Sheo Nandan Paswan Vs. State of Bihar & Ors [1986] INSC 284 (20 December 1986)
1986 Latest Caselaw 284 SC

Sheo Nandan Paswan Vs. State of Bihar & Ors [1986] INSC 284 (20 December 1986)

BHAGWATI, P.N. (CJ) BHAGWATI, P.N. (CJ) VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) KHALID, V. (J) OZA, G.L. (J) NATRAJAN, S. (J)

CITATION: 1987 AIR 877 1987 SCR (1) 702 1987 SCC (1) 288 JT 1986 1132 1986 SCALE (2)1099

CITATOR INFO:

R 1987 SC 863 (31) R 1988 SC1531 (191) RF 1992 SC 248 (44) RF 1992 SC 604 (114,140)

ACT:

Review of judgments or orders by the Supreme Court--Constitution of India, 1950, Article-137 read with Rule 1 of order XL of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966--Nature of the power of Review by the Supreme Court--Whether the Supreme Court could interfere with the granting consent orders for "Nolles Prosequi" against the accused, when the orders of the Special Judge, of the High Court in Revision, and of the majority of the Judges of the Supreme Court in an appeal by special leave, were in favour of the accused.

Review order is to the effect "the review petition should be admitted and the appeal should be reheard immediately after the decision of Nandini Satpathi's case Crl.

Appeals 48 and 49 referred to a Constitution Bench"--Meaning and consequence of the order admitting the Review Petition--Whether the judgment sought to be reviewed was set aside or not.

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, section 321--Withdrawal from the Prosecution--Scope and construction of the provisions of the section as to the power of the Public Prosecutor to withdraw and the power to grant consent to such withdrawal by the Magistrate--Whether on the face of the record, there was any error apparent--Whether the principle of administrative law be invoked for construing the section.

Locus standi of a complainant in a criminal proceedings to file a revision before the High Court and an appeal by special leave before the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution, against an order granting consent to withdraw the criminal case.

"Discharge" of an accused, consequent to the consent passed by the Magistrate under section 321 and "Discharge" of an accused made under section 227 or 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure .

HEADNOTE:

Under Article 137 of the Constitution of India The Supreme Court shall have power to review any judgment pronounced or order 703 made by it, subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or any rules made under Article 145. The Supreme Court, in exercise of the powers conferred by Article 145 of the Constitution and all other powers enabling it and with the approval of the President made the "Supreme Court'Rules 1966". Under Rule I of Order XL thereof, the "Court may review its judgment or order but no application for review will he entertained ...... in a criminal proceeding except on the ground of an error apparent on the face of the record." Patna Urban Cooperative Banks was registered in May 1970 and it commenced its banking business with Nawal Kishore Sinha as its Chairman, K.P. Gupta as its Honorary Secretary, M.A. Hydary as Manager and A.K. Singh as loan clerk. Dr.

Jagannath Misra who was then a Member of the Legislative Council was closely associated with Nawal Kishore Sinha and helped the Cooperative Bank and Nawal Kishore Sinha in diverse ways in connection with the affairs of the Bank and assisted in mobilisation of the resources for the Bank.

There were some irregularities in the affairs of the Bank.

The then Chief Minister Shri Abdul Ghafoor ordered the prosecution of the officers and staff of the Bank including its Honorary Secretary Shri K.P. Gupta, Manager, M.A. Haidary and the loan clerk. However, this was not done. On 11.4.1975 Shri Abdul Ghafoor was replaced by Dr. Jagannath Misra as Chief Minister. On May 16, 1975 he passed an order that only stern action should he taken for realisation of loans since on the perusal of the file it appeared there was no allegation of defalcation against the Chairman and members of the Board. This date is alleged to have been later changed to May 14, 1975 by a fresh order. As per the revised order directions for restoration of normalcy and holding of Annual General Meeting "of the bank was made. On 15.4.1976 the Reserve Bank cancelled the banking licence issued to the Bank and a liquidator was appointed. Consequent to the report of the Estimates Committee and the debate in the Assembly, Dr. Jagannath Misra directed, on 4.8.76 the prosecution against those involved in the defalcation. Thus 23 criminal cases were filed against the office bearers and loanees but Nawal Kishore Sinha was excluded from being arraigned as an accused. In June 1977 there was a change of Ministry at the Centre. In June 1977 the Government headed by Dr. Jagannath Misra was replaced by the Government headed by Sri Karpoori Thakur.

As a sequel to the memorandums submitted by the Patna Secretariat Non-gazetted Employees' Association to the now Chief Minister on 9.7.1977 requesting him to enquire into allegations against Dr. Jagannath Misra, after a detailed procedure and obtaining requisite 704 sanction of the Governor, a criminal case was instituted by the vigilance Department against Dr. Jagannath Misra and others.

The charge sheet filed by the State of Bihar against the respondents on 19th February, 1979, was for offences under sections 420/466/ 471/109/120-B of Indian Penal Code and under Sections 5(1) (a), S(a) (b) & 5(1) (d) read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The charge against Dr. Jagannath Misra was that he, who at all material times, was either a Minister or the Chief Minister of Bihar abusing his position as a Public servant, in conspiracy with the other accused, sought to interfere with the criminal prosecution and surcharge proceedings against Nawai Kishore Sinha and others with a view to obtain to himself and to the other respondents pecuniary advantage to the detriment of Patna Urban Cooperative Bank. The Chief Judicial Magistrate took cognizance of the case on 29.7.1979.

There was a change of ministry in Bihar in June 1980 and the second respondent became the Chief Minister again. A policy decision was taken on 10.6.1980, that criminal cases launched out of political vendetta and cases relating to political agitation be withdrawn. On 24.2.1981 the Government appointed Shri L.P. Sinha as a Special Public prosecutor. On 25.2.1981, the secretary to the Government of Bihar wrote a letter to the District Magistrate informing him of the policy decision taken by the Government, to withdraw from prosecution of two vigilance cases including the case with which the Court is concerned. He was requested to take steps for the withdrawal of the case. On I7th June, 1981, Shri Sinha made an application under s.32I of the Cr.P.C. to the Special Judge seeking permission to withdraw from the prosecution of respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 on four grounds; (a) Lack of prospect of successful prosecution in the light of the evidence, (b) Implication of the persons as a result of political and personal vendetta; (c) Inexpediency of the prosecution for the reasons of the State and public policy and (d) Adverse effects that the continuance of the prosecution will bring on public interest in the light of the changed situation. The learned Special Judge gave consent sought, by his order dated 20th June, 1981. The appellant, thereupon, filed a criminal Revision Application No. 874/81 against the order permitting withdrawal of the prosecution.

