Rishi Chauhan vs State Of U.P. And Another
2018 Latest Caselaw 3010 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 

Reserved
 
Court No. - 53								A.F.R.
 

 
Case :- CRIMINAL REVISION No. - 1770 of 2017
 

 
Revisionist :- Rishi Chauhan
 
Opposite Party :- State Of U.P. And Another
 
Counsel for Revisionist :- Raghuvansh Misra
 
Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.,Kuldeep Singh Yadav
 
Hon'ble J.J. Munir,J.

1. The revisionist insists that he is a child - a child in conflict with law within the meaning of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Court no.1, Mainpuri has disagreed with his contention vide an order dated 27.03.2017 made in Criminal Appeal no.46 of 2016 filed under Section 101 of the Act by opposite party no.2, Sarvendra Singh, and found him to be an adult on the date of commission of the offence, giving rise to Case Crime no.769 of 2018, under Section 302 IPC, Police Station Kotwali, District Mainpuri. The revisionist had persuaded the Juvenile Justice Board, Mainpuri in Misc. Enquiry no.55 of 2015, State vs. Rishi Chauhan, relating to the case crime under reference, to find him a juvenile on the date of occurrence, by their order dated 16.09.2016 that has since been reversed in appeal. The event in the appeal before the Additional Sessions Judge has brought the revisionist to this Court under Section 102 of the Act, asking that the order of the Juvenile Justice Board be restored, and, that of the Appellate Court set aside.

2. Heard Sri Raghuvansh Misra, learned counsel for the revisionist, Sri Kuldeep Singh Yadav, learned counsel appearing on behalf of opposite party no. 2 and Sri Nitin Kesarwani, learned A.G.A. on behalf of the State.

3. Looking to the nature of the issue involved in the orders under challenge, the details of the prosecution case or the evidence appearing against the revisionist are not of much relevance. It would suffice to mention that in substance the prosecution case against the revisionist is that on 18.08.2015, Sushil Chauhan, and, his son Rishi Chauhan, abused the son and the son-in-law of the informant followed by assault, employing sticks (Danda blows) to batter the son of the informant, Nitesh. Nitesh was dragged over to their house by the assailants and done to death. It is on the basis of the said occurrence that the present crime was registered at the instance of opposite party no.2, Sarvendra Singh at Police Station Kotwali, District Mainpuri, leading to the revisionist being remanded to custody pending trial.

4. An application was made to the Juvenile Justice Board, Meerut, and, hereinafter referred to as the 'Board' on behalf of the revisionist, claiming that on the date of incident he was below 18 years of age, and, therefore, had a right to be dealt with as a child in conflict with law (for short 'child'). In support of that application, the revisionist relied upon as the star documents on his secondary school certificate grade sheet, and the certificate issued by the Central Board of Secondary Education, New Delhi, that show his date of birth to be 16.05.1998. Reckoning the revisionist's age on that basis, he claimed to be 17 years 3 months and 2 days, on the date of occurrence, and, supported his application, laying claim to juvenility by an affidavit. He filed on record, his secondary school examination certificate before the Board, which shows that he had passed his secondary school certificate examination or the more familiar description of it, the High School Examination, from the U.P. Sainik School, Sarojini Nagar, Lucknow. In order to prove the document last mentioned during enquiry before the Board, an employee of the U.P. Sainik School, Sarojini Nagar, Lucknow, one Devesh Kumar was produced. He was examined before the Board as CW-1. He said in his deposition that in order to prove the date of birth of Rishi Chauhan, the revisionist here, a one time student of the School last mentioned, he had appeared along the S.R. Register maintained by the School, the admission form relating to Class VII, and, the transfer certificate dated 30.04.2009 in original, issued by Blooming Buds Public School, Mainpuri, all in respect of the revisionist. All the aforesaid documents were duly proved by the witness aforesaid, and, exhibited. The witness was also cross-examined by the prosecution.

