R. S. Nayak Vs. A. R. Antulay [1984] INSC 34 (16 February 1984)

DESAI, D.A.

PATHAK, R.S.

REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) SEN, A.P. (J) ERADI, V. BALAKRISHNA (J)

CITATION: 1984 AIR 684 1984 SCR (2) 495 1984 SCC (2) 183 1984 SCALE (1)198

CITATOR INFO :

RF 1984 SC 718 (2) F 1985 SC1655 (4,5) RF 1986 SC2045 (36) RF 1987 SC1140 (3) 1988 SC1531 (145) RF 1992 SC1531 (23) RF 1992 SC1701 (7,9)

ACT:

Prevention of Corruption Act 1947-S. 6-Interpretation of. Whether court can take congizance of offences enumerated in s. 6 against public servant without sanction of competent authority-Which is competent authority-Which is competent authority to give sanction-What is relevant date on which sanction be there-For attracting s. 6 accused should be a public servant both on date of offence and on date when court takes congizance of offence. In cases where accused holds several offices each one of which makes him public servant Weather sanction of competent authorities of all the offices necessary or whether sanction of that competent authority alone under which public servant has misuse his office is sufficient.

Indian Penal Code s.21 clauses (3).(7) and (12) (a)- Definition of 'public servant'-Scope of-Whether Member of State Legislative Assembly a public servant. Expressions or pay in the pay of and Government used in s. 21 explained.

Construction of Statutes-Rule of-Construct on must advance object of Act-Court must give effect to natural meaning of words-In case of ambiguity court must ascertain intention of legislature behind Act-Court can take help of external aids-While constructing ancient statute court can look at surrounding circumstances when statue was enacted.

Words and Phrases- Words 'or an `pay, meaning of Phrase 'in the pay of, -Explained.

HEADNOTE:

The appellant, R.S. Nayak, filed a complaint against the respondent, A.R. Antualy, a public servant being the Chief Minister of Maharashtra State under ss. 161, 165 I.P.C. and s. 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (1947 Act) alleging abuse of office of Chief Minister. The complaint was rejected on account of absence of necessary sanction of the Governor of Maharashtra State under s. 6 of the 1947 Act to prosecute the respondent. After the Governor issued necessary sanction, the appellant filed a fresh complaint in the Court of Special Judge against the respondent on the same grounds. However, on the date of filing fresh complaint the respondent had already resigned as Chief Minister. The respondent contended that the Special Judge had no jurisdiction to try him under s. 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 and that no cognizance could be taken on private complaint. The Special Judge rejected both the contentions. In the meantime the State Government issued a notification under s. 7(2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1752 under which the case was transferred to another Special Judge. In a criminal revision application filed by the respondent against the order of earlier 496 Special Judge, a Division Bench of the High Court held that the Social Judge had jurisdiction to try the respondent and that the private complaint was maintainable. When the latter Special Judge proceeded with the case the respondent filed an application for his discharge on the grounds that the charge against him was baseless and that he being a Member of legislative Assembly (M.L.A) requisite sanction under s. 6 of the 1947 Act was necessary. The Special Judge discharged the respondent holding that the respondent being M.L.A was a public servant within s. 21 (12)(a) of I.P.C. and hl the absence of the sanction of the Legislative Assembly he could not take cognizance of offence. . The Special Judge also held that. The material date for deciding the applicability of s. 6 of the 1947 Act was the date on which the Court was asked to take cognizance of the offence.

The appellant challenged the order of the Special Judge in this Appeal.

The questions which arose for consideration were:- (a) That is the relevant date with reference to which a valid sanction is a pre-requisite for the prosecution of a public servant for offences enumerated in s. 6 of the 1947 Act ? (b) If the accuse holds several offices occupying each of which makes him a public servant, is sanction of each one of the competent authorities entitled to remove him from each one of the offices held by him necessary and if anyone of the competent authorities fails or declines to grant sanction, is the Court precluded or prohibited from taking cognizance of the offence with which the public servant is charged, or is it implicit in s. 6 of the 1947 Act that sanction of that competent authority alone is necessary which is entitled to remove the public servant from the office which is alleged to have been abused or misused for corrupt motives ? (c) Is M.L.A. a public. servant within the meaning of the expression in clauses 12(a), 3 and 7 of s. 21 I.P.C. ? (d) Is sanction as contemplated by s. 6 of the 1947 Act necessary for prosecution of M.L.A. and if so, which is the sanctioning authority competent to remove M.L.A. from the office of Member or the Legislative Assembly ? Allowing the appeal.

