Ashok Pratap Rai vs State Of U.P. And 3 Others
2017 Latest Caselaw 313 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 

A.F.R.
 
Court No. - 40
 

 
Case :- CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 2500 of 2016
 
Petitioner :- Ashok Pratap Rai
 
Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 3 Others
 
Counsel for Petitioner :- Samit Gopal
 
Counsel for Respondent :- G.A.
 

 

 
Hon'ble Bala Krishna Narayana,J.

Hon'ble Arvind Kumar Mishra-I,J.

Heard Sri Samit Gopal, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri J.K.Upadhyay, learned AGA and Smt. Manju Thakur, brief holder for the State. None appears on behalf of the respondent no. 4.

Despite time being granted none of the respondents have filed any counter affidavit. With the consent of the learned counsel for the parties present, this writ petition is being disposed of finally at the admission stage itself.

This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner Ashok Pratap Rai with a prayer to issue a writ order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned FIR dated 07.10.2015 lodged by respondent no.4 at P.S. Sahibabad, District Ghaziabad and registered as case crime no. 1339 of 2015 under Sections 195, 500, 501 and 120-B IPC. (Annexure No.-1 to the writ petition)

A further prayer has been made to issue a writ order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents not to arrest the petitioner in pursuance of investigation of case crime no. 1339 of 2015 under Sections 195, 500, 501 and 120-B IPC registered on the basis of impugned FIR dated 07.10.2015.

Sri Samit Gopal, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that even if the entire allegations made in the impugned FIR are taken to be true and accepted on their face value and left unrebutted, the same do not disclose an offence under Section 195 IPC against the petitioner. He next submitted that the prosecution of the petitioner under Sections 500, 501 and 120-B IPC pursuant to the impugned FIR is clearly barred by Section 199 Cr.P.C. and also on account of the fact that both the offences are non cognizable and hence Section 2(d) Cr.P.C. is attracted.

He further submitted that the impugned FIR is a product of malice and has been lodged by respondent no.4 as a measure of vendetta and as a counter blast to the complaint filed by the petitioner against him, his brother Saurabh Gupta and several other persons under Sections 170, 171, 509, 379 and 451 IPC and Section 177 of the Motor Vehicles Act and the FIR lodged by the petitioner against the same persons on 25.08.2009 registered as case crime no. 142 of 2009 under Section 451/34 IPC and hence the same is liable to be quashed.

Per contra Smt. Manju Thakur, appearing for the State has submitted that from the perusal of the impugned FIR and on the basis of the allegations made therein it cannot be said that no cognizable offence against the petitioner is made out. The writ petition is devoid of any merit and is as such liable to be dismissed.

We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned FIR as well as the averments made in the writ petition and the documents appended as annexure thereto.

Brief facts of this case which emerge from the perusal of the averments made in the writ petition are that the lodging of the impugned FIR by respondent no.4 Gaurav Gupta against the petitioner was preceded by an incident which had taken place on 21.05.2008 in the petitioner's house when some persons including Saurabh Gupta brother of respondent no.4 Gaurav Gupta, Ajeet Singh, Mohit Dutta and Nadeem arrived at the petitioner's house in a vehicle belonging to Govt. of India and forced their entry into the petitioner's house in his absence masquerading as officers of Govt. of India and immediately started manhandling and abusing his wife and his partner Mr. Jayesh Mathur accusing them of keeping prohibited animals in their premises which constituted violation of the provisions of Wild Life Protection Act 1973. Upon being informed about the presence of trespassers in his house, he immediately rushed to his residence and requested the persons present in his house to furnish proof of their identity on which they disclosed that they were the members of an organization which was run by Mrs. Menka Gandhi, who is presently a cabinet minister. The police was called on the spot, Wild Life Inspector Mr. R.R.Beena searched the petitioner's residence but did not find any prohibited species of wild animal and intimated the aforesaid fact to Smt. Menka Gandhi on telephone on which she started abusing the Wild Life Inspector and forcing him to register a case against the petitioner under the Wild Life Protection Act. The aforesaid persons while leaving the petitioner's premises, apart from threatening to implicate him in false cases decamped with his watch and wallet containing about Rs. 20,000-21,000/-.