The said application was dismissed in limine by the High Court by an order dated 14.9.1981. The appellant therefore preferred Crl. Appeal No. 241/82 by special leave to this Court. In two well reasoned concurring judgments, Baharul Islam J and R.B. Misra J. dismissed the appeal by their judgments dated December 16, 1982 and by an equally reasoned judgment, Tulzapurkar J. dissented from the 705 main judgement and allowed the appeal. (See Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar & 0rs.,[(1983) 2 SCR 61] Baharul Islam J. demited office on 13.1. 1983. An application was filed on 17.1. 1983 to review the judgment under Article 137 of the Constitution read with Order XI of the Supreme Court Rules. On 22.8.1983, the matter was heard in open court by a Bench consisting of Tulzapurkar J., A.N. Sen J. and R.B. Misra J, and A.N. Sen J. passed an order admitting the Review Petition without disclosing any reason therefor and directed the rehearing of the petition immediately after the decision in Mohd. Mumtaz v. Smt. Nandini Satpathy [1983] 4 SCC 104, which was referred already to a Constitutional Bench of five Judges. Hence the rehearing of the case to review the two concurrent judgments.

Dismissing the appeal, in accordance with the opinion of the majority, the Court, (Per Venkataramiah J.) (Majority view) Held: 1.1 Merely because a court discharges or acquits an accused arraigned before it, the court cannot be considered to have compromised with the crime. True, corruption, particularly at high places should be put down with a heavy hand. But, the passion to do so should not overtake reason.

The Court always acts on the material before it and if it finds that the material is not sufficient to connect the accused with the crime, it has to discharge or acquit him, as the case may be, notwithstanding the fact that the crime complained of is a grave one. Similarly if the case has been withdrawn by the Public Prosecutor for good reason with the consent of the Court, Supreme Court should be slow to interfere with the order of withdrawal. In either case, where the Special Judge had rejected the application for withdrawal and the High Court had affirmed that order, and where the special judge had permitted the withdrawal but the High Court had reversed that order, the Supreme Court may not have interfered with the orders of the High Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. But this is a case where the Special Judge had permitted the withdrawal of the prosecution, and the said order of withdrawal has been affirmed by the High Court as well as by the majority judgment pronounced by Supreme Court earlier. Interference by the Supreme Court on review must only be on strong and compelling reasons. [766D-H]

1.2 When the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court are allowed to remain in tact, there is no justification to reverse the majority judgments of Baharul Islam and R.B. Misra JJ., reported in [1983] 2 SCR 61 by which the appeal had already been dismissed. The reversal of the earlier judgment of Supreme Court by the process of Review strikes at 706 the finality of judgments of Supreme Court and would amount to the abuse of the power of review vested in Supreme Court, particularly in a criminal case. This case which was admitted solely on the ground that Nandini Satpathy's case had been subsequently referred to a larger Bench to review the earlier decision cannot be converted into an appeal against the earlier decision of Supreme Court. [774A-C] R.K. Jain etc. v. State through Special Police Establishment and Ors. etc., [1980] 3 SCR 982 and State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh Pandey, [1957] SCR 279, referred to.

2.1 Section 321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be construed in the light of the principles of Administrative law. The legal position expounded by the Supreme Court in R.K. Jain's case and in Ram Naresh Pandey's, case is correct. If any change in the law is needed it is for Parliament to make necessary amendments to section 321 of the Code of the Criminal Procedure, 1973, which has remained so despite the judgment of the Supreme Court in Pandey's case rendered in 3957. [773D-E]

2.2 The judgment of a Public Prosecutor under section 321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure , 1973 cannot be lightly interfered with unless the Court comes to the conclusion that he has not applied his mind or that his decision is not bona fide. A person may have been accused of several other misdeeds, he may have been an anthema to a section of the public media or he may be an unreliable politician. But these circumstances should not enter into the decision of the Court while dealing with a criminal charge against him which must be based only on relevant material. [773B-C ]

2.3 In the circumstances of this case, it cannot be said that the Public Prosecutor had not applied his mind to the case or had conducted himself in an improper way. If in the light of the material before him the Public Prosecutor has taken the view that there was no prospect of securing a conviction of the accused it cannot be said that his view is an unreasonable one. The Public Prosecutor is not a Persecutor. He is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all, and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the land, the two fold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnest and vigour indeed, he 707 should do so. But while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate one to bring about a just one. [772E-H] Berger v. United States, 295 US 78, quoted with approval.

2.4 Further the questions involved in this case are:

whether Dr. Jagannath Misra has been a privy to the misdeeds committed in the Patna Urban Co-operative Bank; whether he and his co-accused should be prosecuted for the offences of conspiracy, bribery etc., and whether the Public Prosecutor had grievously erred in applying for the withdrawal of the case. All the other Judges who have dealt with the case on merits from the Special Judge onwards, except Tulzapurkar J.

have opined that the permission was properly given for withdrawal. In the circumstances, it is difficult to take a different view. [770G-H; 771A-B] The three circumstances put up against the accused in this case are (i) that Jiwanand Jha had credited Rs. 10,000 and Rs. 3000 on 27.12.1973 and on 1.4.1974 respectively in the Savings Bank account of Dr. Jagannath Misra; (ii) that there was ante-dating of the order passed by Dr. Jagannath Misra on 14.5.1975; and (iii) that there was a second confessional statement of Hydary which supported the prosecution. As regards the two items of bribe, it has not been shown by any extract of bank account that the said two sams came from the Patna Urban Cooperative Bank. If that was so there would have been entries in the Bank accounts. Mere crediting of the two sums, without any other reliable evidence, in a bank account by a political ally or a friend does not by itself show that the sums were either bribe amounts or any official favour had been shown. This fact by itself is not conclusive about the guilt of the accused. The passing of the two orders one on 15.6.1975 on the note sheet and the other on buff paper which is dated 14.5.1975 cannot be faulted on account of the explanation that it was the practice in the Bihar Secretariat that whenever an order is changed it is done by writing the later order on a buffsheet and pasting it on the earlier order. It is not also shown by the prosecution that any action had been taken pursuant to the order dated 16.5.1975 by any of the departmental authorities. If any action had been taken it would have been a matter of record readily available for production. No such record is produced before Supreme Court.

