The Delhi High Court has held that it requires more than mere 'wrong decision' to attract the supervisory jurisdiction of High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
The single-judge bench of Justice Asha Menon noted that the power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India being one of judicial superintendence cannot be exercised to upset conclusions, howsoever erroneous they may be, unless there was something grossly wrong or unjust in the impugned order shocking the court’s conscience or the conclusions were so perverse that it becomes absolutely necessary in the interest of justice for the court to interfere.
The petitioner herein has assailed the Commercial Court order with contention that it contained directions contrary to “law of the land.”
Learned Counsel for the petitioner also submitted that it was in contravention to the SC Ruling in Black Diamond Track Parts Private Limited and Ors. Vs. Black Diamond Motors Private Limited,
It was further submitted that the Division Bench of Apex Court only, while dealing with the First Appeal in question, has set aside interim injunction which had been granted ex-parte to the respondent/plaintiff. Thus on the date when the impugned order was passed, there was no right left in the respondent/plaintiff which required protection. Such an observation in the impugned order was thus misplaced and against the orders of this court in the First Appeal.
It was also averred that under Section 136 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the court could not have appointed a Court Commissioner beyond its jurisdictional limits.
Since the dispute is an Intellectual Property one it was submitted that the Section 34 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 saved the vested rights of the petitioners/defendants as it was the predecessor-in-interest of the parties who had the Trademark ‘BLACK DIAMOND’ registered in their names. Therefore, the family members being engaged in a dispute, his client could not be prevented from using the trademark.
It was lastly mentioned before the Court that the Trial Court could not have further directed the petitioners/defendants to deposit the sale proceeds in the court or furnish a bank guarantee, as such orders were beyond the jurisdiction vested in a court.
On the other hand, Learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the respondent/plaintiff objected on the maintainability of the petition itself. Placing reliance on Black Diamond Case, it was argued that the scope of exercise of powers under Article 227 was very restricted and the petitioners/defendants have failed to disclose any error in the impugned orders.
It was submitted that the suit was yet to be disposed of finally thus protection of the interests of the respondent/plaintiff was but natural, since they were the registered proprietors of the trade mark ‘BLACK DIAMOND.
High Court Analysis
The Court while reflecting on the High Court's discretion to exercise powers under Article 227, referred to Mohd. Yunus Vs. Mohd. Mustaqim & Ors, 1983 Latest Caselaw 140 SC, India Pipe Fitting Co. Vs. Fakruddin M.A. Baker & ANR, 1977 Latest Caselaw 210 SC and noted that the supervisory jurisdiction conferred to the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is limited to overseeing that an inferior court or tribunal functions within the limits of its authority and is not meant to correct an error, even if apparent on the face of the record. A mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract this jurisdiction.
It further noted that the court should be more cautious in suits which under the CPC are revisable and which remedy has been taken away by the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, in order to preserve the legislative intent and give effect to the purpose behind the Commercial Courts Act, of expeditious disposal of commercial suits.
Addressing the Counsel for petitioner's grievance with regard to phrasing in the impugned judgement, "“in my view if the rights of plaintiff are adequately protected then the goods can be released to the applicant/defendant….”, the Court clarified that the business had been commenced by the common predecessors and it was not “deemed appropriate at the interim stage to restrain one part of the family” and thus interest of both the parties was taken into consideration.
"When the First Appeal was first heard on 8 th April, 2021, the Trial Court’s order restraining the petitioners/defendants in the suit, from using the trademark had been kept in abeyance and they were permitted to use the said trademark. Even if the application for release had been filed immediately after this interlocutory order was passed in the First Appeal, it would be incorrect to urge that the respondent/plaintiff’s right in the Trademark stood dislodged. It only permitted the petitioners/defendants to also use the Trademark. At the time of final disposal of the First Appeal, the Division Bench of this court set aside the orders of the learned Commercial Court disposing the application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 of the CPC, on the ground that it did not meet the parameters of a judgment. The respondent/plaintiff was also found disentitled for interim relief on account of their conduct. Once again, the appeal does not hold that the respondent/plaintiffs had lost their rights to use the registered Trademark. In the circumstances to say that the impugned order was in violation of the view taken by the Division Bench would be incorrect. The mutual rights are yet to be determined in the suit and pending the suit, the interests of both sides have to be kept in mind and in the impugned order when the petitioners/defendants sought the release of the goods, while allowing that plea of the petitioners/defendants, the court chose to also take care of the interests of the respondent/plaintiffs. No error can be ascribed to the view taken."
The Court rejected the contention made with regard to Section 136 of the CPC as it deals with the procedure where a person is to be arrested or the property is to be attached outside the courts’ jurisdiction and not the appointment of a Court Commissioner which is governed by Order XXVI of the CPC.
With regard to the application of Section 34 of the Trademarks Act, the same has no bearing, the Court noted.
"the application disposed of by the learned Commercial Court was for the release of goods, on an application moved by the petitioners/defendants and it was not a determination of mutual rights in respect of the registered trademark ‘BLACK DIAMOND’."
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