as one referable to the powers of the first appeal authority under Section 55(5)(a)(ii) of the Act inasmuch as for such an order to arise, the appeal authority must have varied by either reducing or enhancing the amount of assessment. In the present case, the appeal authority had only expressed the possibility of such enhancement arising after reconciliation of the seized material with the regular books of account of the assessee.

19. Then, it has also been submitted, in any case, there was no jurisdiction with the first appeal authority to make any observation requiring a re-assessment to be made in the case of the assessee for the A.Y. 2012-13 (Central) inasmuch as no appeal for that year was before the first appeal authority and the facts of that case were not in issue in the appeal for the A.Y. 2012-13 (U.P.), which was before the appeal authority.

20. Last, reliance has been placed on the provisions of Section 29(9) of the Act to submit, no power exists under that provision to allow for a re-assessment to arise for the assessment year whose facts are not in issue in the matter heard by the higher appeal authority or the court. Therefore, there never arose any jurisdiction or justification to issue directions in terms of Section 29(9) of the Act.

21. Sri B.K. Pandey, learned Standing Counsel has submitted that in the first place, the assessing authority had requested to the first appeal authority to remand the matter to re-examine the seized material in light of the books of account of the assessee. Such request was made by the assessing officer on 05.12.2017. Therefore, it is submitted that there is no force in the submission advanced by learned counsel for the assessee that the assessee had acquired a near absolute right to withdraw the appeal.

22. Alternatively, he would submit that in any case, the option given to the assessee to withdraw his appeal at any stage, cannot curtail the powers of the appeal authority itself to vary the assessment order. According to him, such an application cannot preclude the first appeal authority from exercising its power otherwise vested under Section 55(5)(a)(ii) of the Act. Thus, even in absence of any request by the Commissioner to examine the legality or propriety of the assessment order under appeal, the appeal authority could itself propose to vary the assessment order including to enhance the assessment. Once that power was invoked by the appeal authority, the application, if any, filed by the assessee to withdraw his appeal would loose its significance. The assessee cannot have a right to defeat the jurisdiction and authority of the appeal authority, to enhance the assessment.

23. As to the submission advanced by learned counsel for the assessee that there is no finding of enhancement, therefore, the order passed by the appeal authority is not referable to Section 55(5)(a)(ii) of the Act and that the notice dated 20.06.2017 described it to be under Section 55(5)(2)(ii) of the Act is a nullity, it has been submitted, mere wrong description of a section in the notice would not invalidate the same. Insofar as the notice dated 20.06.2017 is clearly referable to the powers vested with the first appellate authority under Section 55(5)(a)(ii) of the Act and inasmuch as it clearly refers to enhancement proposed to be made, no benefit can be had by the assessee because of a typographical error in the description of section under which, the notice dated 20.06.2017 had been issued.

24. Then, with respect to the order passed by the first appeal authority, it has been submitted that though a notice was issued by the first appeal authority proposing to make enhancement to the assessment for the A.Y. 2012-13, in absence of any reply being furnished by the assessee and also in view of the stand taken by the assessing authority that a re-examination of the seized material in light of the regular books of account of the assessee would be required before any conclusion may be drawn as to under-assessment, the appeal authority in all fairness, did not exercise its power under Section 55(5)(a)(ii) of the Act but in fact, he chose to pass an order that is referable to Section 55(5)(iii) of the Act. He has allowed the appeal and set aside the order with a direction to the assessing authority to pass a fresh assessment order in light of the directions issued by him.

25. It is then submitted, merely because a notice may have been issued under Section 55(5)(a)(ii) of the Act, it did not imply that the appeal authority must necessarily vary the assessment himself.

26. As to the further submission advanced by learned counsel for the assessee that no direction could have been issued to make assessment for the A.Y. 2012-13 (Central), learned Standing Counsel would submit that the language of Section 29(9) of the Act is very clear and it lies with the higher authority to ensure that no part of revenue escapes assessment.

27. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, in the first place, it requires examination whether upon filing the application dated 13.06.2017, the assessee had acquired any right to withdraw the appeal inasmuch as the language of proviso to Section 55(5) of the Act is clear, the answer may be found in that provision itself and no general principle of law either under any other or special law is relevant. The nature of the right given to the assessee was examined by this Court in the case of R.R. Brick Factory Vs. Commissioner Of Sales Tax (supra). Though it is true, in that case, the Court had the occasion to consider the language of the proviso to Section 9(3)(b) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, however, it cannot be denied that the language of proviso to Section 55(5) of the Act is pari materia in material aspect i.e. as to the effect of a proper application filed to Section 9(3)(b) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948.

28. The first difference in the language of two provisions appears to be, under the Central Act, the person/authority who could make the 'request' and defeat the right of the assessee to withdraw his appeal was not specified. It could be made by any authority. Only requirement was it (request), had to exist for the purpose of making the enhancement of tax or penalty as the case may be whereas under the VAT Act that request may be made by the Commissioner (as defined under the Act). It includes within its meaning officers of the rank of Joint Commissioner and above. Second, the request now required to be made not with respect to enhancement but to examine the legality or propriety of the order under appeal. However, as to the effect of the application being moved in absence of such request, the two provisions are pari materia.

29. In the case of R.R. Brick Factory Vs. Commissioner Of Sales Tax (supra), the assessee had filed an application to withdraw his appeal pending before the first appeal authority, which was opposed by the departmental representative on the ground - presumably it was a case of under-assessment and therefore, a further inquiry was initiated, which was also pending. Therefore, the department approached the appeal authority to decide the appeal on merits. In such fact, the appeal authority recorded a finding that the assessing authority had not properly recorded its finding on certain aspects having bearing on the determination of the turnover and therefore he remitted the matter to the assessing authority to re-frame the assessment.

30. In those facts, this Court observed, under the proviso to Section 9(3)(b) of the Central Act, the appeal authority was not empowered to allow the appeal and set aside the assessment in face of the application to withdraw the appeal. At most, the appeal authority could have dismissed the appeal. It was specifically held that in any view, the order allowing the appeal against the wishes of the appellant could not be sustained. Such finding is found recorded in paragraph 7 of the report.

31. That being the interpretation made by this Court, it is seen, in the instant case also, there did not exist any positive request made by any other officer of the rank of Joint Commissioner and above to the first appeal authority at any stage, to examine the legality or propriety of the order under appeal. The notice issued by the first appeal authority dated 20.06.2017 and 07.12.2017 cannot ever be read as request made to the appeal authority inasmuch as for a request to arise to the appeal authority, it must be by another authority, namely the 'Commissioner'. There was no such request made.

32. The subject/context contained in the response given by the assessing authority dated 05.12.2017 also not relevant for the purpose of the proviso to Section 55(5) of the Act inasmuch as it did not contain any request to examine the legality or propriety of the order under appeal. It only contained a bald recital that the matter may be remitted to the assessing authority so that a fresh examination of the seized material may be made by that authority. Clearly, such a prayer fell outside the scope of the proviso under consideration. The assessing officer did not question or doubt the legality or propriety of the order under appeal and therefore, there did not arise any presumption in that regard.

33. Once the assessment had been made by the assessing authority, no power survived with him to either directly review that order or to ask any authority to be permitted him to review the same. The assessing authority did not have a right to defeat the withdrawal application filed by the assessee.

34. Only the 'Commissioner' as defined under the Act could oppose such application by requesting the appeal authority on the basis of any illegality or impropriety that may be pointed out in the order under appeal, but not otherwise. Therefore, the written request made by the assessing authority/Deputy Commissioner who was clearly of rank below the Joint Commissioner (to be permitted to review the assessment order), was not maintainable. It could not be relied to reject the withdrawal application filed by the assessee to withdraw his appeal. Therefore as a fact, there did not exist any request in terms of the proviso to Section 55(5) of the Act. The findings to the contrary are perverse and based on a complete misreading of the provision of law.

