Citation : 2017 Latest Caselaw 4383 ALL
Judgement Date : 14 September, 2017
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
[A.F.R.]
[Reserved]
Court No. - 19
1. Case :- SERVICE SINGLE No. - 4813 of 2014
Petitioner :- Sarvesh Chandra Chaudhary & 17 Ors.
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Through Prin. Secy. Deptt. Of Law Lko. & Ors.
Counsel for Petitioner :- Akhilesh Kalra,Avinash Chandra
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Gavrav Mehrotra,Manish Kumar
2. Case :- SERVICE SINGLE No. - 5530 of 2014
Petitioner :- Manish Kumar Malviya
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Through Prin. Secy. Deptt. Of Law Lko. & Ors.
Counsel for Petitioner :- Anand Dubey
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Gaurav Mehrotra,U.N.Mishra
3. Case :- SERVICE SINGLE No. - 176 of 2002
Petitioner :- Sunil Kumar Tripathi
Respondent :- State Of U.P.Through Prin.Secy.Law And 2 Ors.
Counsel for Petitioner :- Mohd.Mansoor Ahmad
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
4. Case :- SERVICE SINGLE No. - 234 of 2002
Petitioner :- Vikas Verma
Respondent :- State Of U.P.Through Prin.Secy.Law And 2 Ors.
Counsel for Petitioner :- Mohd.Mansoor Ahmad
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
5. Case :- SERVICE SINGLE No. - 4742 of 2002
Petitioner :- Girja Prasad
Respondent :- State Of U.P.Through Prin.Secy.Law And 1 Ors
Counsel for Petitioner :- M.Mansoor Ahmad
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
6. Case :- SERVICE SINGLE No. - 4970 of 2002
Petitioner :- Shireesh Kumar Srivastava
Respondent :- State Of U.P.Through Prin.Secy.Law And Anors.
Counsel for Petitioner :- M.Mansoor Ahmad
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
7. Case :- SERVICE SINGLE No. - 5474 of 2002
Petitioner :- Om Kesh Kumar Pandey
Respondent :- The State Of U.P.Thru Princ.Secy.,Law Deptt.,Lucknow & Anr.
Counsel for Petitioner :- J.P. Yadav,Manish Mathur
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
8. Case :- SERVICE SINGLE No. - 783 of 2003
Petitioner :- Satish Kumar Chaudhary
Respondent :- The State Of U.P. Through The Principal Secretary Law
Counsel for Petitioner :- Akhilesh Kalra,Manish Mathur
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
9. Case :- SERVICE SINGLE No. - 7544 of 2003
Petitioner :- Panch Deo Pathak
Respondent :- State Ofu.P. Through Prin. Secy. Law Deptt. Civil Sectt.
Counsel for Petitioner :- Satya Prakash,Sudhir Srivastava
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
******
Hon'ble Vivek Chaudhary,J.
1. Heard Mr. Akhilesh Kalra, and Mr. Avinash Chandra, learned Advocates for petitioners and Mr. Gaurav Mehrotra, learned Advocate for respondent No.2 and 3 (Writ Petition No.5530 (S/S) of 2014), Allahabad High Court and District Judge, Ambedkar Nagar, as well as learned Standing Counsel for State.
2. In Writ Petition No.4813 (S/S) of 2014 and Writ Petition No.5530 (S/S) of 2014 both are filed challenging the impugned orders No.151/2014, order No.152/2014 and order No.153/2014 all dated 16.08.2014, passed by the District Judge, Ambedkar Nagar, whereby the District Judge, recalled the regularization order, consequential order for payment of salary and increment therein and recovery of excess amount paid to the petitioners. Writ Petition No.176 (S/S) of 2002, Writ Petition No.234 (S/S) of 2002, Writ Petition No.4742 (S/S) of 2002, Writ Petition No.4970 (S/S) of 2002, Writ Petition No.5474 (S/S) of 2002, Writ Petition No.783 (S/S) of 2003 and Writ Petition No.7544 (S/S) of 2003 are filed by the petitioners for quashing oral and written order of their removal from service and for mandamus commanding the respondents to continue in their services.
