Sushil Ansal Vs. State through Central Bureau of Investigation
[Criminal Appeal No.597 of 2010]
[Criminal Appeals No.598/2010, 599/2010, 600-602/2010, 604/2010, 605- 616/2010 and 617-627/2010]
T.S. THAKUR, J.
1. Enforcement of laws is as important as their enactment, especially where such laws deal with safety and security of citizens and create continuing obligations that call for constant vigil by those entrusted with their administration. Callous indifference and apathy, extraneous influence or considerations and the cynical "Chalta Hai" attitude more often than not costs the society dearly in man-made tragedies whether in the form of fire incidents, collapse of buildings and bridges, poisonous gas leaks or the like.
Short-lived media attention followed by investigations that at times leave the end result flawed and a long winding criminal trial in which the witnesses predecease their depositions or switch sides under pressure or for gain and where even the victims or their families lose interest brings the sad saga to an uncertain end.
A somewhat similar story is presented in these appeals by special leave arising out of a common judgment and order dated 19th December, 2008 passed by a Single Judge of High Court of Delhi whereby a batch of criminal appeals filed by those convicted by the trial Court for commission of different offences and the sentences awarded to them were disposed of alongwith criminal revision petition no.17 of 2008 filed by the Association of Victims of Uphaar Tragedy (hereinafter, "AVUT") that led to the death of 59 persons besides injuries to nearly 100 others.
2. The High Court has, on a reappraisal of the evidence adduced at the trial, acquitted five of the appellants before it while upholding the convictions of the rest with or without modification of the nature of offence in some cases and reduction of the sentence in others. We shall in the course of this judgment refer in detail to the view taken by the Trial Court and the extent and nature of modification made to that by the High Court in the impugned judgment.
3. Suffice it to say that the fire incident that claimed valuable human lives took place in the heart of the capital city of Delhi in a cinema building situate in its posh Green Park Extension area on 13th June, 1997. The factual backdrop in which the unfortunate victims lost their lives or suffered injuries has been set out by the Trial Court in its judgment and reiterated by the High Court in the order passed by it without any significant changes in the narrative. In the Trial Court, as in the High Court and even before us there was no serious dispute as to the cause of the fire leading to the loss of human lives. We, therefore, would remain content with the broad narration of the facts as are available from the order passed by the Trial Court and that passed by the High Court, which are as under: The Incident:
4. Uphaar Cinema building, situate on a plot of 2480 square yards at Green Park Extension Shopping Centre, New Delhi, comprised a cinema auditorium with a sanctioned capacity of 750 seats besides a balcony with a sanctioned capacity of 250 seats. The cinema auditorium comprised the first floor of the cinema complex while the balcony was constructed on the second floor.
The ground floor of the building comprised a parking lot besides three separate rooms on the western side, one of which was used for placing a 500 KVA electric transformer that supplied electric energy to the cinema theatre while the other was used for housing a 1000 KVA transformer that was installed and maintained by the Delhi Vidyut Board (hereinafter referred to as "DVB"). It is common ground that the second transformer even though located within the cinema premises, did not supply electricity to the cinema but rather to some of the tenants occupying parts of the commercial complex that formed a part of the building and some other consumers from the locality.
5. The prosecution case is that on 13th June, 1997 at about 6.55 a.m. the bigger of the two transformers installed and maintained by DVB on the ground floor of the Uphaar Cinema building caught fire. The fire was brought under control by 7.25 a.m. Inspection of the transformer by the Superintendant of the DVB and his team revealed that three of the low tension cable leads of the transformer had been partially burnt. At about 10.30 a.m., B.M. Satija (A-9) and A.K. Gera (A-10), Inspectors from DVB along with Senior Fitter, Bir Singh (A-11) conducted repairs on the transformer by replacing two aluminium sockets on the B-Phase of the low tension cable leads. The repairs, it appear, were carried out with the help of a dye and hammer without the use of a crimping machine. The transformer was recharged for resumption of electric supply by 11.30 a.m. on 13th June, 1997.
6. The prosecution alleges that repairs conducted on the transformer in the earlier part of the day were unsatisfactory and resulted in loose connections that caused sparking on the B-Phase of the transformer where such repairs were carried out. This resulted in the loosening of one of the cables of the transformer which eventually came off and started dangling loose along the radiator and burnt a hole in the radiator fin.
Through this hole the transformer oil started leaking out which, on account of the heat generated by the loose cable touching against the radiator, ignited the oil at about 4.55 p.m. on 13th June, 1997. Since the transformer did not have an oil soak pit as required under the regulations and the standard practice, the oil that spread out of the enclosure continued leaking and spreading the fire to the adjacent parking lot where cars were parked at a distance of no more than a metre from the door of the transformer.
The result was that all the cars parked in the parking area on the ground floor of the cinema hall were ablaze. Smoke started billowing in the northern and southward directions in the parking lot of the cinema complex. The northern bound smoke encountered a gate which was adjacent to a staircase leading to the cinema auditorium on the first floor. Due to chimney effect, the smoke gushed into the stairwell and eventually entered the cinema auditorium through a door and through the air conditioning ducts.
The southward bound smoke similarly travelled aerially through another staircase and into the lower portion of the balcony of the auditorium from the left side. All this happened while a large number of people were seated in the auditorium enjoying the matinee show of 'BORDER', a popular Hindi movie with a patriotic theme. Because of smoke and carbon monoxide released by the burning oil and other combustible material, the people in the auditorium started suffocating.
7. The Shift In-charge of the Green Park Complaint Centre of DVB received a telephonic message from K.L. Malhotra (A-4), since deceased, who was the Deputy General Manager of Uphaar Cinema at the relevant point of time, regarding the fire. It was only then that the AIIMS grid to which the transformer in question was connected was switched off and the flow of energy to the cinema complex stopped. According to the prosecution the supply of the 11 KV outgoing Green Park Feeder tripped off at 5.05 p.m. thereby discontinuing the supply of energy to the cinema.
8. Inside the auditorium and balcony there was complete pandemonium. The people in the balcony are said to have rushed towards the exits in pitch darkness as there were neither emergency lights nor any cinema staff to help or guide them. The prosecution alleged that no public announcement regarding the fire was made to those inside the auditorium or the balcony, nor were any fire alarms set off, no matter the management and the employees of the Uphaar Cinema were aware of the fact that a fire had broken out.
Even the Projector Operator was not given instructions to stop the film while the fire was raging nor was any patron informed about the situation outside. On the contrary, the doors to the middle entrance of the balcony were found to be bolted by the gatekeeper-Manmohan Uniyal (A-8) who had left his duty without handing over charge to his reliever. More importantly, the prosecution case is that the addition of a private 8- seater box had completely closed off the exit on the right side of the balcony, while the addition of a total of 52 extra seats over the years had completely blocked the gangway on the right side of the balcony. Similarly, the gangway on the right of the middle entrance was significantly narrower than required under the regulations.
