Rajesh Kumar & Another vs State Of U.P.
2012 Latest Caselaw 6229 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 

RESERVED
 
Court No. - 35
 

 
Case :- CRIMINAL APPEAL U/S 374 CR.P.C. No. -1880 of 1995
 

 
1. Rajesh Kumar s/o Raghubir Prasad 
 
2. Puttan Lal s/o Raghubir Prasad                              ...............Appellants
 
                                                   versus
 
State of U.P.                                                                ............. Respondent
 
Counsel for appellants    :  	Sri Upendra Kumar Tiwari, Amicus Curiae 
 
Counsel for respondent   : 	Sri R. Y. Pandey, AGA                                                 
 
Hon'ble Rakesh Tiwari, J.

Hon'ble Anil Kumar Sharma, J.

(By Justice Anil Kumar Sharma)

The appellants have challenged the judgment and order dated 31.10.1995 passed by the then 5th Additional Sessions Judge, Kanpur Nagar in S.T. No. 658 of 1992, under section 498A, 304-B, 302/34 IPC and section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act (Crime No. 496 of 1992, P.S. Naubasta, District Kanpur Nagar), whereby each appellants have been convicted and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life under section 304-B IPC, one year rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 500/- under section 498A IPC with default stipulation and 6 months rigorous imprisonment under section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. The sentences were to run concurrently.

2. The facts germane to the appeal are that Mauji Lal s/o Nanhaku Lal, r/o 321 opposite to Block Kachchi Jhopri, Juhi Lal Colony, P.S. Kidwai Nagar, District Kanpur Nagar submitted a written report in P.S. Kidwai Nagar on 07.05.1992 at 10.15 A.M. wherein he stated that he had married his daughter Sanjoo 5-6 years ago with Rajesh Kumar s/o Late Raghubir, resident of Darji Narayan Ka Ahata, Usmanpur, Kanpur according to Hindu rites but his son-in-law along with his wife were living in Malviya Vihar, Karaihi. His son-in-law, brother-in-law (Jeth) Puttan Lal, Gangajali mother-in-law of the deceased used to demand Rs. 5000/- and a sewing machine but on account of poverty he showed his inability but accused persons were threatening to kill by setting her ablaze. The complainant further stated that his daughter told her mother about her plight and atrocities of the accused. On 07.05.1992 at about 6-7 A.M. she had been burnt and injured by pouring acid by his son-in-law, Jeth and mother-in-law of the deceased. She was seriously injured. Her brother-in-law Bauva at about 9.00 A.M. informed him, whereupon he along with his wife Radha, Ram Narayan and Vimla immediately reached Malviya Nagar Karahi and brought his injured daughter in Rikshaw to police station. He has further stated in the report that his son-in-law and others fled away leaving their house. On the basis of the report case crime no. 496/92 under section 498A, 326 IPC was registered in P.S. Kidwai Nagar, the investigation whereof was entrusted to S.I. Surjan Singh. The injured was treated taken to U.H.M. Hospital, Kanpur Nagar, where Dr. R.V. Gautam examined her at 11.05 A.M. The doctor has noted in his medico legal report that the injured had told that thermal burns were caused by her mother-in-law. Doctor found the following injuries:

First to 3rd degree of burn of left lower half face, neck, interior part of chest, abdomen, both elbow, both hands, fore arms, lower back and both lower limbs. Skin is peeling of at many placed red in colour. Scalp hairs singed.

In the opinion of the doctor injured suffered deep thermal burnt about 60 percent. The injuries were fresh in duration. Patient was admitted and Magistrate on call was informed.

Sri Ram Manohar Sahu, Additional City Magistrate, 7th Kanpur recorded dying declaration of Smt. Sanju on 07.05.1992 at 4.00 P.M. The injured succumbed to the injuries at 4.10 P.M. in the hospital. After her death the case was converted in to section 304B IPC. Inquest was performed on 08.05.1992 at 11.30 A.M. and the dead body in sealed condition was sent for post mortem examination.