5. The revisionist further examined in support of his age a clerk from the Blooming Buds Public School, Mainpuri, one Subhash Chandra Mishra as CW-2. He took stand in the dock and stated that in regard to the date of birth of Rishi Chauhan, a one time student of the Blooming Buds Public School, Mainpuri, he had brought along the S.R. Register in original, where the date of birth of the revisionist in the relevant column had some erasure by a blade and overwriting, whereafter it was written as 16.05.1998. In addition, the document showed that in the entry of withdrawal of the scholar, where Class VIth was written, there was again some erasure with overwriting done. Also, erasure and overwriting were seen in column no.15. The witness after proving the admission and withdrawal register, and, the admission form filed, duly proved authenticated copies of the same, that were exhibited. The said witness was cross-examined by the learned counsel for the informant, who said in his cross-examination that along with the admission form, transfer certificate from the school last attended is generally enclosed, but in case of the revisionist, the transfer certificate from the School earlier attended was not attached on an assurance that it would be done, that remained a promise unkept. He said that he was not in a position to say, as to what was the child's birth in his Primary Transfer Certificate. On being further cross-examined, the witness said that he had brought the original S.R. Register of the School, where column no.620 indicated the date of admission as 15.07.2007, wherein the date of birth was entered as 16.05.1998, but the figure 8 has been erased and overwritten, by someone he was not in a position to say. There were some other overwritten entries too, as acknowledged in the cross-examination by the witness. The witness also stated that he was not aware where the child had done his Classes Ist, IInd & IIIrd, nor did he have any certificate in the records of his School, in that regard. The Board have recorded that the witness said in the last part of his cross-examination, to a suggestion made, that it was wrong to say that the concerned employee in his School establishment, had fraudulently tampered the date of birth to 16.05.1998.

6. At this stage there being overwriting in the records of one of the Schools about the date of birth, the informant demanded that the child be sent for a medical evaluation of his age. Shorn of avoidable detail in this regard, the application was allowed and the child was subjected to a medical estimation of his age, where in the report of the Radiologist, he was indicated to be 21 years. The Radiologist, Dr. R.B. Singh, deposed in the witness box as CW-2, and, was cross-examined. He stood by the report, and, the medical estimation of the child's age, there.

7. There is also on record educational certificates of the child from a certain Mahatma Gandhi Public School, New Gariwan, Mainpuri as Papers no.8-B/2 and 8-B/3. The Principal of the said School was summoned by the Board by an order dated 03.08.2016 not on the application, either of the informant or the child, but by the Board suo motu. The witness was summoned to prove those testimonials, so to speak as a court witness. In response to an order in this regard made by the Board on 03.08.2016, the Principal of the Mahatma Gandhi Public School, New Gariwan, Mainpuri, Uma Sharma appeared as CW-4, and, testified before the Board. She said in her deposition that she had appeared before the Board, to prove records relating to the date of birth of the child, a former student of her School. She stated that the child was admitted to her School to Class IIIrd on 05.07.2005; that she had admitted him in her School on the basis of a T.C. from the School earlier attended, wherefrom he had passed his Class IInd; that the said institution from where the child had passed Class IInd, and, filed his T.C. at the time of admission was Pandit Shyam Lal Public School, Mainpuri. The witness stated that the S.R. Register in column no.47 indicated the name of the child as Rishi Chauhan and his date of birth as 16.05.1998; and, that she had brought along the original T.C. relating to her School. On the evidence of the said witness relative documents for the child, being an extract of the S.R. Register, were marked as Ex. 23A, and, the Transfer Certificate as Ex. 22A/4, and, made part of the record.

8. CW-4 was cross-examined by learned counsel for the first informant. She said in her cross-examination that the child had not read in her School in Class 1st and 2nd; that she had given her testimony on the basis of the transfer certificate issued by the School last attended by the child, that is to say, Pandit Shyam Lal Prathmik Vidyalaya, Mainpuri, where he had done his Class 2nd. Her further cross-examination shows that her credit was sought to be impeached by the learned counsel for the first informant by confronting her with her previous statement, but generally speaking, it comes out from her cross-examination that she had admitted the child to Class IIIrd, and, entered his date of birth as 16.05.1998 on the basis of the transfer certificate, issued by Pandit Shyam Lal Prathmik Vidyalaya, Mainpuri, wherefrom he had passed his Class 2nd.

9. The Juvenile Justice Board in applying the criteria to determine the age of the child took note of the fact that the occurrence was one dated 18.08.2015 and by time the matter came up for enquiry before the Board, the Act had come into force on 15.01.2016 repealing the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act of 2000, and, hereinafter, referred to as the 'Act of 2000'. The law applicable to the determination of age of a child in conflict with law under the Act of 2000 was governed by the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Rules'. However, after the Act came into force, the Rules determining the age of a child in conflict with law found place in the Act, vide Section 94(2) of the Act.