3. Nineteen persons were regularized by the District Judge, Ambedkar Nagar by his order dated 09.11.2012 and were granted salary of regular employees by another order of the same date and further, by order dated 25.7.2013, the District Judge also granted them increment in salary. The successor District Judge having found the said regularization to be illegal and bad, recalled the said order dated 09.11.2012 by his order No.152/2014 dated 16.08.2014. Further by order No.151/2014 and order No.153/2014 also dated 16.08.2014 he directed for recovery of excess salary and amounts wrongly paid from the petitioners. Said 19 persons (18 by Writ Petition No.4813 (S/S) of 2014 and 1 by Writ Petition No.5530 (S/S) of 2014) have challenged the said orders No.151/2014,152/2014 and 153/2014 dated 16.08.2014.
4. Facts of the case are that on creation of a new Judgeship in District-Ambedkar Nagar in the year 1999, finding that regular appointments of Class-III employees for the District-Court may take sometime, with the approval of the High Court, petitioners were appointed between 1999 to 2001 on ad-hoc basis. In the year 2001 an advertisement for direct recruitment in the ministerial cadre of the said district was published which was challenged by the ad-hoc appointees. Since there were number of writ petitions filed challenging the advertisement, therefore, they were clubbed together and an interim order dated 01.08.2006 was passed in the leading Writ Petition No.7544 (S/S) of 2003; Panch Deo Pathak vs. State of U.P. & others. The relevant portion of the order dated 01.08.2006 is as follows:-
"Accordingly, in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the opinion that District Judge should now initiate fresh exercise for starting direct recruitment process. Advertisement, etc. must be issued within 10 days from today. The advertisement will be issued in the newspapers of vide circulation, calling applications form eligible candidates indicating the vacancies etc.
The District Judge shall follow the procedure prescribed under the said Rules and complete the process of selection. After the selection process is over formal appointment orders shall be issued to the selected candidates.
As far as the grievance of the petitioners is concerned that some of them have now become over age and as such shall be excluded from consideration and their applications may be rejected on the ground of their being over age, considering the fact that writ petitions are pending disposal and they had already approached this Court, they need sympathetic consideration. They have already filed the writ petitions in the years 2001, 2003, raising their grievance and the Court granted them indulgence on their petitions, staying the direct recruitment process. As per spirit of the orders passed by this Court they may continue in the services of the Judgeship till the selection process is over.
The learned standing counsel has drawn attention of this Court to the sub-rule (2) of Rule-6 of the aforementioned rules. The relevant rules is quoted below.-
"The District Judge may with the sanction of the High Court of the Chief Court, as the case may be, extend the age limit in favour of a candidate on the grounds of public interest or fair dealing."
Accordingly, in the interest of justice, it is provided that all the petitioners who are working on the Ad-hoc basis may apply in response to the advertisement. Their cases shall be considered alongwith other candidates. It is open for the District Judge to send their names to the Hon'ble High Court on the administrative side for considering their cases for granting them relaxation in age as per provisions contained in sub-rule (2) of Rule-6 of the Sub-ordinate Civil Courts Ministerial Establishment Rules, 1947. It is open for the District Judge and the selection committee to take into account the length of service, experience etc. of the candidates, who are already in services and they have acquired substantial experience of working in the Judgeship.
Considering the anxiety of the learned counsel for the petitioners who are before the Court, it would be appropriate, that the District Judge, Ambedkar Nagar after receiving applications of the petitioners sends them alongwith his report to the High Court on the administrative side for their consideration and granting age relaxation in accordance with law in the peculiar circumstances of the case.
List in September, 2006 for hearing. Till the selection process is over, the petitioners shall be allowed to continue in the services in the same capacity."