3. Dr. R. Kumar conducted autopsy upon the cadaver of the deceased on 08.09.1992 at 4.30 P.M. He found that deceased was thin built young girl. Her eyes and mouth were half open. Rigor mortis was present in all extremities. Cut open wound stitches and polythene tube in right ankle were found. P.M. stains were present in upper part visible which was spared from burnts. Following ante-mortem injury was reported:

"1St, 2nd and 3rd degree burns on chin, neck, shoulder, left upper arm, all round face, on lower 1/3 upper arm, chest, abdomen, front part of back hips, both lower limbs all round soles. Skin peeled of places. Peeling of skin was seen."

In internal examination the doctor found that pleura, larynx, trachea, bronchi, both lungs, pericardium, liver, spleen and kidney were congested. Uterus was non-gravid. The cause of death was shock on account of burn injuries.

4. After the death of Smt. Sanju, investigation of the case was undertaken by Sri Shailendra Singh, Deputy S.P. who interrogated the witnesses, reached on the spot and prepared site plan and seized the half burnt piece of Sari, Blouse and Petticot of the deceased through memo. Accused Smt. Gangajali could not be apprehended during investigation which culminated in to charge sheet against both the accused appellants.

5. After committal of the case to the Court of Session charges for the offence punishable under section 498-A, 304-B and 302 IPC read with section 34 IPC and section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act were framed against both the accused, who abjured their guilt and claimed trial.

6. In order to substantiate charges levelled against the appellants, the prosecution examined complainant Mouji Lal as PW-1, Dr. R. Kumar PW-2, Munnit Tiwari PW-3, Ramnarain PW-4, Mamta PW-5, constable Ram Chandra PW-6, Dr. R. B. Gautam PW-7, S.I. S.N. Gupta PW-8 and retired Additional City Magistrate Ram Monohar Sahu PW-9.

7. The case of the accused persons in their separate statement under section 313 Cr.P.C. was total denial. However, they have admitted the marriage of the deceased with accused Rajesh Kumar who further stated that he had been falsely implicated in the case and on the alleged date of incident he was not at home but had gone to Sachendi in the marriage of his cousin. Accused persons have not adduced any defence in the court.

8. Learned trial court after hearing the parties counsel had convicted and sentenced the accused appellants as stated in para-1 of the judgment. Aggrieved the appellants have come up in appeal.

9. This appeal was being listed for hearing since 17.08.2000. On 07.12.2012 the case was taken up in the revised list before us but none of the four counsel engaged by the appellants appeared in the court, therefore, Sri Upendra Kumar Tiwari, Advocate was appointed as Amicus Curiae for the appellants to argue the appeal on their behalf and the case was listed for hearing on 12.12.2012. On this day the hearing was adjourned on joint prayer of the parties counsel fixing 13.12.2012 for hearing.

10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the original record of the case carefully.

11. Learned counsel for the appellants has argued that the impugned judgment and order is against the weight of evidence on record; that no dowry was ever demanded by any of the accused-appellant nor the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment on this count; that the deceased accidentally caught fire while cooking food; that in her alleged dying declaration the deceased has attributed the role of setting her ablaze on Smt. Gangajali and accused-appellant no. 1 was not present in the house at the time of alleged incident and appellant no. 2 had been implicated in the case being the real elder brother of appellant no.1.

12. In oppugnation learned AGA has contended that the deceased had suffered death within seven years of her marriage with appellant no. 1 due to burn injuries sustained in her matrimonial evidence and there is evidence that she was being harassed and tortured on account of dowry demand by accused persons named in the FIR. He further contended that the dying declaration of the deceased was recorded by the Executive Magistrate, in which she had levelled allegations against the present appellants as well apart from their mother. He had concluded that the husband of the deceased was responsible for the security and safety of his wife, but he has joined hands with his family members in harassing and maltreating the deceased on account of dowry demand and in ultimate killing her by burn injuries.

13. Section 304-B IPC deals with dowry death reads as follows:

"Dowry Death- (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with any demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death" and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.