With regard to the aforesaid incident the petitioner filed a complaint on the same day against the aforesaid persons under Sections 170, 171, 354, 504, 379 and 451 IPC and Section 177 of Motor Vehicles Act. When the aforesaid complaint made no progress, the petitioner filed a FIR on 25.08.2009 against the same persons which was registered as case crime no. 142 of 2009 under Section 451/34 IPC at P.S. Crime Branch, District Crime and Railway, copy of the aforesaid FIR has been brought on record by the petitioner as Annexure-2 to the writ petition. However when the Investigating Officer without conducting proper investigation submitted final report in the matter, copy whereof has been filed as Annexure No.3 to the writ petition, the petitioner filed a protest petition against the final report on 09.01.2015 before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, South Saket Court, New Delhi, copy whereof has been brought on record as Annexure-4 to the writ petition. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, South Saket passed an order for further investigation on the protest petition of the petitioner which annoyed the accused in the aforesaid case to such an extent that respondent no. 4 lodged the impugned FIR against the petitioner.

The prosecution case as spelt out in the FIR is that on 27.09.2015 an incident had taken place in village Basada, District Gautam Budh Nagar in which one person had lost his life and two persons Gaurav Gupta respondent no.4 and Saurabh Gupta (brother of respondent no.4) who were members of NGO closely linked with Smt. Menka Gandhi were arrested in connection with the aforesaid crime although they had no concern with the same. The respondent no.4 and his brother Saurabh Gupta were working in NGO run by Mrs. Menka Gandhi, object whereof was to prevent wildlife smuggling and activities of animal mafias, for the last ten years and more than one thousand cases had been instituted at the behest of the NGO in different States under different provisions of the Wild Life Protection Act. It was further alleged in the FIR that when the respondent no.4 switched on his television set on 02.10.2015 at about 9.00 a.m. and started watching Samachar Plus channel he saw one person, namely, Ashok Pratap Rai giving a statement that two persons who are the members of a NGO run by Mrs. Menka Gandhi, namely, Gaurav Gupta ad Saurabh Gupta had been arrested in connection with the murder, which had taken place in village Bisara and sent to jail. He also stated that aforesaid two persons were very well known to him. In the FIR it was further alleged that petitioner Ashok Pratap Rai was a smuggler of wildlife and he had given the aforesaid statement with the intention of bringing disrepute to the respondent no.4 and Smt. Menka Gandhi and his statement was telecasted live on television with the intention to disturb the public order. The telecast of the aforesaid news item was followed by respondent no.4 receiving a series of telephone calls from his acquaintances inquiring from him about his whereabouts and the matter in connection with which he had allegedly been arrested. Thereafter the informant was informed by one of his friends that one person with the name of Ashok Pratap Rai had given an interview to the daily newspaper Carava against him in which he had stated that Gaurav Gupta and Saurabh Gupta had committed a murder in village Bisara at the instigation of Smt. Menka Gandhi and both of them had been arrested and are in police custody.

The FIR also contains a recital that when the respondent no.4 opened the website of the said newspaper Carawa he was shocked to notice that news editor Ambresh Mishra on the direction of the petitioner Ashok Pratap Rai had without verifying the facts divulged to him by the petitioner, had put a news item on the website of the newspaper that Smt. Menka Gandhi was trying to disturb the peace of village Bisara and Gaurav Gupta and Saurabh Gupta had committed a murder and had been arrested. In the same news Smt. Menka Gandhi had been referred to as "Badtameez" and a photograph of two persons along with Smt. Menka Gandhi was also posted on the website and captioned as "two persons in the photograph were Saurabh Gupta and Gaurav Gupta who have been arrested on account of their alleged involvement in the murder which has taken place in village Bisara". As a result of the aforesaid telecast and the statement given by petitioner to the editor of news paper Carawa, which was put on the website of news paper, the muslim community had become inimical towards Gaurav Gupta and Saurabh Gupta and there was imminent threat of their house being attacked by bad elements and animal mafias and their lives as well as the lives of their family members being endangered.

