Expanding the purview of 'Family' from its traditional notion, the Supreme Court of India has allowed a woman employee to avail Child Care Leave for children other than her 'biological'.
The Division Bench comprising of Justice DY Chandrachud and Justice AS Bopanna observed that familial relationships may take the form of domestic, unmarried partnerships or queer relationships and that atypical family units are also entitled to the equal protection of law.
The issue in the appeal was surrounding the restrictive ambit of Rule 43 of the Central Civil Services (Leave Rules) 1972. The Court was of the view that it should be given a purposive interpretation in terms of the Maternity Benefit Act and Article 15 of the Constitution of India, under which the State is to adopt beneficial provisions for protecting the interest of women.
"Unless a purposive interpretation were to be adopted in the present case, the object and intent of the grant of maternity leave would simply be defeated. The grant of maternity leave under Rules of 1972 is intended to facilitate the continuance of women in the workplace. It is a harsh reality that but for such provisions, many women would be compelled by social circumstances to give up work on the birth of a child, if they are not granted leave and other facilitative measures. No employer can perceive child birth as detracting from the purpose of employment. Child birth has to be construed in the context of employment as a natural incident of life and hence, the provisions for maternity leave must be construed in that perspective", the Court opined.
In the judgement authored by Justice DY Chandrachud, significant remarks about changing perceptions on 'Family' has been made. The Judge viewed 'atypical families' as parallel to their traditional norms and definitions. Majorly, it sided with their place in both society and law.
"The predominant understanding of the concept of a “family” both in the law and in society is that it consists of a single, unchanging unit with a mother and a father (who remain constant over time) and their children. This assumption ignores both, the many circumstances which may lead to a change in one‟s familial structure, and the fact that many families do not conform to this expectation to begin with. Familial relationships may take the form of domestic, unmarried partnerships or queer relationships. A household may be a single parent household for any number of reasons, including the death of a spouse, separation, or divorce. Similarly, the guardians and caretakers (who traditionally occupy the roles of the “mother” and the “father”) of children may change with remarriage, adoption, or fostering. These manifestations of love and of families may not be typical but they are as real as their traditional counterparts. Such atypical manifestations of the family unit are equally deserving not only of protection under law but also of the benefits available under social welfare legislation. The black letter of the law must not be relied upon to disadvantage families which are different from traditional ones. The same undoubtedly holds true for women who take on the role of motherhood in ways that may not find a place in the popular imagination."
The appellant in the present case had entered the names of the two children born from the first marriage of her spouse in the official service record. She availed Child Care Leave for her non-biological child.
When she conceived herself, the authorities denied her maternity leave, citing the bar under Rule 43 of Central Services (Leave Rules ) 1972. She challenged the decision in CAT which ruled in favour of the authorities and observed that having child care leave in respect of one of the children born to the spouse she was not entitled to maternity leave in respect of birth of her own biological child in terms of Rule 43 of the CCS Rules.
The writ petition in High Court against the same was also dismissed.
The Apex Court on the other hand found her eligible to avail the Child Care Leave as it noted that the structure of the appellant‟s family changed when she took on a parental role with respect to her spouse‟s biological children from his previous marriage.
"When the appellant applied to PGIMER for maternity leave, PGIMER was faced with facts that the law may not have envisaged or adequately accounted for. When courts are confronted with such situations, they would do well to attempt to give effect to the purpose of the law in question rather than to prevent its application."
The Court in its extensive deliberation of the legal issue, went into the skin of various provisions and their legislative and constitutional interpretations. Determining the scope of 'Maternity Leave', it mentioned K. H. NAZAR vs. MATHEW K. JACOB, 2019 Latest Caselaw 886 SC wherein it was held that beneficial legislation must be given a liberal approach.
The Court also cited Badshah Vs. Sou. Urmila Badshah Godse & ANR., 2013 Latest Caselaw 735 SC wherein a two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court comprising of Justice AK Sikri and Justice Ranjana Desai ruled that Courts must bridge the gap between law and society through the use of purposive interpretation, where applicable.
"For the purpose of adopting an approach which furthers legislative policy, it would be appropriate to derive some guidance from the provisions of the Maternity Benefit Act 19617 though, it must be stated at the outset that the Act per se has no application to the PGIMER as an establishment. Nonetheless, the provisions of the Act of 1961 are indicative of the object and intent of Parliament in enacting a cognate legislation on the subject."
After detailed look at various provisions, the Court asserted that the Act of 1961 was enacted to secure women's right to pregnancy and maternity leave and to afford women with as much flexibility as possible to live an autonomous life, both as a mother and as a worker, if they so desire. It cited Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Female Workers (Muster Roll) wherein a two-judge Bench of this Court placed reliance on the obligations under Articles 14, 15, 39, 42 and 43 of the Constitution, and India‟s international obligations under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 19489 and Article 11 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women10 to extend benefits under the Act of 1961 to workers engaged on a casual basis or on muster roll on daily wages by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi. The Central Civil Services (Leave) Rules 1972, it is well to bear in mind, are also formulated to entrench and enhance the objects of Article 15 of the Constitution and other relevant constitutional rights and protections.
"Under Article 15(3) of the Constitution, the State is empowered to enact beneficial provisions for advancing the interests of women. The right to reproduction and child rearing has been recognized as an important facet of a person‟s right to privacy, dignity and bodily integrity under Article 21.11 Article 42 enjoins the State to make provisions for securing just and humane conditions of work and for maternity relief", the Court commented while referring to several international conventions of the United Nations that India has ratified which provides for maternity leave benefits.
CASE TITLE: Deepika Singh versus Central Administrative Tribunal and Others
CASE DETAILS: Civil Appeal No 5308 of 2022
CORAM: Justice DY Chandrachud and Justice AS Bopanna
Read Judgement @LatestLaws.com:
Share this Document :Picture Source :