Hence' it is a mere surmise to say that any such action was sought to be nullified, particularly when there was no acceptable evidence at all on the communication of the order dated 16.5.1975 to any departmental authorities. [769F-G; 770D-G ] 708 Per Khalid J. (on behalf of himself and on behalf of S. Natarajan J.)

1.1 Admitting a review petition is not, the same thing as setting aside the order sought to be reviewed. Order 47, Rule 1 C.P.C. deals with review in civil matters, Article 137 of the Constitution is a special power with the Supreme Court to review any judgment pronounced or order made by it.

An order passed in a criminal case can be reviewed and set aside only if there are errors apparent on the record. In this case, one of the Judges who was a party to the order to review (R.B. Misra J) had earlier dismissed the appeal with convicting reasons. If the judgment was set aside by the order passed in the review petition, the learned Judge would definitely have given his own reasons for doing so by a separate order. This has not been done. All that the order says is that the review petition had been admitted. The direction to re-hear the appeal, therefore can only be to ascertain reasons to see whether the judgment need be set aside. [776C-G]

2.1 There is no error apparent on the face of the record in the judgment reported as Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar & Ors., [1983] 2 SCR 61. [776G-H]

2.2 All the three judges who gave the earlier judgment in this case have correctly declined to accept the plea that Shri Sinha was not a competent Public Prosecutor since Datt's appointment has not been cancelled. [780B-C]

3.1 Section 321 needs three requisite to make an order under it valid; (1) The application should be filed by a public prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor who is competent to make an application for withdrawal; (2) he must be in charge of the case; (3) the application should get the consent of the court before which the case is pending. All the three requisites are satisfied here. [780D-E]

3.2 In the absence of any allegation of mala fide against the public prosecutor or of bias against the Special Judge the Public Prosecutor should normally be credited with fairness in exercise of his power under s.321. Equally, in the absence of a challenge in the revision petition before the High Court to the order of the Special Judge giving consent, it has to be assumed that he has perused the relevant records before passing the consent order. [781 C-E]

3.3 Section 321 gives the public prosecutor the power for withdrawal of any case at any stage before judgment is pronounced. This 709 pre-supposes the fact that the entire evidence may have been adduced in the case, before the application is made. When an application under s.32I Cr. P.C. is made, it is not necessary for the court to assess the evidence to discover whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. To contend that the court when it exercises its limited power of giving consent under s.32I has to assess the evidence and find out whether the case would end in acquittal or conviction, would be to re-write s.321 Cr.P.C. and would be to concede to the court a power which the scheme of s.321 does not contemplate. [781 F-H]

3.4 The acquittal or discharge order under s.321 are not the same as the normal final orders in criminal cases. The conclusion will not be hacked by a detailed discussion of the evidence in the case of acquittal or absence of prima facie case or groundlessness in the case of discharge. All that the court has to see is whether the application is made in good faith, in the interest of public policy and justice and not to thwart or stifle the process of law. The court, after considering these facets of the case, will have to see whether the application suffers from such improprieties or illegalities as to cause manifest injustice if consent is given. On a reading of the application for withdrawal, the order of consent and the other attendant circumstances, it must be held that the application for withdrawal and the order giving consent were proper and strictly within the confines of section 321 Cr.P.C. [781H; 782A-C]

3.5 While construing s.321, it is necessary to bear in mind the wide phraseology used in it, the scheme behind it and its field of operation. True, it does not give any guideline regarding the grounds on which an application for withdrawal can be made. But since it was enacted with a specific purpose, it would be doing violence to its language and contents by importing into the section words which are not there or by restricting its operation by fetters in the form of conditions and provisos. [782C-D]

3.6 While conferring powers upon the Subordinate courts under s.321 of the Code, the Legislature had only intended that the court should perform a supervisory function and not an adjudicatory function in the legal sense of the term.

Section 321 clothes the public prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution of any person, accused of an offence both when no evidence is taken or even if entire evidence has been taken. The outer limit for the exercise of this power is "at any time before the judgment is pronounced". The initiative is that of the Public Prosecutor and what the court has to do' only to give its consent and not to determine any matter judicially. The Judicial function implicit in the 710 exercise of the judicial discretion for granting the consent would normally mean that the court has to satisfy itself that the executive function of the Public Prosecutor has not been improperly exercised, or that it is not an attempt to interfere with the normal course of justice for illegitimate reasons or purposes. [484A-B; C-D]

3.7 The courts' function is to give consent. It is not obligatory on the part of the court to record reasons before consent is given. However, consent of the court is not a matter of course. When the Public Prosecutor makes the application for withdrawal after taking into consideration all the materials before him, the Court exercises its judicial discretion by considering such materials and on such consideration either gives consent or declines consent. If on a reading of the order giving consent a higher court is satisfied that such consent was given on an overall consideration of the materials available, the order giving consent has necessarily to be upheld. [484D-G]

3.8 The order under section 321 is pot appealable but only revisable under section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure . While considering the legality, propriety or the correctness of a finding or a conclusion, normally, the revising court does not dwell at length into the facts and evidence of the case. The Court, in revision, considers the materials only to satisfy itself about the correctness, legality and propriety of the findings, sentence or order and refrains from substituting an order passed under s.397 appeal comes to the Supreme Court by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. [789B-C] It has been the declared policy of the Supreme Court not to embark upon a roving enquiry into the facts and evidence of cases like this or even an order against discharge. The Supreme Court will not allow itself to be converted into a court of facts and evidence. The Supreme Court seldom goes into evidence and facts. That is as it should be. Any departure from this salutary self imposed restraint is not a healthy practice. As an apex Court, any observation on merits or on facts and evidence of a case which has to go back to the courts below will seriously prejudice the party affected and it should be the policy of the court not to tread upon this prohibited ground and invite unsavory but justifiable criticism. Supreme Court cannot assess the evidence to find out whether there is a case for acquittal or conviction and cannot convert itself into a trial court.