5. In compliance of interim order dated 01.08.2006, an advertisement was issued on 18.08.2006 for direct recruitment for vacancies in Class-III posts. Meanwhile, a dispute arose requiring reassessment of the vacancies in view of certain orders passed by the High Court, and thus, the advertisement was cancelled for initiating a fresh selection process. The selection process however, remained pending. Petitioners continued to function as ad-hoc employees as per the interim order dated 01.08.2006 of the High Court. Without seeking for modification or compliance of the interim order, petitioners alongwith one Satish Kumar Chaudhary, claim to have moved a representation on 28.05.2012 regarding their regularization before the District Judge. On same day i.e., 28.5.2012, Sri P.K. Chaturvedi, the then District Judge, passed the following order on the representation:-
"A Committee headed by Sri S.K. Goyal, Addl. District Judge alongwith members Sri Raghvendra Mani and Gyanendra Singh, Addl. Civil Judge (Jr.) and Judicial Magistrate, respectively is constituted to give report into the representation by 31.05.2012."
6. Though there is nothing on record to show that the time of three days given to the Committee was ever extended, the said Committee gave its report after nearly six weeks on 12.07.2012. The report is subjected "regarding regularization of ad-hoc employees". By the said report the Committee, treating itself to be a Committee constituted under the Uttar Pradesh Regularization of Ad-hoc Appointments (On Posts Outside Purview of the Public Service Commission) (Third Amendment) Rules, 2001 (here-in-after referred to as 2001 Rules) proceeded to call for records of applicants and after considering their cases on merits, recommended them for regularization to the District Judge. Accepting the said report of the Committee, the District Judge by his order dated 09.11.2012 regularized the services of all the applicants, but that of Sri Satish Kumar Chaudhary, as his services had been dispensed with on same day itself, i.e. 09.11.2012, by a separate order. Thus, the services of all 19 petitioners before this Court were regularized by the above order 09.11.2012. It appears that in 2014, Sri Raj Kumar-II took over charge as District Judge, Ambedkar Nagar. He passed three separate orders, all dated 16.08.2014, which were numbered as 151/2014, 152/2014 and 153/2014. By order No.152/2014 he found that the regularization order dated 09.11.2012 was passed in violation of order passed in Writ Petition No.7544 (S/S) of 2003 dated 01.08.2006. He further found that there is no reference of the government orders or rules under which regularizations have taken place nor there is any approval of the High Court on administrative side for regularization of the said employees and hence he cancelled/recalled the regularization order dated 09.11.2012. After the cancellation of regularization of the said employees, by another order No.153/2014 he directed that since the regularization order is no more effective, therefore, orders of increment and salary passed by the earlier District Judge and his Administrative Officer dated 25.07.2013 are also declared null and void. As a consequence he further passed order No.151/2014 thereby directing that all financial benefits given to petitioners, as a consequence of recalled / void orders, be recovered from their salary.
7. By means of present writ petition, 19 petitioners have challenged the aforesaid three orders dated 16.08.2014.
8. Learned counsel for petitioners have vehemently argued that all three orders passed by the District Judge are illegal and cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. The challenge is made on three grounds. Later, that orders have been passed by the District Judge sou-moto and he has no power to do so. Second challenge is that orders have been passed without giving any opportunity of hearing to the petitioners and first is that petitioners were within the cutoff date and have been rightly regularized under the rules of 2001 and hence the District Judge has wrongly recalled their regularization order. Petitioners' counsel also tried to argue that now under Uttar Pradesh Regularization of Persons Working on Daily Wages or on Work Charge or on Contract in Government Departments on Group "C" and Group "D" Posts (Outside The Purview Of The Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission) Rules, 2016, petitioners would be further entitled for regularization, while counsels for respondents have supported the impugned orders and argued that regularization orders itself are bad.
9. So far as any entitlement of petitioners under any Rules of 2016 is concerned, that is not the subject matter of this case as there are neither any pleadings nor any relief sought to that effect and, further the same can only be looked into by the competent authority under the rules, if applicable, hence, the said issue is left undecided.
10. This case was heard and judgment was reserved on 29.05.2014. While dictating judgment it was found that order of the District Judge dated 28.05.2012, by which the Committee was constituted, was not on record of the case and, hence, the matter was directed to be listed for further hearing. Thus, the matter was listed for further hearing and a supplementary counter affidavit of Sri Arvind Kumar Shukla, ADJ-FTC-II was filed along with an application dated 12.07.2017. Along with the supplementary counter affidavit, a photocopy of the representation of petitioners containing order dated 28.05.2012 of the District Judge is filed as Annexure No.SCA-1.