It was alleged that Sushil Ansal (A-1) and Gopal Ansal (A-2), the owners of the cinema hall, had knowledge of these deviations from fire safety norms despite which they had continued exhibiting films, thereby endangering the lives of all those who patronized the theatre. All these obstructions, deviations, violations and deficiencies had, according to the prosecution, resulted in the victims getting trapped in the balcony for at least 10-15 minutes exposing them to lethal carbon monoxide, to which as many as 59 persons eventually succumbed.
9. Rescue operations attempted by the fire tenders from the Bhikaji Cama Place and Safdarjung Fire Stations were undertaken after the Delhi Fire Service received a complaint from K.L. Malhotra (A-4), since deceased, at 5.10 p.m. The fire tenders took nearly forty five minutes to one hour to extinguish the fire and to rescue the persons trapped in the balcony by opening the bolted doors and taking those who had collapsed and those injured to the hospitals. No one from the staff or management of the theatre was, according to the prosecution, present at the spot to lend a helping hand in the rescue operations. Investigation and Charges:
10. Investigation into the fire incident and the resultant causalities started pursuant to FIR No.432/97 registered at Police Station, Hauz Khas on the basis of a written complaint filed by one Sudhir Kumar, Security Guard, employed by the management of the cinema complex. The investigation was initially conducted by the Delhi Police but was soon thereafter transferred to the Crime Branch and eventually to the Central Bureau of Investigation under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946. The CBI registered case bearing No.RC-3(S)/97/SIC.IV/New Delhi on 25th July, 1997.
11. The investigating agencies first looked into the incidents of fire and got prepared and seized the record relevant thereto, including a report signed by B.M. Satija (A-9), A.K. Gera (A-10), Inspectors and Bir Singh (A- 11) Senior Fitter, which dealt with the nature of repair that was conducted on the DVB transformer after the first incident. The investigating agencies also looked into the chain of events that led to the second fire at around 5.00 p.m. and the entry of smoke into the cinema auditorium and the balcony. A report from the Central Building Research Institute was also obtained by the investigating agencies on 17th August, 1997 under the signatures of T.P. Sharma (PW-25). Expert opinion of K.V. Singh, Executive Engineer (Electrical), PWD was also obtained by the investigating officers on 29th June, 1997, in addition to two CFSL reports prepared by Dr. Rajender Singh forwarded to the Hauz Khas Police Station on 27th June, 1997 and to the CBI on 11th August, 1997. These reports were marked Exs. PW 64/B and PW 64/D at the trial.
12. The investigating officers also examined the cause of malfunctioning of the DVB transformer and obtained a report Ex. PW24/A in that regard from Mr. K.L. Grover, Electrical Inspector and Mr. A.K. Aggarwal, Assistant Electrical Inspector on 25th June, 1997. The report obtained from Professor M.L. Kothari of IIT, New Delhi, on 2nd July, 1997 analysed and attributed the cause of fire to malfunctioning of the DVB transformer.
13. The investigating agencies then looked into the fire safety deviations in the Uphaar Cinema building to determine whether the same had contributed to the fire and hindered the escape of those seated in the cinema auditorium and balcony from the poisonous carbon monoxide that had polluted the atmosphere inside the complex. Reports from Executive Engineers, MCD were also obtained in this regard. A Panchnama depicting floor-wise deviations in the Uphaar Cinema building and an Inspection-cum- Scrutiny report marked as Ex.PW 2/A indicating the structural deviations was also submitted by the MCD to the CBI on 11th August, 1997.
14. Similarly, the investigating agencies collected a fire report marked Ex. PW 49/E from the Delhi Fire Service regarding the rescue operations conducted by the fire service personnel on the date of the occurrence.
15. Post-mortem conducted on the dead body of Captain M.S. Bhinder, one of the unfortunate victims, revealed that the cause of death was asphyxiation. From the report of Dr. T.D. Dogra, Forensic Expert, obtained on 18th September, 1997, the investigating officers concluded that the rapid death of the victims could have been caused by inhalation of a combination of toxic gases including carbon monoxide and sulphur dioxide which were produced by combustion of articles like diesel, petrol, rubber and styrene.
16. Statements of a large number of witnesses relevant to the fire incident, its causes and effects were also recorded by the investigating agencies from time to time culminating in the filing of a common chargesheet against 16 persons accusing them of commission of several offences punishable both under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 as also under the provisions of the Cinematograph Act, 1952.
What is important is that while accused A-1, A-2, A-12, A-13 and A-14 were charged with commission of offences punishable under Sections 304A, 337, 338 read with Section 36, IPC and Section 14 of the Cinematograph Act, 1952, accused A-3 to A-8 comprising the management and gatekeeper of the Cinema were charged with commission of offences punishable under Sections 304, 337, 338 read with Section 36, IPC and Section 14 of the Cinematograph Act, 1952. The employees of DVB namely Inspectors B.M. Satija (A-9), A.K. Gera (A-10) and Senior Fitter, Bir Singh (A-11) were also charged with the commission of offences punishable under Sections 304, 337 and 338 read with Section 36 of the IPC . As regards the remaining three accused namely, N.D. Tiwari (A- 14), H.S. Panwar (A-15) and Surender Dutt (A-16), they were charged with commission of offences punishable under Sections 304A, 337, 338 read with Section 36 of IPC .
17. Since some of the offences with which the accused persons were charged were triable by the Court of Sessions, the case was committed for trial to Additional Sessions Judge, New Delhi, who framed specific charges against Sushil Ansal (A-1), Gopal Ansal (A-2) and the rest of the accused.
18. Sushil Ansal (A-1) and Gopal Ansal (A-2), who happen to be brothers, were charged with offences punishable under Sections 304A read with Section 36 and Sections 337 and 338 read with Section 36 IPC for their negligent acts of omission and commission of allowing installation of the DVB transformer, various structural and fire safety deviations in the building in violation of various Rules and not facilitating the escape of patrons which caused the death of 59 persons and simple and grievous injuries to 100 others in the fire incident mentioned above. They were also charged under Section 14 of the Cinematograph Act, 1952 for contravention of the provisions of the Delhi Cinematograph Rules, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as 'DCR, 1953') and Delhi Cinematograph Rules, 1981 (hereinafter referred to 'DCR, 1981').
