Recently, the Rajasthan High Court drew a sharp line between criticism and contempt, dismissing a criminal contempt reference while holding that statements made against a judicial officer during an official inquiry would not attract contempt unless they are intended to scandalise the institution or obstruct the administration of justice. In a significant clarification of the law’s limits, the Court emphasised that contempt jurisdiction is not a shield for individual judges against criticism, but a safeguard for preserving the credibility and authority of the judiciary as a whole.
Brief facts:
The case stemmed from a criminal contempt reference initiated under Sections 2(c) and 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, by a judicial officer, alleging that certain police officials had made derogatory and defamatory statements against him during an inquiry conducted by a superior police officer. The inquiry itself arose from directions issued in a criminal case involving offences under Sections 376, 420, 389, 120-B, 166-A, and 509 of the IPC, where concerns were raised regarding the fairness of the investigation. During the course of the inquiry, conducted pursuant to judicial directions under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., statements of police personnel were recorded in the case diary under Section 172 Cr.P.C. These statements contained allegations regarding the conduct and courtroom behaviour of the presiding officer. Treating these statements as scandalising the court and interfering with judicial proceedings, a reference was made to the High Court for initiating contempt proceedings.
Contentions of the Petitioner:
The Petitioner contended that the police officials, under the guise of an inquiry, made statements imputing misconduct to a sitting judicial officer, thereby lowering the authority of the court and interfering with the administration of justice. The allegations, it was argued, were not merely personal grievances but amounted to an attempt to intimidate and scandalise the judiciary. Reliance was placed on the statutory definition of criminal contempt under Section 2(c)of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, asserting that such statements, if left unchecked, would erode public confidence in the judicial system. It was further submitted that judicial orders cannot be criticised through informal statements during inquiries and must be challenged only through appellate mechanisms.
Contentions of the Respondent:
The Respondents argued that the statements were made strictly in the course of an official inquiry initiated pursuant to judicial directions and were limited to narrating facts and personal experiences in response to queries by a superior officer. The Counsel submitted that there was no intention to scandalise the court or interfere with judicial proceedings. The statements were neither published nor made in the public domain, and therefore lacked the essential ingredients of criminal contempt. The Respondent further contended that complaints regarding the conduct of a judicial officer, when made in good faith before competent authorities, are protected under Section 6 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
Observation of the Court:
The Court observed that the law of criminal contempt is not intended to safeguard the personal prestige or ego of an individual judicial officer, but to protect the dignity and authority of the judicial institution as a whole. It emphasised that personal criticism or allegations directed against a presiding officer, without any tendency to scandalise the court or interfere with the administration of justice, would not ordinarily fall within the ambit of criminal contempt.
The Bench noted that the statements in question were made during the course of an official inquiry and were recorded in a case diary, which is not a public document. It held that such statements, made in response to queries by a superior officer and confined to an internal process, cannot be equated with publication or dissemination capable of undermining public confidence in the judiciary.
The Court held that mere narration of grievances or perceived misconduct, even if expressed in strong terms, does not amount to criminal contempt unless it satisfies the statutory ingredients under Sections 2(c) and 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It clarified that there must be a clear tendency to scandalise the court, prejudice judicial proceedings, or obstruct the administration of justice, thresholds which were not met in the present case.
The Bench further observed that the law does not impose a gag on individuals from truthfully stating their version of events, particularly when such statements are made before a competent authority during an inquiry. It cautioned that treating such expressions as contempt would discourage legitimate grievances and impair transparency within institutional processes.
The Court finally noted that equating complaints against a judicial officer with contempt would render internal vigilance mechanisms ineffective and have a chilling effect on accountability. It reiterated that contempt jurisdiction must be exercised with circumspection, and cannot be invoked to silence criticism unless it crosses the line into deliberate vilification of the institution of justice.
The decision of the Court:
In light of the foregoing discussion, the Court dismissed the criminal contempt reference, holding that the statements made by the police officials did not satisfy the ingredients of criminal contempt as they neither scandalised the court nor interfered with judicial proceedings.
Case Title: In Re, Bhilwara (Raj.) Vs. Dilip Kumar Saini
Case No.: D.B. Criminal Contempt Petition No. 3/2019
Coram: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Farjand Ali, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Yogendra Kumar Purohit
Advocate for the Petitioner: AAG Sajjan Singh Rathore
Advocate for the Respondent: Additional S.P. Dilip Kumar Saini, CO. Bhura Ram Khillery, Mr. Megha Ram, CO. Saroj Jakhar, Head Constable. Nathu Singh
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