Recently, the Gujarat High Court dismissed a petition seeking to quash a charge sheet against officials accused of diverting duty-free metal scrap. The Court held that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot bypass the statutory bar in Section 19(3)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, emphasising that criminal proceedings must follow the legal process without judicial shortcuts.
Brief Facts:
The case arose from the issuance of a Letter of Permission by the Development Commissioner of Kandla Special Economic Zone in favour of a company, allowing duty-free import of metal scrap for export-oriented production. It was later alleged that the company had diverted the imported materials into the domestic market using forged export documents, causing loss to the government. Although the petitioners were not named in the original FIR, they were later implicated based on a joint inspection report they submitted in the course of their official duties. A charge sheet was filed against them for offences under Sections 120B, 420, 467, and 471 the Indian Penal Code and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Their applications seeking discharge were rejected by the Special CBI Court, leading to the present petition for quashing the charge sheet and further proceedings.
Contentions of the Petitioners:
The counsel for the Petitioners contended that the inspection report was prepared in compliance with official directions and contained no false statement or criminal intent. The counsel maintained that it accurately reflected the factory status, showing that the furnaces and machinery were in place and operational as verified by a Chartered Engineer. The counsel for the Petitioners further argued that one of them had already been exonerated in a departmental inquiry on the same allegations, and this finding was upheld by the competent tribunal. Therefore, continuing criminal proceedings on identical facts would amount to double jeopardy and abuse of process. The Petitioner relied on Supreme Court precedents to argue that once a person is cleared in departmental proceedings based on the same set of facts, criminal prosecution on identical grounds cannot be sustained. Hence, the Petitioner sought quashing of the charge sheet and the order rejecting their discharge.
Contentions of the Respondents:
The counsel for the Respondents opposed the petition, arguing that it was not maintainable since the Prevention of Corruption Act bars revisional or writ interference against interlocutory orders. The Respondent contended that the petitioners converted their revision application into a writ petition only to bypass the statutory bar. It was also submitted that sanction for prosecution had been granted after due consideration and that departmental exoneration does not erase criminal liability, as both proceedings are independent. Accordingly, the Respondents urged that the petition be dismissed as being without merit and not maintainable in law.
Observation of the Court:
The Court observed that the Petitioners had attempted to invoke the extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to circumvent the statutory bar imposed by the Prevention of Corruption Act. It noted that what could not be done under the revisional jurisdiction could not be achieved indirectly through writ proceedings.
The Court held that “This sequence of events unmistakably demonstrates that the petitioners were fully conscious of the express bar contained in Section 19(3)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, which precludes the grant of stay of proceedings or entertainment of revision against interlocutory orders. Ergo, it is manifest that what could not have been achieved under Sections 397 and 401 Cr.P.C., cannot be permitted to be attained sub silentio through the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.”
The Court, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Satya Narayan Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, noted that Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot be used to bypass the clear provisions of any other law. If a statute specifically bars interference, the Court cannot use its inherent powers to get around that bar.
The Court also referred to Neeta Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, explaining that once a charge-sheet is filed and the trial court takes cognizance, the High Court cannot interfere through a writ petition. It emphasized that judicial orders cannot be challenged under Article 226 once the court has acted, and that Article 227 serves a distinct jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the Court concluded that the petition was “wholly misconceived and legally untenable,” holding that the relief sought was beyond the permissible scope of Article 226 in criminal proceedings governed by a special statute.
The decision of the Court:
The Court held that the petition was not maintainable under Article 226, as it sought to bypass the statutory bar in Section 19(3)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and could not use writ jurisdiction to override the Cr.P.C. revisional provisions. Consequently, the Court dismissed the Special Criminal Application and vacated any interim relief granted.
Case Title: Chirala Sesha Srinivas, Inspector of Central Excise, & Anr. Versus State of Gujarat & Anr.
Case No.: Special Criminal Application (Quashing) No. 5364 of 2014
Coram: Hon’ble Mr Justice J. C. Doshi
Counsel for the Petitioner: Adv. Harsha R Jadav and Adv. YV Vaghela
Counsel for the Respondent: Adv. RC Kodekar and Adv. Chintan Dave
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