Smt. Seema Yadav And Others vs Gayatri Kumar
2018 Latest Caselaw 170 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 

								AFR	
 
						Reserved on  20.03.2018          
 
						Delivered on  24.04.2018            
 

 
Case :- CIVIL REVISION No. - 15 of 2013
 
Revisionist :- Smt. Seema Yadav And Others
 
Opposite Party :- Gayatri Kumar
 
Counsel for Revisionist :- Abhay Raj Singh,Mohan Yadav
 
Counsel for Opposite Party :- Ravindra Kumar Mishra,N.D. Shukla
 

 
Hon'ble Siddharth,J.

Heard Sri Mohan Yadav, learned Counsel for the revisionists and Sri N.D. Shukla learned Counsel for the respondents.

This Civil Revision is directed against the Judgment and Decree dated 19.11.2012, passed by Special Judge (E.C.Act)/Additional District Judge, Allahabad in S.C.C. Suit No.28/2003, whereby the suit of the plaintiff- respondent instituted for decree of arrears of rent and ejectment has been decreed against the defendants- revisionists.

The plaintiff-respondent instituted a S.C.C. Suit No. 28 of 2003, against the defendants- revisionists, praying for a decree of arrears of rent amount to Rs.15,000/- for the period 01.07.2002 to 30.09.2003.

The plaint case was that the plaintiff has constructed a new house no.167/1A, Azad Square, South Malaka, Allahabad City and let it out to one Lal Chand, who was husband of defendant no.1 and father of defendant nos. 2,3 and 4, at the rent of Rs.1000/- per month w.e.f., 01.03.1996. The tenancy was from first day to the last day of the month. Late Lal Chand paid rent from March, 1996 to Nov., 1996 and thereafter defaulted in the payment of rent. He instituted an Original Suit No.804 of 1999, praying for injunction against the plaintiff. By notice dated 22.11.1999, he was directed to deposit the arrears of rent from Nov., 1996 to Oct., 1999 amount to Rs.35,000/- within 30 days by the plaintiff. Lal Chand died on 26.03.2003 and the defendants are his legal heirs, who also did not paid any amount towards rent. Even after 30 days notice dated 08.09.2003, for depositing the arrears of rent amounting to Rs.81,000/-, the defendants did not pay the same, hence the Suit was instituted confining the relief to the recovery of 15 months rent and damages. It was pleaded that the provisions of U.P. Act No.13/72 do not apply on the property in dispute.

The defendants filed their Written Statement stating that they did not received any notice regarding the arrears of rent from Nov. 1996 to Oct. 1999. The rate of rent was stated to be Rs.400/- per month and not Rs.1,000/- per month as claimed by the plaintiff. Filing of Original Suit No.804/1999 against forcible eviction was admitted. It was stated that the defendants are paying the rent @ Rs.400/- per month regularly and there is no default. The plaintiff does not issued rent receipts. The Suit was alleged to be barred by provisions of U.P. Act No.13/1972 and the Small Causes Court was stated to be incompetent to entertain the suit.

The learned Trial Court by the Judgment and Decree dated 19.11.2012, decreed the suit of the plaintiff and hence this revision has been preferred by the defendants- revisionists.

The Trial Court on the basis of the pleadings of the parties framed the following issues,

(i). Whether the provisions of U.P. Act No.13/72 applied to the house in dispute?

(ii). Whether the rent of the disputed house was Rs.1,000/- per month?

(iii). Whether there is any arrears of rent against the defendants?

(iv). Whether the notice was served upon the defendant?

(v). Whether the defendant is liable for ejectment and the plaintiff is entitled to get the arrears of rent?

The learned Trial Court decided the issue no.(i) in favour of the plaintiff, holding that the provisions of U.P.Act No.13/72 do not apply to the house in dispute.

The issue nos. (ii) and (iii) were decided holding that the rate of rent of the house in dispute is Rs.1,000/- per month and the notice dated 22.11.1999 and 08.09.2003 were served on the defendants, but they did not deposited any rent. Issue no.(iv) was decided holding that the registered notice dated 08.09.2002 was served on the defendants and issue no.(v) was decided holding that the defendants are liable to be ejected and the plaintiff is entitled to get the arrears of rent @ Rs.1,000/- per month from the defendants. The decree for arrears of rent of Rs.15,000/- w.e.f. 01.07.2002 to 30.09.2003 was passed and damages @ Rs.1,000/- per month were also directed to be paid to the plaintiff till actual delivery of possession of the house in dispute to him.