Explanation - For the purpose of this sub- section 'dowry' shall have same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).

(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life."

The provision has application when death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or relatives of her husband for, or in connection with any demand for dowry. In order to attract application of Section 304-B IPC, the essential ingredients are as follows:-

(i) The death of a woman should be caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under a normal circumstance.

(ii) Such a death should have occurred within seven years of her marriage.

(iii) She must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband.

(iv) Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand of dowry.

(v) Such cruelty or harassment is shown to have been meted out to the woman soon before her death.

Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is also relevant for the case at hand. Both Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act were inserted as noted earlier by the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act 43 of 1986 with a view to combat the increasing menace of dowry deaths. Section 113-B reads as follows:-

"113-B: Presumption as to dowry death- When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death.

Explanation For the purposes of this section 'dowry death' shall have the same meaning as in Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)."

14. The necessity for insertion of the two provisions has been amply analysed by the Law Commission of India in its 21st Report dated 0th August, 1988 on 'Dowry Deaths and Law Reform'. Keeping in view the impediment in the pre-existing law in securing evidence to prove dowry related deaths, legislature thought it wise to insert a provision relating to presumption of dowry death on proof of certain essentials. It is in this background presumptive Section 113-B in the Evidence Act has been inserted. As per the definition of 'dowry death' in Section 304-B IPC and the wording in the presumptive Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, one of the essential ingredients, amongst others, in both the provisions is that the concerned woman must have been "soon before her death" subjected to cruelty or harassment "for or in connection with the demand of dowry". Presumption under Section 113-B is a presumption of law. On proof of the essentials mentioned therein, it becomes obligatory on the Court to raise a presumption that the accused caused the dowry death. The presumption shall be raised only on proof of the following essentials:

(1) The question before the Court must be whether the accused has committed the dowry death of a woman. (This means that the presumption can be raised only if the accused is being tried for the offence under Section 304-B IPC).

(2) The woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives.

(3) Such cruelty or harassment was for, or in connection with any demand for dowry.

(4) Such cruelty or harassment was soon before her death.

15. A conjoint reading of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B IPC shows that there must be material to show that soon before her death the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment. Prosecution has to rule out the possibility of a natural or accidental death so as to bring it within the purview of the 'death occurring otherwise than in normal circumstances'. The expression 'soon before' is very relevant where Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B IPC are pressed into service. Prosecution is obliged to show that soon before the occurrence there was cruelty or harassment and only in that case presumption operates. Evidence in that regard has to be led by prosecution. 'Soon before' is a relative term and it would depend upon circumstances of each case and no strait-jacket formula can be laid down as to what would constitute a period of soon before the occurrence. It would be hazardous to indicate any fixed period, and that brings in the importance of a proximity test both for the proof of an offence of dowry death as well as for raising a presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. The expression 'soon before her death' used in the substantive Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test. No definite period has been indicated and the expression 'soon before' is not defined. A reference to expression 'soon before' used in Section 114 Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act is relevant. It lays down that a Court may presume that a man who is in the possession of goods 'soon after the theft, is either the thief has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his possession. The determination of the period which can come within the term 'soon before' is left to be determined by the Courts, depending upon facts and circumstances of each case. Suffice, however, to indicate that the expression 'soon before' would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the concerned cruelty or harassment and the death in question. There must be existence of a proximate and live-link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the concerned death. If alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence.

