In a recent ruling that fortifies the constitutional mandate of equal opportunity in public employment, the Supreme Court has upheld the Patna High Court’s verdict striking down the proviso to Rule 6 of the Bihar Chaukidari Cadre (Amendment) Rules, 2014, which permitted appointment of the kin of serving or deceased Chaukidars on hereditary grounds.
A Bench comprising Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Manmohan, while dismissing the challenge to the High Court’s judgment, held that the impugned rule was “in the teeth of the precedents” and hence void. The judgment emphatically declares, “Public offices are not the spoils of office to be distributed on the basis of descent.”
The Court traced a detailed constitutional trajectory, citing prior decisions to reaffirm that public employment must be based solely on merit and open competition, not familial succession.
Calling out the 2014 amendment introduced by the Bihar Government as constitutionally impermissible, the Bench observed: "The respondent no.1 again sought to make appointment on the post of chaukidar a heritable right in favour of the dependent kin of the chaukidar in service. The offending proviso being in the teeth of the precedents...was rightly struck down by the Division Bench and the impugned judgment and order is unexceptionable on this score."
The Court referred to analogous situations in Kala Singh v. Union of India (2016) (P&H) and Manjit v. Union of India (2021) (SC), concerning the now-defunct LARSGESS (Liberalised Active Retirement Scheme for Guaranteed Employment for Safety Staff) scheme of the Indian Railways. The scheme, which enabled backdoor entry of wards of retiring employees, was called “a device evolved by the Railways to make backdoor entries in public employment” and was subsequently discontinued.
The three-judge Bench in Manjit (2021) had then declared: "The Scheme provided for an avenue of a back door entry into the service of the Railways. This would be fundamentally at odds with Article 16 of the Constitution." The present Bench, taking note of this position, categorically held: “This Court has consistently deprecated the practice of appointment in public service as if public offices are heritable.”
On the procedural objection that the High Court struck down the offending proviso without it being specifically challenged in the writ petition, the Supreme Court dismissed the contention stating:
“The Division Bench found the offending proviso to be so obtrusively unconstitutional that notwithstanding absence of a specific challenge thereto, it proceeded to declare the same as void.”
Issuing a calibrated caution, the Court added that though such power must be exercised “sparingly and with due care, caution and circumspection”, it nevertheless exists within the “vast reserve of powers of the Constitutional Courts.” Importantly, the Court clarified that this power applies only to subordinate legislation and not to primary laws.
The Bench noted: "We are minded and do hold that, a writ court, when it finds its conscience to be pricked in a rare and very exceptional case by the patent unconstitutionality of a subordinate legislation... may grant a declaration as to unconstitutionality and/or invalidity of such legislation."
The petitioning union also argued that the Division Bench of the High Court lacked jurisdiction as another Bench was designated to hear vires challenges. Rejecting the plea, the Court invoked its decision in Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) (P) Ltd. 1996 Latest Caselaw 637 SC, to hold that: "Inherent powers are powers which are resident in all courts, especially of superior jurisdiction... Such power is necessary for the orderly administration of the justice delivery system by the courts."
The roster, the Court held, does not limit inherent jurisdiction in matters where justice demands immediate intervention.
Lastly, the Court addressed the claim that the petitioning union’s members were deprived of an opportunity of hearing in the High Court. It found the objection immaterial since no enforceable right had accrued under the now-invalidated rule. The Bench reasoned: "No right, far less any enforceable right of the members, has been infringed by reason of the impugned judgment and order... The plinth of the petitioning union’s attack to the impugned judgment and order crumbles."
Dismissing the special leave petition, the Supreme Court left no doubt about the constitutional inadmissibility of hereditary public employment, stating that: "The fact that his father is/was an existing/a former employee of the same employer should make no difference while considering the candidature purely based on merit."
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