11. The representation dated 28.05.2012, though contains names of 20 persons for regularization in its very first paragraph but, is signed by only 19 persons, which includes signature of Sri Satish Kumar Chaudhary, whose services were dispensed with, and was thus not regularized. The said representation does not contain signature of Sri Ahtesham Hasan (Petitioner No.6 in Writ Petition No.4813 (S/S) of 2014). It defines logic as to how a person, who had not even applied for regularization, was considered for regularization by the Committee and thereafter his regularization was also approved by the District Judge and he has also joined as writ petitioner before this Court.
12. Further the order of District Judge dated 28.05.2012 by any stretch of imagination, cannot be deemed to be an order passed under the 2001 Rules to consider the case of petitioners for regularization. The said order only directs the Committee to give its' report on the representation within a period of three days. The said Committee was only an administrative Committee to look into the representation and to give report as to what should be done with respect to the representation. This view is grounded on four facts. Firstly, there is nothing in the order dated 28.05.2012 which directs the Committee to consider the case of applicants for purposes of regularization under any Regularization Rules. There is nothing in the order which could lead to conclusion that the said Committee was even constituted under or for purposes of the 2001 Rules. Secondly, the Committee was to give its' report within a short period of three days which is grossly insufficient for considering regularization of 20 persons. Thirdly, there is nothing in the order directing the service record of employees to be sent to the said Committee or authorizing the Committee to summon the service record of the applicants and fourthly, there is also nothing in the order which empowered the Committee to consider the case of other ad-hoc employees for regularization which may be working within the judgeship, like Ahtesham Hasan, who had not signed the representation. In any exercise of regularization was to be taken in a Judgeship, The District Judge would be required to call for report from Office regarding all the ad hoc employees in his Judgeship at least in said cadre and then issue directions and not direct to consider representation of some of employees. Thus, by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the Committee was constituted under 2001 Rules. In a grossly illegal manner, the Committee treating itself to be having powers under 2001 Rules, proceeded to summon the service record of the applicants and even of Shri Ahtesham Hasan, who had not even signed the said representation for regularization or was directed by the District Judge to be considered.
13. After summoning the record on 12.07.2012, i.e. after a period of nearly one and half month, the Committee, treating itself to be a Committee constituted under the 2001 Rules, submitted its' report recommending regularization of all. Since, it is held that the said Committee was not constituted under Rules 2001, the report of the Committee cannot be treated to be a recommendation for regularization under 2001 Rules. The said report of the Committee is even otherwise illegal and thoroughly vitiates the law. 2001 Rules specifically provides that the employees applying for regularization should have been appointed on or prior to 30.06.1998. Admittedly, all the petitioners, except Shri Manish Kumar Malviya who was appointed on 06.04.1998, were appointed in November 1999 or thereafter. Thus, since they were all appointed after 30.6.1998, they were not covered by the 2001 Rules. There was no judgment given by any court of law, declaring that the cutoff date as given in 2001 Rules was illegal, and or modifying the same. Relying upon some earlier case law, whereby the cutoff date of Rules of 1998 was declared arbitrary modified by the court, the Committee itself modified the cutoff date provided in the 2001 Rules. Such a power to modify the cutoff date was never vested in the Committee allegedly created under the said rules. Any change in the notified rules can only be made by the authority issuing the rules or by a competent Court under its judicial powers. Neither the District Judge nor the Committee, which was required to act under and in accordance with the 2001 Rules, had any powers to modify the cutoff date and in its place to read any date, other than the date specifically provided in the 2001 Rules. Further, the modification of cutoff of date in the rules was also not possible by the said Committee in view of the Circular of High Court No.18/VIIb-104/Admn. (D) Sec. Dated 8th May, 2002 for Regularization of Ad-hoc Employees in Civil Courts, Uttar Pradesh which reads:.