The learned Counsel for the defendants-revisionists has argued that the finding of the Trial Court that the U.P. Act No.13/1972 did not applied to the house in dispute is not correct. He has relied upon the Judgment in the case of Vijai Laxmi Jain Vs. Rameshwar Dayal Gupta, 2001(2) CRC 208, wherein it has been stated that the controversy whether a particular accommodation is to be governed by the provisions of U.P.Act No.13/1972 are not is a mixed question of law and fact and the burden of proof lies upon the landlord to prove the same. He has relied upon paragraph nos.6, 7 and 10 of the aforesaid judgment, which are quoted below,

"6. There has been some controversy with regard to the burden of proof, whether it is initially on the landlord or the tenant. In Durga Prasad v. IIIrd Additional District Judge, Kanpur and Anr. , it was held by this Court that the burden to prove the fact that the provisions of the Act No. XIII of 1972 are attracted to the tenanted accommodation or not, lies on the landlord but where both the parties have led evidence to prove or disprove this fact, the revisional court has jurisdiction to record a finding on this jurisdictional fact and consequently, the burden of proof loses its importance. There have been some conflicting decisions of this Court as divergent views were expressed on the point See Ram Pal Singh v. VIth Additional District Judge and Ors. . It is not necessary to refer all such cases as the whole controversy came to be quelled by an authoritative pronouncement of the Apex Court in Ram Swaroop Rai v. Smt. Leelawati , in which taking note of the fact that the provisions of the Act No. XIII of 1972 apply to all buildings except where the exemption operates, it was laid down that the landlord, who seeks exemption, must prove that exemption. The burden is on him to make out that notwithstanding the rent control legislation, his building is out of its ambit. It is not for the tenant to prove that the building has been constructed beyond a period of ten years, but it is for the landlord/landlady to make out that the construction has been completed within ten years of the suit. In the same decision, it was further noticed that the statute makes it clear that reliance upon the municipal records, rather than on the lips of witnesses, is indicated to determine the date of completion and the nature of the construction. The oral evidence in the case is inconsequential being second-hand testimony. Even the recital in the rent deed that there was a new construction by the tenant and the landlady, neither of whom has any direct knowledge about the construction because the landlady had purchased that building. It was further observed that of course, an admission by the tenant is admission against him but an admission is not always conclusive especially in the light of the municipal records such as are available and the burden such as has been laid down by the Statute.

7. In the subsequent decision in Suresh Kumar Jain v. Shanti Swarup Jain and Ors. , the Apex Court has further dwelt over the same point and observed as follows:

There is no dispute that the Defendant Appellant is a monthly tenant covered by the provisions of the said Rent Act. It is apparent that for mitigating the hardship likely to be meted out to a landlord who has made new construction by incurring substantial expenses, the landlord, in case of tenancy in a newly constructed building has been favoured with exemption of the rigours of the Tenancy Act in the matter of evicting a tenant inducted in such newly constructed premises. But such exemption is not unfettered but controlled by the provisions of Section 2(2) of the said Rent Act read with Explanation 1 and proviso to such Explanation 1. The outer limit of the period of exemption in respect of newly constructed building is ten years. Such outer limit of the period of exemption has been introduced for balancing the equities between the landlord and tenant. In order to ensure that such exemption in favour of the landlord is not extended indefinitely, the Legislature has provided a mechanism for determining the date with reference to which the building in question will be deemed to have been constructed by indicating four distinct alternatives. As such, four dates are likely to be different, Legislature, in its anxiety to ensure that the period of exemption is not unjustly extended beyond the period intended, has indicated that such period of exemption is to be reckoned from the date which is on the earliest point of time amongst four different deemed dates provided for in Explanation 1 to Sub-section (2) of the U.P. Rent Act. The four different dates for the purpose of exemption as to whether a newly constructed building is ten years old or not are as follows:

(i) the date on which completion of the building is reported to local authority;

(ii) the date on which the completion of the building is otherwise reported by the local authority having jurisdiction;

(iii) the date on which the assessment of property tax is first made;

(iv) In the absence of any such report, record or assessment, the date on which the building was actually occupied.

