In its latest judgment, the Supreme Court remarked that "A mere reference to the names of family members in a criminal case arising out of a matrimonial dispute, without specific allegations indicating their active involvement, should be nipped in the bud."

The Court emphasized that vague allegations, especially in cases involving matrimonial disputes, could easily be misused as leverage during divorce proceedings. The bench further questioned the delay in filing the complaint, pointing out that the alleged incident was not mentioned in the earlier divorce notice, raising doubts about the sincerity of the allegations.

Brief Facts:

The complainant married Madhav Suryawanshi (son of the appellants) in 2006, and they had two daughters. After the birth of the second daughter in 2011, the appellants and Madhav subjected her to physical and mental cruelty, demanding a son. In November 2016, they allegedly forced her to eat a meal, which led to stomach pain, bleeding, and a miscarriage. She later sought medical treatment, discovering a piece of the foetus remained. Based on these allegations, the complainant filed a case for forced abortion and cruelty. The appellants and their son sought to quash the FIR under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., but the High Court dismissed the application in January 2020. In May 2019, a mutual consent divorce was granted. The complainant filed an appeal, and a chargesheet was filed in February 2021 during the appeal’s pendency.

Contentions of the Petitioner:

Shri Deshpande, counsel for the appellants, argued that the appellants had no active role in the alleged incidents and were merely included in the complaint as the complainant’s in-laws. He contended that if such a serious offence had occurred in November 2016, it should have been mentioned in the complainant's divorce notice of May 2018, but it was not. The complaint, filed after the divorce notice, was allegedly a tactic to exert pressure on the appellants. He further claimed that there was no evidence to suggest that the appellants had given the complainant any poisonous substance.

Deshpande also pointed out that after the appellants did not respond to the divorce pressure, a new FIR was filed, and the divorce was granted in May 2019, suggesting that the allegations were a tactic for revenge. Additionally, he argued that the chargesheet did not establish any role of the appellants in the miscarriage, as the doctor’s statement indicated that the miscarriage could have resulted from abortion pills, not the appellants’ actions.

Contentions of the Respondent:

Shri Shinde, counsel for the State, argued that the FIR allegations prima facie disclosed offences under Sections 498-A, 312, 313, and 34 of the IPC, highlighting the harassment and cruelty faced by the complainant due to the demand for a male child. He contended that the appellants instigated their son against the complainant and played a role in her miscarriage. Shinde emphasized that the truth of the allegations could not be examined at this stage and that the Trial Court should investigate these points. He supported the High Court's decision to not interfere at this stage, asserting that the complaint required thorough examination during the trial. Smt. Prachiti Deshpande, counsel for the complainant, concurred with Shinde’s arguments.

Observation of the Court:

The Court observed that the allegations in the FIR must be examined to determine whether they constitute an offence under Sections 498-A, 312, 313, and 34 of the IPC. Regarding Section 498-A, the Court highlighted that for an offence to be made out, there must be cruelty inflicted upon the victim that either drives her to suicide or causes grave injury. The allegations in the FIR were found to be vague, with no specific incidents or roles mentioned regarding the appellants' involvement in cruelty or harassment.

The Court referred to Dara Lakshmi Narayana and Others v. State of Telangana, where it was held, “A mere reference to the names of family members in a criminal case arising out of a matrimonial dispute, without specific allegations indicating their active involvement should be nipped in the bud.” Similar vague allegations were found in the present case, especially regarding the appellants' involvement in instigating the son to harass the complainant. The Court emphasized concerns over the misuse of Section 498-A in matrimonial disputes, stressing the need to scrutinize vague allegations used as leverage in divorce proceedings.

The Court also discussed the allegations under Sections 312 and 313 of the IPC, noting that while the complainant was coerced into consuming poisonous food leading to a miscarriage, no clear evidence was provided to substantiate these claims.

The Court noted that for an offence under Section 312 of the IPC, "the miscarriage must be voluntarily caused and must not be caused in good faith for the purpose of saving the life of the woman." Section 313 further stipulates that the offence is committed if the miscarriage occurs "without the consent of the woman."

The Court examined the doctor's statement, which revealed that the complainant had a "seven-week-old lifeless fetus" due to the abortion pill she had taken. The Court also pointed out that the FIR did not explain why the appellants visited the complainant’s house or how they knew about her pregnancy, making the allegations appear incomplete and inconsistent.

The Court observed that the facts, even if accepted at face value, did not make out a prima facie case against the appellants. Vague statements about cruelty or miscarriage did not suffice to attract Sections 498-A, 312, and 313 of the IPC.

The Court highlighted the delay in filing the complaint, noting that it was lodged after the complainant had sent a notice for divorce. The Court questioned the delay, especially since the complaint did not mention the alleged cruelty or miscarriage, raising doubts about the genuineness of the allegations.

The Court concluded that continuing the criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of legal process and held that the High Court should have exercised its inherent powers to quash the proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

The decision of the Court:

The Court allowed the present appeal and quashed the impugned judgment and order dated 23rd January 2020 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay at. It also quashed the criminal proceedings against the appellants, along with all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom. Any pending application(s) were disposed of.

Case Title: Digambar and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr.

Case no: SLP (Crl.) No.2122 of 2020

Citation: 2024 Latest Caselaw 812 SC

Coram: Hon'ble Mr. Justice B.R. Gavai and Hon'ble Mr. Justice K.V. Viswanathan

Advocate for Petitioner: Adv. Shirish K. Deshpande

Advocate for Respondent: Adv. R. R. Deshpande [For Respondent 2] and Adv. Aaditya Aniruddha Pande [For Respondent 1]

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Picture Source :

 
Pratibha Bhadauria