The Indian Telephone Industries ... vs Smt. Asha Rani Pandey & Others
2013 Latest Caselaw 4886 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
 
 

A.F.R.
 
RESERVED
 
Court No. - 24
 

 
Case :- FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDER No. - 273 of 1995
 

 
Appellant :- The Indian Telephone Industries Ltd. & Another
 
Respondent :- Smt. Asha Rani Pandey & Others
 
Counsel for Appellant :- Krishna Chandra,Suresh Punjwari,Umesh Chandra
 
Counsel for Respondent :- R.S. Tripathi,R.S Tripathi,U.P.S. Kushwaha
 
ALONGWITH
 
Case :- FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDER No. - 275 of 1995
 

 
Appellant :- National Insurance Co.
 
Respondent :- Smt. Asha Rani Pandey & Others
 
Counsel for Respondent :- R.S. Tripathi,U.P.S. Kushwaha
 
ALONG WITH
 
Case :- FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDER No. - 276 of 1995
 

 
Appellant :- Smt.Asha Rani Pandey & Others
 
Respondent :- M/S.Iti Ltd. & Others
 
Counsel for Appellant :- R.S.Tripathi
 
Counsel for Respondent :- U.P.S. Kushwaha
 

 
Hon'ble Rajiv Sharma,J.

Hon'ble Dr. Satish Chandra,J.

All the appeals filed by different appellants under Section 173 of Motor Vehicle Act, 1988, against the common judgment and order dated 30.08.1995, passed by the Motor Accident Claim Tribunal, Faizabad, in Claim Petition No.133 of 1993.

The brief facts of the case are that on 30.09.1998, Sri Chhabi Nath Padney, husband and father of the claimants was going by an official car from Raebareli to Lucknow, from where he was supposed to fly to Geneva via New Delhi to attend a meeting. He was working as Additional General Manager in Indian Telephone Industries Ltd., Raebareli (in short, "ITI"). He was aged about 48 years. On the date of accident, he was going from Raebareli to Lucknow Airport in an official Ambassador Car No. UGB 4040. When the car reached near Microwave Station on Raebareli Lucknow road, about 8.00 p.m., it has collied with one loaded truck of iron rods. The car was driven by Sri Pratap Singh, who was holding a valid driving license and was an employee of the ITI. Sri Chhabi Nath Pandey was taken to Balrampur Hospital and K.G.M.C. Lucknow, lastly, to Sanjai Gandhi Post Graduate Institute, Lucknow, where after seven days, he died. The appellants-claimants have filed a claim petition for Rs.8,00,000/-, out of which, a total claim of Rs.7,54,000/- was awarded against the ITI and the National Insurance Company jointly and severely, who had provided the insurance cover to the Ambassador Car in question, but no liability was fixed on the Truck owner and the Oriental Insurance Company, who had insured the Truck No. URL-9855. Being aggrieved, the National Insurance Company Ltd., Indian Telephone Industries Ltd., as well as the claimants have filed present appeals.

With this background, Sri R.S. Tripathi, learned counsel for the appellants-claimants (FAFO No. 276 of 1995) submits that the compensation is meager one. Ex-gratia payment of Rs. Three Lacs has wrongly been deducted by the ITI from the total compensation awarded. He further submits that the employer has taken an amount of Rs.65,228/- under the Workmen's Compensation Act as a part of the compensation wrongly. The Tribunal has wrongly applied the multiplier of 11. He also submits that no compensation was awarded for the mental agony, pain and suffering as well as the future prospects. This is also a plea of the learned counsel for the appellant that no benefit of time pay scale of the deceased was given to family members. So, he made a request that the total compensation may be awarded more than Rs.15,00,000/-. The ex-gratia payment should not be a part of the compensation. For this purpose, he has relied on the ratio laid down on the following cases :-

(i) Helen C. Rebello (Mrs) & Ors. vs. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation & Another, 1999 SCC (Cri) 197;

(ii) State of A.P. & Another vs. K. Pushpalatha & Ors., 2007 (1) TAC 887 (AP);

(iii) The General Manager, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, Bangalore vs. Kwaja Hussain Shaiksab, AIR 1979 (Kar) 58;