19. Managers, R.M. Puri (A-3), since deceased, K.L. Malhotra (A-4) since deceased, R.K. Sharma (A-5) since deceased, N.S. Chopra (A-6), Ajit Choudhary (A-7), since deceased and Manmohan Uniyal (A-8), gatekeeper were also charged with commission of offences punishable under Section 304 read with Section 36 of IPC since, despite being present at the time of the fire incident, they failed to inform, alert and facilitate the escape of the patrons from the balcony during the fire while knowing fully well that their act was likely to cause death or such bodily injuries as was likely to cause death.
20. Similarly, B.M. Satija (A-9), A.K. Gera (A-10) and Bir Singh (A-11) were charged with commission of offences punishable under Section 304 read with Section 36 IPC in that they had not used the required crimping machine while repairing the DVB transformer after the first fire incident on 13th June, 1997 knowing fully well that this could and did cause the transformer to catch fire once again and result in the death or bodily injury as was likely to cause death of persons in the building.
21. The rest of the accused persons namely, S.N. Dandona (A-12) since deceased, S.S. Sharma (A-13), N.D. Tiwari (A-14), H.S. Panwar (A-15) and Surender Dutt (A-16) since deceased, were charged with offences punishable under Sections 304A, 337 and 338 IPC read with Section 36 IPC for causing the death of 59 persons and simple and grievous injuries to 100 others by their acts and omissions of negligently issuing No Objection Certificates to Uphaar Cinema without ensuring that the statutory requirements for fire safety and means of escape were adhered to.
22. All the accused persons pleaded not guilty to the charges framed against them and claimed a trial. Not only that, all of them filed writ petitions before the Delhi High Court against the order framing charges passed by the Trial Court which were dismissed by the High Court in terms of four separate orders passed by it. A Special Leave Petition filed against the order of dismissal of the writ petition by Sushil Ansal (A-1) was dismissed as withdrawn by an order of this Court dated 12th April, 2002. Evidence at the Trial:
23. At the trial the prosecution examined as many as 115 witnesses in support of its case apart from placing reliance upon nearly 893 documents marked in the course of the proceedings. The oral evidence adduced broadly comprised depositions of witnesses whom providence helped to escape alive from the cinema complex on the fateful day. These witnesses narrated the events inside the cinema hall and the confusion that prevailed after people started suffocating because of smoke entering from in front of the screen and through the AC ducts before the hall was eventually plunged into darkness, leaving the people inside trapped without any emergency lights or help coming from any quarter. Those in the balcony found that they could not escape since all the doors were locked. The depositions comprising Kanwaljeet Kaur (PW-1), Karan Kumar (PW-3), Rishi Arora (PW-7), Amit (PW- 8), Hans Raj (PW-11) and Satpal Singh (PW-12) gave graphic accounts of the situation that prevailed inside the cinema hall and the rescue operations after the Fire Brigade arrived to help them out.
24. The evidence also comprised the depositions of Neelam Krishnamoorthy (PW-4), Ajay Mehra (PW-5), Harish Dang (PW-6), Satish Khanna (PW-9), Kishan Kumar Kohli (PW-10), Raman Singh Sidhu (PW-13) and Surjit Singh (PW-66) relatives of some of the victims, who narrated their travails and proved the death certificates of those lost in the tragedy. Neelam Krishnamoorthy (PW-4) happens to be the unfortunate mother of two who were seated in the rightmost two seats in the front row of the balcony.
25. Some of the onlookers and others who helped in the rescue operations were also examined by the prosecution apart from the officers of the Delhi Fire Service. R.C. Sharma (PW-49) Chief Fire Officer, testified to the presence of smoke in the stairwell and the balcony and stated that he could not open the balcony door until he received help of two other officers. Depositions of B.L. Jindal (PW-15) and Ram Kumar Gupta (PW-17) who happened to be the Assistant Engineer and Junior Engineer respectively of the MCD were also recorded. A large number of 14 witnesses were examined to prove the structural deviations in the building upon an inspection conducted after the fire incident. An equally large number of 33 witnesses were examined to prove documents relied upon by the prosecution. Witnesses were also examined to prove the sanction orders issued by the competent authority to prosecute some of the accused who happened to be public servants. Evidence regarding the ownership, management and administration of the company which owned Uphaar Cinema, M/s Green Park Theaters Associated (P) Ltd. was also adduced.
26. Medical evidence led at the trial comprised the deposition of Dr. T.D. Dogra (PW-62) who proved the death certificates of 41 victims in which the cause of death was stated to be suffocation. In addition, Dr. S. Satyanarayan (PW-77) who conducted the post-mortem on the dead body of Captain M.S. Bhinder was also recorded. Officials from DVB and those connected with the investigation too were examined by the prosecution before closing its case. Findings of the Trial Court:
27. The Trial Court appraised the evidence led at the trial including the depositions of three defence witnesses, one each, examined by H.S. Panwar (A-15), Bir Singh (A-11) and A.K. Gera (A-10) and recorded findings and conclusions that may be summarized as under: (a) That Uphaar Cinema was owned by a company that was closely held by Sushil Ansal (A-1) and Gopal Ansal (A-2) and other members of their family and that several violations regarding the installation of a transformer and the seating arrangement in the balcony, structural deviations in the building were committed while Sushil Ansal (A-1) and Gopal Ansal (A-2) were either Directors or the Managing Directors of the said company.
Even after the alleged resignation of the Ansal brothers in the year 1988 they continued to be in control of the management of the cinema and the running of its day-to-day affairs, including exercising control over the Managers and other staff employed.
(1) In coming to that conclusion, the Trial Court relied upon both documentary and oral evidence adduced before it by the prosecution. The Trial Court found that application dated 2nd February, 1973 made to the erstwhile DESU for grant of electricity connection for Uphaar Cinema was signed by Sushil Ansal (A-1). So also letter dated 2nd February, 1973 by which the company had agreed to give DESU two rooms for their transformer and HT and LT panels at a nominal rent of Rs.11/- per year was signed by Sushil Ansal (A-1).
The fact that the original licence granted to Uphaar Cinema was granted in favour of M/s Green Park Theatres Associated (P) Ltd. (in short, "GPT") through Sushil Ansal (A-1) as the Managing Director at that time, as also the fact that Sushil Ansal (A-1) continued to be representative licensee for the cinema was also relied upon by the Trial Court in support of its conclusion that Sushil Ansal (A-1) exercised control and management over Uphaar Cinema at the relevant point of time. Reliance was also placed by the Trial Court upon letter dated 19th June, 1974 written on behalf of GPT by Sushil Ansal (A-1) whereby the Entertainment Officer was requested to permit the owner to lease out the top floor of Uphaar Cinema for office use and the ground floor for commercial establishments.