Nor can this court order a retrial and examination of hundred witnesses to find out whether the case would end in acquittal or conviction. [789D-G] 711

3.9 Section 321 Crl. P.C. is virtually a step by way of composition of he offence by the State. The State is the master of the litigation in criminal cases. By the exercise of functions under s.321 the accountability of the concerned person or persons does not disappear. A private complaint can still be filed if a party is aggrieved by the withdrawal of the prosecution but running the possible risk of a suit of malicious prosecution if the complaint is bereft of any basis. [789G-H; 790A] 3.10 When the Magistrate states in his order that he has considered the materials, it is not proper for the court not to accept that statement. The proper thing to do is to hold that Magistrate gave consent on objective consideration of the relevant aspects of the case. It would be acting against the mandate s.321 to find fault with the Magistrate in such cases, unless the order discloses that the Magistrate has failed to consider whether the application is made in good faith, in the interest of public policy and justice and not to thwart or strifle the process of law. The application for withdrawal by the Public Prosecutor has been made in good faith after careful consideration of the materials placed before him and the order of consent given by the Magistrate was also after the consideration of various datails as indicated above. It would be improper for the Court, keeping in view the scheme of s.321, to embark upon a detailed inquiry into the facts and evidence of the case or to direct re-trial for that would be destructive of the object and intent of the section. [792C-E; 793B-D] State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh Pandey, [1957] SCR 279;

M.N. Sankaranarayanan Nair v.P.V. Balakrishnan & Ors., [1972]2 SCR 599; Bansi Lal v. Chandan Lal, AIR 1976 AC 370;

State of Orissa v. Chandrika Mohapatra & Ors., [1977] 1 SCR 335; Balwant Singh v. State of Bihar, [1978] 1 SCR 604;

Subhash Chander v. State, [1980] 2 SCR 44 and Rajendra kumar Jain v. State, [1980] 3 SCR 982, referred to.

4.1 In this case the Supreme Court is called upon only to consider the ambit and scope of s.321 Crl. P.C. and not the truth or otherwise of the allegations against the respondent No. 2. The appellant is admittedly a political rival of respondent No.2. There is no love lost between them. It is at the instance of such a highly interested person that the Court is called upon to direct re-trial of the case, setting aside the consent given by the Special Judge. The second respondent is a leader of a political party. He was a rival to the Chief Minister who followed him after the 1977 at the time of institution of the case. In 1977, when the second respondent was the Chief Minister, a warrant of arrest was issued 712 against Shri Karpoori Thakur for his arrest and detention.

It has been suggested that Shri Thakur had grudge against the second respondent. Viewed against this background, and on the unsatisfactory factual details of the case, accepting the appeal and ordering retrial would not advance either the interests of justice or public interest. [796B-E]

4.2 There were two confessional statements of Haidari in this case one on 4.11.1976 and another on 24.1.1978. In the former he did not implicate respondent No.2 but he did it in the next one. The second statement at best is the confessional statement of a co-accused which normally will not inspire confidence, in any court. It is also a statement an accomplice turned approver and hence of a very little evidentiary value. When Supreme Court exercises its jurisdiction while considering an order giving consent on an application under s.321, consistent with the declared policy of the court not to embark upon evidence, request for an order for retrial on this legally weak and infirm evidence should be rejected. [795A-E]

4.3 As to the accusation of forgery, taking the entire evidence against the appellant it cannot be held that he has committed forgery under s.463 or an offence under s.466.

Even though there is overwriting or pasting or interpolation or change of digits, there is no evidence at all to show that this paper went out of the Chief Minister's office or that any one was unduly favoured or that any one secured undue advantage by use of such overwriting. [796A-B] Per Bhagwati (on behalf of himself and G.L. Oza J.) (Minority view). (Per contra)

1.1 The Review Bench did exercise the power of review and set aside the order made by the Original Bench. When the Review Bench used the expression "I ....... admit the Review" and directed rehearing of the appeal, it must by necessary implication be held to have allowed the Review Petition and set aside the order of the Original Bench. The true meaning and effect of the order of the Review Bench cannot be allowed to be obfuscated by a slight ineptness of the language used by the Review Bench. The substance of the order must always be looked in to its apparent form. [737FH]

1.2 There can be no doubt that the Review Bench was not legally bound to give reasons for the order made by it. The apex Court being the final court against which there is no further appeal, it is not under any legal compulsion to give reasons for an order made by it. But 713 merely because there may be no legal compulsion on the apex court to give reasons. It does not follow that the apex court may dispose of cases without giving any reasons at all. It would be eminently just and desirable on the part of the apex court to give reasons for the orders made by it.

But when the apex court disposes of a Review Petition by allowing it and setting aside the order sought to be reviewed on the ground of an error apparent on the face of record, it would be desirable for the apex court not to give reasons for allowing the Review Petition. Where the apex court holds that there is an error apparent on the face of the record and the order sought to be reviewed must therefore be set aside and the case must be reheard, it would considerably prejudice the losing party if the apex court were to give reasons for taking this view. If the Review Bench of the Court were required to give reasons, the Review Bench would have to discuss the case fully and elaborately and expose what according to it constitutes an error in the reasoning of the Original Bench and this would inevitably result in pre-judgment of the case and prejudice is rehearing. A reasoned order allowing a Review Petition and setting aside the order sought to be reviewed would, even before the reheating of the case, dictate the direction of the rehearing and such direction, whether of binding or of persuasive value, would conceivably in most cases adversely affect the losing party at the rehearing of the case. Therefore, the Review Bench, in the present case, could not be faulted for not giving reasons for allowing the Review Petition and directing rehearing of the appeal. [738B-G]

2. It is now well settled law that a criminal proceeding is not a proceeding for vindication of a private grievance but it is a proceeding initiated for the purpose of punishment to the offender in the interest of the society. It is for maintaining stability and orderliness in the society that certain acts are constituted offences and the right is given to any citizen to set the machinery of the criminal law in motion for the purpose of bringing the offender to book. Locus standi of the complainant is a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence. Now if any citizen can lodge a first information report or file a complaint and set the machinery of the criminal law in motion and his locus standi to do so cannot be questioned, a citizen who finds that a prosecution for an offence against the society is being wrongly withdrawn can oppose such withdrawal cannot oppose such withdrawal. If he can be a complainant or initiator of criminal prosecution, he should equally be entitled to oppose prosecution which has already been initiated at his instance. If the offence for which a prosecution is being launched is an offence against the society and not merely an individual wrong, any member of the society must have locus to initiate a prosecution as also to resist 714 withdrawal of such prosecution, if initiated. Here in the present case, the offences charged against Dr. Jagannath Misra and others are offences of corruption, criminal breach of trust etc. 'and therefore any person who is interested in cleanliness of public administration and public morality would be entitled to file a complaint; equally he would be entitled to oppose the withdrawal of such prosecution, if it is already instituted. [739C-H; 740A] R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay, [1984] 2 SCR 500, referred to 3.1.