In order to examine the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner that from the perusal of the impugned FIR and on the basis of the allegation made therein offence under Section 195 IPC is not made out against the petitioner and the Magistrate is barred from taking cognizance of the offences punishable under Sections 500 and 501 IPC by Section 199(1) Cr.P.C., it would be useful to extract relevant provisions of the IPC which have been mentioned in the impugned FIR And Section 199 (1) Cr.P.C. :-

"Section 195. Giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure conviction of offence punishable with imprisonment for life or imprisonment

Whoever gives or fabricates false evidence intending thereby to cause, or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby cause, any person to be convicted of an offence which 102[by the law for the time being in force in 103[India]] is not capital, but punishable with 104[imprisonment for life], or imprisonment for a term of seven years or upwards, shall be punished as a person convicted of that offence would be liable to be punished.

Illustration

A gives false evidence before a Court of Justice, intending thereby to cause Z to be convicted of a dacoity. The punishment of dacoity is 104[imprisonment for life], or rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, with or without fine. A, therefore, is liable to 105[imprisonment for life] or imprisonment, with or without fine.

Section 500. Punishment for defamation

Whoever defames another shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.

Section 501. Printing or engraving matter known to be defamatory

Whoever prints or engraves any matter, knowing or having good reason to believe that such matter is defamatory of any person, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.

Section 120B. Punishment of criminal conspiracy

(1) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death, 51[imprisonment for life] or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, shall, where no express provision is made in this Code for the punishment of such a conspiracy, be punished in the same manner as if he had abetted such offence.

(2) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable as aforesaid shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding six months, or with fine or with both.

199. Prosecution for defamation.

(1) No Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Chapter XXI of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860 ) except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by the offence: Provided that where such person is under the age of eighteen years, or is an idiot or a lunatic, or is from sickness or infirmity unable to make a complaint, or is a woman who, according to the local customs and manners, ought not to be compelled to appear in public, some other person may, with the leave of the Court make a complaint on his or her behalf.

We will first deal with the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the prosecution of the petitioner u/s 500 and 501 IPC pursuant to the impugned FIR is bad in law in view of Section 199 (1) Cr.P.C. Section 199 (1) Cr.P.C. clearly provides that no Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Chapter XXI of the IPC (45 of 1860) except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by the offence.

Complaint has been defined in Section 2 (d) of the Criminal Procedure Code as any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate with a view to his taking action under this code, that some person whether known or unknown has committed an offence but does not include a police report.

Chapter XV of the Code of Criminal Procedure prescribes the procedure for dealing with a complaint filed before a Magistrate.

Section 204 (1) of the Cr.P.C. provides that if in the opinion of a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence there is sufficient ground for proceeding and the case appears to be a summon case, he shall issue his summons for the attendance of the accused or, a warrant case, he may issue a warrant, if he thinks fit a summon for causing the accused to be brought or to appear at a certain time before such Magistrate or if he has no jurisdiction himself some other Magistrate having jurisdiction.

Section 190 of the Cr.P.C. provides that subject to the provisions of this Chapter any Magistrate of the first class and any Magistrate of the second class especially empowered in this behalf under sub-Section (2) may take cognizance of any offence-

(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence;

(b) upon a police report of such facts;

(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed.

Thus, in view of the bar stipulated in Section 199 (1) Cr.P.C., even if the investigation in the present case of the offence under Sections 500 and 501 IPC is allowed to proceed and upon completion of investigation any police report is filed u/s 173 (2) of the Cr.P.C., even then the concerned Magistrate would be barred from taking cognizance of the offences u/s 500 and 501 IPC against the petitioner on the basis of such police report and hence no useful purpose would be served in permitting the investigation of the offences u/s 500 and 501 IPC against the petitioner pursuant to the impugned FIR to go on.

Coming to the next ground of challenge to the impugned FIR by the petitioner's counsel that the recitals contained in the impugned FIR do not disclose the offence punishable u/s 195 IPC, we find upon perusal of Section 195 IPC that if a person who gives or fabricates false evidence intending thereby to cause or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby cause, any person to be convicted of an offence which {by the law for the time being in force in (India)} is now capital but punishable with (imprisonment for life) or imprisonment for term of 7 years or upwards, he shall be punished as a person convicted of that offence would be liable to be punished.