"In continuation of court's circular letter No.69/VIIb-104/Admn. (D) Sec. Dated 10.11.1993 on the above subject I am directed to send herewith a copy of State government notification No.15/18/86 Ka-1-2001 dated 20.12.2001, making amendment in Rule 4 of U.P. Regularisation of Ad-hoc appointments (on posts outside the purview of Public Service Commission) Rules, 1979 by introducing the cut off date as 30.6.1998, and to say that aforesaid notification has been adopted by this Hon'ble Court.
I am, therefore, to request you kindly to take necessary step for the regularisation of Ad-hoc employees
It is further added that any deviations from the directions contained in the abovenoted notification is prohibited (emphasis added)."
Thus, in view of the last line of the circular of High Court the deviation of cutoff date in 2001 Rules by the Committee was illegal and without any authority of law.
14. Further the interim order dated 01.08.2006 passed in Writ Petition No.7544 (S/S) of 2003, while refusing prayer of petitioners for regularization, directed them to face selection process, if their age is relaxed by High Court. The Committee in most illegal manner, to circumvent the said judicial order, notes in its report that Writ Petition No. 7544 (S/S) of 2003 stands dismissed on 31.08.2006. This statement of dismissal of writ petition is incorrect and farthest from truth. Writ Petition No. 7544 (S/S) of 2003 is pending till date and the interim order is also in operation. The said writ petition is before this Court clubbed in the present bunch of petitions. The report is silent as to from where the Committee got knowledge that aforesaid Writ Petition No. 7544 (S/S) of 2003 was dismissed on 31.08.2006. Thus, in highly illegal and abusive manner, by order dated 09.11.2012,the Committee proceeded to recommend regularization of petitioners. While making the said recommendation the Committee knowingly and willfully violated both, a judicial order dated 01.08.2006 and administrative order dated 8.5.2002 of the High Court.
15. The said recommendations of the Committee, without going into the correctness or validity of the same, in a summary manner, were accepted by the District Judge by order dated 09.11.2012 and services of all the petitioners were made regular by the same order. On the same day, i.e. 09.11.2012 only, the District Judge also passed another order permitting them regular pay scale. Thereafter, by order dated 25.07.2013 the District Judge further revised the pay-scale of the petitioners, on the basis of their regularization, by giving them increment w.e.f. 01.01.2014. On the basis of the aforesaid order, petitioners continued to work as regular employees. The District Judge also did not send any information of regularization or increments to the High Court on administrative side. The District Judge, while considering the recommendations of the Committee was required to look into the validity of its constitution, its authority to summon service record, compliance of judicial and administrative orders and also the validity of the change in the cutoff date. He could not have accepted the report without application of mind.
16. The successor District Judge by his three orders, all dated 16.08.2014, recalled the aforesaid orders of his predecessor and directed for recovery of excess payment given to the petitioners and adjustment of their salary. In order No.151/14 the successor District Judge also notes that one of the petitioners, namely, Sri Rajnish Kumar (Petitioner No.18 in Writ Petition No.4813 (S/S) of 2014) is the son of Vashisth Kumar Mishra, who was Sadar Munsarim in the said Judgeship at the relevant time. The successor District Judge specifically notes that being administrative officers of Nazarat Sri Vinay Prakash Srivastava, S.M. Srivastava and Vashisth Kumar Mishra were fully aware of the interim order dated 01.08.2006 passed in Writ Petition No.7544 (S/S) of 2003 and record relating to the said writ petition was in the custody of Senior Administrative Officer of the Judgeship.
17. It is the duty of a District Judge, who is the administrative incharge of the District Judgeship, to be cautious that the administration of District Court is run as per the rules, regulations and law applicable in all fields and affairs including services of the employees. The order of regularization dated 09.11.2012 was an order which was without jurisdiction and was passed violating not only of the rules and regulations or administrative procedures, but was also directly in teeth of judicial and administrative orders passed by the High Court, which were effective on the said date.
18. Thus, the successor District Judge had rightly withdrawn the illegal orders, which could not stand even for a day. It cannot be said that he did not have jurisdiction to recall the said illegal orders passed without any authority of law.
19. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, since petitioners themselves were fully involved and conspired with the then District Judge and the officers of the Committee in obtaining the order of regularization, for which they have no explanation, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned orders and give another opportunity of hearing to the petitioners as there remains nothing to explain.
20. This Court is not bound to insist for compliance of principles of natural justice in the given facts and circumstances on law in this regard is well settled by the Apex Court. In case of Punjab National Bank vs. Manjeet Singh reported in (2006) 8 SCC 647, wherein in para-17 it has been said that :-
"The principles of natural justice were also not required to be complied with as the same would have been an empty formality. The court will not insist on compliance with the principles of natural justice in view of the binding nature of the award. Their application would be limited to a situation where the factual position or legal implication arising thereunder is disputed and not where it is not in dispute or cannot be disputed. If only one conclusion is possible, a writ would not issue only because there was a violation of the principles of natural justice."
21. In P.D. Agarwal vs. State Bank of India and others reported in (2006) 8 SCC 776 wherein in paras-30 and 39, the Apex Court has held that:-
"30. The principles of natural justice cannot be put in a straitjacket formula. It must be seen in circumstantial flexibility. It has separate facets. It has in recent time also undergone a sea change.
39. "Decision of this Court in S.L. Kapoor vs. Jagmohan & Ors. [(1980) 4 SCC 379], whereupon Mr. Rao placed strong reliance to contend that non- observance of principle of natural justice itself causes prejudice or the same should not be read "as it causes difficulty of prejudice", cannot be said to be applicable in the instant case. The principles of natural justice, as noticed hereinbefore, has undergone a sea change. In view of the decision of this Court in State Bank of Patiala & Ors. vs. S.K. Sharma [(1996) 3 SCC 364] and Rajendra Singh vs. State of M.P. [(1996) 5 SCC 460], the principle of law is that some real prejudice must have been caused to the complainant. The Court has shifted from its earlier concept that even a small violation shall result in the order being rendered a nullity. To the principal doctrine of audi alterem partem, a clear distinction has been laid down between the cases where there was no hearing at all and the cases where there was mere technical infringement of the principal. The Court applies the principles of natural justice having regard to the fact situation obtaining in each case. It is not applied in a vacuum without reference to the relevant facts and circumstances of the case. It is no unruly horse. It cannot be put in a straightjacket formula."
22. The same view have been followed and relied upon by the Apex Court in the judgment of Ashok Kumar Sonkar vs. Union of India reported in (2007) 4 SCC 54. Further thereafter again in case of State of U.P. and others vs. Rekha Rani reported in (2011) 11 SCC 441, wherein in para-13 the Apex Court held as under:-
"13. Also, it is well settled that a temporary employee has no right to the court vide State of U.P. v. Kaushal Kishore Shukla. The respondent's service was not terminated as a measure of punishment. Hence no opportunity of hearing was necessary for terminating her service. The direction for her reinstatement is not sustainable as she was only a temporary employee and hence had no right to the post."
23. Learned counsel for respondents further submitted that even otherwise if on any technical ground the impugned orders are set aside, the same would have effect of reviving an illegal order. Law is settled on this issue that this Court would not exercise its discretionary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to pass such an order which would revive illegal situation. For such purposes, he relied upon the case of Bhartiya Seva Samaj Trust & Anr. vs. Yogeshbhai Ambalal Patel & anr. reported in (2012) 9 SCC 310, in which the Apex Court in para-14 has held as under:-
"14. It is a settled legal proposition that the post should not set aside the order which appears to be illegal, if its effect is to revive another illegal order. It is for the reason that in such an eventuality the illegality would perpetuated and it would put a premium to the undeserving party/ person."
Further learned counsel for respondent submits that since orders are passed in violation of order of High Court, thus, are nullity in view of law settled by Apex Court in case of Manohar Lal vs. Ugrasen reported in (2010) 11 SCC 557, wherein the Apex Court in paras-24, 25, 26, 27, 28 & 29 considered the law on the subject and held:-
"24. In Mulraj Vs. Murti Raghunathji Maharaj, AIR 1967 SC 1386, this Court considered the effect of action taken subsequent to passing of an interim order in its disobedience and held that any action taken in disobedience of the order passed by the Court would be illegal. Subsequent action would be a nullity.
