Shri Ramji Das & Others vs State Of U.P. & Others
2012 Latest Caselaw 910 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 

?Court No. - 58
 

 
Case :- WRIT - C No. - 64282 of 2007
 

 
Petitioner :- Shri Ramji Das & Others
 
Respondent :- State Of U.P. & Others
 
Petitioner Counsel :- B.C. Rai
 
Respondent Counsel :- C.S.C.,Satish Mandhyan,Satish Pandey
 

 
Hon'ble B. Amit Sthalekar,J.

This writ petition has been filed by the the petitioners challenging the order dated 20.9.2007 passed by the District Judge, Muzaffarnagar while deciding the Land Acquisition Reference No.416 of 2003 (Reference). These acquisition proceedings leading upto the Reference have had a long and chequered history..

A notification under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the Act) was issued by the Government of Uttar Pradesh on 30.10.1975 which was published in the official gazette on 29.11.1975. This acquisition was for an area covering 102 bighas and 12 biswas of land comprising Revenue Estate of three villages namely (i) Kukra, (ii) Yusufpur and (iii) Sarwat, Pargana Muzaffarnagar, District Muzaffarnagar.

This notification covered the tenure holding of the petitioner no.1 along with one Nand Lal in the Revenue Estate of village Kukra bearing Khasara No.345/0-5-0, 346/0-5-0, 357/1-11-0, 358/1-6-0, 359/1-1-0,362/1-8-0, 364/0-17-0, 365/1-0-0, 368/1-10-0 and 369/0-13-0 (total area 10/9-16-0).

A writ petition was filed by the original tenure holders i.e. petitioner no.1 and Nand Lal being Writ Petition No.590 of 1976 challenging the notification for acquisition under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6 of the Act. This writ petition was dismissed on 12.10.1977. The SLP against the judgement of the High Court was also dismissed by the Supreme Court on 6.8.1992 in Civil Appeal No.2857 of 1977.

During the pendency of the civil appeal before the Apex Court, Nand Lal died on 14.1.1992. In the present writ petition it is claimed that one Smt. Devki Devi, wife of Swami Ram Ji Das, petitioner no.1 claimed herself to be the legal heir of Nand Lal on the basis of a will executed by Nand Lal in her favour. On 2.6.1994 Ram Ji Das and Devki Devi filed objections under Section-9 of the Act before the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Muzaffarnagar. It is stated that the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, respondent no.3, filed writ petition no.9057 of 1994 challenging the acquisition proceedings and the High Court by order dated 5.8.1994 was pleased to restrain the Collector, Muzaffarnagar from preparing the award. However, on 5.8.1994 itself the Additional Collector (F&R), Muzaffarnagar prepared an award in respect of the land of Ram Ji Das and Devki Devi.

Ram Ji Das and Devki Devi thereafter filed writ petition no.27527 of 1994 challenging the award dated 5.8.1994. The said writ petition was dismissed by the High Court by order dated 2.11.1994. Thereupon Ram Ji Das and Devki made a request to the Collector on 13.9.1994 to make a reference under Section 18 of the act to the District Judge as contemplated by the provisions of 18 of the Act. Even after much delay when no reference made by the Collector, Ram Ji Das and Devki Devi filed a writ petition No.45655 of 1997 for a direction to the Collector to make the reference expeditiously.

When still no reference was made by the Collector, Ram Ji Das and Devki Devi filed Contempt Petition no.2917 of 2003. In the said contempt petition the High Court by order dated 18.9.2003 gave one more opportunity to the opposite parties to comply with the order of the High Court. In compliance of the order of the High Court passed in the Contempt Petition, the District Magistrate, forwarded the reference to the District Judge who registered the reference on 17.10.2003 as Land Acquisition Reference No.416 of 2003 and thereafter notices were issued to the State of U. P. as well as respondent no.3, Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti on 28.11.2003.

On 4.3.2006 Smt. Devki Devi died. The petitioners no.2 to 5 claimed to have stepped into the shoes of late Devki Devi on the basis of a will executed by late Devki Devi on 5.2.2002. Thereafter, the petitioner nos. 2 to 5 filed an application before the District Judge, Muzaffarnagar requesting that their names may be substituted in place of late Devki Devi.