An affidavit dated 21st March, 1975 and letter dated 2nd April, 1979 filed in connection with renewal of the cinema license were also relied upon by the Trial Court to show that Sushil Ansal (A- 1) was not only the licensee of Uphaar Cinema, but also that he had held himself out in that capacity before the concerned authorities. Letter of authority authorizing V.K. Bedi, Architect, to deal, discuss, explain and make corrections in the building plan as well as to collect the sanction plan on his behalf as also reply to show-cause notice dated 11th May, 1981 issued by the Deputy Commissioner of Police (Licensing) [in short, "DCP (L)"] which too was sent by Sushil Ansal (A-1) as licensee for GPT were relied upon by the Trial Court to buttress its conclusion that Sushil Ansal (A-1) was the person exercising control over the affairs of the cinema and its Managing Director.
(2) The Trial Court noted that although Sushil Ansal (A-1) had resigned from the Directorship of the company on 17th October, 1988, he had continued to be the licensee of the cinema as is evident from an affidavit dated 3rd March, 1992 (Ex. PW50/B) addressed to DCP (L) seeking renewal of the license for the years 1992-93. In the said affidavit the Trial Court observed that Sushil Ansal (A-1) clearly mentioned that he continued to be the occupier of the licensed premises and the owner of the Cinematograph. Minutes of the meeting of the Board of Directors held on 24th December, 1994 were also noticed by the Trial Court to show that although Sushil Ansal (A-1) resigned from the Directorship of the company in 1988 he had continued to be involved in the affairs of the cinema, no matter in the capacity of a Special Invitee. Reliance was also placed by the Trial Court upon the inspection proformas of the Delhi Fire Service for the years 1995-1997 to show that Sushil Ansal (A-1) continued to be shown as licensee of Uphaar Cinema.
(3) The Trial Court placed reliance upon the financial authority and the control exercised by Sushil Ansal (A-1) in the affairs of the cinema hall. In this regard the Trial Court referred to a self-cheque (Ex.PW91/B) dated 26th June, 1995 for a sum of rupees fifty lakhs drawn by Sushil Ansal (A-1) from the accounts of GPT. Closer to the date of occurrence, the Board of Directors of the company had on 25th March, 1996 passed a resolution authorising Sushil Ansal (A-1) to operate the bank accounts of the company upto any amount. The Trial Court also relied upon other circumstances to support its conclusion that although Sushil Ansal (A-1) claims to have resigned from the Directorship of the company in the year 1988, he continued to be the heart and soul of the company and in complete management of the cinema affairs. Reliance was also placed upon Ex. PW103/XX3 by which Sushil Ansal (A-1) was appointed authorized signatory to operate the Current Accounts with various banks.
(4) The Trial Court similarly referred to and relied upon several pieces of documentary evidence in holding that Gopal Ansal (A-2) also exercised extensive control over the affairs of the cinema. The Court, in particular, relied upon the resolution of the Board of Directors passed on 15th July, 1972 (Ex.PW103/XX) according to which Gopal Ansal (A-2) was authorised to sign all documents, drawings and other connected papers regarding the submission of revised plans, applications for electricity connections concerning Uphaar Cinema, etc. Letter dated 24th May, 1978 (Ex. PW110/AA20), addressed by Gopal Ansal (A-2) as Director, GPT seeking permission to install an eight- seater box and reply dated 6th December, 1979 to the show-cause notice for removal of one hundred extra seats after withdrawal of the 1979 resolution which was signed by Gopal Ansal (A-2) as Director of GPT were also relied upon by the Trial Court. Similarly, letter dated 29th July, 1980 addressed to DCP(L) for the installation of fifteen additional seats in the balcony was found to have been written by Gopal Ansal (A-2) as Director, GPT. Reply to the show-cause notice dated 28th May, 1982 was similarly found to have been given by Gopal Ansal (A-2) as Director of GPT in which he tried to explain the reasons for the bolting of doors from the inside during exhibition of a film and gave assurance that the utmost precaution would be taken by the management in future. The Trial Court also relied upon the fact that the car parking contract was granted by Gopal Ansal (A-2) as Director of GPT in April, 1988.
(5) The Trial Court further relied upon the Minutes of the Meeting held on 25th March, 1996 of the Board of Directors of the company appointing Gopal Ansal (A-2) as authorised signatory upto any amount to operate the bank accounts. Cheques issued by Gopal Ansal (A-2) subsequent to the said authorisation in favour of the Chief Engineer (Water) and in favour of the Music Shop from the accounts of GPT which later was rechristened as Ansal Theaters & Clubotels (P) Ltd. were also relied upon by the Trial Court in support of its conclusion that Gopal Ansal (A-2), like his brother Sushil Ansal (A-1), even after resigning from the Directorship of the company, continued to exercise control over the affairs of the cinema complex. This was, according to the Trial Court, evident from the fact that Gopal Ansal (A-2) was appointed authorised signatory to operate the current accounts, as was the case for Sushil Ansal (A-1) also.
(6) Last but not the least, the Trial Court relied upon the Minutes of the Meeting dated 27th February, 1997 (Ex. PW98/X4) in which Gopal Ansal (A-2), described as "MD" of the company, is said to have desired that not even a nail be put in the cinema premises without his prior permission. Similarly, in the Minutes of the MD Conferences dated 2nd April, 1997 and 1st May, 1997, Gopal Ansal (A-2), described as "MD in Chair", issued instructions in this capacity regarding a large number of business decisions and day-to-day affairs of the company. The Trial Court held that Gopal Ansal (A-2) was proved to be MD in Chair by letters marked (Ex. PW98/X-2) and (Ex. PW98/X-3). He was also shown to be "MD in Chair" for the MD Conference held on 7th May, 1997 in terms of letter dated 9th May, 1997 marked Ex. PW98/X-C.
(b) That a 750 KVA DVB transformer was installed in the cinema premises in complete violation of the Electricity Rules and in breach of the sanctioned plan for the building.
(1) The Trial Court found that the sanctioned plan marked Ex. PW15 Y/3 provided for three adjacent rooms on the ground floor each measuring 20x10 feet to be used for installation of a transformer. The first of these three rooms was to be used for HT cables that would bring high voltage current from the AIIMS Grid Station. The second room was to be used for installing the transformer that would step down the high density current and transmit the same to the third room which was meant for LT cables from where the current would then be supplied to the cinema building.
(2) Relying upon the report submitted by Mr. K.L. Grover (PW-24), the Electrical Inspector, the Trial Court concluded that it was essential for the management of the cinema to obtain permission from the Licensing Department as also from the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (in short, "MCD") prior to the installation of the said transformer. Instead of doing so, the internal positioning of the walls of the transformer area comprising the three rooms mentioned above was changed without so much as notifying the MCD about the said change or obtaining its sanction for the same. Reliance was, in this regard, placed by the Trial Court upon the depositions of R.N. Gupta, Executive Engineer, MCD (PW-2) and Shri K.L. Grover, Electrical Inspector (PW-24).
