The Bombay High Court observed that Section 126 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as “IEA”) prohibits disclosure by a barrister, attorney or pleader concerning information received by him by a client or advice/opinion given to a client. The prohibition on disclosure exists even after the engagement/employment has ceased.
The Bench opined that admissibility presupposes relevancy and therefore, even if certain privileged documents are relevant and fall under Sections 126 or 129 of IEA, they cannot be produced as evidence. Further, it was expounded that even if the said communication is already out in the open, the communication being privileged in nature cannot be made admissible as evidence.
Brief Facts
The present petition is preferred by the Petitioner who is a designated Senior Advocate of the Hon’ble High Court of Bombay seeking quashing of the witness summons issued to him for giving evidence in a Special Civil Suit.
Contentions of the Petitioner
It was contended that the Petitioner was being asked to remain present before the Court and produce a copy of the letter which was written by the Petitioner to his client. It was submitted that the said communication is a professional communication and an opinion which is protected under Section 126 of the IEA.
It was argued that no barrister, attorney or pleader can be permitted to disclose any communication made to him in the course and for the purposes of his employment or to disclose any advice given by him to his client unless there is express consent by the client to disclose. It was argued that the prohibition is two-way as neither communication by the client nor
communication to the client can be disclosed.
Contentions of the Respondent
It was argued that the said communication is already out and hence, it is no longer a privileged communication. The Petitioner is only required to confirm his signature. There is no prohibition in doing so.
Observations of the Court:
It was observed that Section 126 of IEA prohibits disclosure by a barrister, attorney or pleader concerning information received by him by a client or advice/opinion given to a client. The prohibition on disclosure exists even after the engagement/employment has ceased. Even though there are certain exceptions to this, however, there was nothing on record to suggest that the present case falls under such an exception.
The High Court also observed Section 129 of the IEA which concerns privileged communication of another type i.e., confidential communications between the client and his legal adviser. As per this, a client cannot be compelled to disclose confidential communication taking place between him and his legal professional adviser unless he offers himself as a witness.
However, the same did not apply to the present case as there was nothing on record to suggest that the said communication is confidential.
The Bench opined that admissibility presupposes relevancy and therefore, even if certain privileged documents are relevant and fall under Sections 126 or 129 of IEA, they cannot be produced as evidence.
Further, it was expounded that even if the said communication is already out in the open, the communication being privileged in nature cannot be made admissible as evidence.
Decision of the Court:
Accordingly, the petition was allowed and the witness summon was quashed and set aside.
Case Title: Anil Vishnu Anturkar v. Chandrakumar Popatlal Baldota & Ors.
Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Abhay Ahuja
Case No.: Writ Petition No. 3359 of 2015
Advocates for Petitioner: Advs. Mr. A.A. Kumbhakoni, Mr. Sandeep Pathak, Mr. Sugandh Deshmukh
Advocate for Respondent: Adv. Mr. S.N. Chandrachood
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