On behalf of Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, respondent no.3, an objection was filed on 28.7.2006 to the effect that late Devki Devi had never been the title holder of the land in question and, therefore, question of her heirs (the petitioners No.2 to 5) being "persons interested" claiming from Smt. Devki Devi, could not be substituted in the Land Acquisition Reference No.416 of 2003. The substitution application was rejected by the District Judge vide order dated 19.10.2006 on the ground that late Devki Devi had abandoned her claim.

Aggrieved by the order dated 19.10.2006 the petitioners no.2 to 5 filed Writ Petition No.65325 of 2006, Mangat Rai Gupta & others vs. State of U.P. and others. This writ petition was allowed by the High Court by order dated 9.4.2007 and the Court directed the Distirct Judge to substitute the petitioners (therein) as the heirs of Smt. Devki Devi in the reference application filed under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act.

A perusal of the order of the High Court shows that one of the objections taken by the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, respondent no.3 was also that Smt. Devki Devi, during her life time, had filed an application along with an affidavit marked as Paper No.53-C and 55-C wherein it was stated that she had no interest in the property in question and that she had relinquished her right and also prayed that her application under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act be dismissed as not pressed. The Court further recorded the findings that the said applications nos.53-C and 55-C were rejected by the District Judge by an order dated 5.10.2005 and, therefore, there was no question of Smt. Devki Devi abandoning her claim in the Reference Proceedings before the District Judge.

In compliance of the order of the High Court, the District Judge, Muzaffarnagar by his order dated 14.5.2007 allowed the substitution application and petitioner nos.2 to 5 were substituted as heirs of the late Devki Devi in the Reference Proceedings.

The petitioners filed objections 71C to the objection already filed by Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti being paper nos.22/c and 23/c. An application supported by affidavit 83C and 84C was also filed on 13.8.2007 requesting the District Judge to summon the original reference from the office of the District Collector.

The applications No.83/C and 84/C filed by the petitioners for summoning record from the office of the District Collector was rejected by the District Judge, Muzaffarnagar and the application nos.22/c and 23/c filed by the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, respondent no.3 was allowed. The District Judge, Muzaffarnagar by his order dated 20.9.2007, on the question of maintainability of the Reference Proceedings held that the Land Acquisition Reference under Section 18 of the Act was not maintainable and the reference was rejected on the basis of preliminary objections raised by Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, respondent no.3. Aggrieved by the order dated 20.9.2007 the petitioners have filed present writ petition.

I have heard Sri B.C.Rai, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and Sri B .D. Mandhyan, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Tarun Gaur on behalf of respondent no.3 and learned standing counsel appearing for respondent nos.1 and 2. The writ petition is being disposed of with the consent of the learned counsels and order is dictated in the open Court.

At the outset a preliminary objection has been raised by Sri Mandhyan that this writ petition is not maintainable and if the petitioners were aggrieved by the order of the District Judge, Muzaffarnagar dated 20.9.2007, the proper remedy for them was to file an appeal as contemplated under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act.

Countering the submission, Sri Rai submitted that an appeal under Section 54 would not be maintainable and the only remedy left to the petitioners was to approach the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act reads as follows:-

[54. Appeals in proceedings before Court.- Subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), applicable to appeals from original decrees, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any enactment for the time being in force, an appeal shall only lie in any proceedings under this Act to the High Court from the award , or from any part of the award, of the Court and the High Court form the award, or from any part of the award, of the Court and from any decree of the High Court passed on such appeal as aforesaid an appeal shall lie to [ the Supreme Court] subject to the provisions contained in section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and in Order XLIV thereof.]

From a reading of Section 54 of the Act, what emerges is that an appeal shall only lie in any proceeding under the Act to the High Court 'from the award or from any part of the award.'

Part III of the Act which contains Sections 18 and 28-A deals with the making of the Reference and the order to be passed ultimately passed by the Court either with regard to determination of compensation or with regard to apportionment of land to the persons interested.