From a close reading of the decisions of the Apex Court in Ram Saroop Rai, (supra) and Suresh Kumar Jain (supra), it follows that it is not for the tenant to prove that the building has been constructed beyond a period of ten years but it is for the landlord to make out that the construction has been completed within ten years of the suit. This is sensible not merely because the Statute expressly states so and the setting necessarily implies so but also because it is the landlord who knows best when the building was completed, and not the tenant. As between the two, the owner of the building must tell the Court when the building was constructed and not the tenant thereof. Speaking generally, it is fair that the onus of establishing the date of construction of the building is squarely laid on the landlord.

10. The controversy whether a particular accommodation is to be governed by the provisions of Act No. XIII of 1972 or it is excepted from the operation of the said Act is a mixed question of law and facts. As stated above, the basic question with regard to the applicability of the Act has to be determined with reference to the provisions of Section 2(2) read with Explanation 1 of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 and no amount of oral evidence or admission of either of the parties would be sufficient to displace the entry made in the municipal record with regard to the tenanted accommodation. In the instant case, the tenanted accommodation is located within the cantonment area and surely there must be a record of the first assessment of the house in question. The crucial question could be determined by taking on record the entries made in the assessment register maintained by the Cantonment Board. The trial court has palpably committed a serious error by not requiring the landlord to produce the copy of the assessment register or by summoning the said document, if for certain reasons, copy thereof was not available. The landlord also did not take any steps in this regard in spite of the fact that the burden of proof lay squarely on him to establish that the disputed construction came into being within a period of ten years reckoned from before the date of the institution of the suit. It is, therefore, not the question of appraising or reappraising by the revisional court the evidence recorded by the court below. As noticed above, the revisional court is duty-bound to correct the apparent and glaring mistake committed by the court below and if the decision of the trial court is apparently against the law, or say, not according to law, in that event, the revisional court has to set aside the order. Therefore, the contention of Sri R.N. Bhalla, senior advocate that this Court exercising revisional powers cannot interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the court below does not go too far. The decision is required to be set aside as it is not according to law.

The second ground argued by the Counsel for the defendants- revisionists is that the Suit instituted by the plaintiff had the valuation of Rs.27,000/- when as per Section-15(2), a Small Cause Court presided over by the District Judge or by the Additional District Judge has pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the suit upto the valuation of Rs.25,000/- only. He has further argued that the S.C.C. Suits above the valuation of Rs.25,000/- are required to be instituted before the regular Civil Court as Original Suit.

The learned Counsel for the defendants- revisionists in support of his argument has relied upon Section-15 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, which is as under,

"15. Cognizance of suits by Courts of Small Causes-

(1). A Court of Small Causes shall not take cognizance of the suits specified in the Second Schedule as suits excepted from the cognizance of a Court of Small Causes.

(2). Subject to the exceptions specified in that Schedule and to the provisions of any enactment for the time being in force, all suits of a civil nature of which the value does not exceed five hundred rupees shall be cognizable by a Court of Small Causes.

(3). Subject as aforesaid, the State Government may, by order in writing, direct that all suits of a civil nature of which the value does not exceeds one thousand rupees shall be cognizable by a Court of Small Causes mentioned in the order."

He has further referred to the various amendments in Section-15 of the Provincial Small Cause Court Act, 1887, which are as follows,

" Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws ( Amendment) Act, 1968 (President's. Act No. XXXV of 1968).

(2). In its application to the State of Uttar Pradesh in Section 15 in sub-section (3), inserted the following:

"Provided that in relation to suits by the lessor for the eviction of a lessee from a building after the determination of his lease, or for recovery from him of rent in respect of the period of occupation thereof during the continuance of the lease, or of compensation for use and occupation thereof after the determination of the lease, the reference in this sub-section to two thousand rupees shall be construed as a reference to five thousand rupees.".