16. It is not disputed that Smt. Sanjoo wife of the accused suffered death due to extensive burn injuries within seven years of her marriage and the incident had taken place inside her matrimonial home. The alleged incident of setting ablaze the deceased as per written report took place at about 5 or 6 a.m. on 7.5.1992 and its report was lodged the same day at 10.15 a.m. by the father of the deceased. It has been stated in the written report that the brother-in-law of the deceased Bauva informed the complainant at 9 a.m. about the incident, whereupon he along with his wife and others reached at the house of the accused persons. He brought her in a rickshaw to police station in injured condition and submitted his written report. It has also been noted in the report that the in-laws of her daughter have fled away from the house. The deceased in injured condition was sent through Constable Chheda Lal to U.H.M. Hospital, Kanpur where she was medically examined by Dr. R. V. Gautam at 11.05 a.m. He has noted in injury report Ex.Ka-5 that she was set ablaze by her mother-in-law. In cross-examination Dr. Gautam has stated that he recorded the statement of the injured as short history of the case. He has further stated that he had informed the Magistrate-on-duty and the injury found on her person were sufficient to cause her death. Sri Ram Manohar Sahu (retired Addl. City Magistrate) PW-9 has recorded the dying declaration of the deceased at 3.45 p.m. on 7.5.1992, which he has proved through his deposition. He has stated that before recording her statement he obtained certificate from doctor-on-duty about fitness of the injured. He had put questions to her, which she answered and then wrote down in his own hand writing and thereafter her thumb impression was obtained. After recording statement again certificate of the doctor was obtained regarding her consciousness and good condition during the period her statement was recorded. No suggestion had been given to this witness that the Smt. Sanjoo was not in a position to speak. A mere suggestion had been given in the end of cross-examination of Mr. Sahu that he has noted incorrect facts in the statement in connivance with her family members, which had been emphatically denied by him.

17. The dying declaration of the deceased proved by PW-9 has been noted in the earlier part of the judgment.

"Patient Smt. Sanjoo aged about 22 years is fit for D.D.

Sd/- E.M.O.

U.H.M. Hospital, Kanpur

7.5.92 - 3.45 p.m.

^^c;ku& Jherh lUtw mez 22 lky iRuh jkts'k dqekj fuoklh ubZ cLrh cjkZA

iz'u& vki dSls tyh\

mRrj& eSa vaxhBh ls [kkuk cuk jgh Fkh vkt djhc 10 cts dk le; FkkA esjh lkl Jherh xaxktyh fo/kok j?kqohj o tsB iqRru yky esjs ihNs ls vk;s esjs Åij feV~Vh dk rsy Mky fn;kA lkl us ekfpl ls vkx yxk fn;kA tsB us feV~Vh dk rsy Mkyus ds ckn dgk Fkk fd vEek vkx yxk nks ge ?kwl Hkj nsaxsA

iz'u& ml le; rqEgkjs ifr dgkW Fks\

mRrj& ifr ckgj ls vk;s Fks vkx yxk ns[kdj Hkkx x;sA eq>s ugha cpk;kA

iz'u& fQj vki fdl rjg ls ckgj vkbZ\

mRrj& esjk nsoj cmok us vkdj ikuh Mkyk o eq>s cpk;kA mlh us esjs ek;ds esa lwpuk yky dkyksuh twgh esa fn;kA

iz'u& ?kj ls vLirky dkSu yk;k\

mRrj& esjs ek;ds ls ekW cki cfgu vk x;s tks vLirky yk;s gSa\

iz'u& lkl o tsB D;ksa ukjkt Fks\

mRrj& mRrj ngst pkgrs FksA

Sd/- A.C.M.VII

7.5.92 4.00 p.m.

Pt. Sanjoo remained fit throughout D/D recorded.

RTI Attested 	                              Sd/- E.M.O.
 
					   U.H.M. Hospital, Kanpur
 
							7.5.92"
 

 

A perusal of the statement shows that she has charged her mother-in-law and brother-in-law (Jeth-Puttu Lal) for setting her ablaze by pouring kerosene. With regard to her husband she had stated that he came when she was burning, but ran away and did not save her. Her brother-in-law (devar) Bauva sprinkled water and saved her. The deceased suffered death 10-minutes after recording of her statement by PW-9 in the hospital.

