Smt. Savitri Solanki vs State Of U.P. And 4 Others
2017 Latest Caselaw 2295 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 

AFR
 
Court No. - 17
 
Case :- WRIT - A No. - 10276 of 2016
 
Petitioner :- Smt. Savitri Solanki
 
Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 4 Others
 
Counsel for Petitioner :- Ram Krishna Yadav
 
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
 

 
Hon'ble Pradeep Kumar Singh Baghel,J.

The petitioner is a retired Assistant Teacher of an attached primary section of an Intermediate College. She is aggrieved by the order of the Director of Education (Secondary), U.P., Allahabad dated 06th January, 2016, whereby her claim with regard to General Provident Fund and full pension has been rejected.

The essential facts are that Maharaj Surajmal Inter College, Raja Mandi, Agra (for short, the "institution") is a recognised institution. The State has enlisted it for the grant-in-aid. The affairs of the institution are regulated under the provisions of the Intermediate Education Act, 1921 and the Uttar Pradesh High Schools and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and Other Employees) Act, 1971. The institution has an attached primary section also, which too was on the grant in-aid list since 1989.

The petitioner was appointed on 25th July, 1979 as an Assistant Teacher in the primary section of the institution. Later, she earned her promotion in L.T. Grade and continued on the said post till her retirement on 30th June, 2015 after completing about 35 years' of regular service. Her papers for the terminal benefits were transmitted to the third respondent. It appears that her subscription towards G.P.F. was deducted since November, 1990 to November, 1991, thereafter the deduction of G.P.F. from her salary was suddenly stopped by the respondent authorities without any reason and again they started deductions from November, 2002 which continued till February, 2015.

The grievance of the petitioner is that she is entitled for the full monthly pension as she has completed 35 years of service, whereas the qualifying service is only 25 years. However, after her retirement, the Deputy Director of Education, Agra Region, Agra has sanctioned a sum of Rs.7,504/- monthly pension to the petitioner. According to the petitioner, at the time of retirement she was drawing monthly salary of Rs.23,090/-, hence she is entitled for the pension of Rs. 11,545/- per month.

When the repeated representations of the petitioner failed to elicit any response from the authority concerned, she preferred a writ petition, being Writ-A No. 55846 of 2015 (Smt. Savitri Solanki v. State of U.P. and others), which was disposed of by this Court on 30th September, 2015. In the said writ petition this Court issued a direction to the second respondent therein to consider the representation of the petitioner.

In compliance with the aforesaid order of this Court, the Director of Education (Secondary), U.P., has rejected the claim of the petitioner vide impugned order dated 06th January, 2016 chiefly on the ground that the judgment of this Court in Banwari Lal Verma v. State of U.P. and others, Writ-A No. 57742 of 2012, decided on 05th November, 2012, is not applicable in the present case for the reason that in the writ petition filed by the petitioner i.e. Writ-A No. 55846 of 2015 the Court has not issued any direction to follow the judgment of Banwari Lal (supra) and other cases. In the impugned order it has also been recorded that the contribution towards G.P.F. was not deposited from November, 1991 to October, 2002, but there was no fault on the part of the petitioner for the said lapse. In spite of recording the said finding, the petitioner's claim has been rejected only on the ground that in her writ petition there was no such direction as issued by this Court in the case of Banwari Lal (supra) and other cases.

I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has completed 35 years of service and there was no fault on her part in not deducting the contribution towards G.P.F. from her salary. He submits that the contribution was deducted for the first time in October, 1990 upto November, 1991, thereafter it was stopped and it was again resumed from November, 2002. Hence, it was submitted that there was no fault on the part of the petitioner. Next he urged that the petitioner has brought to the notice of the Director of Education various judgments of this Court including Banwari Lal (supra) and others on the issue which has been mentioned in the impugned order, but the Director of Education has not followed those judgments of this Court. Lastly, he urged that the petitioner is suffering recurring financial loss as her pension has adversely been affected due to the aforesaid facts.

Learned Standing Counsel has drawn the attention of the Court to paragraph-9 of the counter affidavit, wherein the Government order of 2004 has been referred.