(iv) A.P. Dorairaj vs. State of Madras, AIR 1974 (Mad) 14;

(v) Pallavan Transport Corporation Ltd. (Metro) vs. P. Murthy & etc., AIR 1989 (Mad) 14;

(vi) Harivadan Maneklal Modi & Another vs. Chandrasinh Chhatrasinh Parmar & Others, AIR 1988 (Guj) 69;

(vii) The Branch Manager, the Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Laxmi Patra & Ors., AIR 1991 (Ori) 310;

(viii) Jyoti Kaul & Ors. vs. State of M.P. & Another, AIR 2000 SC 3582;

(ix) Ramesh Chandra vs. Randhir Singh & Others, (1990) 3 SCC 723;

(x) Smt. Shashi Jain vs. State of U.P., F.A.F.O. No. 57 of 1984, decided on 03.05.2002;

(xi) General, Manager, Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, Trivandrum vs. Susamma Thomas (Mrs) & Ors., (1994) 2 SCC 176;

(xii) National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. M/s. Swaranlata Das & Ors., 1993 Supp. (2) SCC 743;

(xiii) National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Indira Srivastava & Ors., (2008) 2 SCC 763;

(xiv) The New India Assurance Company Ltd., Saharanpur vs. Shri Sudesh Bhalla & Ors., AIR 1991 (All) 43; and

(xv) Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Mohd. Nasir & Anr., 2009 (5) ALJ 253 (SC).

Sri Krishna Chandra, learned counsel for the Indian Telephone Industries Ltd. (FAFO No. 273 of 1995) submits that the award @ 12% interest is on higher side. The liability was fixed jointly and severely on the National Insurance Company as well as Indian Telephone Industries. He submits that the ITI has already given Rs.3,00,000/- as ex-gratia payment and remaining amount of its share has been deposited. He submits that for the balance of Rs.4,54,000/-, the National Insurance Company Ltd. may be directed to make the payment

Learned counsel further submits that it is a case of accident on the highway, where the car had naturally to be driven at a high speed and the driver in the night might have not seen the parked truck on the road. He submits that the truck owner is exclusively liable for the compensation and no liability can be fastened upon the appellant. He also submits that the ex-gratia payment was rightly adjusted against the compensation awarded by the Tribunal. For this purpose, he has relied on the ratio laid down in the case of Smt. Kashmiran Mathur and others vs. Sardar Rajendra Singh & Anr., AIR 1983 (MP) 24 [Indore Bench (FB)], Para-26, where it was mentioned that :-

"26. Last item of deduction is the exgratia payment made by the State to the widow. S.L. Parmer (C.W. 7), an employee of the Industries Department where the deceased was in service, stated on the basis of record that Rs.4,400/- were paid ex-gratia to the widow. Payment of ex-gratia amount is a condition of the contract of service and it is payable only on the death of the employee. It is not a voluntary payment on charitable grounds "On the occasion of the death" but is an advantage "by reason of the death". This amount cannot be claimed by the dependent unless death of the employee has occurred. This amount was, therefore, deductible from the amount of compensation."

Sri U.P.S. Kushwaha, learned counsel for the National Insurance Company (FAFO No. 275 of 1995) submits that driver of the car was holding a Heavy Motor Vehicle (HMV) driving license and as per Motor Vehicles Act, no person shall drive a transport vehicle in a public place, unless his driving license specifically entitled to do so and as per the facts of the case, the driver of the Ambassador Car was holding a driving license in the category of HMV i.e., he does not have any valid and effective license issued by the competent authority to drive the light motor vehicle (LMV). So, the judgment and order passed by the Tribunal is not sustainable in the eye of law.

Learned counsel also submits that the insurance policy covers risk of the third party and the deceased was not a third party. He again repeated that the driver of the car in question was not holding valid and effective driving license to drive the Ambassador Car. He also submits that the Tribunal has erred in holding that the accident took place solely due to the negligence of the car driver but without proper examining the documents. The negligence of the truck driver was not considered. The Truck No. URL 9855 was parked in the middle of the road. There was no light in the truck and it was without any attendant, as a result of which, ambassador car had dashed the said truck behind the back.