18. The doctrine of dying declaration is enshrined in the legal maxim 'Nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire', which means 'a man will not meet his maker with a lie in his mouth'. The doctrine of Dying Declaration is enshrined in Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter called as, 'Evidence Act') as an exception to the general rule contained in Section 60 of the Evidence Act, which provides that oral evidence in all cases must be direct i.e. it must be the evidence of a witness, who says he saw it. The dying declaration is, in fact, the statement of a person, who cannot be called as witness and, therefore, cannot be cross-examined. Such statements themselves are relevant facts in certain cases. In the incident deceased suffered burn injuries in the early morning of 7.5.1992. There is no eye witness of the incident. She was admitted in U. H. M. Hospital, Kanpur the same day on at 11.15 a.m. and the doctor has found fresh burn injuries to the extent of 60%. It has come in the evidence of PW-1 that when he reached at the house of the accused persons, they were not found and he took her injured daughter in a rickshaw to the police station and then to hospital. This shows the callous attitude and ill-intention of accused persons. She had expired the same day at 4.10 p. m. in the aforesaid hospital. Her dying declaration was recorded few minutes before her death by PW-9. Dr. R. V. Gautam PW-7 has also noted her very short statement for the purpose of case history, in which the deceased had levelled allegations of setting her ablaze on her mother-in-law. This cannot be treated as a complete statement of the deceased in view of categorical statement of PW-7. The dying declaration as per settled norms was recorded by PW-9, the Addl. City Magistrate who has no animus with the accused or affinity with the deceased or the complainant's family. No suggestion had been given either to PW-1 or PW-4 that the deceased had been in any manner tutored by any of them. In view of the aforesaid preposition of the law the dying declaration of the deceased recorded in this case fulfils all the legal requirements and it is in consonance with the prosecution story as also the medical evidence.

19. The question for determination remains as to whether there was any demand of dowry from the deceased or her parents by the husband or his family members and she was subjected to cruelty and harassment on this count. In order to prove these ingredients the prosecution has relied upon the testimony of PW-1, PW-3 to PW-5 as also the dying declaration of the deceased. In the end of her statement the Magistrate had asked question from the deceased as to why her mother-in-law and brother-in-law (jeth) were enraged. She had replied that they wanted dowry. PW-1, the father of the deceased has reiterated in his statement about the demand of dowry by accused persons and torture of the deceased on this score. He has admitted that earlier no police report was made or the deceased was medically examined with regard to the atrocities of the accused persons. It is quite natural. Every parents of the bride desire that their daughter/sister is settled in her matrimonial home and they think that the time is the best healer. According to PW-2 deceased was known to her. She told her that her in-laws demand Rs. 5000/- and machine. They beat her and do not provide food. She had named all the three accused persons in this regard. She had not been cross-examined by the accused with regard to demand of dowry or torture of the deceased on this count. PW-3 is neighbour of PW-1. He has corroborated PW-1 and PW-3 about dowry demand by accused persons and harassment of the deceased for the same. He has further stated that when Sanjoo was set ablaze he had gone to see her and at that time she had stated that her husband, mother-in-law and brother-in-law (jeth) have fled away after setting her ablaze. He has been cross-examined by the defence at length but nothing adverse could elicited there from, which may create a shadow of doubt on his testimony. PW-5 is neighbour of the deceased and tenant of Rajesh (husband-appellant no.1). She had not supported the prosecution story with regard to the incident of burning the deceased. She had been declared hostile by the prosecution. However, her cross-examination shows that she is hiding the truth. She had stated as under:

" eSa fdlh dh HkykbZ cqjkbZ esa ugha iM+uk pkgrh Fkh esjh fuxkg esa tks gqok lks gqokA iqfyl okys ogkW vk;s Fks vkSj ogkW ls dqN diM+s ys x;s FksA tys tyk;s diM+s fy;s vkSj eq>ls ckrphr dh tks eSaus ns[kk og mudks cryk fn;k A tks dqN eSus iqfyl okyks dks crk;k og mUgksaus us uksV dj fy;k Fkk "