(3) The Trial Court also looked into the Rules regarding installation of transformers in the Bureau of Indian Standard: 10028 (Part II) - 1981 and the Building Bye Laws, 1983 to hold that the installation of the transformer in question did not adhere to the following three distinct requirements under the rules:
(i) The two transformers namely one installed by the management of the company owning the cinema and the other installed by the DVB were not separated by a fire resistant wall as required in Para 3.6.2, IS: 10028 (Part II) - 1981.
(ii) The transformers did not have oil soak pits necessary for soaking the entire oil content in the transformers as required in Paras 3.6.3 and 3.6.4, IS: 10028 (Part II) - 1981.
(iii) The rooms where the transformers were kept did not have proper ventilation and free movement of air on all four sides of the transformers, nor were adequately sized air inlets and outlets provided to ensure efficient cooling of the transformers as required in Paras 7.3.1.1 and 7.3.1.4, IS: 10028 (Part II) - 1981.
(4) Having said so, the Trial Court rejected the contention urged on behalf of the Ansal brothers (A-1 and A-2) that they were coerced into providing space for the DVB transformer by the DVB authorities. The Court found that correspondence exchanged between GPT and the DVB authorities did not suggest that the Ansals were forced to provide space for the DVB transformer as contended by them.
(c) That the condition of the DVB transformer was wholly unsatisfactory and that the fire had started on account of the sparking of the loose connection of the cable and socket of the bar of the said transformer.
(1) Relying upon the depositions of K.L. Grover, the Electrical Inspector (PW-24), T.P. Sharma, CBRI Expert (PW-25), K.V. Singh, Executive Engineer (Electrical), PWD (PW-35), Professor M.L. Kothari from IIT (PW-36) and Dr. Rajinder Singh, Sr. Scientific Officer, CFSL, (PW-64), as well as their respective inspection reports, marked Ex. PW24/A, Ex. PW25/A, Ex. PW35/A, Ex. PW36/A and Ex. PW64/B, the Court held that the condition of the DVB transformer was wholly unsatisfactory on account of the following:
i) The transformer did not have any protection system as required by the Electricity Act.
ii) The terminals on the LT side were not enclosed in a box, unlike in the case of the Uphaar transformer.
iii) The LT side cables from the bus bar lacked any kind of clamping system or support for the cables.
iv) There was no relay system connected to the HT Panel board of the DVB transformer which could have tripped in case of any fault.
v) The check nut of the neutral terminal was found to be loose.
vi) There were earth strips lying in the transformer room but these were not properly joined.
vii) The connection between earth and neutral was also broken.
viii) The LT Panel's outgoing switches did not have fuses.
ix) No HRC (High Rupture Capacity) fuses were found and use of wires, in lieu of it was not proper.
x) All the four oil circuit breakers were completely unprotected against earth faults and over current.
xi) The potential transformer was found to be in the disconnected condition of the OCB operation mechanism. Its battery and charger were also found to be defective and heavily damaged in the fire.
(2) The Court further held that fire in the DVB transformer had resulted on account of the sparking by the loose connection of the cable end socket of the bus bar of the DVB transformer. The cable end socket of the B-phase bus bar was unsatisfactorily repaired since it was fixed by hammering and not by using a crimping machine. The LT cable got disconnected from the cables on the B-phase and made a hole in the radiator fin when the live conductor of the disconnected cable fell upon it. Transformer oil gushed out of the opening on to the floor, while continued short circuiting of the cable with the radiator fin in the absence of a protection relay system caused sparking, which in turn resulted in the oil from the transformer catching fire. The sparking would have continued for a significant amount of time since there was no immediate tripping system available in the HT panel. Tripping was ultimately found to have taken place at the 33 KV sub- station at AIIMS. The main switch from the generator which was going to the AC blower was found to be fused. The fuses were found to be inside the body of the switch. The condition of dust covered fuses suggested that they had been out of use for a long time.
(d) That the parking of extra cars and the parking of cars close to the transformer in what was meant to be a 16 ft. wide passage for free movement of the vehicles aggravated the situation and contributed to the incident. The Trial Court found that apart from petrol and diesel cars, CNG gas cylinders and upholstery comprising combustible material emitted smoke when burnt containing carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide and other hydrocarbons which resulted in suffocation of those inside the balcony of the cinema.
(1) The Trial Court held that the management of the cinema had disregarded the requirements of law and the sanctioned plan, thereby putting the lives of the patrons at risk. The Court found that there was nothing on record to show that the Ansal brothers (A-1 and A-2) or the Managers of the cinema for that matter had impressed upon the contractor appointed by them the legal and safety requirements of maintaining a safe distance between vehicles and the transformer room when they entered into a parking contract in the year 1988. This, according to the Court, was gross negligence that contributed to the death of a large number of patrons and injuries to many more. The Trial Court in support of that conclusion relied primarily upon the following pieces of evidence:
i) The sanctioned plan for the ground/stilt floor of the Uphaar Cinema building as also the report of R.N. Gupta, Executive Engineer, MCD (PW-2), according to which the provision for parking of fifteen cars was made on the said floor. The plan also earmarked a 16 feet wide passage to be maintained alongside the transformer rooms for the easy maneuvering of vehicles.
(ii) The deposition of R.K. Sethi (PW-56), the parking contractor, proved that cars were parked at a distance of no more than 3-4 feet from the transformer room. On the fateful day parking tokens had been issued for 18 cars for the matinee show, apart from 8-10 office cars that were parked in the parking lot.
(iii) The deposition of K.V. Singh, Executive Engineer (Electrical), PWD (PW-35) and the report marked Ex.PW35/A which proved that the fire situation had been aggravated due to the presence of petrol and diesel in the fuel tanks of the vehicles parked in front of the transformer rooms.
(iv) Local Inspection Note of the place of incident prepared by the Trial Court which supported the conclusion that cars had been parked in close proximity to the transformer room and that the same were burnt in the incident.
(2) Absence of proper care on the part of the management in ensuring that only the permissible number of vehicles were parked in the parking area and that a 16 ft. wide passage remained free from any obstruction were held by the Trial Court to be acts of gross negligence on the part of the management, endangering the lives of the patrons visiting the cinema and contributing to the magnitude of the hazardous gases that eventually led to the death of a large number of innocent victims.
(e) That there were several structural deviations in the cinema building apart from a rear wall behind the HT/LT room that was found to be constructed up to a height of 12 feet even though it was sanctioned only up to a height of 3 feet.