10. The provisions governing determination of age under the Rule 12(3) of the Rules on the one hand, and, under Section 94(2) of the Act are different about the relative priority, that the more or less common criteria would have in the matter of determination of age. That difference may be best appreciated by a juxtaposition of the provisions of Rule 12(3) of the Rules, and, Section 94(2) of the Act, that read thus:

"12. Procedure to be followed in determination of Age.- (1) x x x x

(2) x x x x x

(3) In every case concerning a child or juvenile in conflict with law, the age determination inquiry shall be conducted by the Court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee by seeking evidence by obtaining -

(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available; and in the absence whereof;

(ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof;

(iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat;

(b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of Clause (a) above, the medical opinion will be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board, which will declare the age of the juvenile or child. In case exact assessment of the age cannot be done, the Court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee, for the reasons to be recorded by them, may, if considered necessary, give benefit to the child or juvenile by considering his/her age on lower side within the margin of one year.

and, while passing orders in such case shall, after taking into consideration such evidence as may be available or the medical opinion, as the case may be, record a finding in respect of his age and either of the evidence specified in any of the Clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii) or in the absence whereof, Clause (b) shall be the conclusive proof of the age as regards such child or the juvenile in conflict with law.

(4) x x x x x

(5) x x x x x

(6) x x x x x"

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

"94. Presumption and determination of age. - 1. x x x x x

2. In case, the Committee or the Board has reasonable grounds for doubt regarding whether the person brought before it is a child or not, the Committee or the Board, as the case may be, shall undertake the process of age determination, by seeking evidence by obtaining --

i. the date of birth certificate from the school, or the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned examination Board, if available; and in the absence thereof;

ii. the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat;

iii. and only in the absence of (i) and (ii) above, age shall be determined by an ossification test or any other latest medical age determination test conducted on the orders of the Committee or the Board:

Provided such age determination test conducted on the order of the Committee or the Board shall be completed within fifteen days from the date of such order.

3. The age recorded by the Committee or the Board to be the age of person so brought before it shall, for the purpose of this Act, be deemed to be the true age of that person."

11. It is noticeable on a comparison of the provisions of Rule 12(3) of the Rules, and, Section 94(2) of the Act, that in case of Rule 12(3) of the Rules, the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available, had a distinct priority above the other criteria for determination of age, mentioned under Rule 12(3)(a)(ii), 3(a)(iii) and 12(3)(b). It is clear that under Rule 12(3), where a matriculation or equivalent certificate was available, the date of birth certificate from the school could not be looked into. In case, the matriculation or equivalent certificate was not available, the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended, would serve as the basis of determination. On facts of the present case, since other criteria may not be of much relevance, it would be profitable to confine the close comparison to the differential criteria under Rule 12(3) of the Rules, and, Section 94(2) of the Act with regard to matriculation or equivalent certificate and the date of birth certificate issued by the School.

12. The one definitive change brought about by Section 94(2) of the Act is that the date of birth certificate from the school, or the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned Examination Board, if available, have been classed together in one category, and, would carry equal weight by contrast to the position under Rule 12(3) of the Rules. The presence of matriculation certificate or equivalent certificate would not exclude the date of birth certificate from the school as a relevant criteria. Likewise, the legislature has made a change to the phraseology about the birth certificate from the school, as mentioned in Rule 12(3) of the Rules, and, that mentioned under Section 94(2)(i) by consciously omitting the words "other than a play school" that found place in Rule 12(3)(ii) of the Rules, and, also omitting the very decisive words "first attended", to qualify the school issuing the date of birth certificate. It is a well established cannon of statutory interpretation, that in case of a successor statute, where a phraseology different from one used in the predecessor statute is employed by the legislature, while enacting a provision pari materia to that in the predecessor statute, the legislative intendment must be inferred to pronounce a change in the law.

13. This is, particularly, true when the successor statute, in the recast phraseology, deletes certain words that were there in the predecessor. In this connection, it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd. (3) vs. Bombay Environmental Action Group and others, (2006) 3 SCC 434, thus:

"90. It is also a fundamental proposition of construction that the effect of deletion of words must receive serious consideration while interpreting a statute as this has been repeatedly affirmed by this Court in a series of judgments. (See CIT V. Bhogilal Laherchand, 1954 SCR 444 : AIR 1954 SC 155, Mangalore Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. CIT, (1978) 3 SCC 248 : 1978 SCC (Tax), Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225 and Onkarlal Nandlal v. State of Rajasthan, (1985) 4 SCC 404 : 1986 SCC (Tax) 34).