It is undoubtedly true that the effect of withdrawal of the prosecution against Dr. Jagannath Misra was that he stood discharged in respect the offences for which he was sought to be prosecuted but it was not an order of discharge which was challanged by Sheonandan Paswan in the revision application filed by him before the High Court but it was an order granting consent for withdrawal of the prosecution that was assailed by him. [740E-G]

3.2 The analogy of an order of discharge made under section 227 or section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not apposite because there the Sessions Judge or the Magistrate, as the case may be, considers the entire material before him and then comes to the conclusion that there is not sufficient ground or proceeding against the accused or that the charge against the accused is groundless. But, here, when the Magistrate makes an order granting consent to withdrawal of the prosecution under s.321, it is a totally different judicial exercise which he performs and it would not therefore be right to say that if the High Court sets aside the order of the Magistrate granting consent to withdrawal from the prosecutor, the High Court would be really setting aside an order of discharge made by the Magistrate.

What the High Court would be doing would be no more than holding that the withdrawal from the prosecution should proceed against the accused and ultimately if there is not sufficient evidence or the charges are groundless, the accused may still be discharged. Even the order of discharge can be discharged by the High Court in revision if the High Court is satisfied that the order passed by the Magistrate is incorrect, illegal or improper or that the proceedings resulting in the order of discharge suffer from any irregularity. [740F-H; 741A-C]

3.3 The revisional power exercised by the High Court under s.397 is couched in words of widest amplitude and in exercise of this power can satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality propriety of any order passed by the Magistrate or as to the regularity of any proceedings of such Magistrate. When the Supreme Court is hearing an appeal 715 against an order made by the High Court in the exercise of its revisional power under s.397 it is the same revisional power which the Supreme Court would be exercising and the Supreme Court, therefore, certainly can interfere with the order made by the Magistrate and confirmed by the High Court if it is satisfied that the order is incorrect, illegal or improper. In fact, in a case like the present where the question is of purity and public administration at a time when moral and ethical values are fast deteriorating and there seems to be a crises of character in public life, the Supreme Court should regard as its bounded duty-a duty owed by it to the society-to examine carefully whenever it is alleged that a prosecution for an offence of corruption or criminal breach of trust by a person holding high public office has been wrongly withdrawn and it should not matter at all as to how many judges in the High Court or the lower court have been party to the granting of such consent for withdrawal. The mathematics of numbers cannot, therefore, be invoked for the purpose of persuading the court not to exercise its discretion under Article I36 of the Constitution. [741C-H]

4.1 It is a well-established proposition of law that a criminal prosecution, if otherwise justifiable and based upon adequate evidence does not become vitiated on account of mala fides or political vendetta of the first informant or the complainant. [742D-E] State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh, [1980] 1 SCR 1076, referred to.

4.2 The fact that the prosecution against Dr. Jagannath Misra was initiated by the successor Government of Karpoori Thakur after the former went out of power, by itself cannot support the inference that the initiation of the prosecution was actuated by political vendetta or mala fides because it is quite possible that there might be material justifying the initiation of prosecution against Dr. Jagannath Misra and the successor Government might have legitimately felt that there was a case for initiation of prosecution and that is why the prosecution might have been initiated. Therefore, the prosecution cannot be said to be vitiated on that account. [742G-H; 743A] Krishna Ballabha Sahay and Ors. v. Commission of Enquiry, [1969] 1 SCR 387 and P.V. Jagannatha Rao v. State of Orissa, [1968] 3 SCR 789, referred to.

5.1 There is no provision of law which requires that no prosecution should be launched against a former Chief Minister or a person holding high political office under the earlier regime without first set716 ting up a Commission of Enquiry for enquiring into his conduct. It cannot be said that if a prosecution is initiated without an inquiry being held by a Commission of Enquiry set up for that purpose, the prosecution would be bad or that on that ground alone the prosecution could be allowed to be withdrawn. [743G-H; 744A]

5.2 In view of the tardy and slow moving criminal process in India causing inordinate delay and availability of adequate protection under different existing laws to the accused, it would be perfectly legitimate for the successor government to initiate a prosecution of a former Chief Minister or a person who has held high political office under the earlier regime without first having an enquiry made by a Commission of Enquiry, provided of course, the investigation is fair and objective and there is sufficient material to initiate such prosecution. [744A-D]

6. No unfettered or unrestricted power is conferred on the Public prosecutor/Assistant Public Prosecutor under section 321 of the Code to apply for withdrawal from the Prosecution, but the said power must be a controlled or guided power or else it will fail foul of Article 14 of the ConstitutionSection 321 is more or less similar to the powers of the police under s. 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure . [746F-H] The police has no absolute or unfettered discretion whether to prosecute an accused or not to prosecute him. In fact, in the constitutional scheme, conferment of such absolute and uncanalised discretion would be violative of the equality clause of the Constitution. The Magistrate is therefore given the power to structure and control the discretion of the police. The discretion of the police to prosecute is thus' 'combined and confined" and, subject to appeal or revision, and the Magistrate is made the final arbiter on this question. The Legislature has in its wisdom taken the view it would be safer not to vest absolute discretion to prosecute in the police which is an Executive arm of the government but to subject it to the control of the judicial organ of the State. The same scheme has been followed by the Lesiglature while conferring power on the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution. This power can be exercised only with the consent of the court so that the court can ensure that the power is not abused or misused or exercised in an arbitrary or fanciful manner.

