Recently, the Delhi High Court acquitted a man convicted in a 2004 kidnapping and rape case after holding that the prosecutrix had voluntarily accompanied him, married him under the Special Marriage Act, 1954, and later altered her stand due to social and familial pressures. Justice Vimal Kumar Yadav observed that deeply entrenched social divisions and resistance towards interfaith relationships often leave young couples with little freedom to choose their partners. The Court remarked that in a “fragmented, stratified and deeply divided Indian society,” an inter-religious alliance was often treated “no less than a sin.”
Brief Facts:
The case arose out of an FIR registered under Sections 363, 366, and 376 of the Indian Penal Code on allegations that the prosecutrix, who was claimed to be a minor, had been kidnapped and sexually assaulted by the Appellant after being taken from Delhi to West Bengal. During the investigation, statements of the prosecutrix were recorded under Sections 161 and 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code, while medical examination and ossification tests were also conducted to determine her age. It was revealed that the prosecutrix had travelled with the Appellant through public transport, stayed with him for nearly two months, and had also married him under the Special Marriage Act, 1954, before the couple was traced by the police. The trial court convicted the Appellant for kidnapping, abduction, and rape, following which the matter reached the Delhi High Court on appeal. The central issues before the High Court were whether the prosecutrix was a minor at the relevant time and whether she had voluntarily accompanied the Appellant.
Contentions of the Appellant:
The Appellant argued that the prosecutrix was major at the time of the incident and had willingly accompanied the Appellant out of her own choice. Reliance was placed upon her statements recorded under Sections 161 and 164 of the CrPC, the marriage certificate issued under the Special Marriage Act, and several letters allegedly written by the prosecutrix to the Appellant. The defence argued that the prosecutrix voluntarily travelled from Delhi to West Bengal, stayed with the Appellant for nearly two months, and never attempted to raise an alarm despite having multiple opportunities during the journey. The Counsel further argued that the ossification test report, when read with the permissible margin of error, indicated that the prosecutrix could legally be treated as eighteen years old. The Appellant also relied upon several judicial precedents to challenge the reliability of school records and to argue that consensual conduct had been ignored by the trial court.
Contentions of the Respondent:
On the other hand, the prosecution contended that the prosecutrix had not attained the age of consent and therefore her consent, even if assumed, was legally immaterial. The State argued that the Appellant had enticed and taken away the prosecutrix, thereby attracting offences under Sections 363 and 366 of the IPC. The Counsel further argued that the prosecutrix’s testimony before the trial court constituted substantive evidence and clearly established the offences alleged against the appellant. The prosecution maintained that the conviction recorded by the trial court did not warrant interference and emphasised that the prosecutrix had been subjected to rape during the period she stayed with the appellant.
Observation of the Court:
Justice Vimal Kumar Yadav observed, “Fragmented, stratified and deeply divided Indian society across all the classes left no room practically for the young lovers to choose their partners. If the prescribed barriers are to be breach then, the consequences have been so severe that they have had to pay with their lives at times. In such a deeply divided society, which has not only divided the lives, religion, caste, region or language but even inter-se divisions have been found within a particular social group."
"In such circumstances, an inter-religious alliance was no less than a sin against such a scenario, where an inter-religious alliance was met with the obvious resistance so much so that one of the partners, that is the prosecutrix herein, who had taken an initial stand of aligning with the Appellant in every aspect from voluntarily accompanying him, to marrying him, having the marriage registered and living with him for about two months, turned tables and shifted the entire blame on the Appellant when she came to depose before the Court, contrary to what she has stated in her statement under Section 161 and 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (Cr.P.C.)", added the Bench
The Bench observed that the conduct of the prosecutrix throughout the journey and during her stay with the Appellant strongly indicated voluntary participation rather than forcible abduction. The Court noted that the prosecutrix travelled more than 1500 kilometres through multiple forms of public transport, including a TSR, buses, and trains, while also spending considerable time at railway stations and public places.
Despite these circumstances, she never attempted to seek help from co-passengers, railway police personnel, or any public authority. The Court held that if she had truly been kidnapped or forcibly taken away, there were sufficient opportunities available to her to raise an alarm or escape. Her silence during the entire journey, according to the Court, demonstrated that she had willingly accompanied the appellant out of her own choice and desire.
The Court held that the evidence relating to the prosecutrix’s age was not conclusive enough to sustain the conviction recorded by the trial court. While the prosecution relied heavily upon school records to establish the minority, the Bench noted that such documents had not been proved strictly in accordance with the Evidence Act. The Court further observed that the ossification test report indicated an age range that, when read with the permissible margin of error, could legally place the prosecutrix at eighteen years of age. The Bench emphasised that in criminal law, the benefit of uncertainty must necessarily go in favour of the accused. Consequently, the Court concluded that the prosecutrix could be treated as a major and capable of exercising her own free will in matters concerning marriage and consensual relationships.
The Bench observed that the prosecutrix’s own conduct after leaving Delhi further weakened the prosecution’s allegations of force or coercion. The Court relied upon the marriage certificate issued under the Special Marriage Act and several letters allegedly written by the prosecutrix to the appellant, which reflected emotional attachment and willingness to remain with him.
The Court also considered the fact that the prosecutrix declined an internal medical examination during the investigation and had initially supported the appellant in her statements before the Magistrate. According to the Court, these circumstances collectively undermined the later allegations made during trial and reflected that the relationship between the parties was consensual in nature.
The decision of the Court:
In light of the overall evidence, the Court allowed the criminal appeal and acquitted the Appellant of all charges under Sections 363, 366, and 376 of the IPC. The Court held that the prosecutrix had voluntarily accompanied and married the Appellant and that the prosecution failed to conclusively establish either forcible kidnapping or non-consensual sexual relations.
Case Title: Mohd. Quasim Vs. State (NCT of Delhi)
Case No.: CRL.A. 654/2009
Coram: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Vimal Kumar Yadav
Advocate for the Petitioner: Adv. Samar Singh Kachwaha, Adv. Arsh Ranpal, Adv. Kavita Vinayak, Adv. Yash Dadriwal
Advocate for the Respondent: APP Nawal Kishore Jha, Adv. Astha, Adv. Megha Singh, ASI Inder Singh
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