35. In the context of the right given to the assessee/appellant to withdraw his appeal, it is seen, the proviso though does not expressly over ride the main part of the Section 55(5) of the Act, however, it preserves the power of the appeal authority to allow the assessee to withdraw his appeal at any stage and that power is not precluded by any part of the main sub-section 5 of Section 55 of the Act. Here, it may be relevant to extract Section 55(5) of the VAT Act.

36. Section 55(5) of the VAT Act is held as below:

"Section 55(5). The appellate authority may, after calling for and examining the relevant records and after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the appellant and the Commissioner -

(a) in the case of an order of assessment and penalty -

(i) confirm or annul such order; or

(ii) vary such order by reducing or enhancing the amount of assessment or penalty, as the case may be, whether such reduction or enhancement arises from a point raised in the grounds of appeal or otherwise; or

(iii) set aside the order and direct the assessing authority to pass a fresh order after such inquiry as may be specified; or

(iv) direct the assessing authority to make such inquiry and to submit its report within such time as may be specified in the direction or within such extended time as it may allow from to time, and on the expiration of such time the appellate authority may, whether the report has been submitted or not decide the appeal in accordance with the provisions of the preceding sub-clauses; or

(b) in the case of any other order -

(i) confirm, cancel or vary such order; or

(ii) set aside the order and direct the assessing authority to pass a fresh order after such inquiry as may be specified:

Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall preclude the appellate authority from dismissing the appeal at any stage with such observation as it deems fit where the appellant applies for withdrawal of the same and no request for examination of legality or propriety of order under appeal has been made by the Commissioner."

37. The legislature appears to have been conscious of the fact that an appeal that may be filed by the assessee may be at different stages of hearing before the first appeal authority when the appellant-assessee may choose to withdraw his appeal. Therefore, the proviso to Section 55(5) of the Act clearly states, the appeal authority may allow the appeal to be dismissed as withdrawn "at any stage" of the appeal. The only rider that has been placed being while doing so, the appeal authority may have the right to make such observations as it may deem fit.

38. This right has been given to the assessee-appellant and preserved in the face of the power given to the appeal authority under Section 55(5)(a)(ii) and (iii) of the Act, to vary the order under appeal by enhancing the same or to set aside the same. It has been further clarified under the proviso that the option given to the assessee to withdraw is precluded by anything contained in the main part of sub-section (5) of Section 55 of the Act. Therefore, it has to be held, in absence of any request to examine the legality or propriety of the order under appeal (as contemplated under sub proviso to Section 55(5) of the Act), the appeal authority could only have dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee with such observation as may have been permissible in law. However, the appeal authority could not have rejected the application moved by the assessee to withdraw his appeal, even though part hearing may have taken place in the appeal.

39. Also, in the facts of the present case, it remains undisputed that though the appeal had been heard on 29.12.2016 and perhaps on 10.04.2017, no notice proposing to make enhancement was issued prior to 20.06.2017. Though I am not inclined to accept the submission advanced by learned counsel for the assessee that the notice dated 20.06.2017 was a nullity since it referred to non-existent section under which it had been issued, however, assuming the same to be the first notice proposing to make enhancement as may be referable to sub-section 5 of Section 55(a)(ii) of the Act, at the same time, it is undisputed that the assessee had filed his application to withdraw the appeal on 13.06.2017, earlier in time. Therefore, in view of the conclusion reached by this Court in the case of R.R. Brick Factory Vs. Commissioner Of Sales Tax (supra) the appeal could not be decided on merits, against the wishes of the appellant. The appeal authority could only have dismissed the appeal as withdrawn with such observations as it may have deemed fit.