Once the charge-sheet is filed and the prosecution is initiated, it is not left to the sweet-will of the State or the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution. Once the prosecution is launched, its relentless course cannot be halted except on sound considerations germane to public justice. The Public Prosecutor cannot therefore withdraw from the prosecution unless the Court 717 before which the prosecution is pending gives its consent for such withdrawal. This is a provision calculated to ensure non-arbitrarinesS on the part of the Public Prosecutor and compliance with the equality clause of the Constitution. [748D-H] H.S. Bains v. State, AIR 1980 SC 1883; Subhash Chander v. State & Ors., [1980] 2 SCR 44; M.N. Sankaranarayanan Nair v. P.N. Balakrishnan & Ors., [1972] 2 SCR 599; and State of Orissa. v. C. Mohapatra, [1977] 1 SCR 385, referred to.

7.1 The position in law in regard to the degree of autonomy enjoyed by the Public Prosecutor vis-a-vis the government in filling an application for withdrawal of the prosecution is rather confused. Now there can be no doubt that prosecution of an offender who is alleged to have committed an offence is primarily the responsibility of the Executive. It is the Executive which is vested with the power to file a chargesheet and initiate a prosecution. This power is conferred on the Executive with a view to protecting the society against offenders who disturb the peace and tranquility of the society by committing offences. Of course it is left to the court to decide whether to take cognizance of the offences set out in the charge-sheet but the filing of the charge-sheet and initiation of the prosecution is solely within the responsibility of the Executive. It is the State through the investigating authorities which files a charge-sheet and initiate the prosecution and the Public Prosecutor is essentially counsel for the State for conducting the prosecution on behalf of the State. The Public Prosecutor is an officer of the court, as indeed every advocate practising before the court is, and he owes an obligation to the court to be fair and just: he must not introduce any person interest in the prosecution nor must he be anxious to secure conviction at any cost. He must present the case on behalf of the prosecution fairly and objectively. He is bound to assist the court with his fairly considered view and the fair exercise of his intention. But at the same time he conducts the prosecution on behalf of the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, and he is an advocate acting on behalf on the Central Government or the State Government which has launched the prosecution. There is nothing wrong if the government takes a decision to withdraw from the prosecution and communicate such direction to the Public Prosecutor. The Public Prosecutor, would, inter alia, consider the grounds on which the government has taken the decision to withdraw from the prosecution and if he is satisfied that those grounds are legitimate, he may file an application for withdrawal from the prosecution. If on the other hand he takes the view that the grounds which have been given by the government are not 718 legitimate he has two options available to him. He may inform the government that in his opinion, the grounds which have weighed with the government are not valid and that he should be relieved from the case and if this request of his is not granted he may tender his resignation or else, he may make an application for withdrawal from the prosecution as directed by the government and at the hearing of the application he may offer his considered view to the court that the application is not sustainable on grounds set out by him and leave it to the court to reject the application. There is nothing wrong in the Public Prosecutor being advised or directed by the government to file an application for withdrawal from the prosecution and the application for withdrawal made by him pursuant to such direction or advice is not necessarily vitiated. The Public Prosecutor can of course come to his own independent decision that the prosecution should be withdrawn but ordinarily if he is wise and sensible person he will not apply for withdrawal without consulting the government because it is the government which has launched the prosecution and is prosecuting the accused.

Theoretically of course, he can make an application for withdrawal from the prosecution without consulting the government and he cannot be accused of any illegality for doing so and the court may give its consent for such withdrawal but in that event the Public Prosecutor would render the risk of incurring the displeasure of the Government which has appointed him. If the Public Prosecutor seeks the permission of the government for withdrawal from the prosecution and the government grants such permission to him and on the basis of such permission he applies for withdrawal the application cannot be said to be vitiated. The proviso to s.321 in fact contemplates in so many terms that in certain categories of offences the Public Prosecutor appointed by the State Government cannot move the court for its consent to withdraw from the prosecution without the permission of the Central Government. There is no danger of abuse or misuse of power by the Government inherent in this process because there are two principal safeguards against any such abuse or misuse of power by the government: one is that an application must be based on grounds which advance public justice and the other is that there can be no withdrawal without the consent of the Court. [755C-H; 756A-H; 757A-F] State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh Pandey, [1957] SCR 279;

Balwant Singh v. State of Bihar, [1978] 1 SCR 604; M.N. Sankaranarayanan Nair v. P.V. Balakrishnan & Ors., [1972] 2 SCR 599;.State of Orissa, v. C. Mohapatra, [1977] 1 SCR 335 and R.K. Jain v. State, [1980] 3 SCR 982, referred to.

7.2 The Public Prosecutor cannot maintain an application for 719 withdrawal from the prosecution on the ground that the government does not want to produce evidence and proceed with the prosecution against the accused or that the government considers that it is not expedient to proceed with the prosecution. The Public Prosecutor has to make out some ground which would advance or further the cause of public justice. If the Public Prosecutor is able to show that he may not be able to produce sufficient evidence to sustain the charge, an application for withdrawal from the prosecution may be legitimately made by. him. [758H; 759A-B]

7.3 However, where a charge has been framed by the court either under s.228 or s.240 of the Code of Criminal. Procedure, 1973 it would not be open to the Public Prosecutor to apply for withdrawal from the prosecution on the ground of insufficiency of evidence in support of the prosecution. The reason is that in both these cases the Court applies its mind to the material consisting of the police report and the documents sent with it under s.173 and comes to a conclusion that a prima facie case has been made out against the accused and the charge should therefore be framed. When the court has come to this conclusion after full consideration and framed a charge, the court cannot be persuaded on the same material to hold that there is not sufficient evidence to sustain the prosecution. The Public Prosecutor cannot be permitted to make a volte face on the basis of the same material. To do so would be mockery of justice and it would shake the confidence of the court in the purity and integrity of the administration of justice. It is, therefore, clear that though the prosecution can be withdrawn at any stage, even after the framing of the charge, it would not be competent to the Public Prosecutor once the charge is framed, to apply for withdrawal of the prosecution on the ground that the same material which was before the court when it framed the charge is not sufficient to sustain the prosecution. Of course, if some material has subsequently come to light which throws doubt on the veracity of the prosecution case the Public Prosecutor can certainly apply for withdrawal on the ground that the prosecution is not well-founded. It may also happen in the meanwhile a key witness may have died or some important evidence may have become unavailable or some such thing may have happened in that event, the Public Prosecutor may legitimately feel that it will not be possible to sustain the prosecution in the absence of such evidence and he may apply for withdrawal from the prosecution.