25. In Surjit Singh Vs. Harbans Singh, AIR 1996 SC 135, this Court while dealing with the similar issue held as under:
"In defiance of the restraint order, the alienation/assignment was made. If we were to let it go as such, it would defeat the ends of justice and the prevalent public policy. When the Court intends a particular state of affairs to exist while it is in seisin of a lis, that state of affairs is not only required to be maintained, but it is presumed to exist till the Court orders otherwise. The Court, in these circumstances has the duty, as also the right, to treat the alienation/assignment as having not taken place at all for its purposes."
26. In All Bengal Excise Licensees Association Vs. Raghabendra Singh & Ors, AIR 2007 SC 1386, this court held as under:
"A party to the litigation cannot be allowed to take an unfair advantage by committing breach of an interim order and escape the consequences thereof..... the wrong perpetrated by the respondents in utter disregard of the order of the High Court should not be permitted to hold good."
27. In Delhi Development Authority Vs. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd. & Anr. AIR 1996 SC 2005, this court after making reference to many of the earlier judgments held:
"On principle that those who defy a prohibition ought not to be able to claim that the fruits of their defiance are good, and not tainted by the illegality that produced them."
28. In Gurunath Manohar Pavaskar Vs. Nagesh Siddappa Navalgund, AIR 2008 SC 901, this Court while dealing with the similar issues held that even a Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in the event of coming to the conclusion that a breach to an order of restraint had taken place, may bring back the parties to the same position as if the order of injunction has not been violated.
29. In view of the above, it is evident that any order passed by any authority in spite of the knowledge of the interim order of the court is of no consequence as it remains a nullity."
24. Learned counsel for respondents also submits that in the facts of the present case a fraud has been played by the petitioners in connivance with the officers, in getting the order of regularization passed and it is well settled by the Apex Court in the case of A.V. Papayya Shastri & others vs. Government of A.P. & others reported in (2007) 4 SCC 221 that fraud vitiates everything. Reliance has been placed on paras-21, 22 and 23 and also on paras-28, 29 & 30:-
21. Now, it is well settled principle of law that if any judgment or order is obtained by fraud, it cannot be said to be a judgment or order in law. Before three centuries, Chief Justice Edward Coke proclaimed;
"Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal".
22. It is thus settled proposition of law that a judgment, decree or order obtained by playing fraud on the Court, Tribunal or Authority is a nullity and non est in the eye of law. Such a judgment, decree or order by the first Court or by the final Court has to be treated as nullity by every Court, superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any Court, at any time, in appeal, revision, writ or even in collateral proceedings.
23. In the leading case of Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley, (1956) 1 All ER 341 : (1956) 1 QB 702 : (1956) 2 WLR 502, Lord Denning observed:
"No judgment of a court, no order of a Minister, can be allowed to stand, if it has been obtained by fraud."
28. Allowing the appeal, setting aside the judgment of the High Court and describing the observations of the High Court as 'wholly perverse', Kuldip Singh, J. stated:
"The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the court, must come with clean-hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the court is being abused. Property-grabbers, tax- evaders, bank-loan- dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the court - process a convenient lever to retain the illegal-gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person, who's case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation". (emphasis supplied)
29. The Court proceeded to state:
"A litigant, who approaches the court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would he guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on the opposite party".
30. The Court concluded:
"The principle of 'finality of litigation' cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants".
25. Thus, in view of aforesaid, there is no force in the present writ petitions. Hence, the same are dismissed. Cost of Rs.50,000/- is imposed on each of the petitioner of Writ Petition No.4813 (S/S) of 2014 and Writ Petition No.5530 (S/S) of 2014, to be deposited in the Registry of this Court within a period of one month, which shall be remitted to the Mediation and Conciliation Centre, at Lucknow Bench of the High Court, failing which the District Judge, Ambedkar Nagar is directed to deduct the same from the salary/funds available of the petitioner and deposit as aforesaid.
Order Date :- 14th September, 2017
Rajneesh DR-PS)
[Vivek Chaudhary, J.]
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