Section 26 which falls within part III provides that every award under this Part shall be in writing signed by the Judge, and shall specify the amount awarded under clause first of sub-section (1 )of Section 23, and also the amounts, if any, respectively awarded under each of the other clauses of the same subsection, together with the grounds of awarding each of the said amounts. Subsection 2 of Section 26 further provides that every such award shall be deemed to be a decree and the statement of the grounds of every such award a judgment within the meaning of section 2, clause (2) and section 2, clause (9), respectively, of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Thus from a reading of the provision of Section 26 of the Act, it will be seen that what is contemplated is that an award given under part III by the Judge shall be a judgment on the statement of grounds of the award and shall be deemed to be a decree.

A conjoint reading of Sections 18 and 26 of Part III of the Act leads to the only inference that in order to be an award and to constitute a judgment on the grounds on the statements and grounds of the award, and thereby be deemed a decree, there must be an order of the Judge. Reference under Section 18 of the Act which contains the statement of grounds and this order containing statement of grounds shall, therefore, constitute the award and then be a judgment and decree.

Such an award may be either by way of enhancement of compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer or may be a determination on the measurement of land or a determination of the rights of the persons to whom compensation is payable or apportionment of compensation.

By the impugned order of the District Judge, Muzaffarnager the objection filed by the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, respondent no.3 that the reference was not maintainable has been accepted. The preliminary objection of Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti is that the Reference which was forwarded by the District Magistrate, Muzaffarnagar under his letter dated 17.10.2003 is only a photo copy of the alleged Reference and is not the original copy and, therefore, the Reference itself was not maintainable. The District Judge while considering the preliminary objection of the respondent no.3, Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti has recorded a further finding that the Reference application was not only a photo copy but also there was no signature of the applicant.

In the circumstances, in my opinion, when the Reference itself was rejected on the ground that it was not maintainable being only a photo copy of alleged Reference which did not even bear the signature of the applicant, it cannot be said that the order dated 20.9.2007 resulted in an award enhancing compensation, or with regard to measurement of land, or amount of compensation,or persons to whom its payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested as provided under Sections 18 of Part III of the Act.

In view of the above, the irresistible conclusion is that there being no award, appeal under Section 54 was not maintainable and the only remedy for the petitioner to challenge the impugned order of the District Judge dated 20.9.2007 is by way of writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. I, therefore, hold that the writ petition is maintainable.

The submission of Sri B.C. Rai, learned counsel for the petitioners is that the District Judge could not have rejected the Land Acquisition Reference case as not maintainable inasmuch as under the orders of the High Court dated 9.4.2007, the petitioners stood substituted in the said reference as the heirs of late Devki Devi. It is further submitted that the application nos. 53-C and 55-C filed by late Devki Devi relinquishing her right to the property, had already been rejected by the District Judge by order dated 5.10.2005 and therefore, it could not be said that there was no Reference at all. Sri Rai further submits that even if the Reference Proceedings had been initiated on the basis of a photo stat copy of the Reference Application it could not be said that there was no reference.

On the other hand, Sri B. D. Mandhyan, learned senior counsel submitted that the original reference application had never been transmitted to the court of District Judge. Reference proceeding was pursued only on the photo stat copy of the Reference Application and, therefore, there was no reference in the eye of law. He further submits that even in the photo stat copy there was no signature of the applicants and in these circumstances also it could not be said that there was a valid reference. Sri Mandhyan further submits that the land acquisition proceedings had been challenged by the petitioners no.1 one of the tenure holders along with Nand Lal by means of writ petition in the High Court, which was dismissed and SLP filed against the order of the High Court was also dismissed and, therefore, there was no cause of action available to the petitioner no.1 or Nand Lal or persons claiming to be heirs of Nand Lal. He further submitted that some time in the year 1992 after the death of Nand Lal (one of the tenure holders), Smt. Devki Devi started claiming herself to be the legal heir of Nand Lal whereas she was not the owner of the land nor any valid will was executed by Nand Lal in her favour. The said will had never been produced in any proceedings nor its validity certified by any court of competent jurisdiction.