But on the same material without anything more, the Public Prosecutor cannot apply for withdrawal from the prosecution after the charge is framed. To allow him to do so would impair the faith of the people in the purity and integrity of the judicial process. [759C-H; 760A-E] 720 Bansi Lal v. Chandi Lal, AIR 1976 SC 370, referred to.

7.4 Further while exercising its function under s.239 is to consider the police report and the document sent along with it as also any statement made by the accused if the court chooses to examine him. And if the court finds that there is no prima facie case against the accused the court discharges him. But that is precisely what the court is called upon to do when an application for withdrawal from the prosecution is made by the public prosecutor on the ground that there is insufficient or no evidence to support the prosecutionThere also the court would have to consider the material placed before it on behalf of the prosecution for the purpose of deciding whether the ground urged by the public prosecutor for withdrawal of the prosecution is justified or not and this material would he the same as the material before the court while discharging its function under s.239. If the court while considering an application for withdrawal on the ground of insufficiency or absence of evidence to support the prosecution has to scrutinise the material for the purpose of deciding whether there is in fact insufficient evidence or no evidence at all in support of the prosecution, the court might as well engage itself in this exercise while considering under s.239 whether the accused shall he discharged or a charge shall he framed against him. It is an identical exercise which the court will he performing whether the court acts under s.239 or under s.321. If that he so, in a warrant case instituted on a police report the public prosecutor should not he entitled to make an application for withdrawal from the prosecution on the ground that there is insufficient or no evidence in support of the prosecution. The court will have consider the same issue under s.239 and it will most certainly further or advance the case of public justice if the court examines the issue under s.239 and gives its reasons for discharging the accused after a judicial consideration of the material before it, rather than allow the prosecution to he withdrawn by the Public Prosecutor. When the prosecution is allowed to he withdrawn there is always an uneasy feeling in the public mind that the case has not been allowed to be agitated before the court and the court has not given a judicial verdict. But if on the other hand, the court examines the material and discharges the accused under s.239 it will always carry greater conviction with the people because instead of the prosecution being withdrawn and taken out of the ken of judicial scrutiny the judicial verdict based on assessment and evaluation of the material before the court will always inspire greater confidence Since the guiding consideration in all these cases is the imperative of public justice and it is absolutely essential that justice must not only he done but also appear to be done. Hence in a warrant case instituted on a police report--which the 721 present case against Dr. Jagannath Misra and others admittedly is-it should not be a legitimate ground for the public prosecutor to urge in support of the application for withdrawal that there is insufficient or no evidence in support of the prosecution. The court in such a case should be left to decide under s.239 whether the accused should be discharged or a charge should be framed against him. [761A-H;

762A-B]

7.5 Ultimately every offence has a social or economic cause behind it and if the State feels that the elimination or eradication of the social or economic cause of the crime would be better served by not proceeding with the prosecution, the State should clearly be at liberty to withdraw from the prosecution. Though in this area no hard and fast rule can be laid down nor can any categories of cases be defined in which an application for withdrawal of the prosecution could legitimately be made. It must ultimately depend on the facts and circumstances of each case in the light of what is necessary in order to promote the ends of justice.

[762C-D; H; 763A-B]

7.6 The Court, while considering whether to grant consent or not, must not accept the ipse dixit of the public prosecutor and content itself by merely examining whether the public prosecutor has applied an independent mind but the court must satisfy itself not only that the grounds are germane or relevant to advancement of public justice but also whether the grounds in fact are satisfactorily established. The ultimate test which must be applied by the court in order to determine the validity of the grounds in a particular case is that the requirement of public justice outweighs the legal justice of that case so that withdrawal from the prosecution could be permitted in the larger interest of public justice. The imperative of public justice provides the only relevant consideration for determining whether consent should be granted or not. It is not possible to provide an exclusive definition of what may be regarded as failing within the imperative of public justice in a straitjacket formula. Every case must depend on its peculiar facts and circumstances because there may be a myriad situation where this question may have to be considered by the Court. [763G-H; 764A-D]

8. Applying these principles to the facts of the present case, it is clear, that the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate Patna as also the High Court were clearly in error in granting consent to the withdrawal from the prosecution against Dr. Jagannath Misra and others. There are two very strong and cogent reasons why consent to the withdrawal of the prosecution must be refused. In the first place, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate could have considered under s.239 whether the 722 material placed before him was sufficient to make out a prima facie case against Dr. Jagannath Misra and the other accused so that if the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate came to the conclusion on the basis of such material that the charge against Dr. Jagannath Misra and the other accused was groundless, he would be bound to discharge them for reasons to be recorded by him in writing. There is no reason why in these circumstances the public prosecutor should be allowed to withdraw from the prosecution under s.321. The same exercise could be performed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate by acting under s.239. Moreover, in the present case, the decision to withdraw from the prosecution was taken by the Cabinet at a meeting held on 24th February 1981 and this meeting was presided over by Dr. Jagannath Misra himself. It may be that Shri Lallan Prasad Sinha did not implicitly obey the decision of the Cabinet and applied his independent mind to the question whether the prosecution should be withdrawn or not but even so, it would seriously undermine the confidence of the people in the administration of justice if a decision to withdraw the prosecution against him is taken by the accused himself and pursuant to this decision the Special Public Prosecutor who was appointed by the State Government of which the accused is Chief Minister, applies for withdrawal from the prosecution. It is an elementary principle that justice must not only done but must also appear to be done. It would be subversive of all principles of justice that the accused should take a decision to withdraw the prosecution against himself and then the Special Public Prosecutor appointed in effect and substance by him makes an application for withdrawal from the prosecution. [764E-H; 765A-E]

8.2 It is no doubt true that if there is not sufficient evidence to sustain the prosecution against Dr. Jagannath Misra and the other accused, it would be subjecting them to harassment and inconvenience to require them to appear and argue before the Court for the purpose of securing an order of discharge under s.239, but even so it would be desirable in the interest of public justice that high political personages, accused of offences should face the judicial process and get discharged, rather than seem to manoeuvre the judicial system and thus endanger the legitimacy of the political as well as the judicial process. It is possible that in a particular case personal harassment or inconvenience may be caused by non withdrawal of the prosecution, if the accused is really innocent and is ultimately liable to be discharged, but such harassment or inconvenience must be considered as an inevitable cost of public life, which the repositories of public power should have no hesitation to pay, as justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done. [765E-H; 766A] 723

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 241 of 1982 From the Judgment and Order dated 14.9.81 of the Patna High Court in Crl. Revision No. 874/81.