In these circumstances, there is negligence on the part of the truck, which was standing in the middle of the road by violating Sections 122 and 126 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and in support of his submission, he relied on the ratio laid down in the case of Surender Kumar Arora & Anr. vs. Dr. Manoj Bisla & Ors., AIR 2012 SC 1918, where it was observed that the victim of an accident or his dependants have an option either to proceed under Section 166 of the Act or under Section 163-A of the Act. Once they approach the Tribunal under Section 166 of the Act, they have necessarily to take upon themselves the burden of establishing the negligence of the driver or owner of the vehicle concerned. But if they proceed under Section 163-A of the Act, the compensation will be awarded in terms of the Schedule without calling upon the victim or his dependants to establish any negligence or default on the part of the owner of the vehicle or the driver of the vehicle. Lastly, he made a request that the impugned order may kindly be set aside.

After hearing all the parties at length and on perusal of the record, it appears that the accident is not in dispute. The deceased was the Additional General Manager in ITI. At the time of the accident, he was on official duty and was travelling in a official car. The Tribunal after examining the entire evidence observed that the truck in question was parked on the side of the road and road was available for the car. The car was on high speed and it has entered into the truck, which was already parked on the side of the road. Car entered into the body of the truck which resulted serious injuries to persons and car was badly damaged. All persons got injuries. The FIR was lodged within four hours of the accident. The neighbour villagers came to the spot and immediately the deceased and the injured persons were taken to the Balrampur Hospital. Thus, the negligence of the car driver was proved. To this effect, the Tribunal has already discussed a number of case laws and statement of eye-witnesses, which are not required to be repeated here. Hence, we hold that the car driver was solely responsible for the accident in question. Hence, the liability was rightly fixed on the car.

The Ambassador Car No. UGB-4040 was owned by ITI, but it was duly insured by the National Insurance Company Ltd., and on the date of the accident, policy was alive. The Insurance Company has taken a plea that driver of the car was holding HMV license. So, he was not allowed to drive any LMV. So, the liability was fixed by the Tribunal jointly and severely on the Insurance Company as well as on ITI. In this regard, it may be mentioned that in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Swaran Singh and others, 2004 (2) AWC 1589 (SC), the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under:-

"87. Section 3 of the Act casts an obligation on a driver to hold an effective driving license for the type of vehicle which he intends to drive. Section 10 of the Act enables Central Government to prescribe forms of driving licenses for various categories of vehicles mentioned in sub-section (2) of said section. The various types of vehicles described for which a driver may obtain a license for one or more of them are (a) motorcycle without gear, (b) motorcycle with gear, (c) invalid carriage, (d) light motor vehicle, (e) transport vehicle, (f) road roller and (g) motor vehicle of other specified description. The definition clause in Section 2 of the Act defines various categories of vehicles which are covered in broad types mentioned in sub-sect on (2) of Section 10. They are 'good carriage', 'heavy-goods vehicle', 'heavy passenger motor-vehicle', 'invalid carriage',' light motor-vehicle','maxi-cab', 'medium goods vehicle', 'medium passenger motor vehicle', 'motor-cab', 'motorcycle', 'omnibus', 'private service vehicle','semi-trailer', 'tourist vehicle', 'tractor', 'trailer' and 'transport vehicle'. In claims for compensation for accidents, various kinds of breaches with regard to the conditions of driving licenses arise for consideration before the Tribunal. A person possessing a driving license for 'motorcycle without gear', for which he has no licence. Cases may also arise where a holder of driving licence for 'light motor vehicle' is found to be driving a 'maxi-cab', 'motor-cab' or 'omnibus' for which he has no licence. In each case on evidence led before the Tribunal, a decision has to be taken whether the fact of the driver possessing licence for one type of vehicle but found driving another type of vehicle, was the main or contributory cause of accident. If, on facts, it is found that accident was caused solely because of some other unforeseen or intervening causes like mechanical failures and similar other causes having no nexus with driver not possessing requisite type of licence, the insurer merely for technical breach of conditions concerned driving licence.