The aforesaid Amending Act was repealed and substituted by,

" Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws ( Amendment) Act, 1970 (U.P. Act No. XIV of 1970), w.e.f., 08.04.1970,

(F). Uttar Pradesh- (1) In its application to the State of Uttar Pradesh, for sub-section (2) and (3) of Section 15 substitute the following-

"(2) Subject to the exceptions specified in that Schedule and to the provisions of any enactment for the time being in force, all suits of civil nature of which the value does not exceed one thousand rupees shall be cognizable by a Court of Small Causes.

(3). Subject as aforesaid, the State Government may, by order in writing, direct that all suits of a Civil nature of which the value does not exceed two thousand rupees shall be cognizable by a Court of Small Causes mentioned in the Order."

Further amendments were made,

"(Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws (Amendment) Act 1972 (U.P. Act No. XXXVII of 1972) with effect from September 20,1972).

(a). in sub- section (2), for the words "one thousand rupees", the words "two thousand rupees" shall be substituted;

(b). in sub-section (3) and in the proviso thereto, for the words, "two thousand rupees" wherever they occur, the words, "three thousand rupees" shall be substituted.

Amending Act, U.P. Act No.17 of 1991 provided that in Section 15 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, for sub sections (2) and (3) the following sub section shall be substituted, namely-

(2). Subject to the exceptions specified in that Schedule and to the provisions of any enactment for the time being in force all suits of a civil nature of which the value does not exceed five thousand rupees shall be cognizable by a Court of Small Causes.

Provided that in relation to suits by the lessor for the eviction of a lessee from a building after the determination of his lease or for recovery from him of rent in respect of the period of occupation thereof during the continuance of the lease. Or of compensation for use and occupation thereof after the determination of the lease, the reference in this sub-section to five thousand rupees shall be construed as a reference to twenty five thousand rupees".

The latest amendment to Section-15 (2) is by way of U.P.Act No.14 of 2015, w.e.f., 07.12.2015 as follows,

4. Amendment of Section 15 of Act No. IX of 1887- In Section 15 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887-

(a). in sub- section (2) for the words "five thousand rupees" the words " twnenty five thousand rupees" shall be substituted,

(b). in the proviso to sub-section (2) for the words "twenty thousand rupees" the words "one lakh rupees" shall be substituted."

The Counsel for the plaintiff- respondent has argued in reply to the first ground raised by the Counsel for the defendants- revisionists, that he deposed before the Court below along with P.W.-2, Sheela Ram and proved that the accommodation in dispute in a new construction and therefore the provisions of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 have no application over the same. The learned Court below has recorded a clear finding of fact that the provisions of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 do not apply to the accommodation in dispute.

Replying to the Second argument for the Counsel for the defendants- revisionists, the Counsel for the plaintiff- respondent has stated that the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court is not circumscribed by the valuation and all Suits specified in second schedule of the provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 which are excepted from the cognizance of Small Cause Court, can be tried by the Small Cause Courts, irrespective of pecuniary jurisdiction. In support of his arguments the learned Counsel for the plaintiff- respondent has placed on record, a notification dated 25th Oct., 1972, issued by this Court, which is as follows,

"No.525- In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of section 25 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887 (Act XII of 1887), as amended by the Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1972 (U.P. Act No.37 of 1972), delegated by the State Government under sub-section (3) of the said section 25 to "The High Court, the High Court is pleased to confer upon all the District Judges and Additional District Judges, the jurisdiction of a Judge of a Court of Small Causes under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Acts, 1887 (Act IX of 1887), for the trial of all suits (irrespective of their value) of the nature referred to in the said sub-section (2)."