Dr. L.M. Singhvi, S.K. Sinha, S.K. Verma, A.M. Singhvi, S. Singh, C. Mukhopadhya and R. Tyagi for the Appellants.

Dr. Y.S. Chitale, F.S. Nanman, S.N. Kacker, Rajinder Singh, D. Goburdhan, D. Chandrachud, L.R. Singh, Gopal Singh, M.P. Jha, R.K. Jain, Ranjit Kumar and B.P. Singh for the Respondents.

The following Judgments were delivered:

BHAGWATI, CJ. This case has had a chequered history and it is necessary to state the facts in some detail in order to appreciate the questions which arise for determination before us. The principal actor in the drama in this case is Dr. Jagannath Misra, one time Chief Minister of the State of Bihar. The main controversy around-which all questions revolve is whether the prosecution launched against Dr.

Jagannath Misra at a time when he was not in power has been rightly allowed to be withdrawn by the Chief Judicial Magistrate or whether such withdrawal is invalid and must be set aside so that the prosecution can continue against Dr.

Jagannath Misra.

The fact-situation out of which this case arises relates to the affairs of a cooperative Bank called the 'Patna Urban Cooperative Bank' (hereinafter referred to as the 'Cooperative Bank'). The Cooperative Bank was registered in May 1970 and it commenced its banking business with Nawal Kishore Sinha as its Chairman, K.P. Gupta as its Honorary Secretary, M.A. Hyderi as its Manager and A.K. Singh as a loan clerk.

It was not seriously disputed that most of the members of the Cooperative Bank were closely associated with Nawal Kishore Sinha. The object of the Cooperative Bank was to help people financially to set up small industries and businesses and to assist people in ordinary circumstances to carry on their vocation or business. There was a sub-Committee formed, called "Loan Sub Committee", consisting of Nawal Kishore Sinha, K.P. Gupta and one Purnendu Narain, an Advocate, to attend to the work of sanctioning and granting of loans. The Chairman, i.e., Nawal Kishore Sinha, was, according to the bye-laws, the ultimate deciding authority in regard to all the functions of the Cooperative Bank and the Honorary Secre724 tary i.e.K.P. Gupta along with the Chairman had to exercise supervisory control over all the activities of the Cooperative Bank, while the Manager, i.e. M.A. Hyderi, was concerned only with its :lay-to-day working. Dr. Jagannath Misra who was then a Member of the Legislative Council was closely associated with Nawal Kishore Sinha and he helped the Cooperative Bank and Nawal Kishore Sinha in diverse ways in connection with the affairs of the Cooperative Bank and also assisted in mobilisation of resources for the Cooperative Bank. Sometime in 1974 separate audits into the functioning of the Cooperative Bank were carried out by the Reserve Bank of India as well as the Cooperative Department of the State of Bihar for the years 1972-73 and 1973-74 and as a result of these audits, there came to light a large number of irregularities such as non-maintenance of cash books in a proper manner and grant of overdraft facilities without current account as also illegal practices and acts of defalcation and malversation of funds of the Cooperative Bank. The audit reports disclosed that huge amounts running into lakhs of rupees, had been squandered away by giving loans to non-members, giving loans even without applications, agreements or promissory notes, giving loans without hypothecation or security, giving short-term loans instead of releasing cash from sale proceeds of hypothecated goods, giving loans to the same persons in different names and giving loans to fictitious persons and non-existing firms or industries. There were instances where loans had been granted on the security of Gandhi Maidan and Patna Railway Station. The audit team of the Reserve Bank in its Report came to the conclusion that Nawal Kishore Sinha and others were responsible for 'bad loans' to the tune of Rs. 12 lakhs and misappropriation and embezzlement of funds to the extent of Rs.25 lakhs.

On the basis of these audit reports, the Registrar Cooperative Societies, at the instance of the Reserve Bank, made an order on 10th July 1974 superseding the management of the Cooperative Bank, removing Naval Kishore Sinha and other Directors on the Board from their office as Chairman and Directors and appointing an officer of the Cooperative Department as Special Officer to look-after the affairs of the Cooperative Bank. The Registrar, Cooperative Societies followed up this action by putting up a note dated 4th November 1974 to the Secretary, Cooperation pointing out that, according to the audit reports, prima facie charges of defalcations, embezzlement of funds, conspiracy etc. were made out against the officials of the Cooperative Bank and legal action should be taken against them after taking the opinion of the Public Prosecutor. The Secretary, Cooperation by his note dated 7th November 1974 sought the opinion of the Law Depart725 ment in regard to the action to be taken as suggested in the note of the Registrar, Cooperative Societies. The Law Department recorded its opinion in the relevant file on 18th November 1974 that a prima facie case of conspiracy and criminal breach of trust was made out against the loanees and the office bearers of the Cooperative Bank. On the basis of this opinion, a draft complaint was prepared on 16th December 1974 by the Asstt. Public Prosecutor, Patna for being filed in the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna and on the same day, an office noting was made on the file suggesting that the advice of the Law Department on the draft complaint be obtained. This course of action was approved by the Secretary, Cooperation and the Minister for Cooperation also approved of it on1st January 1975 and it also received the approval of the then Chief Minister, Shri Abdul Ghafoor on 2nd January 1975. The file was then sent back to the Law Department and the Law Department again reiterated its earlier advice for launching the prosecution and on the file being received back on 17th January 1975, the Secretary Cooperation, endorsed the file on 21st January 1975 to the Additional Public Prosecutor, Shri Girish Narain Sinha, for necessary action, that is, to file the prosecution. Thus, by 21st January 1975 a firm decision was taken to launch a criminal prosecutionagainst the loanees and the members of the Board of Directors of the Cooperati