A Single Judge Bench of Justice Subramonium Prasad of Delhi High Court has in the case titled Parveen Tandon v. Tanika Tandon upheld the order of an Additional Sessions Judge directing a married man to pay ad-interim maintenance under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 to a woman claiming to be his live-in partner. While doing so, the Bench observed that the issue as to whether the parties were residing in a shared household and were enjoying a domestic relationship in the nature of marriage could not be decided without leading evidence. It has to be borne in mind that this latest ruling acquires considerable relevance in light of the recent judgments of other High Courts holding that a live-in relationship between a married and unmarried person is not permissible.
Reasoning and Decision of the Court
While reflecting on the purpose of the DV Act, the Court noted:
“The DV Act has been enacted to provide a remedy in civil law for protection of women from being victims of domestic violence and to prevent occurrence of domestic violence in the society. The DV Act has been enacted also to provide an effective protection of the rights of women guaranteed under the Constitution, who are victims of violence of any kind occurring within the family. The Act enables the wife or the female living in a relationship in the nature of marriage to file a complaint under the proposed enactment against any relative of the husband or the male partner."
The Court observed that,
“In order to maintain a petitioner under the DV Act the aggrieved person has to show that the aggrieved person and the respondent (man) lived together in a shared household and this could be even from a relationship in the nature of marriage."
The material placed on record shows that the petitioner had entered into a marriage agreement in the year 2012 wherein it is stated that both the parties intend to marry each other.
"The agreement shows that the petitioner undertook to discharge all liabilities/obligations towards the respondent herein and similarly the respondent undertook to discharge all liabilities/obligations towards the petitioner herein. The affidavit has been signed by both the parties. After the respondent herein obtained divorce from her husband, another agreement-cum-marriage deed was entered into between the parties on 22.11.2014, wherein it is stated that the petitioner and the respondent are residing together for the last five years in a live-in relationship and are now getting married to each other according to Hindu rites and ceremonies and the marriage was solemnized in an Arya Samaj Mandir at Delhi.
The marriage deed also records that after solemnization of marriage both the parties will reside together as husband and wife and will be faithful towards each other. The marriage deed has been signed by both the parties. There are photographs of the petitioner and the respondent which gives an impression that the parties were living together as husband and wife and have married each other. The school records of the child have been filed wherein the petitioner has been shown as the father of the child. Copies of the bank accounts have been filed wherein the petitioner has been shown as a nominee of the account held by the respondent.”
The Court reiterated the findings of the Supreme Court in D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal, (2010) 10 SCC 469, wherein the Apex Court noted that,
"(...) a “relationship in the nature of marriage” is akin to a common-law marriage. Common law marriages require that although not being formally married:
(a) The couple must hold themselves out to society as being akin to spouses.
(b) They must be of legal age to marry.
(c) They must be otherwise qualified to enter into a legal marriage, including being unmarried
(d) They must have voluntarily cohabited and held themselves out to the world as being akin to spouses for a significant period of time."
With respect to the factual aspects of the case, the Court noted:
"The principal challenge is that the order could not be passed since the application under the DV Act was not maintainable as the respondent is not an aggrieved person. Since the case is only at an interim stage this Court is not inclined to interfere with the direction of the courts below awarding interim maintenance to the respondent herein towards the maintenance of the child and also towards the rent/accommodation.”
"The scope of the revision petition under Sections 397/401 Cr.P.C. read with Section 482 Cr.P.C. is narrow. It cannot be said that the order of the courts below warrants interference of this Court by exercising its revisional jurisdiction."
Held
"In case the Metropolitan Magistrate, after evidence is led, comes to a conclusion that the respondent herein was not entitled to the protection of the DV Act then adequate safeguards must be made to ensure that the respondent returns the amount received by her as interim maintenance in terms of the order dated 26.10.2020, passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate back to the petitioner with interest. The rate of interest is to be fixed by the Metropolitan Magistrate. The learned Trial Court is directed to hear the matter and decide the matter finally within a period of one year.”
Case Nmae: Parveen Tandon v. Tanika Tandon
Case No.: CRL.M.C. 264/2021 & CRL.M.A. 1352/2021 (Stay) and CRL.M.C.420/2021 & CRL.M.As. 2196/2021 & 8859/2021 (Stay)
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