The question which next arises for our consideration is that whether from the unrebutted allegations made in the impugned FIR it appears that the petitioner has either given or fabricated false evidence with the intent to procure conviction of the complainant or his brother of an offence punishable with imprisonment for life or imprisonment for 7 years and the statements given by him during the television show to the correspondent and to the editor newspaper karvan in which it is alleged that he had stated that respondent no.4 and his brother Gaurav Gupta were accused of a murder which had taken place in village Bisara and were arrested in connection with the aforesaid crime and sent to jail constitutes "evidence" and in order to answer the aforesaid question we will have to examine the meaning of the word "evidence". According to Section 3 of the Evidence Act, "evidence" means :- (1) all statements which the Court permits or requires to be made before it by witnesses in relation to matters of fact under enquiry, such statements are called oral evidence, (2) all documents including electronic records produced for the inspection of the Court, such documents are called documentary evidence.

The Apex Court while examining the definition of word "evidence" as defined in Section 3 of the Evidence Act, has in paragraphs 56 and 57 of its judgement rendered in the case of Hardeep Singh and others Vs. State of Punjab and others reported in 2014 Law Suit (SC) 22 as held hereunder :-

"56. According to Tomlin's Law Dictionary, Evidence is "the means from which an inference may logically be drawn as to the existence of a fact. It consists of proof by testimony of witnesses, on oath; or by writing or records." Bentham defines 'evidence' as "any matter of fact, the effect, tendency or design of which presented to mind, is to produce in the mind a persuasion concerning the existence of some other matter of fact- a persuasion either affirmative or disaffirmative of its existence. Of the two facts so connected, the latter may be distinguished as the principal fact, and the former as the evidentiary fact." According to Wigmore on Evidence, evidence represents "any knowable fact or group of facts, not a legal or a logical principle, considered with a view to its being offered before a legal tribunal for the purpose of producing a persuasion, positive or negative, on the part of the tribunal, as to the truth of a proposition, not of law, or of logic, on which the determination of the tribunal is to be asked.

57. The provision and the above-mentioned definitions clearly suggest that it is an exhaustive definition. Wherever the words "means and include" are used, it is an indication of the fact that the definition 'is a hard and fast definition', and no other meaning can be assigned to the expression that is put down in the definition. It indicates an exhaustive explanation of the meaning which, for the purposes of the Act, must invariably be attached to these words or expression. (Vide: M/s. Mahalakshmi Oil Mills v. State of A.P., AIR 1989 SC 335; Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd., Chandigarh v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Chandigarh & Ors., (1990) 3 SCC 682; P. Kasilingam & Ors. v. P.S.G. College of Technology & Ors., AIR 1995 SC 1395; Hamdard (Wakf) Laboratories v. Dy. Labour Commissioner & Ors., AIR 2008 SC 968; and Ponds India Ltd. (merged with H.L. Limited) v. Commissioner of Trade Tax, Lucknow, (2008) 8 SCC 369).

58. In Feroze N. Dotivala v. P.M. Wadhwani & Ors., (2003) 1 SCC 433, dealing with a similar issue, this Court observed as under:

"Generally, ordinary meaning is to be assigned to any word or phrase used or defined in a statute. Therefore, unless there is any vagueness or ambiguity, no occasion will arise to interpret the term in a manner which may add something to the meaning of the word which ordinarily does not so mean by the definition itself, more particularly, where it is a restrictive definition. Unless there are compelling reasons to do so, meaning of a restrictive and exhaustive definition would not be expanded or made extensive to embrace things which are strictly not within the meaning of the word as defined."

We, therefore proceed to examine the matter further on the premise that the definition of word "evidence" under the Evidence Act is exhaustive.