. The learned Counsel for the plaintiff- respondent has argued that the defendants- revisionists never deposited any amount in Court, nor sent the amount by money order, nor they ever sought Account Number of the plaintiff for the purpose of making deposit of rent and therefore the decree of eviction passed against them can not be faulted with. He has relied upon paragraph no.14 of the Judgment in the case of Atma Ram Vs. Shakuntala Rani, 2005 Law Suit (SC) 1160, which is as follows,

"14. The Court found that before making the deposit in Court, the tenant had not remitted the amount by postal order nor had the tenant called upon the landlord to specify the name of the bank and the account number in which the deposit could be made. In such a situation this Court held that the tenant could not avail of the benefit of the legal fiction under Section 13(1)(a) of the Act. This Court held :-

"It is settled law that a legal fiction is to be limited to the purpose for which it is created and should not be extended beyond that legitimate fiel. [See : Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd v. State of Bihar MANU/BH/0026/1953 : AIR1953Pat87. The appellant can avail of the benefit of Section 19-A(4) if the deposit of Rs. 3600/- made by him in the Court of Munsif (South), Udaipur, on 29-10-1982, by way of rent for the months of May 1982 to October 1982, can be treated as a payment under Section 19-A(3)(c) so as to enable the appellant to say that he was not in default in payment of rent. Under Section 19-A(3)(c) the tenant can deposit the rent in the court only if the conditions laid down in the said provision are satisfied. It is the admitted case of the appellant that these conditions are not satisfied in the present case. The deposit which was made by the respondent in court on 29-10-1982 cannot, therefore be regarded as a deposit made in accordance with Clause (c) of Sub-section (3) of Section 19-A and the appellant cannot avail of the protection of Sub-section (4) of Section 19-A and he must be held to have committed default in payment of rent for the months of May 1982 to October 1982. This means that the decree for eviction has been rightly passed against the appellant on account of default of payment of rent for the period of six months."

Further submission on behalf of the plaintiff- respondent is that the notices of demand of rent were sent by registered post to the defendants on their correct address and therefore they can not deny the receipt of notices. He has relied upon paragraph no.6 of the Judgment of Mani Ram Vs. Vimla Devi and others, 1997 (2) ARC 644, mentioned below,

"The Courts below after taking into account the facts and circumstances of the present case particularly Ex.13 which is a certificate issued by the Post office to the effect that the letter which was correctly addressed, was sent to the petitioner. It was not disputed by the petitioner that the address given on the said letter as certified by the Post Office, was not correct or that the said letter was not posted by the respondent. The Courts below have, thus, rightly presumed the service of the said letter upon the petitioner, the contents of which were proved as plaintiff respondent No.1.

It has been submitted again that U.P.Act No.13 of 1972 provides vide Section-20 (2)(a) that where the tenancy has been determined, on the ground that the tenant is in arrears of rent for not less than 4 months and has failed to pay the same, the landlord can institute a Suit within 1 month from the date of service of notice upon him. He has relied upon paragraph no.6 of the Judgment in the case of Raghubir Prasad Vs. Rajendra Kumar Gurudev, LAWS (ALL)-1993-5-61, which is as follows,

"6. U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 provides relaxation of the restriction imposed against filing of a suit for the eviction of a tenant on certain specified grounds like bona fide need or default in payment of rent etc. Thus, any right that the tenant could be deemed to possess to continue to occupy the building under tenancy after the termination of the tenancy can be only that which stands conferred on him only by virtue of the provisions contained in the Rent Control Act. A perusal of Section 20(1) and 20(2) of the Act makes it abundantly clear that the bar against the maintainability of the suit for eviction of a tenant from a building gets lifted once the plaintiff successfully establishes that the requisite conditions contemplated under Section 20(2) of the Act stand satisfied. The provisions contained in Section 38 of the Act provide that the provisions contained in the Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and Civil Procedure Code 1908. Section 20(2)(a)of the Act provides that the suit for eviction of a tenant from a building after the determination of tenancy may be instituted on the ground that the tenant is in arrears of rent for not less than four months, and has filed to pay the same to the landlord within one month from the date of service upon him of a notice of demand."

Finally relying upon paragraph no.3 of the Judgment in the case of Staya Prakash Vs. District Judge, LAWS (ALL)-1982-2-38, the learned Counsel for the plaintiff- respondent has argued that where the defence of the defendants has been struck of under Order-15, Rule-5 C.P.C. and the landlord has deposed that the tenant is arrears of rent, the burden of proof lies upon the tenant to prove that he has paid the rent and this burden is never discharged by the landlord, even if the case of the tenant is that the landlord never used to issue receipts of rent. For ready reference paragraph no.3 of the aforesaid is,

"3.This petition is wholly uncalled for and not maintainable. It seems that on account of the failure of the petitioner to comply with the provisions of Order 15 Rule 5 CPC his defence had been struck off. The plaintiff landlord's case was that the rent was due for the period from 1-12-1973 onwards. The petitioner as the defendant was alleging that he had paid rent upto 14-10-1975. The plaintiff landlord had entered into the witness-box and had deposed to the aforesaid effect, namely that the rent had not been paid to him with effect from 1-12-73."