91. It is furthermore well-known that when the statute makes a distinction between the two phrases and one of the two is expressly deleted, it is contrary to the cardinal principle of statutory construction to hold that what is deleted is brought back into the statute and finds place in words which were already there in the first place.

92. In Charles Bradlaugh v. Henry Lewis Clarke [(1883) 8 AC 354 : (1881-85) All ER Rep Ext 1582 (HL)], Lord Watson as regards conscious omission from the statute stated the law, thus:

"I see no reason to suppose that all these omissions were accidental, and as little reason to suppose that the enactments with regard to personal disabilities were intentionally left out, whilst the express mention made of common informers was omitted through accident or inadvertence."

14. Under the Rules there was this mention of the school 'first attended', in case the relevant criteria was the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, and, not any other school subsequently attended would, therefore, have statutory favour of certifying the date of birth of a child. Also, a play school would stand excluded from the definition of the school, first attended. And, above all, the date of birth certificate from the school, would become relevant only in the absence of a matriculation certificate, or equivalent from the concerned Examination Board. Now, with the definite changes to the phraseology of the pari materia provisions in Section 94(2) of the Act, the date of birth certificate from the school, has been relieved of that qualification about the school being the one first attended; the date of birth certificate from the school can come from any school attended during the course of studies. In the changed statutory context, to fall back on the vestiges of the old law governed by Rule 12(3) by attaching more weight, if not exclusivity, to the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, over the date of birth certification by the other schools, would go against the positive legislative intendement of Section 94(2) of the Act.

15. Thus, now faced with the date of birth certification from different schools attended by a child, the Board or Court would be free to accord each its due probative value on the issue, bearing in mind well settled principles of appreciation of evidence. The matriculation or equivalent certificates from the concerned Examination Board would also be reckoned together with date of birth certification by the school or various of them, again to be assessed by the Board or Court as to what probative value is to be attached, while arriving at a finding about the child's age. In short, unlike Rule 12(3) of the Rules there is no exclusiveness and conclusiveness attached to the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the Board or the date of birth certificate from the school first attended. All these certifications stand at par, open to assessment for their evidentiary worth, by the Board, or Court on the issue of determination of the child's age. This is not to say that between these documents and those mentioned in categories of priority lower down, there is no exclusion of the higher by the lower. But again, as said earlier, that is not relevant to the case of the child here.

16. Learned counsel for the second opposite party placed reliance on a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Parag Bhati (Juvenile) thr. Legal Guardian mother Smt. Rajni Bhati vs. State of U.P. And another, (2016) 12 SCC 744 to submit that even under the Act of 2000 there was nothing sacrosanct about the High School Certificate, though graded criteria under Rules 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), (iii), if available, would be sufficient for a prima facie satisfaction of the Court about the age of the delinquent, necessitating further enquiry under Rule 12. He submits that whatever is mentioned in the High School Certificate, which stood on a higher pedestal under the Rules than under Section 94(2) of the Act, was not conclusive. It was still a matter of evidence. In this connection it is said by their Lordships in Parag Bhati (supra) as under:

"33. In Abuzar Hossain [Abuzar Hossain v. State of W.B., (2012) 10 SCC 489 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 83] , wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court has already summarised the position regarding what materials would prima facie satisfy the court and/or are sufficient for discharging the initial burden cannot be catalogued nor can it be laid down as to what weight should be given to a specific piece of evidence which may be sufficient to raise presumption of juvenility but the documents referred to in Rules 12(3)(a)(i) to (iii) shall definitely be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the court about the age of the delinquent necessitating further enquiry under Rule 12. The credibility and/or acceptability of the documents would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no hard-and-fast rule can be prescribed that they must be prima facie accepted or rejected and if such documents prima facie inspire confidence of the court, the court may act upon such documents for the purposes of Section 7-A and order an enquiry for determination of the age of the appellant.

