Allahabad High Court
Chandra Pal Singh And 2 Others vs State Of U.P. Thru Chief Secy. And 3 ... on 25 November, 2013
Bench: Dhananjaya Yeshwant Chandrachud, Chief Justice, Dilip Gupta
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
?Chief Justice's Court
Case :- WRIT - C No. - 64129 of 2013
Petitioner :- Chandra Pal Singh And 2 Others
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru Chief Secy. And 3 Others
Counsel for Petitioner :- Deepak Kumar Jaiswal,Santosh Tripathi
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Ramendra Pratap Singh
Hon'ble Dr. Dhananjaya Yeshwant Chandrachud,Chief Justice
Hon'ble Dilip Gupta,J.
The petitioners have sought to question the legality of an award which has been passed under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and have sought a mandamus to the first respondent to declare that the entire proceeding for acquisition have lapsed in view of the provisions of Section 11-A of the Act.
In making the submissions, learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon a judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Megh Singh Vs. State of U.P. and Others, reported in 2011 (1) ALJ 243.
The subject matter of the petition consists of Khasra Nos.942, 1333 and 1438, situated at Village Ghodi Bachera, Tehsil Dadari, District Gautam Budh Nagar. The petitioners claim to be co-tenure holders of half share in Khasra Nos.940, 946 and 1437. Admittedly, the date of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act is 10th October 2005 and the date of declaration under Section 6 of the Act is 19th January, 2006. The provisions of Section 17(1) and (4) were applied and possession of the land was taken on 14th June, 2006 and 6th October, 2006. The award was made on 25th July, 2011.
According to the petitioners, the acquisition proceedings must be regarded as having lapsed as the award was made beyond a period of two years from the date of publication of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act on 19th January, 2006.
This submission is directly contrary to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Satendra Prasad Jain and others Vs. State of U.P. and others, reported in 1993 (4) SCC 369. The Supreme Court observed as follows:
"15. Ordinarily, the Government can take possession of the land proposed to be acquired only after an award of compensation in respect thereof has been made under Section 11. Upon the taking of possession the land vests in the Government, that is to say, the owner of the land loses to the Government the title to it. This is what Section 16 states. The provisions of Section 11-A are intended to benefit the land owner and ensure that the award is made within a period of two years from the date of the Section 6 declaration. In the ordinary case, therefore, when Government fails to make an award within two years of the declaration under Section 6, the land has still not vested in the Government and its title remains with the owner, the acquisition proceedings are still pending and, by virtue of the provisions of Section 11-A, lapse. When Section 17(1) is applied by reason of urgency, Government takes possession of the land prior to the making of the award under Section 11 and thereupon the owner is divested of the title to the land which is vested in the Government. Section 17(1) states so in unmistakable terms. Clearly, Section 11-A can have no application to cases of acquisitions under Section 17 because the lands have already vested in the Government and there is no provision in the said Act by which land statutorily vested in the Government can revert to the owner."
However, it has been urged on behalf of the petitioners that in a judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Megh Singh (supra), the judgment in Satendra Prasad Jain (supra) has been distinguished.
In Megh Singh (supra), the decision of the Supreme Court in Satendra Prasad Jain (supra) was sought to be distinguished on the ground that the generality of the observations in respect of the applicability of Section 11-A of the Act in that case "was not intended to be expositions of the whole law but is governed and qualified by the particular facts and circumstances of that case".
We are unable to subscribe to the interpretation which has been placed by the Division Bench on a binding judgment of the Supreme Court. The provision of Section 11-A of the Act specifically came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Satendra Prasad Jain (supra). The exposition of law by the Supreme Court is authoritative and clearly binds this Court.
Moreover, the decision in Satendra Prasad Jain (supra) has been reiterated thereafter as well in Banda Development Authority, Banda Vs. Moti Lal Agarwal and others, reported in JT 2011 (5) SC 106 and in Mahadeo (deed) through LRS & others Vs. State of U.P. and others, reported in (2013) 4 SCC 524.
It was held by the Supreme Court in Banda Development Authority (supra) that once the provisions of Section 17(1) were applied and possession of the acquired land was taken, the view taken by the High Court that the acquisition proceedings have lapsed due to non-compliance of Section 11-A, could not be sustained. The judgment in Satendra Prasad Jain (supra) was reiterated and followed.
In Mahadeo (supra) the Supreme Court, referred to the earlier judgments rendered in Government of Andhra Pradesh and another Vs. Syed Akbar, reported in (2005) 1 SCC 558 and Satendra Prasad Jain (supra), and it was observed that there can be no dispute with regard to the settled proposition of law that once the land is acquired and mandatory requirements are complied with including possession having been taken, the land vests in the State Government free from all encumbrances and even if some unutilised land remains, it cannot be re-conveyed or reassigned to the erstwhile owner by invoking the provisions of the Act.
Before we conclude, we may also note that in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Banda Development Authority (supra), it has also been noted that if the acquisition is of a large tract of land, it may not be possible for the acquiring/designated authority to take physical possession of each and every parcel of the land and it will be sufficient that symbolic possession is taken by preparing appropriate document in the presence of independent witnesses.
Having regard to this position in law, the petitioners cannot derive benefit from the judgment of the Division Bench in Megh Singh's case.
Moreover, the record will indicate that the petitioners had earlier filed writ petition before this Court being Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.50785 of 2009, praying for a direction to decide their objections regarding the exemption of their abadi land and for the payment of compensation of the plots acquired according to the market rates. When this petition was filed in 2009, admittedly, two years had lapsed since the declaration was published under Section 6 of the Act on 19th January, 2006. The petition was disposed of with a direction to the Special Land Acquisition Officer to consider the application and to pass an order in accordance with law. The petitioners, therefore, had chosen not to agitate this point in the first writ petition which was filed by them.
For all these reasons, we find no merit in the contention of the petitioners that the acquisition proceedings have lapsed under Section 11-A of the Act.
The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
There shall be no order as to costs.
Order Date :- 25.11.2013
VMA
(Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, C.J.)
(Dilip Gupta,J.)