I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

The petitioner was appointed as an Assistant Teacher in 1979 in the primary section of the institution. The primary section is attached to the recognised and aided institution and it also receives financial aid from the State Government. The institution came on the grant-in-aid list in the year 1989 and since then the petitioner was drawing her salary from the salary payment account uninterruptedly till she reached her age of superannuation on 30th June, 2015. Concededly, the contribution towards G.P.F. was deducted from November, 1990 to November, 1991, thereafter it was stopped and it was again resumed in November, 2002. The petitioner has offered to deposit the amount of G.P.F. for the period when the deduction was not made along with interest in terms of the judgment of this Court in Buddhiram v. State of U.P. and others, Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 45217 of 2012, decided on 26th September, 2012, reported in 2013 (1) ADJ 254, which has consistently been followed in Banwari Lal (supra) and other cases. It is stated that the petitioner has again offered to deposit the entire amount of contribution.

It is apt to extract the relevant part of the judgment of Buddhiram (supra), which reads as under:

"37. In view of this, qua incumbents who have been appointed in the said institution and said institution in question has been included in the grant-in-aid list of the State Government prior to 01.04.2005 qua them last opportunity be given by the State Government for enabling them to deposit managerial contribution alongwith with interest and thereafter whatever benefit of the aforesaid old scheme is liable to be extended, the same be extended to said category of incumbents. In respect of institution who have been included in the grant-in-aid list after 01.04.2005 the incumbents working therein their claim would be governed under new pension scheme.

38. In view of aforesaid discussion, Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 45217 of 2012; 45229 of 2012 are dismissed. Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 47649 of 2012 and Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 44742 of 2012 are allowed. Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 55778 of 2010 and Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 47000 of 2010 are dismissed.

39. Petitioners' whose writ petition has been allowed are permitted to deposit contribution with interest within two months from today, and in the event of deposit being made, then benefit of Government Order be extended to them, subject of fulfillment of other terms and condition."

It is stated that in the identical and similar facts this Court has considered the same issue in the case of Banwari Lal Verma (supra), which has followed the judgment of Buddhiram (supra). The petitioner has made several representations to the authorities concerned for rectifying the anomaly in her pension and she offered that she is ready to deposit the required amount towards G.P.F. in terms of the law laid down by this Court in the case of Buddhiram (supra) and other cases, where this Court has taken a consistent view that in case the contribution towards G.P.F. has not been deposited and the said amount is deposited by the petitioner/employee along with the interest, in that event necessary correction in the pension shall be made.

Relevant, it would be to mention, that the petitioner had brought to the notice of the Director of Education the aforesaid judgments of this Court, but the Director of Education has not considered those judgments only on the ground that in the earlier writ petition filed by the petitioner i.e. Writ-A No. 55846 of 2015 this Court has not issued any such direction.

The Court regrets to record that the Director of Education has not taken pain to read the order of this Court passed in the case of the petitioner. The Court has very clearly clarified that it has not expressed its opinion on the merits of the case. The relevant part of the order dated 30th September, 2015 passed in Writ-A No. 55846 of 2015 is extracted below:

"It is made clear that the Court has not adjudicated the claim of the petitioner on merits."

The petitioner has filed the copy of the judgment of Banwari Lal (supra) before the Director of Education. In the impugned order the Director of Education has referred the judgment of Banwari Lal (supra) but he has not followed the law laid down by this Court without giving any reason. The Director of Education has also taken the view that in her writ petition there is no such direction. The Director of Education has failed to consider that her writ petition was disposed of with a direction that the Director of Education shall pass the order in accordance with law. Hence, it was obligatory on the part of the Director of Education to decide the matter in terms of the law laid down by this Court. It is a well-settled law that the judgment of the High Court, which is the apex Court of the State, is binding on all the authorities, tribunals and courts. If the High Court lays down the law, then it is binding on all the authorities in the State irrespective of the fact whether the authority was party in the said writ petition or not.