59. In Kalyan Kumar Gogoi v. Ashutosh Agnihotri & Anr., AIR 2011 SC 760, while dealing with the issue this Court held :

"18. The word "evidence" is used in common parlance in three different senses: (a) as equivalent to relevant, (b) as equivalent to proof, and (c) as equivalent to the material, on the basis of which courts come to a conclusion about the existence or non-existence of disputed facts. Though, in the definition of the word "evidence" given in Section 3 of the Evidence Act one finds only oral and documentary evidence, this word is also used in phrases such as best evidence, circumstantial evidence, corroborative evidence, derivative evidence, direct evidence, documentary evidence, hearsay evidence, indirect evidence, oral evidence, original evidence, presumptive evidence, primary evidence, real evidence, secondary evidence, substantive evidence, testimonial evidence, etc."

60. In relation to a Civil Case, this court in Ameer Trading Corporation Ltd. v. Shapoorji Data Processing Ltd., AIR 2004 SC 355, held that the examination of a witness would include evidencein- chief, cross-examination or re-examination. In Omkar Namdeo Jadhao & Ors v. Second Additional Sessions Judge Buldana & Anr., AIR 1997 SC 331; and Ram Swaroop & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2004 SC 2943, this Court held that statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. during the investigation are not evidence. Such statements can be used at the trial only for contradictions or omissions when the witness is examined in the court. (See also: Podda Narayana & Ors. v. State of A.P., AIR 1975 SC 1252; Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1976 SC 294; and State (Delhi Administration) v. Laxman Kumar & Ors., AIR 1986 SC 250).

61. In Lok Ram v. Nihal Singh & Anr., AIR 2006 SC 1892, it was held that it is evident that a person, even though had initially been named in the FIR as an accused, but not charge-sheeted, can also be 4 Page 45 added as an accused to face the trial. The trial court can take such a step to add such persons as accused only on the basis of evidence adduced before it and not on the basis of materials available in the charge-sheet or the case diary, because such materials contained in the charge-sheet or the case diary do not constitute evidence.

62. The majority view of the Constitution Bench in Ramnarayan Mor & Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra, AIR 1964 SC 949 has been as under: "9. It was urged in the alternative by counsel for the appellants that even if the expression "evidence" may include documents, such documents would only be those which are duly proved at the enquiry for commitment, because what may be used in a trial, civil or criminal, to support the judgment of a Court is evidence duly proved according to law. But by the Evidence Act which applies to the trial of all criminal cases, the expression "evidence" is defined in Section 3 as meaning and including all statements which the Court permits or requires to be made before it by witnesses, in relation to matters of fact under enquiry and documents produced for the inspection of the Court. There is no restriction in this definition to documents which are duly proved by evidence." (Emphasis added)

63. Similarly, this Court in Sunil Mehta & Anr. v. State of Gujarat & Anr., JT 2013 (3) SC 328, held that "It is trite that evidence within the meaning of the Evidence Act and so also within 4 Page 46 the meaning of Section 244 of the Cr.P.C. is what is recorded in the manner stipulated under Section 138 in the case of oral evidence. Documentary evidence would similarly be evidence only if the documents are proved in the manner recognized and provided for under the Evidence Act unless of course a statutory provision makes the document admissible as evidence without any formal proof thereof."

64. In Guriya @ Tabassum Tauquir & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Anr., AIR 2008 SC 95, this Court held that in exercise of the powers under Section 319 Cr.P.C., the court can add a new accused only on the basis of evidence adduced before it and not on the basis of materials available in the charge sheet or the case diary.

65. In Kishun Singh (Supra), this Court held : "11. On a plain reading of sub-Section (1) of Section 319 there can be no doubt that it must appear from the evidence tendered in the course of any inquiry or trial that any person not being the accused has committed any offence for which he could be tried together with the accused. This power (under Section 319(1)), it seems clear to us, can be exercised only if it so appears from the evidence at the trial and not otherwise. Therefore, this sub-Section contemplates existence of some evidence appearing in the course of trial where from the court can prima facie conclude that the 4 Page 47 person not arraigned before it is also involved in the commission of the crime for which he can be tried with those already named by the police. Even a person who has earlier been discharged would fall within the sweep of the power conferred by S. 319 of the Code. Therefore, stricto sensu, Section 319 of the Code cannot be invoked in a case like the present one where no evidence has been led at a trial wherefrom it can be said that the appellants appear to have been involved in the commission of the crime along with those already sent up for trial by the prosecution. 12. But then it must be conceded that Section 319 covers the post-cognizance stage where in the course of an inquiry or trial the involvement or complicity of a person or persons not named by the investigating agency has surfaced which necessitates the exercise of the discretionary power conferred by the said provision....."