(1) Relying upon the deposition of B.S. Randhawa, ASW, PWD (PW-29) and Ex. PW29/A, the panchnama/report of floor-wise deviations prepared by him along with Dalip Singh, Executive Engineer, PWD and Prithvi Singh, DSP, the Court held that the construction of the rear wall beyond 3 feet had affected the ventilation in the area and obstructed the dispersal of smoke in the atmosphere. The Court rejected the contention that PW-29 had been tutored since he had made no mention of the obstruction of smoke in the report, Ex. PW29/A. The Court found that his testimony had been corroborated by the sanctioned plan Ex. PW15/Y-3, which too only allowed a wall upto a height of 3 feet.
(2) Similarly, the Court found certain other structural deviations in the cinema building some of which contributed to the fire, smoke and obstruction of escape claiming human lives by asphyxia. The Court in this regard placed reliance upon Ex. PW17/D, the report prepared by R.K. Gupta, Junior Engineer, MCD (PW-17) and the deposition of R.S. Sharma (PW-18) and Vinod Sharma (PW-20). The Court also placed reliance upon Ex. PW2/A which happened to be the inspection-cum- scrutiny report dated 2nd August, 1997 submitted by the MCD Engineers depicting floor-wise deviations and deposition of R.N. Gupta, Executive Engineer, MCD (PW-2) in that regard. Reliance was also placed upon the depositions of R.K. Bhattacharaya (PW-39) and the inspection note prepared by the Trial Court based on its inspection on the spot as per the direction of the High Court. Based on the said evidence the Trial Court enumerated the following structural deviations in the Uphaar Cinema building: Basement
(i) A 12' X 20' room was constructed adjoining the staircase.
(ii) A 26' X 20' room was constructed adjoining the blower room.
(iii) A wooden store with wooden partitions was being used. (iv) One 40' long and one 20' long brick wall were constructed and old seats were found partially filling the space between them. Ground Floor/Stilt Floor
i) A 20' X 9' Homeopathy Dispensary was constructed above the ramp, behind the transformer room.
ii) Behind the HT, LT and transformer rooms, the outer wall was built up from a height of 3' to the height of the first floor. iii) Though externally unchanged, the partitions between the HT, LT and transformer rooms were shifted to alter the rooms' internal sizes.
iv) A 14' X 7' room adjoining the HT room was being used as a ticket counter.
v) A 20' X 20' ticket foyer was converted into Syndicate Bank. Sanjay Press Office was found in place of the restaurant on the front side.
vi) A mezzanine floor was constructed using R.S. Joists of timber, at a height of 8' above the stilt floor, to be used as offices. This was completely burnt in the fire.
vii) A small construction was made using RCC slabs on the mid landing of the staircase at a height of 8' above the stilt floor to be used as offices.
viii) M/s Sehgal Carpets was occupying a partition of the staircase leading to the basement around the lift well. Foyer/First Floor
(i) A refreshment counter was found constructed between the expansion joint and the staircase.
(ii) A second refreshment counter was constructed near the rear exit gate, 10'9'' away from the auditorium exit gate. Mezzanine Floor/Balcony
(i) A refreshment counter covering 21' X 9' was found between the doors of the toilet and the staircase.
(ii) An office room was constructed in place of the sweeper room and adjoining toilets.
(iii) The operator room was converted into an office-cum-bar room.
(iv) A door of full width on the right side of the staircase landing between the Projection Room floor and the loft floor was found to be obstructing the path to the terrace.
(v) Sarin Associates' reception counter was found in the staircase leading to the terrace, thereby obstructing the passage way. Top Floor
i) A large hall at the loft level was converted into office cabins with wooden partitions and the same appeared to be occupied by Sarin Associates, Supreme Builders, Supreme Promoters, Supreme Marketing (P) Ltd. And Vikky Arin Impex (P) Ltd.
ii) The staircase above the loft level was converted into an office.
(f) That, apart from structural deviations referred to above, the seating arrangement within the balcony area of the cinema was itself in breach of the mandatory requirements of the DCR, 1953 and DCR, 1981.
(1) Relying upon the Completion Certificate Ex. PW17/DA, dated 10th April, 1973, the Trial Court held that the number of seats originally sanctioned for the balcony was limited to 250 seats (two hundred and fifty seats). The Court also noticed that the first seating plan Ex. PW95/B1 was in conformity with the DCR, 1953 and provided a total of three exits, one each on the two sides of the balcony and the third in the middle. Gangways leading to these exits were also found to be in conformity with the statutory requirements which prescribed a width of 44 inches for the same. In the year 1974, however, Sushil Ansal (A-1) made a request for installation of 14 seats in what was originally sanctioned by the MCD to be an Inspection Room, pursuant whereto the Inspection Room was converted into a 14-seater box with the permission of the licensing authority. Two years later, a development of some significance took place inasmuch as by a Notification dated 30th September, 1976 issued by the Lt. Governor of Delhi, Uphaar Cinema permitted addition of 100 more seats to its existing capacity. Forty three of the said additional seats were meant to be provided in the balcony by using the vertical gangways to the right of the middle entry/exit of the cinema in the right wing of the balcony. The remaining 57 seats were meant for addition in the main auditorium of the cinema hall. The addition of these seats was approved on 30th September, 1976 as per the seating plan marked Ex. PW95/B-2.
(2) As per the above seating plan the vertical gangway along the rightmost wall of the balcony was completely utilized and blocked because of the installation of the additional seats whereas the width of the gangway along the right side of the middle entry/exit was reduced to 22.5 inches, the remainder of the space having been utilized for fixing 32 additional seats in that area. The addition of 11 more seats to the row along the back of the balcony (1 on the right, 8 in the middle and 2 on the left side) made up for the remainder of the 43 additional seats permitted under the Notification. The Trial Court found that in order to compensate for the blocking and narrowing of the gangways in the right wing, the seating plan provided for a 44 inch wide vertical gangway along the middle of the right wing of the balcony. Inevitably, the altered seating arrangement made it relatively more difficult for those occupying the right wing of the balcony to reach the exit.
(g) That an eight-seater family box was added in the year 1978 upon an application moved by Gopal Ansal (A-2), which had the effect of completely closing the right side exit, access to which already stood compromised on account of the additional seats.