36. It is settled position of law that if the matriculation or equivalent certificates are available and there is no other material to prove the correctness of date of birth, the date of birth mentioned in the matriculation certificate has to be treated as a conclusive proof of the date of birth of the accused. However, if there is any doubt or a contradictory stand is being taken by the accused which raises a doubt on the correctness of the date of birth then as laid down by this Court in Abuzar Hossain[Abuzar Hossain v. State of W.B., (2012) 10 SCC 489 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 83] , an enquiry for determination of the age of the accused is permissible which has been done in the present case."

17. Learned counsel for the second opposite party has placed strong reliance on a decision of this Court in C.B.I. through its S.P. Sc-I, C.G.O. vs. Yogendra Kumar @ Bablu, 2014(86) ACC 454, where this Court was concerned about the age of a juvenile banking on the entries made in the High School Certificate issued by the Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad U.P., Allahabad that were impeached by the prosecution agency, no less than the C.B.I., relying on changes to that age, made during the course of school education, the record of which was available. The court went into the details of the date of birth, recorded at different levels of education of the person claiming juvenility, in re C.B.I. vs. Yogendra Kumar (supra), comparing his age with his younger brother in meticulous detail, and, holding that the school record has been tampered. It was concluded, that whatever age was recorded in the High School Certificate, was the result of manipulation in the school records at the lower levels of education. There were also some erasions and manipulations in entries in the record of date of birth, in the lower classes, which the Court relied upon to disbelieve the age that ultimately made its way to the High School Certificate. In this connection, the view expressed by this Court in C.B.I. vs. Yogendra Kumar (supra) is of particular relevance, where it is held:

"23. The Sessions Judge, Lucknow has given very curious reasoning to discard this fact. He has written in his judgment that "I had raised one important query with learned counsel for the CBI that why the prosecution or CBI has proceeded with the case by presuming that the date of birth of appellant as 18.12.1994, contained in the document concerning pre-matriculation class, would have been actual and exact date and not 18.5.1996. The possibility cannot be ruled out that actual date of birth of the appellant would have been 18.5.1996 and not 18.12.1994. The possibility also cannot be ruled out that father and guardian of the appellant would have approached to the authority of the School to get the wrong date of birth 18.12.1994 corrected as 18.5.1996. On this query, the learned CBI counsel failed to give specific reply to the Court. It is also established law that if two views are possible in respect of the matter of declaring some person as a juvenile, the view favouring the applicant/accused must be adopted. At the same time, it should also be kept in mind the judicial notice of the fact may be taken that when parents of a child, while getting him admitted in primary class, are always tempted in getting the date of birth mentioned 1, 2 or 3 years lessor than actual date of birth, so that benefit of this can be availed by the child in the government service."

24. The Sessions Judge has lost sight of the fact that the age of the person recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission, for obtaining an appointment, for contesting elections, for registration of marriage, for obtaining separate unit in cealing laws, and even for the purposes of litigating before civil forum. I am afraid that these examples are only indicative, there may be several other reasons also.

25. The Sessions Judge has also lost sight of the fact that it is for the person claiming himself to be juvenile to prove that he is juvenile, so the burden of proof is on the person claiming to be juvenile. There is no scope for conjectures and surmises. Learned Sessions Judge has not given any thought to the fact that there were several cuttings, interpolations in the entries and whitener was also used. These entries are the only basis on which date of birth in matriculation certificate has been mentioned. Date of birth in matriculation certificate is mentioned on the basis of form filled by the student, so when there is any doubt regarding correctness of entries in the school register, then entries must be proved strictly with regard to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act.

26. The claim of juvenility lacking in credibility or frivolous claim of juvenility or patently absurd or inherently improbable claim of juvenility must be rejected by the court at the threshold whenever raised. (See : Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain v. State of West Bengal (supra).

28. Admittedly, none of the witnesses examined are the author of the entries, so it is not clear as to what was the basis of date of birth entry into the scholar register, which is the basis of entry of matriculation certificate, when Yogendra Kumar @ Bablu was admitted in class IV for the first time, so it was essential for the Sessions Judge to consider as to on what basis the date 18.5.1996 was held to be his date of birth. Certainly, the boy must have been admitted by his father or other relatives. Unfortunately, father of Yogendra Kumar @ Bablu has died, so the best person to show the basis of date of birth was his mother. She has not been examined.