88. We have construed and determined the scope of sub-clause (ii) of sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act. Minor breaches of licence conditions, such as want of medical fitness certificate, requirement about age of the driver and the like not found to have been the direct cause of the accident, would be treated as minor breaches of inconsequential deviation in the matter of use of vehicles. Such minor and inconsequential deviations with regard to licensing conditions would not constitute, sufficient ground to deny the benefit of coverage of insurance to the third parties."

Hence, we are of the view that a person, who can drive HMV can also drive LMV. For the minor technical fault, if any, the National Insurance Company cannot escape its liability. Hence, we are of the view that the National Insurance Company is liable to pay the total compensation awarded by the Tribunal. No liability can be fastened on the ITI, who owns the car.

Regarding ex gratia payment, it may be mentioned that the Board of Directors in its meeting dated 27.11.1989 observed that :

"... deceased expired as to the general policy followed for payment of ex-gratia to the employees who died due to accident while on duty. Chairman informed that the above calculation of ex-gratia is based on past precedent, though no general policy has been laid down. Sri K.P. Rao said that it would be advisable to have a uniform method and it is desirable to look into the Schemes of other industries and thereafter the scheme could be rationalised by laying proper yard-stick. After detailed discussion the Board approved the compensation of Rs.3 lakhs instead of Rs.2.5 lakhs."

Thus, the ex-gratia payment was made by the Board of Directors as per general policy of the Industries. So, it has nothing to do with the compensation awarded under the Motor Vehicles Act.

Regarding the ratio laid down by Hon'ble M.P. High Court in the case of Smt. Kashmiran Mathur & Ors. vs. Sardar Rajendra Singh & Anr. (supra), it may be mentioned that the said ratio was related to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (an obsolete Act), but the present case falls under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. So, the same is not applicable in the instant case. Moreover, compensation was awarded by the Tribunal according to Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the payment made under ex-gratia operates in different fields and they are governed by different set of rules with different objects and the entitlement of compensation under the latter, would not disentitle the claimants from receiving the former. Thus, in the instant case, the benefits is not paid twice.

It is relevant to point out at this juncture that word "Ex gratia" is a latin word and is most often used in a legal context. Word "ex gratia" means a payment made that is not legally necessary under the terms of a contract; as a favour; out of kindness; a payment made out of a sense of moral rather than legal; given as a favour not required by a legal duty; a gift made without any obligation on the part of the giver or any return from the receiver. From the above meaning of word "ex gratia", it is abundantly clear that a gift made without any obligation on the part of the giver or any return from the receiver, whereas compensation, which is being awarded as determined by the Court of laws as per the terms & conditions entered between the parties while purchasing a policy of insurance and the provisions of the statutes under which the compensation is awarded and as such it is in the nature of the contract and under legal provisions.

In Regional Director, Employees' State Insurance Corporation and another Versus Bata Shoe Company (P) Ltd. (1985) 4 SCC 460, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para-7 has held as under :

"It is plain from what has gone before that the bonus paid by the respondent to its employees is in the nature of ex-gratia payment or, as has been described in one of the settlements, it is paid as has been described in one of the settlements, it is paid as a gesture of goodwill on the part of the respondent. It is nothing else. In cannot be regarded as part of the contract of employment. Although the provisions relating to it were included in the Standing Orders and Rules, they were subsequently excluded from them. In our opinion, therefore , the bonus paid or payable by the respondent to its employees under the successive settlements and agreements made between them cannot in fulfilment of the terms of the of employment. Although the provisions relating to it were included in the Standing Orders and Rules, they were subsequently excluded from them. In our opinion, there fore, the bonus paid or payable by the respondent to its employees under the successive settlements and agreements made between them. cannot be regarded as remuneration paid or payable to the employees in fulfilment of the terms of the contract of employment."

In the case of Bhakra Beas Management Board vs. Kanta Aggarwal & Ors., 2008 (3) TAC 661 (SC), the compassionate job and residence were given immediately after the accident by the employer against whom liability was fixed. But in the instant case, we have fixed liability on the insurance company. So, the facts of the said case are not applicable in this case.