(1) The above addition was made pursuant to a report given by S.N. Dandona (A-12), since deceased, who at the relevant time was posted as Executive Engineer, PWD and who appears to have inspected the site on 27th June, 1978 on a reference made to him by the Entertainment Tax Officer. What is significant is that the Entertainment Tax Officer had by his letter dated 2nd September, 1978 asked S.N. Dandona (A-12) to confirm his report pursuant to the inspection conducted by him, drawing his attention to Clause 6 of the First Schedule of DCR, 1953, which required that the total number of spectators accommodated in the building shall not exceed 20 per 100 sq. ft. of the area available for sitting and standing, or 20 per 133.5 sq. ft. of the overall area of the floor space in the auditorium. Mr. Dandona (A-12) replied in terms of his letter dated 20th September, 1978 Ex. PW29/DN, that the installation of the eight-seater box was in accordance with the prevalent DCR, 1953.
(2) The Trial Court found fault with the installation of the eight- seater box and held that even though permission for installation of the box had been granted to the Ansals (A-1 and A-2), the same continued to be in clear violation of Para 10(4) of the First Schedule to DCR, 1953 which in no uncertain terms stipulated that exits from the auditorium shall be placed suitably along both sides and along the back thereof.
(h) That to compensate for blocking of the exit on the right of the eight- seater box, an exit was provided along the back on the left side. This addition of an exit on the left side of the balcony did not satisfy the stipulation under Para 10(4) of the First Schedule of DCR, 1953.
(1) The object underlying para 10(4) of the First Schedule of DCR, 1953, observed the Trial Court, was to ensure rapid dispersal in both directions through independent stairways leading outside the building. This necessarily meant that addition of the left side exit did not amount to substantial compliance with the DCR, 1953, declared the Court.
(i) That addition of seats and closure of the right side gangway were in violation of the statutory provisions and severely compromised the need for quick dispersal in the event of an emergency.
(1) A further development and another dimension to the seating arrangement in the balcony came in the form of a Notification dated 27th July, 1979, from the Lt. Governor whereunder the relaxation in the number of seats provided to Uphaar Cinema under the 1976 Notification was withdrawn. The withdrawal, it appears, came as a consequence of a judgment delivered by the High Court of Delhi in a writ petition filed by the cinema owners challenging the State's power to fix the price of admission tickets to the theatre. The power to fix admission rates to the cinema having thus been taken away, the Lt. Governor appears to have withdrawn the relaxation in the number of additional seats allowed to the cinema owners under the 1976 Notification. This withdrawal was not acceptable to the Ansals (A-1 and A-2) along with others who challenged the same before the High Court of Delhi and obtained interim directions in their favour. The High Court directed that such of the additional seats as comply substantially with the requirements of the Rules may be allowed to stay while others which infringed the Rules may have to be removed. A show-cause notice was accordingly issued to Uphaar Cinema asking it to remove all the 100 additional seats, which according to the licensing authority were non-compliant with the requirement of the relevant Rules. Gopal Ansal (A-2) opposed the removal of these seats in the reply filed by him as Director of GPT Pvt. Ltd. stating that all the additional seats installed by them were compliant with the Cinematograph Rules and requested the authorities to apply their minds to the direction of the High Court regarding substantial compliance with the Rules.
(2) A fresh process of inspection of the Cinema was therefore started, pursuant to the direction of the High Court and the show- cause notice. This inspection was conducted by Mr. Amod Kanth, DCP (L), S.N. Dandona, Executive Engineer, MCD (A-12) and the Chief Fire Officer and Executive Engineer, all of whom had submitted a joint report Ex.PW29/DR. The report, inter alia, stated that 37 of the 43 additional seats in the balcony were substantially compliant with the Rules while 6 additional seats on the right side of the balcony were in gross contravention of Paras 7(1) and 8(1) of the First Schedule to DCR, 1953 as they were blocking vertical gangways and causing obstruction to free egress of patrons from the balcony. The said 6 seats were, therefore, required to be removed and the original number of vertical gangways restored. The result was that 37 additional seats were allowed out of 43 to stay in the balcony in terms of order dated 24th December, 1979 marked Ex. PW29/DR passed by Mr. Amod Kanth, DCP (L).
(3) In his letter dated 29th July, 1980, Gopal Ansal (A-2), Director of GPT wrote a letter Ex. PW110/AA7 to the DCP(L) for installation of 15 additional seats in the balcony. Pursuant to the said letter, the DCP (L) wrote a letter dated 20th August, 1980 (Ex. PW29/DS) to the Executive Engineer, requesting him to verify whether the proposed installation of 15 seats would be compliant with the relevant provisions of the DCR, 1953 and to submit a detailed report regarding the same.
In his reply dated 3rd September, 1980, Executive Engineer, S.N. Dandona (A-12) stated that the proposed installation of seats was not in accordance with the scheme of the DCR, 1953. Gopal Ansal (A-2), therefore, submitted a revised plan for the proposed additional seats vide letter dated 5th September, 1980 (Ex. PW29/DV). In his report Ex. PW29/DX dated 10th September, 1980 S.N. Dandona (A-12) stated that the additional 15 seats would be in conformity with DCR, 1953, but raised a concern that the installation of the 15 additional seats would bring the total number of seats in the balcony to 302 while the total number of exits would remain 3 in number.
As per the First Schedule of the DCR, 1953, the number of exits should be 1 per 100 seats. This would imply that 2 additional seats in the balcony would be in excess, unless a fourth exit was to be provided. Having said that, S.N. Dandona (A-12) excused this excess on the grounds that it was decided in a meeting held in October, 1979 in which the DCP(L) and Chief Fire Officer were present that, keeping in view the High Court's orders for substantial compliance, an excess of 1% in the number of seats over the required number of exits should be allowed. Pursuant to S.N. Dandona's report, the DCP(L), Amod Kanth allowed the installation of the 15 additional seats in the balcony on 4th October, 1980. The result was that 15 additional seats were installed as per the seating plan marked Ex. PW95/B4. The Trial Court further found that DCP(L), Amod Kanth, S.N. Dandona (A-12), Chief Fire Officer and Executive Engineer were equally responsible for not noticing the closure of the right side exit.
(4) The Trial Court found that the addition of seats as also closure of the right side exit because of installation of the family box in that area, in the process blocking one vertical gangway, narrowing of another and partial blocking of the third (new) exit on the left side of the balcony were all in violation of the statutory provisions and severely compromised the safety of the patrons visiting the cinema. The Trial Court also held that because of the alterations in the seating plan on account of the addition of seats and blocking of the right side exit, rapid dispersal of the patrons in the event of an emergency was seriously jeopardized, which amounted to gross negligence on the part of the owners and management of Uphaar Cinema, as well as those who were responsible for sanctioning the changes.