He further submits that the petitioner no.1, Ram Ji Das and Devki Devi formed an illegal partnership along with one Shashi Kant and Neeraj Agarwal which was subsequently resolved on 30.4.1994. It is further submitted that this partnership was formed only in order to show transfer of the land in question so as to facilitate their claim in the reference on the basis of enhanced compensation. It is also submitted that Suit No.301 of 1994 was filed in the court of Civil Judge by Sashi Kant and Neeraj Agarwal. A compromise was filed on 12.8.1994 and on the basis of alleged compromise, a compromise decree was prepared to transfer a portion of the land measuring 2-18-0 to Shashi Kant and 2 bighas of land to Neeraj Agarwal. It is submitted that once the land stood transferred to the State Government under the U.P. Z.A. & L .R. Act the question of transferring portion of the land to Shashi Kant and Neeraj Agarwal did not arise and, therefore, the compromise decree was a nullity and fraud deliberately executed for the purpose of transferring the property in question. It is further submitted that Neeraj Agarwal in collusion with some officials of the office of Land Acquisition Officer, on the basis of the collusive decree dated 12.8.1994 managed to obtain Rs.2,50,401.58p as compensation. He further submitted that when all these fraudulent dealings and transactions came to the knowledge of the Government, a case under the Prevention of Corruption Act was registered against the officials and all the original records pertaining to the acquisition proceedings were seized and sealed by the Anti Corruption Court. It is also submitted that subsequently the civil court was also apprised of the facts and the compromise decree was declared to be null and void and same was set aside.

It is also submitted by Sri Madhyan that some time after the land acquisition proceedings had commenced and the award given, Ram Ji Das, petitioner no.1 initiated proceedings under Section 143 of the U.P. Z.A.& L. R. Act and fraudulently the agricultural land (land in question) was got declared to be non agricultural land. This was done with the malafide motive so as to increase the value of the land showing it to be Abadi and thereby gain benefit of enhanced compensation in the Reference Proceedings.

Be that as it may, from perusal of the impugned order what emerges is that the reference before the District Judge was a photo-stat copy of the reference application, the original records having been seized by the Anti Corruption Court. The District Judge in the impugned order further recorded findings that the photo-stat copy of the Reference Application does not contain any signature of any party and, therefore, such document cannot be the basis of initiating the reference proceedings under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act and that being the preliminary objection of respondent no.3 Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Application no.22-C filed by the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti was allowed and reference was rejected as not maintainable.

In my opinion the impugned order of the District Judge dated 20.9.2007 does not suffer from any infirmity for the reason that the reference in question was initiated on a photo-stat copy of the Reference Application. This Reference application did not even bear signature of the applicant. A reference on photo- stat copy could not have been initiated inasmuch as the photo-stat copy of the Reference Application would not have been admissible as secondary evidence under Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Before the photo-stat copy of the Reference Application could be treated as an admissible document, the conditions laid down in Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act would have to be established namely that the original application has been destroyed or lost or is in the possession of the person against whom the document is sought to be proved etc.

The Supreme Court in the case of J.Yashoda v. K.Sholbha Rani reported in (2007) 5 SCC 730 has held as follows:-

7.Secondary evidence, as a general rule is admissible only in the absence of primary evidence. If the original itself is found to be inadmissible through failure of the party, who files it to prove it to be valid, the same party is not entitled to introduce secondary evidence of its contents.

9.The rule which is the most universal, namely that the best evidence the nature of the case will admit shall be produced, decides this objection. That rule only means that, so long as the higher or superior evidence is within your possession or may be reached by you, you shall give no inferior proof in relation to it. Section 65 deals with the proof of the contents of the documents tendered in evidence. In order to enable a party to produce secondary evidence it is necessary for the party to prove existence and execution of the original document. Under Section 64, documents are to be provided (sic proved) by primary evidence. Section 65, however permits secondary evidence to be given of the existence, condition or contents of documents under the circumstances mentioned. The conditions laid down in the said Section must be fulfilled before secondary evidence can be admitted. Secondary evidence of the contents of a document cannot be admitted without non- production of the original being first accounted for in such a manner as to bring it within one or other of the cases provided for in the Section.