66. A similar view has been taken by this Court in Raj Kishore Prasad (Supra), wherein it was held that in order to apply Section 319 Cr.P.C., it is essential that the need to proceed against the person other than the accused appearing to be guilty of offence arises only on evidence recorded in the course of an inquiry or trial.

67. In Lal Suraj @ Suraj Singh & Anr. v. State of Jharkhand, (2009) 2 SCC 696, a two-Judge Bench of this Court held that "a court framing a charge would have before it all the materials on record which were required to be proved by the prosecution. In a case where, however, the court exercises its jurisdiction under Section 319 4 Page 48 Cr.P.C., the power has to be exercised on the basis of the fresh evidence brought before the court. There lies a fine but clear distinction."

68. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Rajendra Singh v. State of U.P. & Anr., AIR 2007 SC 2786, observing that court should not exercise the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. on the basis of materials available in the charge-sheet or the case diary, because such materials contained in the charge-sheet or the case diary do not constitute evidence. The word 'evidence' in Section 319 Cr.P.C. contemplates the evidence of witnesses given in the court.

69. Ordinarily, it is only after the charges are framed that the stage of recording of evidence is reached. A bare perusal of Section 227 Cr.P.C. would show that the legislature has used the terms "record of the case" and the "documents submitted therewith". It is in this context that the word 'evidence' as appearing in Section 319 Cr.P.C. has to be read and understood. The material collected at the stage of investigation can at best be used for a limited purpose as provided under Section 157 of the Evidence Act i.e. to corroborate or contradict 4 Page 49 the statements of the witnesses recorded before the court. Therefore, for the exercise of power under Section 319 Cr.P.C., the use of word `evidence' means material that has come before the court during an inquiry or trial by it and not otherwise. If from the evidence led in the trial the court is of the opinion that a person not accused before it has also committed the offence, it may summon such person under Section 319 Cr.P.C.

70. With respect to documentary evidence, it is sufficient, as can be seen from a bare perusal of Section 3 of the Evidence Act as well as the decision of the Constitution Bench, that a document is required to be produced and proved according to law to be called evidence. Whether such evidence is relevant, irrelevant, admissible or inadmissible, is a matter of trial."

What follows from the reading of Hardip's case (supra) is that the word evidence means the material that has come before the Court during inquiry or the trial by it and not otherwise and in order to constitute documentary evidence is required to be proved, according to law to be called evidence, whether such evidence is relevant or irrelevant, admissible or inadmissible is a matter of trial.

Thus in view of the interpretation of the word "evidence" as expounded by the Apex Court in its catena of decisions, the statement given by the petitioner during a television show to the T.V. correspondent or to the editor of a news paper which contained references to the respondent no.4 and his brother Saurav Gupta as persons connected with a murder and their being arrested and sent to police custody in connection with the aforesaid murder do not constitute evidence within the meaning of word "evidence" as defined in Section 3 of the Evidence Act and hence the allegations made in the FIR do not disclose the ingredients of the offence under Section 195 IPC.

Since the congnizance of offence under Section 500 and 501 IPC can be taken by a Magistrate only on the basis of a complaint made before him orally or in writing and no cognizance can be taken of the aforesaid offences on the basis of the police report, no useful purpose would be served in permitting the investigation of the case qua the offences under Sections 500 and 501 IPC to continue against the petitioner and since the allegations made in the FIR do not disclose the offence under Section 195 IPC, the impugned FIR is liable to be quashed.

For the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned FIR dated 07.10.2015 registered as case crime no. 1339 of 2015 under Sections 195, 500, 501 and 120-B IPC is hereby quashed.

However, this order shall not preclude the respondent no.4 from pursuing the remedy, if any, available to him under the law of land for proceeding against the petitioner for having allegedly committed the offences under Sections 500 and 501 IPC.

There shall, however, be no order as to costs.

Order Date :- 9.5.2017

Abhishek Sri.