(5) The Trial Court, in fact, went a step further and ordered further investigation of the offence under Section 173(8) of the CrPC vis-a-vis the persons left out by the CBI, particularly the DCP(L), Amod Kanth against whom the Association of Victims of Uphaar Tragedy had filed an application under Section 319 of the CrPC . The Trial Court held that the balcony seating plans showed that the authorities responsible for the enforcement of the Rules as well as their subordinates who were to carry out inspections were in connivance with the proprietors of the cinema, Sushil and Gopal Ansal (A-1 and A-2) who acted in connivance with each other with a view to making an unlawful gain at the cost of the public.
(j) That the owners of Uphaar Cinema who carried out the structural deviations, the officers of the MCD who granted 'No Objection' certificates for running the cinema hall for the years 1995-96 and 1996-97 respectively despite the structural deviations existing in the cinema building and the managers of Uphaar Cinema who turned a blind eye to the said deviations and the threat to public safety caused by them, were the direct cause of death of 59 persons and 100 injured in the cinema hall. The act of the gatekeeper in fleeing from the cinema hall without unbolting the door of balcony was also found to be a direct cause of the death of persons inside the balcony.
(1) As regards the unfolding of events in the balcony after the smoke began to spread inside, the Trial Court relied upon the depositions of patrons seated in the balcony, PWs 1, 3, 7, 8, 11 & 12 who were fortunate to survive the ordeal, but all of whom had lost in the tragedy some of their relatives who accompanied them to the movie. The Trial Court also relied upon the depositions of relatives of deceased patrons from the balcony, examined as PWs 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 13 & 66, who were not among those in the cinema hall themselves but who had rushed to the scene upon learning about the disaster. The deposition of the complainant Security Guard, Sudhir Kumar (PW63) who first noticed the fire and helped in rescue operations was also relied upon. Relying upon the above evidence, the Trial Court arrived at the following conclusions:
i) Since the patrons were trapped inside the balcony which was engulfed by the smoke, those who succumbed died due to inhalation of smoke.
ii) The patrons seated in the balcony were unable to save themselves in time since there were no proper means of escape.
iii) Though four exits were statutorily required in the balcony, only three were provided. iv) As previously held, the alterations made to the balcony by the owners of Uphaar Cinema in contravention of legal provisions became a hindrance to egress into the open air for patrons in the balcony, as a result of which the said patrons could not save themselves in time.
v) Three exit doors were bolted. After becoming aware of the fire in the building, the gatekeeper, Manmohan Uniyal (A-8) fled the scene without unbolting the exit doors.
vi) Since the doors had been bolted, one of the doors had to be pushed open by the trapped patrons in order to come out into open space. This endeavour took 10-15 minutes, which resulted in a sufficient amount of exposure to the toxic gases to cause the death of the persons inhaling the same.
vii) Moreover, since descending the staircase would only take the patrons into denser smoke, people attempted to climb upwards towards the terrace. However, their path was obstructed due to the unauthorised construction of the commercial office of M/s Sareen Associates on the landing of the staircase on the top floor, which created a bottleneck and facilitated in causing the death of more patrons. Moreover, one of the structural deviations previously noted by the Trial Court was the presence of a full width door on the right side of the stair case landing on the top floor, which created an obstruction for going to the terrace.
viii) It is revealed from the inspection reports that the four exhaust fans which were to face an open space instead opened out into the staircase.
ix) As previously held, the existing structural deviations in the building obstructed the egress of patrons into open spaces and thereby directly contributed to their deaths. These blatant structural deviations were never objected to by the MCD, a government body which is responsible for ensuring compliance with building plans.
x) The eye-witnesses have unanimously deposed that once they realized that smoke was entering the hall and a hue and cry was raised, no one from the management of the cinema theatre was there to help them escape. Instead, the managers fled the scene without thought for the patrons.
xi) There were no fire alarms or emergency lighting, nor was any public announcement made to warn the patrons of the fire.
xii) As per the deposition of the Projector Operator, Madhukar Bagde (PW85), an announcement system was present in the Projector Room but the same was out of order. He deposed that he had previously informed K.L. Malhotra (A-4), since deceased, to have the same rectified. This fact was also verified in the report of PW64, Dr. Rajinder Singh.
xiii) The managers being directly responsible for the daily functioning of the cinema failed in their duty to ensure the safety of the patrons seated inside. They grossly neglected their duties to take measures to prevent fires and follow fire safety regulations, which caused the death of patrons trapped inside.
xiv) It is writ large that the failure of the owners and management of Uphaar Cinema to adhere to provisions relating to fire safety caused the death/injury of those who had gone to view the film in the cinema.
xv) The factors which constituted the direct and proximate cause of death of 59 persons and injury of 100 persons in Uphaar cinema were the installation of the DVB transformer in violation of law, faulty repair of the DVB transformer, presence of combustible material in the cinema building, parking of cars near the transformer room, alterations in the balcony obstructing egress, structural deviations resulting in closure of escape routes in the building at the time of the incident, bolting of the exit doors from outside and the absence of fire fighting measures and two trained firemen, during the exhibition of the film in the cinema building.
(k) That the cause of death of the 59 victims was asphyxia caused by prolonged inhalation of smoke consisting of carbon monoxide and other toxic gases.
(1) On the basis of the result of the post-mortem examination on the dead body of Captain M.S. Bhinder, the Trial Court held that all the victims died on account of the very same cause as was found to be responsible for the demise of Captain Bhinder. Reliance was also placed by the Trial Court upon the reports submitted by a Board of Medical Experts from AIIMS which proposed that the death of 59 victims of asphyxia was caused due to inhalation of smoke consisting of carbon monoxide and other toxic gases. On the basis of the expert opinion, the Court concluded that the cause of death of the persons sitting in the balcony was due to inhalation of smoke. The Court noted that the effect of gases is rapid as the fatal period for carbon monoxide with 10% concentration is within 20-30 minutes while the fatal period of hydrocyanic acid is 2-20 minutes. The combustion of materials released such toxic compounds, which in turn caused rapid death of the victims. The Court also held that immediate well-organized intensive rescue operations could have saved many lives.
28. In conclusion and on the basis of the findings recorded by it, the Trial Court convicted Sushil Ansal (A-1) and Gopal Ansal (A-2) for commission of the offences punishable under Sections 304A, 337 and 338 read with Section 36 of IPC and sentenced each one of them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years with a fine of Rs.5,000/- and a default sentence of six months. They were also convicted under Section 14 of the Cinematograph Act, 1952 and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- or undergo two months imprisonment in default. All the sentences were directed to run concurrently. The Trial Court further convicted S.S. Sharma (A-13) and N.D. Tiwari (A-14) who were officials of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi apart from H.S. Panwar (A-15), Divisional Officer, Delhi Fire Service under the above provisions and sentenced them similarly to undergo two years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.5,000/- besides default sentence of six months imprisonment. In ad