It may be mentioned that the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of M/s. Helen C. Rebello vs. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation & Anr., AIR 1998 SC 3191 observed that :

"... It is very clear, to which there could be no doubt that Motor Vehicles Act delivers compensation to the claimant only on account of accidental injury or death, not on account of any other death. Thus, the pecuniary advantage accruing under this Act has to be deciphered, co-relating with the accidental death. The compensation payable under the Motor Vehicles Act is on account of the pecuniary loss to the claimant by accidental injury or death and not other forms of death. If there is natural death or death by suicide, serious illness, including even death by accident., through train, air flight not involving motor vehicle. would not be covered under the Motor Vehicles Act. Thus. the application of general principle under the common law of loss and gain for the computation of compensation under this Act must co-relate to this type of injury or deaths, viz., accidental. If the words "pecuniary advantage' from whatever source are to be interpreted to mean any form of death under this Act it would dilute all possible benefits conferred on the claimant and would be contrary of the spirit of the law. If the 'pecuniary advantage' resulting from death means pecuniary advantage coming under all forms of death then it will include all the assets movable, immovable, shares, bank accounts, case and every amount receivable under any contract. In other words, all heritable assets including what is willed by the deceased etc. This would obliterate both, all possible conferment of economic security to the claimant by the deceased and the intentions of the legislature. By such an interpretation the tortfeasor in spite of his wrongful act or negligence, which contributes to the death, would have in many cases no liability or meagre liability. Therefore, the general principle of loss and gain takes colour of this statute, viz., the gain has to be interpreted which is as a result of the accidental death and the loss on account of the accident death. Thus, under the present Act whatever pecuniary advantage is received by the claimant, from whatever source, would only mean which comes to the claimant on account of the accidental death and not other form of death. The receipt of the provident fund is a deferred payment out of the contribution made by an employee during the tenure of his service. Such employee or his heirs are entitled to receive this amount irrespective of the accidental death. This amount is secured, is certain to be received, while the amount under the Motor Vehicles Act is uncertain and is receivable only on the happening of the event viz., accident, which may not take place at all. Similarly, family pension is also earned by an employee for the benefit of his family in the form of his contribution in the service in terms of the service conditions receivable by the heirs after his death. The heirs receive family pension even otherwise than the accidental death. No correlation between the two."

In view of above, it is clear that ex-gratia payment to anyone of the allowable dependent of the deceased, who dies in harness due to motor accident cannot be taken as a ground to denied the compensation awarded by the Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 or to adjust the same from the compensation so awarded.

Payment of ex-gratia by the employer or the Government in payment of the amount by the insurance company cannot be deducted from the compensation granted by the Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, as per the ratio laid down in the case of State of A.P. & Anr. vs. K. Pushpalatha & Ors., 2007 (1) TAC 887 (AP). Long back, the Karnataka High Court in the case of The General Manager, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, Bangalore vs. Kwaja Hussain Shaiksab, AIR 1979 (Kar) 58, observed that the ex gratia payment to the claimant on compassionate ground would not ensure to the benefit of the wrong-doer and, therefore, it would be deducted from the compensation payable to the claimant. Similar views were expressed by the Madras High Court in the case of A.P. Dorairaj vs. State, AIR 1974 (Mad) 252, where it was observed that the payment made on compassionate ground is an independent payment. The law is quite clear that such gratuitous payment should not be taken into consideration in assessing the damages payable by the wrong-doer.

The ex-gratia payment has nothing to do with the accident, whereas the compensation to be awarded under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act relates to the damages caused on account of the accident. Further, the compensation amount represents the loss which the tortfeasor had caused to the estate of the deceased. Deducting the ex-gratia payment from the amount of compensation arrived at will amount to relieving the tortfeasor of his liability. The amount payable under the Family Benefit Scheme are also not for such purpose.

In the case of Harivadan Maneklal Modi & Anr. vs. Chandrasinh Chhatrasinh Parmar & Ors., AIR 1988 (Guj) 69, it was observed that money received from the employer of the deceased under the Workmen's Compensation Act is not exercising option and the payment not barred from claiming compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act.