After hearing the Counsel for the parties and considering their arguments, case laws, notifications and material on record, the first issue which comes up for the consideration is whether the house in dispute was exempted for operation of the provisions of U.P.Act No.13 of 1972 or not. A perusal of the Case Law cited on behalf of the defendants- revisionists in the case of Vijai Laxmi Jain (supra), it is clear that the burden of proving this plea was squarely on the plaintiff. The plaintiff was required to produce documentary evidence in the form of assessment record of Municipality which he did not produced. He did not produced any other documentary evidence to prove that the disputed house was a new construction. He only deposed as P.W.1 before the Court below and P.W.2 also deposed before the Court below that the house in dispute is a new construction without relying upon any documentary evidence to this effect. The finding recorded by the Small Cause Court, while deciding issue no.1 is absolutely perverse and illegal. It states that on the basis of the documentary and oral evidence on record, it is proved that the provisions of the U.P.Act No.13 of 1972 do not apply to the house in dispute. There was no documentary evidence to this effect but the finding has been recorded which is clearly perverse and deserves to be set aside.

The Second argument of the Counsel for the defendants- revisionists that the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Small Cause Court, which heard and decided the Suit in dispute was limited to Rs.25,000/- on 29.11.2012, when the decree was passed. A perusal of the U.P. Act No.14 of 2015 applicable w.e.f., 07.12.2015, quoted above, proves that the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Small Cause Court presided over by District Judge or Additional District Judge was only Rs.25,000/- after the U.P. Act No.17 of 1991 came into force and it is only after coming into force of the U.P. Act No.14 of 2015 w.e.f., 07.12.2015 that the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Judge or Additional District Judge has been enhanced to rupees one lac for trying suits of the nature in dispute.

The argument of the Counsel for the plaintiff- respondent that in view of the Notification No.525, dated 25.10.1972, the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Judge or Additional District Judge exercising jurisdiction of Small Cause Courts is unlimited is not correct. The notification, mentioned above vested the High Court with the powers to confer jurisdiction upon all the Additional District Judge and District Judge to decide cases cognizable by Small Causes Courts by virtue of powers conferred by Section 25(2) of the Bengal, Agra and Aasam Civil Courts Act, 1887. Such power was delegated by the State Government under Section 25 (3) on the High Court but the High Court did not conferred unlimited pecuniary jurisdiction on any Judge holding the Court of Small Causes. By issuing different notifications, mentioned above, the pecuniary jurisdiction was conferred on the Courts and thereafter extended from time to time and now for the Court of District Judge and Additional District Judge, such pecuniary jurisdiction, after 07.12.2015 is rupees one lac, when prior to 07.12.2015, it was only rupees twenty five thousands. When the suit is dispute was decided in the year 2012, the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court was only rupees twenty five thousands and it had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, having valuation of rupees twenty seven thousands. This Court in the case of Smt. Vidhya Singh Vs. M/S. Programme Support Unit Foundation and another, 2002 (1) CRC 369 held in paragraph no.22 that in relation to Suits by lessor for eviction of lessee from a building after the determination of the lease or for the recovery rent from him for the period of occupation for damages after determination of lease, the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court of Small Causes is Rs.25,000/-

The other grounds argued by the Counsel for the plaintiff- respondent are legally correct and can not be disputed. However the fact remains that in the absence of determination of the fact as to whether the provisions of U.P. Act No.13/1972 apply to the house in dispute as per the requirements of law and the lack of pecuniary jurisdiction in the Small Causes Court to try the Suit, the decree under challenge deserves to be set aside. It is open for the plaintiff to institute fresh suit in accordance with law since the suit in dispute was legally nonest.

The Revision stands allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.

Order Date :- 24.04.2018

Ruchi Agrahari