HELD: The provisions of the Act must receive such construction at the hands of the court as would advance the object and purpose underlying the Act and at any rate not defeat it. If the words of the statute are clear and unambiguous, it is the plainest duty of the court to give effect to the natural meaning of the words used in the provisions. In the event of an ambiguity of the plain meaning of the words used in the statute being self- defeating, the court is entitled to ascertain the intention of the legislature to remove the ambiguity by construing the provision of the statute as a whole keeping in view what was the mischief-when the statute was enacted and to remove which the legislature enacted the statute. Whenever a question of construction arises upon ambiguity or where two views are possible of a Provision, it would be the duty of the court to adopt that construction which would advance the object underlying the Act. [521 A-C] The basic purpose underlying all canons of construction is the ascertainment 497 with reasonable certainty of the intention of Parliament in enacting the legislation. A For this purpose why should the aids which Parliament availed of such as report of a special committee preceding the enactment, existing state of law, the environment necessitating enactment of legislation, and the object sought to be achieved, be denied to court whose function is primarily to give effect to the real intention of the Parliament in enacting the legislation. Such denial would deprive the court of a substantial and illuminating aid to construction. Therefore, departing from the earlier English decisions, the reports of the committee which preceded the enactment of a legislation, reports of Joint Parliamentary Committee report of a commission set up for collecting information leading to the enactment are permissible external aids to construction. [527-A; D-E] In construing a statute more especially the ancient statute, the court may look at the surrounding circumstances when the statute was enacted. The construction of ancient statutes may be eludicated by what in the language of the courts is called contemporanea expositio, that is, by seeing how they were understood at the time when they were passed.

[528F-G] Standard dictionaries as a rule give in respect of each word as many meanings in which the word has either been used or it is likely to be used in different contexts and connections. While it may be permissible to refer to dictionaries to find out the meaning in which a word is capable of being used or understood in common parlance, the well-known cannon of construction should not even for a minute be overlooked that the meaning to the words and expressions used in a statute ordinarily take their colour from the context in which they appear. [539F-G] Deputy Chief Controller of Imports & Exports New Delhi v. K.T. Kosalram Ors., [1971] 2 S.C.R. 507 at 517; and State Bank of India v. N. Sundara Money, [1976] 3 S.C.R. 160, referred to.

Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 bars the courts from taking cognizance of the offences therein enumerated alleged to have been committed by a public servant except with the previous sanction of the competent authority empowered to grant the requisite sanction. Therefore, when the court is called upon to take cognizance of such offences, it. must enquire whether there is a valid sanction to prosecute the public servant for the offence alleged to have been committed by him as public servant. Undoubtedly the accused must be a public servant when he is alleged to have committed the offence of which he is accused because ss. 161, 164, 165 I.P.C. and s. 5(2) of the 1947 Act clearly spell out that the offences there in defined can be committed by a public servant. A trial without a valid sanction where one is necessary under s. 6 would be a trial without jurisdiction by the court. It is well settled that the relevant date with reference to valid which a valid sanction is sine qua non for taking cognizance of an offence committed by a public servant as required by s. 6 is the date when the court is called upon to take cognizance of the offence of which he is accused. If, therefore, when the offence is alleged to have been committed, the accused was a public servant but by the time the court is called upon to take cognizance of the offence committed by him as public servant, he has cased to be a public servant, s. 6 will not be attracted and no sanction would be necessary for taking cognizance of the offence against him. This approach is in accord with the policy underlying s.6 in that a public servant is not to be exposed to harassment of a frivolous or speculative prosecution. If he has ceased to be a public 498 servant in the meantime, this vital consideration ceases to exist. [512D; H; 513 A-E]. C.R. Bansi v. State of Maharashtra, [1971] 3 S.C.R. 236; R.R. Chari v. State of U.P., [1963] 1 S.C.R. 121; S.N. Bose v. State of Bihar, [1968] 3 S.C.R. Venkataraman v. The State. [1958] S.C.R. 1040 at 1052; K.S. Dharmaatan v. Central Government & Ors., [1979] 3 S.C.R. 832, referred to.