It may also be mentioned that the Motor Vehicles Act is a welfare piece of legislation and State cannot ignore the responsibility towards its citizens and has to be guided by the principle as contained in the legal maxim : "Salus Populi Est Supreme Lex" means "regard for the public welfare is the highest law".

In the light of above discussion, we are of the view that the claimants are entitled for the compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act independently by the employer as well as Insurance Company as per the ratio provided in the award. The employer had wrongly deducted the amount of ex-gratia payment, which was paid as per the policy of the Industries.

Regarding FAFO No. 276 of 1995, filed by the claimants-appellant, it may be stated that the claimants have filed a claim petition before the Tribunal for award of Rs.8,00,000/- only, out of which a total compensation of Rs.7,54,000/- has already been awarded. The claim petition was filed under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, therefore, the claimants cannot be claimed any amount more than it, which has already been claimed before the Tribunal. Hence, the claim for enhancement cannot be accepted. In the instant case, the Tribunal has rightly awarded the compensation by looking the salary, age and multiplier. The same appears reasonable in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and the same is hereby sustained.

Moreover, Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Helen C. Rebello (Mrs) & Ors. vs. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation & Another, 1999 SCC (Cri) 197 (supra) observed that compensation is not a source of earning or pecuniary advantage.

Further, it may be mentioned that India is one of the countries with the highest number of road accidents. Motor accidents are everyday affairs. A large number of claims for compensation for injury caused by road accidents are pending in various Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. In a fatal accident, the dependents of the deceased are entitled to compensation for the loss suffered by them on account of the death. The most commonly practiced method of assessing the loss suffered is to calculate the loss for a year and then to capitalize the amount by a suitable multiplier. To that is added the loss suffered on account of loss of expectation of life and the like.

Regarding interest, in the instant case, the Tribunal has awarded interest @ 12% per annum. It may be mentioned that no rate of interest is fixed under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Varying rates of interest are being awarded by Tribunals, High Courts and the Supreme Court. Interest can be granted even if claimant does not specifically plead for the same as it is consequential in the eye of law. Interest is compensation for forbearance or detention of money and that interest being awarded to a party only for being kept him out of the money which ought to have been paid to him. No principle could be deducted nor any rate of interest can be fixed to have a general application in motor accident claim cases having regard to nature of provision under Section 171 giving discretion to Tribunal in such matter. In other matters, awarding of interest depends upon the statutory provisions, mercantile usage and doctrine of equity. Neither Section 34 CPC nor Section 4-A(3) of the Workmen's Compensation Act are applicable in the matter of fixing rate of interest in a claim under the Motor Vehicles Act. The Courts have awarded the interest at different rates depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case, as observed in the case of Abati Bezbaruah v. Deputy Director General Geological Survey of India & another, 2003 (2) T.A.C. 18 S.C.

The genetics of the interest may be traced from the Motor Vehicles Act, 1964. Erstwhile Section 110-CC of that Act provides for awarding of interest where any claim was allowed prior to that there was no statutory provision for awarding interest. The object of the interest is that claimants have been deprived of the compensation amount would have been paid forthwith they could have deposited in the bank and could have secured interest or could have utilized it much more usefully. The amount of compensation, in fact, became due on the date when the accident took place but Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, provides that the interest cannot be awarded earlier than the date of claim made.

Needless to mention that the liability to pay interest is an independent liability and excluded from the liability to pay compensation. Payment of interest is allowable in view of Section 171, of the Act, if the Tribunal in its discretion so directs. Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, subsequently, empowers the Tribunal to award interest at such rate as it may specify in that behalf in the award, it cannot be said that Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure would govern the award. Section 171 gives discretion to the Tribunal to award reasonable amount of interest after taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of each case. There is no prohibition that it shall not award interest at a particular rate but its inspiration may also be drawn from the interest given by the bank at the relevant time. Hence, interest awarded by the Tribunal @ 12% per annum is looking on higher side. Hence, we modify the impugned order and restricted interest @ 8% per annum.

In view of above discussion and by considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, the impugned award passed by the Tribunal is modified.

In the result, all the appeals are disposed of.

Order Date :- 5th August, 2013

Rakesh/-