29. The deposition of Salig Ram Pal and Indresh Kumar, examined in this case, do not satisfy the requirements of Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. None of the above witnesses have stated about the basis on which the entry of date of birth was made in school register. Cuttings and use of whitening fluid creates doubt about the authensity of entry made in the school register. If the entry of date of birth "18.5.1996" is treated to be correct, without any interpolation, then too there is no basis of such entry. The juvenile has failed to prove that entry made in the school register i.e. "18.5.1996" is correct one.

30. On the contrary, it is evident from the record that the date of birth mentioned in matriculation certificate is due to manipulation of documents.

31. A Court of law, for the purposes of determining the age of party to the lis must have regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in civil cases, and in criminal cases. In case of dispute, the court may appreciate the evidence having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. It would be a duty of the court of law to accord the benefit to the juvenile provided he is one. To give the same benefit to a person, who, in fact, is not jevenile may cause injustice to the victim. Hence, this Court is of the view that the impugned order passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Lucknow is liable to be quashed, being erroneous and perverse."

18. Learned counsel for the second opposite party has made much of the fact that in the present case too, like the facts in Parag Bhati (supra) and C.B.I. vs. Yogendra Kumar (supra), there is a clear case of manipulation in the school records. In the S.R. Register of the Blooming Buds Public School, Mainpuri, where the child had read in Class Vth to VIIth, the date of birth of the child has been scratched off by a blade and overwritten in the school records. It may be noticed that the school records involve some erasure and overwriting, but the credibility about the date of birth of the child recorded there, cannot be doubted for the good reason that the date of birth written, in words, in the school records of the Blooming Buds Public School, Mainpuri does not show any such tampering. It is of considerable significance that the child has studied in multiple schools, at different grades of his education. The employees and informed representatives of such schools have been examined by the Board, during the age determination enquiry. It is established from that evidence that the child was duly enrolled as a student, in each of the above mentioned schools, where he has read in different grades. His date of birth consistently recorded is 16.05.1998, in all those various school records - in different institutions, at different points of time. CW-2 who appeared to prove the records of the Blooming Buds Public School, Mainpuri has denied the possibility of tampering in school records. To the understanding of this Court, scratching or overwriting entries, in the records of the Blooming Buds Public School, Mainpuri are a solitary aberration, of which opposite party no.2, appears to have made the proverbial mountain of a mole. The consistent entries in the records of different institutions where the child has read, would far out weigh the solitary glitch in the records of one of the schools; that too, entries made in figures alone. The entry in words about the date of birth at Blooming Buds Public School, Mainpuri is again consistent about the date of birth that the child claims.

19. There is another aspect of the matter. There is no earthly reason why the parents would manipulate the date of birth of the child, at the different levels of his education, which otherwise has remained consistent. The same date of birth has been recorded in the Secondary School Examination Certificate issued by the Central Board of Secondary Education dated 30.05.2013. There is indeed no good reason why a consistent date of birth recorded from Class 1st to the Secondary School Certificate issued by the Board would be manipulated. In any case, there was no reason for the parents to make allowance in the year 2013, and, a decade before that, for the child to go delinquent on 18.08.2015, when the offence is said to have been committed. In Ashwani Kumar Saxena vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2012 (9) SCC 750 their Lordships of the Supreme Court while dealing with the same issue under the Act of 2000, have held in an inspiringly similar vein:

"43. We are of the view that admission register in the school in which the candidate first attended is a relevant piece of evidence of the date of birth. The reasoning that the parents could have entered a wrong date of birth in the admission register hence not a correct date of birth is equal to thinking that parents would do so in anticipation that child would commit a crime in future and, in that situation, they could successfully raise a claim of juvenility."

20. In view of what this Court has held, there is no good reason to doubt that the date of birth of the child consistently recorded as 16.05.1998 in his school records, is to be discarded or even doubted, for all those reasons that the Appellate Court has done. The view taken by the Board in the matter, holding the child to be a juvenile on the date of occurrence, whose date of birth is 16.05.1998, deserves to be upheld.

21. In the result this revision succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 27.03.2017 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Court no.1, Mainpuri in Criminal Appeal no.46 of 2016 is hereby set aside and that of the Juvenile Justice Board, Mainpuri, dated 16.09.2016, in Misc. Enquiry no.55 of 2015 stands restored. The revisionist shall now be dealt with as a juvenile abnegating all proceedings hitherto taken, in accordance with the order of the Additional Sessions Judge, dated 27.03.2017.

Order Date :- 3.10.2018

Anoop