The issue whether the High Court has power like the power of the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution or not, came to be considered before the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. East India Commercial Co. Ltd. Calcutta and another v. Collector of Customs, Calcutta, AIR 1962 SC 1893, wherein the Supreme Court has expressed the view that although the High Courts do not have the power as under Article 141 the Supreme Court has, but the orders of the High Court like Article 141 are binding on all the authorities, tribunals and Courts irrespective of the fact whether they are party in the petition or not. Once the High Court has laid down a law in a particular case, the said law is binding on all the authorities. The relevant part of the judgment of the Supreme Court reads thus:

"29. ....The division Bench of the High Court held that a contravention of a condition imposed by a licence issued under the Act is not an offence under S. 5 of the Act. This raises the question whether an administrative tribunal can ignore the law declared by the highest court in the State & initiate proceedings in direct violation of the law so declared. Under Art. 215, every High Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. Under Art. 226, it has a plenary power to issue orders or writs for the enforcement of the fundamental rights and for any other purpose to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within its territorial jurisdiction. Under Art. 227 it has jurisdiction over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. It would be anomalous to suggest that a tribunal over which the High Court has superintendence can ignore the law declared by that court and start proceedings in direct violation of it..... We, therefore, hold that the law declared by the highest court in the State is binding on authorities or tribunals under its superintendence, and that they cannot ignore it either in initiating a proceeding or deciding on the rights involved in such a proceeding. If that be so, the notice issued by the authority signifying the launching of proceedings contrary to the law laid down by the High Court would be invalid and the proceedings themselves would be without jurisdiction."

Following the view taken in M/s. East India Commercial Co. Ltd. Calcutta and another (supra), the Supreme Court in Shri Baradakanta Mishra v. Shri Bhimsen Dixit, AIR 1972 SC 2466, has held as under:

"14. Under Art. 227 of the Constitution, the High Court is vested with the power of superintendence over the courts and tribunals in the State. Acting as a quasi judicial authority under the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, the appellant was subject to the superintendence of the High Court.

Accordingly the decisions of the High Court were binding on him. He could not get away from them by adducing factually wrong and illegitimate reasons. In East India Commercial Co. Ltd. Calcutta v. The Collector of Customs, Calcutta, (1963) 3 SCR 338= (AIR 1962 SC 1893), Subba Rao, J. observed...."

Applying the said principle of the law laid down by the Supreme Court, I find that the Director of Education has completely misdirected himself while deciding the case of the petitioner. The law laid down by this Court in Buddhiram (supra) was binding on the Director of Education, but he has ignored the law laid down in the said case. The judgment of Buddhiram (supra) has also been followed in a series of judgments of this Court. Reference may also be made to some of the judgments of this Court on the issue in the cases of Smt. Shanti Solanki v. State of U.P. and others, Writ Petition No. 75746 of 2005, decided on 06th September, 2006; Banwari Lal Verma (supra); Lal Chandra Singh v. State of U.P. and others, Writ Petition No. 17033 of 2012, decided on 05th April, 2012, Smt. Ram Keshi Devi v. State of U.P. and others, 2009 (2) UPLBEC 1557, and Mangli Prasad Verma v. State of U.P. and others, 2012 LawSuit (All) 2081 : 2013 (1) UPLBEC 285.

In spite of these long line of decisions of this Court, the Director of Education has rejected the claim of a retired teacher. Hence, in my view, the Director of Education has not only ignored the law but he has passed the order in a most casual way and has forced a retired lady teacher to file a writ petition in this Court again for her terminal benefits.

In view of the above, the impugned order dated 06th January, 2016 passed by the Director of Education (Secondary), U.P. is liable to be set aside and it is hereby set aside. The matter is remitted to the Director of Education (Secondary), U.P. to reconsider the matter afresh in the light of the law laid down by this Court in Buddhiram (supra). In case the petitioner offers to deposit the entire remaining amount of contribution towards G.P.F. along with interest, the Director of Education shall pass the appropriate order in the light of the judgment of Buddhiram (supra). The said exercise shall be completed within two months from the date of communication of this order.

Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed.

Since the petitioner has been compelled to file two writ petitions for the cause, which has already been settled by this Court long back in Buddhiram (supra), the State shall pay a cost of Rs.10,000/- to the petitioner.

Order Date :- 13.7.2017

SKT/-