Recently, while addressing the scope of limitation under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, the Kerala High Court held that applications filed under Section 3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, are governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Division Bench of Dr. Justice A.K. Jayasankaran Nambiar and Justice Jobin Sebastian, answering an Intra-Court Reference, affirmed that such proceedings, though adjudicated by a Magistrate, are civil in nature and therefore subject to the three-year limitation period applicable to “applications” under Article 137.
Brief facts:
The case arose from the Petitioner's claim for maintenance under Section 3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, which she filed nearly nine years after her 2004 divorce. The Magistrate rejected the application as barred by limitation under Article 137 of the Limitation Act and further concluded that she had relinquished her statutory rights through an agreement executed at the time of talaq.
In the revision proceedings, the Sessions Court upheld the applicability of Article 137 but found that her claim was nonetheless within time, since it had been filed within three years from the alleged refusal of maintenance. Despite this, the Sessions Court dismissed her revision on merits, holding that she had not established that her husband possessed sufficient means.
When the petitioner carried the matter to the High Court in a Criminal Miscellaneous Case, the Single Judge, though limitation was not in dispute before him, expressed reservations about the correctness of the precedent in Hassainar v. Raziya and referred the question of limitation to a Division Bench for authoritative determination.
Contentions:
The petitioner contended that the earlier ruling in Hassainar v. Raziya, which applied Article 137 to Section 3 proceedings, required reconsideration, especially since Section 3 proceedings are conducted before a Magistrate. On the other hand, the Respondent argued that Hassainar v. Raziya, correctly held that applications under Section 3 are civil in nature and that the limitation applies. The State supported this view.
Observation of the Court:
The Court noted that the Single Judge had questioned whether proceedings under the 1986 Act were criminal in nature, observing that “the procedure contemplated for the relief envisaged by the Muslim Women Rights Act is essentially criminal in nature,” given the use of Cr.P.C mechanisms for enforcement.
The Division Bench of Dr. Justice A.K. Jayasankaran Nambiar and Justice Jobin Sebastian observed that, " Since a criminal offence is a wrong against the State and the Society, notwithstanding that it has been committed against an individual, a mere delay in the prosecution approaching a court of law would not by itself be a ground for dismissing the case against an accused. Proceedings under Section 3 of the 1986 Act are not criminal proceedings but civil proceedings, although the adjudicatory forum might be a Magistrate’s court."
“The mere fact that the enforcement machinery to effectuate the adjudicated right is specified under the Cr.P.C does not take away from the fact that the adjudication proceedings themselves are civil proceedings”, added the Bench.
The Court further noted that the exclusion of the Limitation Act in criminal proceedings is based on the principle that “crime never dies,” but that such reasoning has no application to civil claims under the 1986 Act.
Addressing the argument that Section 3 should be treated similarly to Section 125 CrPC, the Bench observed that Section 125 contains a built-in safeguard preventing retrospective claims, whereas the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, creates a distinct statutory right requiring limitation to prevent indefinite revival of claims.
The decision of the Court:
In view of the foregoing discussion, the Court held that the view in Hassainar v. Raziya stands affirmed, declaring that “the provisions of Article 137 of the Limitation Act would apply to applications for adjudication made under Section 3 of the 1986 Act.” The Bench directed that the matter be remitted to the learned Single Judge for consideration of the remaining issue, whether the petitioner had established that her husband had sufficient means to pay the amount claimed.
Case Title: Safia P.M. Vs. State of Kerala & Anr.
Case No.: ICR (Crl.M.C.) No. 14 of 2025
Coram: Hon'ble Dr. Justice A.K. Jayasankaran Nambiar and Hon'ble Justice Jobin Sebastian
Advocate for the Petitioner: Advs. Prashanth Padmanabhan and K.V. Bhadra Kumari
Advocate for the Respondent: Public Prosecutor Sheeba Thomas, Advs. B.J. John Prakash, P. Pramel, Sooraj M.S., Varsha Vijayakumar Nair, Sona A.B., and Colin Alex
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