In (2011) 4 SCC 240, H.Siddiqui v. A.Ramalingam the Supreme Court has held as follows:-

12. The Provisions of Section 65 of the Act 1872 provide for permitting the parties to adduce secondary evidence. However, such a course is subject to a large number of limitations. In a case where the original documents are not produced at any time, nor,has any factual foundation been laid for giving secondary evidence, it is not permissible for the court to allow a party to adduce secondary evidence. Thus, secondary evidence relating to the contents of a document is inadmissible, until the non production of the original is accounted for, so as to bring it within one or other of the cases provided for in the section. The secondary evidence must be authenticated by foundational evidence that the alleged copy is in fact a true copy of the original. Mere admission of a document in evidence does not amount to its proof. Therefore, the documentary evidence is required to be proved in accordance with law. The court has an obligation to decide the question of admissibility of a document in secondary evidence before making endorsement thereon. (Vide The Roman Catholilc Mission v. The State of Madras, State of Rajasthan v. Khemraj, LIC. v. Ram Pal Singh Bisen, and M. Chandra v. M. Thangamuthu. )

If the original records pertaining to the acquisition proceedings, including the original Reference order, if any, had been seized and sealed by the Anti Corruption Court the original records would be the custodia legis of the Anti Corruption Court. It, therefore, could not be said that the original Reference Application was not in existence. Merely because no effort was made to obtain the original application would not justify the maintainability of the Land Acquisition Reference no.416 of 2003 on the basis of a photo copy of the Reference order which also did not bear the signature of the applicant.

Therefore, in my opinion, the rejection of the land acquisition reference by the District Judge by the impugned order dated 20.9.2007 does not suffer from any illegality or infirmity.

However, there is another aspect which cannot be ignored by this Court, i.e., on a reading of the impugned order of the District Judge dated 20.9.2007 it will be seen that the District Judge while recording other objections taken by the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti with regard to the allegedly fictitious will of Devki Devi; fraudulent decree obtained in Civil Suit no.301 of 1994; the partnership being constituted by petitioner no.1, Devki Devi along with Shashi Kant and Neeraj Agarwal; the fact that the petitioner no.1 had initiated proceedings under Section 143 of the U.P. Z.A.& L.R. Act and got the nature of the land changed from agricultural land to non agricultural; that such proceedings were not maintainable in view of the provisions Sections 167 and 168A of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, he entered into a discussion of these objections and recorded his own findings thereon and thereafter had come to the conclusion that the Reference was also liable to be rejected on the grounds other than that the Reference was on photo copy of the application.

I have given my conscious consideration to the various issues arising in the case and the objections raised by respondent no.3 with regard to the maintainability of the Reference No.416 of 2003. So far as the question of the Reference being made on a photo-stat copy of the Reference Application, which did not bear signature of the applicants, I have already held that the findings of the District Judge do not suffer from any illegality or infirmity. It is not in dispute that a Reference was made by Devki Devi but the original record has been seized by the Anti Corruption Court and proceedings before the Anti Corruption Court are still pending. In the present case from the facts on record it emerges that photo-stat copy of the Reference Application was forwarded by the District Magistrate to the District Judge on account of directions given in the Contempt Case No.2917 of 2003, Ram Ji Das and another vs. Rajiv Agarwal and another. The District Magistrate was not in a position to summon the original application and even otherwise he could not have been in a position to summon the original Reference Application since the original records had been seized and sealed and kept in the custody of the Anti Corruption Court. However, the findings recorded by the District Judge, Muzaffarnagar on the various objections raised by the Mandi Samiti other than the fact that the Reference was made on photo-stat copy of the Reference which was unsigned, were manifestly illegal as those findings were wholly uncalled for.