40. Then, interestingly, after rejecting the assessee's application to withdraw the appeal, the appeal authority did not pass the final order with reference to his powers under Section 55(5)(a)(ii) of the Act. It has not made any enhancement to the assessed turnover of the assessee. He has not varied the turnover assessed. Therefore, even if it is assumed, there existed any power with the appeal authority to decide assessee's appeal on merits even then, the appeal order could not be justified on that reasoning inasmuch as the eventual order passed by the appeal authority is not to enhance the assessment but to set aside the same which is referable to Section 55(5)(iii) of the Act.

41. That order, by very nature, in the first place, is an order in favour of the assessee inasmuch as it was the assessee alone who challenged the assessment order on specific grounds. It would be for the appeal authority to accept those grounds and allow the appeal and thus set aside the assessment order. However, at the same time, to protect the interest of the revenue, the power has been given to the appeal authority to thereafter remand the matter for the purpose of making fresh assessment. Unless the assessment order is first set aside, there can never arise a situation where the appeal authority may allow for a fresh assessment.

42. Therefore, once the assessee filed an application to withdraw his appeal, in view of that right having been given to him under the proviso to Section 55(5) of the Act, the assessee had validly interjected the appeal authority's inquiry and clearly signified his intent to not press any ground of challenge raised by him, in his appeal. The assessee thus successfully prevented the appeal authority from passing any order in his favour that may further allow the appeal authority to issue any directions for the purpose of conduct of a fresh inquiry for the purpose of making fresh assessment. To that extent, findings recorded in the earlier decision of this Court in the case of R.R. Brick Factory Vs. Commissioner Of Sales Tax (supra) is pertinent inasmuch as it had been held as below:

"In any view of the matter the order allowing the appeal against the wishes of the appellant cannot be sustained even by invoking the said proviso."

43. Therefore, the appeal authority had no jurisdiction surviving in him to pass any order referable to Section 55(5)(iii) of the Act after the assessee had filed an application to withdraw his appeal and there was no request made by the Commissioner to examine the legality or propriety of the order under appeal.

44. The only course that survived with the appeal authority was to have dismissed the appeal as withdrawn with such observations as it may have deemed fit. For the consequences of those provisions to arise, the provisions of Section 29(9) of the Act provides for limitation. However, by virtue of Section 29(9) of the Act existing on the statute book, no fresh or other power arises to the appeal authority to pass any order, to either set aside the assessment order under appeal or to provide for fresh inquiry in any manner with respect to that assessment. That provision only provides for limitation. The powers of the appeal authority are governed by the provisions of Section 55 of the Act and it would be wholly impermissible and erroneous to refer to Section 29(9) of the Act to infer existence of any larger or other powers to the appeal authority. The reliance placed by the learned Standing Counsel on Section 29(9) of the Act in that regard, is wholly misconceived.

45. As to the direction issued by the appeal authority for the purpose of making assessment for the A.Y. 2012-13 (Central) is concerned, it is seen, admittedly, that assessment order was not in appeal before the appeal authority. Further, in any case, even according to the reasoning offered by the first appeal authority, no part of the inter-state transaction for the A.Y. 2012-13 (Central) had been assessed to tax in the order for the A.Y. 2012-13 (U.P.).

46. Therefore, since that matter was not in appeal before the appeal authority and those facts had not been examined in the context of the original assessment order, no direction could have been issued to re-open that assessment. No conclusion to that effect is found to have been recorded either in the order of the appeal authority or the Tribunal. Therefore, those observations appear to be clearly beyond jurisdiction.

47. Consequently, question nos.1 and 2 are answered in affirmative that is in favour of the assessee and against the revenue.

48. In view of the discussions made above, the order passed by the Tribunal and the first appeal authority are set aside and the matter is remitted to the first appeal authority to pass a fresh order, in accordance with law.

49. The present revision thus stands allowed.

Order date :- 01.03.2019

Abhilash