In the instant case, long before the date on which the cognizance was taken by the Special Judge, the accused had ceased to hold the office of the Chief Minister and as such had ceased to be a public servant in his capacity as Chief Minister. A fortiori no sanction as contemplated by s. 6 was necessary before cognizance of the offence could be taken against the accused for offences alleged to have been committed in his former capacity as public servant. [514 D- E] The submission that if the accused has held or holds a plurality of offices occupying each one of which makes him a public servant, under s. 6 sanction of each one of the competent authorities entitled to remove him from each one of the offices held by him, would be necessary and if anyone of the competent authorities fails or declines to grant sanction, the court is precluded or prohibited from taking cognizance of the offence with which the public servant is charged is not acceptable. Such an interpretation of s.6 would render it as a shield to an unscrupulous public servant. Someone interested in protecting may shift him from one office of public servant to another and there by defeat the process of law. Such an interpretation is contrary to all cannons of construction and leads to an absurd end product which of necessity must be avoided. [520G; 518F-C] The State (S.P.E. Hyderabad) v. Anr Commodore Kailash Chand, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 697, referred to and partly dissented from.

The expression 'office' in the three sub-clauses of s 6(1) clearly denotes that office which the public servant misused or abused for corrupt motives for which he is to be prosecuted and in respect of which a sanction lo prosecute him is necessary by the competent authority entitled to remove him from that office which he has abused. The sanction to prosecute a public servant can be given by an authority competent to remove him from the office which he has misused or abused because that authority alone would be able to know whether there has been a misuse or abuse of the office by the public servant and not some rank outsider. The authority entitled to grant sanction must apply its mind to the facts of the case, evidence collected and other incidental facts before according sanction. A grant of sanction is not an idle formality but a solemn and sacrosanct act which removes the umbrella of protection of government servants against frivolous prosecutions and the aforesaid requirements must therefore, be strictly complied with before any prosecution could be launched against public servants. Therefore, it is implicit in s.6 that sanction of that competent authority alone would be necessary which is competent to remove the public servant from the office which he is alleged to have misused or abused for corrupt motive and for which a prosecution is intended to be launched against him. [516H; 517A-D] Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed v. State of A. P., [1979] 2 S.C.R.

1007, referred to.

499 The finding of the Special Judge that the respondent being M.L.A. was a public servant within clauses (12)(a) (3) and (7) of s.21 I.P.C. and sanction of the Legislative Assembly to prosecute him was necessary, is not correct. A person would be a public servant under clause (12)(a) of s.

21 I.P.C. if he falls under any of the following three categories: (i) if he is in the service of the Government;

or (ii) if he is hl the pay of the Government; or (iii) if he is remunerated by fees or commission for the performance of any public duty, by the Government. Looking into the history and evolution of s.21 I.P.C. as traced and adopted as an external aid to construction, it is clear that M.L.A. was not and is not a 'public servant' within the meaning of expression in any of the clauses of s. 21 I.P.C. Assuming that it would not be legally sound or correct according to well-accepted cannon of construction of a statue of construe s. 21(12)(a) by mere historical evolution of the section, the constitutionally valid approach would be to look at the language employed in the section to ascertain whether M.L.A. is a public servant within the meaning of the expression in that section. Depending upon the context, 'or'. The use of the expression 'or' in the context in which it is used in cl.(12) (a) does appear to be a disjunctive. Therefore, those would be a public servant. The question is whether M.L.A. falls in under any of the above three categories? It was concerned that M.L.A. is not the service of the Government but it was contended that M.L.A. is in the pay of the Government. Undoubtedly, M.L.A. receives a salary and allowances his capacity as M.L.A. under the relevant statute. But does it make him a person 'in the pay of the Government'? The word 'pay' standing by itself is open to various shades of meaning and when the word is used in a phrase in the pay of' it is more likely to have a different connotation than when standing by itself. The phrase "in the pay of' would ordinarily import the element of employment or paid employment or employed and paid by the employer. The phrase does not import of necessity a master-servant relationship between the person receiving the pay and the Government as payer. Next what does the expression 'Government' in cl. (12)(a) of s. 21 I.P.C. connote ? Section 17 I.P.C. provides that the word "Government' denotes the Central Government or the Government of a State.