She had resiled from police statement u/s 161 Cr.P.C., saying -

" latw dks mlds ifr] tsB iqRru o lkl }kjk vk;s fnu ekjihV ;k izrkfM+r djrs jgus o dHkh dHkh [kkuk u nsus dh ckr crkbZ rFkk nsok cmok }kjk e`rdk ls lnSo Bh O;ogkj fd;k tkuk crk;k FkkA^^ iqfyl okyks us esjk ;g c;ku dSls fy[k fy;k bldh otg ugha crk ldrh gwWA eSa ySVªhu x;h xbZ FkhA eSa latw dks [kkuk cukrs gq, NksM+ VV~Vh pyh xbZ FkhA eSaus iqfyl dks ;g c;ku ugha fn;k Fkk fd ^^'kkSp ls fuo`r gksdj tc ?kj okil vkbZ rks ckmUMªh ls e`rdk ds ifr dks ckgj dwnrs ns[kkA^^ tc eS ySVªhu ls ykSV dj vkbZ rks latw fpYyk jgh Fkh fd cpkvks cpkvksA ysfdu eSa Mj ds ekjs dkj.k nwljs xsV esa pyh xbZA eSaus mls cpk;k ugha D;ksafd ogkW ij dksbZ ugha FkkA---- "

The above statement of PW-5 corroborates the statement of the deceased and PW-1 that after the incident the accused left their house. She had supported the defence being the tenant of appellant no. 1.

20. There is only one discrepancy in the prosecution story, which is the medium with which the deceased was burnt. In FIR the complainant has stated that acid was poured on the deceased, while the case of the prosecution including the statement of the deceased is that she was set ablaze by kerosene. In cross-examination PW-1 has stated that his daughter had told her that she had been burnt by kerosene, but he wrote in the report 'acid'. In further cross-examination he has stated that some one from the crowd (of about 50 people) said that by acid his daughter had been burnt. Complainant is not the eye witness of actual incident of burning. The statement of the deceased would have primacy over the statement of the complainant. Thus, this discrepancy would not affect the case of the prosecution. The sole dying declaration of the deceased is sufficient to bring home the guilt to the accused persons. There is nothing on record to disbelieve the dying declaration of the deceased which also finds corroboration from the testimony of PW-4. The appellant no. 1, being the husband of the deceased cannot escape his liability because he had not been named by the deceased for setting her ablaze along with other accused persons. Being the husband of the deceased, it was his prime duty to keep his wife happy and save her from any misbehaviour by any of his family members. The young woman leaves her parents' house after nuptial knot with a dream to lead happy life in her matrimonial home. She cannot foresee that the person who is responsible for her safety and security would indulge and join hands with his family members to make dowry demand or to mentally and physically harass and torture her on this score. In our ancient society the bride of the family used to be treated as "x`g&y{eh", but the evil of 'dowry demand' had lowered her status to be an instrument of earning by way of dowry. In the instant case the accused could not offer any plausible explanation as to how and in what circumstances, the deceased sustained extensive burns on her body resulting in her death the same after-noon.

21. In view of the above, we find that the prosecution has successfully proved its case against the appellants beyond all reasonable doubt and the learned trial Court has not at all erred in giving guilty verdict against the accused-appellants. Considering the manner in which the deceased was burnt alive in her matrimonial home, we find that the accused persons deserve exemplary and deterrent punishment and so adequate sentence had been passed against each of them. Thus, the appeal sans merit and is accordingly dismissed. The conviction and sentence of each appellant is hereby confirmed.

22. Appellant no. 1 is on bail. His bail is cancelled. Steps should immediately be taken to take him into custody and sent to jail for serving out the sentence. Appellant no. 2 is in jail and would serve out the remaining part of the sentence.

23. Sri Upendra Kumar Tiwari, Amicus Curiae would be paid Rs.2,100/- by the State as remuneration for arguing the appeal on behalf of the appellants within one month from today.

24. Let certified copy of the judgment be sent to the Court concerned and the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sultanpur for ensuring compliance, which should be reported within 4-weeks.

		(Anil Kumar Sharma, J)                      (Rakesh Tiwari, J)
 
December 21, 2012
 
Imroz/-