If the District Judge was of the opinion that the Reference itself was not maintainable on the preliminary objection that the Reference Application was a photo-stat copy which did not bear the signature of the applicant, he ought to have rejected the Reference on that ground itself without entering into the merits of the case and recording his own findings on the various other issues as to whether there was fraudulent compromise decree or application under Section 143 of the U.P. Z.A.& L. R. Act had fraudulently been filed by the petitioner no.1 or that the will of Smt. Devki Devi was a fictitious document and other grounds. I am fortified in my view by the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the following cases:-

1.(2001) 7 SCC 394, Hussan Mithu Mhasvadkar vs. Bombay Iron & Steel Labour Board and another

2.(2002) 10 SCC 101, Arun Agarwal vs. Nagreeka Exports (P) LTD. and another

In the case of Hussan Mithu Mhasvadkar vs. Bombay Iron & Steel Labour Board and another the Supreme Court has held as under:-

"5. On a careful consideration of the respective submissions of the learned counsel on either side, we are of the view that in a case of this nature where the Labour Court as well as the High Court entertained doubts about the status of the appellant as a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the ID Act, instead of embarking upon an adjudication in the first instance as to whether the respondent Board is an industry or not so as to attract the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, they ought to have refrained from doing so and taken up the question about the status of the appellant for adjudication at the threshold and if only the finding recorded was against the appellant, refrained from adjudicating on the larger issue affecting the various kinds of other employees, as to the character of the Board, as an industry or not. The larger issue should have been entertained for consideration only in a case where it is absolutely necessary and not when the claim before it could have been disposed of otherwise without going into the nature and character of the undertaking itself."

In the case of Arun Agarwal vs. Nagreeka Exports (P) LTD. and another

the Supreme Court has held as under:-

"2. The plaintiff-respondents herein filed a suit with leave under clause XII of the Letters Patent before the High Court of Calcutta on its original side for recovery of Rs.87,20,000 from the defendant-appellant herein. In the said suit, the plaintiff-respondents moved an application under Chapter XIII-A of the Rules for summary disposal of the suit. The appellant filed a petition for revocation of leave. The appellant took an objection that the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the matter. The High Court in its original side held that the question relating to jurisdiction shall be decided at the hearing of the suit. However, the High Court directed the appellant to furnish security for a sum of Rs.55 lakhs by way of bank guarantee failing which there will be a decree for the principal amount of Rs.55 lakhs. It is against the said order, the defendant-appellant is in appeal before us.

3.Heard counsel for the parties. We are of the view that the question regarding the jurisdiction of the Court was required to be decided as a preliminary issue. We, therefore, set aside the order under challenge and send the case back to the High Court to decide the question of jurisdiction of the Court as a preliminary issue. The order passed by the High Court directing the defendant-appellant to furnish security for a sum of Rs.55 lakhs by way of bank guarantee shall remain suspended till the said question pertaining to jurisdiction of the Court is decided by the High Court. In case it is held by the High Court that the Court has jurisdiction, the direction to furnish security for a sum of Rs.55 lakhs shall come into operation.

4.The appeal is disposed of in the aforesaid terms. There shall be no order as to costs."

The question therefore now is what relief is to be granted to the petitioners in the circumstances. I have already held the impugned order of the District Judge to be valid so far as his findings regarding the maintainability of the Reference Application on photo stat copy of the Reference is concerned. So far as his findings on the other grounds are concerned where the District Judge entered into the merits of the case and recorded his own findings on each and every question raised by the respondent no.3, it is directed that these findings shall be treated as non est and shall not prejudice any court in any future proceedings including fresh Reference Proceedings, if any, which may be initiated at the behest of the petitioners.

Sri B.C. Rai, learned counsel for the petitioners then submitted that the Court may give a direction to the District Magistrate to call for the record of the original Reference application from the Anti Corruption Court.

I am of the view that no such direction is called for. If the petitioners no.1 to 5 claiming to be a 'persons interested' move such an application before the Anti Corruption Court, that Court will consider the same on its own merits.

Sri B.C. Rai further submits that he has an apprehension that even if the petitioners are able to obtain the original records from the Anti Corruption Court, any request made by them thereafter to the District Magistrate to refer the matter to the District Judge under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act would be barred by limitation as per the limitation provided under Section 18 of the Act.

This apprehension, as of today is premature and unfounded. At present neither any application has been made to the Anti Corruption Court nor there is any application before the District Magistrate for Reference to the District Judge and, therefore, it is not proper for this Court to give any presumptive or premptive directions, as to what orders should be passed by the District Magistrate, if a fresh application is made before him.

With these observations, the writ petition is disposed of.

There shall be no order as to costs.

Order Date :- 26.4.2012

Asha