Sec. 71 I.P.C. provides that 'every expression which is explained in any part of the Code, is used in every part of the Code in conformity with the explanation'. Let it be noted that unlike the modern statute s.7 does not provide unless the context otherwise indicate', a phrase that prefaces the dictionary clauses of a modern statute.

Therefore, the expression "Government' in s. 21(12)(a) must either mean the Central Government or the Government of a State. The Central Government being out of considering the question is whether M.L.A. is the pay of the Government of a State or is remunerated by fees for the performance of any public duty by the Government of a State. Even though M.L.A. receives pay and allowances, he is not in the pay of the state Government because legislature of a State cannot be comprehended in the expression 'State Government'. This conclusion would govern also the third part of c. (12)(a) i.e. 'remunerated by fees for performance of any public duty by the Government. Therefore, if M.L.A. is not in the pay of the Government in the sense of executive government or is not remunerated by fees for performance of any public duty by the exe- 500 cutive government, certainly, he would not be comprehended in the expression 'public servant' within the meaning of the expression in cl. (12)(a). He is thus not a public servant within the meaning of the expression in cl. (12)(a). This conclusion rein forces the earlier conclusion reached after examining the historical evolution of cl. (12)(a): [537 A B; 536G; E; H; 537 H;E; 539 E; 541 A; D-F; 543 E; 551 A-B] Evolution of Parliamentary Privileges by S. K. Nag ;

Legislative Bodies Corrupt Practices Act, 1925; Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 by Sethi and Anand P.60; Santhanam Committee Report dt. 31-3-1964; Lok Sabha Debates (Third Series Vol. 35, Cls. 729 and 731; The Anti-Corruption Laws (Amendment) Bill, 1964 (enacted as Act 40 of 1964); G.A. Monerop v. The State of Ajmer, [1959] S.C.R. 682; The State of Ajmer v. Shivji Lal [1959] supp. 2 S.C.R. 739;

Prabhashanker Dwivedi and Anr. v. The State of Gujarat, AIR 1970 Gujart, AIR 1970 Gujarat 97; State of Gujart v. Manshanker Prabhashanker Dwivedi, [1971] 1 S.C.R. 313; Green v. Premier Glynrohonwy State Co. Ltd, [1928] 1 K.B. 8561 at 568; Babi Manmohan Das Shah & Ors. v. Bishnu Das, [1967] 1 S.C.R. 836 at 839; Kamta Prasad Aggarwal etc. Executive Engineer, Ballabgarh & Anr., [1974] 2 S.C.R. 827; M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India, [1979] 3 S.C.R. 254;

Costituent Assembly debates, Vol. VII p. 984; Rai Shib Ram jawaya Kapur & Ors. v. The State of Punjab [1975] 1 S.C.R. 225 at p. 236; Shamsher Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 841; Sardari Lalv. Union of India & Ors.

[1971] 3 S.C.R. 461; His Majesty the King v. Boston 7 Ors., [1923-24] 33 Commonwealth Law Report 386.....82; Earskine May Parhamentary Practice 20 edition, p. 149, referred to The Submission that the accused would be a public servant within the meaning of the expression any person empowered by law to discharge any adjudicatory functions, in cl. (3) of s.21 I.P.C. must be rejected. Participation in a debate on a motion of breach of privilege or for taking action for contempt of the House and voting thereon in a constitutional function discharged by the members and therefore, it cannot be said that such adjudicatory functions if it can be so styled, constitutes adjudicatory function undertaken by M.L.A. as empowered by law. [554 E-F] Special Ref. No. 1 of 1966, [1965] 1 S.C.R. 413 at pages 490, 491 and 472; I.C. Golaknath v. State of Punajab, [1967] 2 S.C.R. 672; Sripadangalavaru v. State of Kerala and Anr.; [1973] Supp. S.C.R 1 referred to.

The submission that M.L.A. would be a public servant within cl. (7) of s.21 I.P.C. must be rejected. cl. (7) takes within its ambit 'every person who holds any office by virtue of which he is empowered to place or keep any person in confinement. Broadly stated the expression comprehends police and prison authorities or those under an obligation by law or by virtue of office to take into custody and keep in confinement any person. To say that M.L.A. by virtue of his office is performing 'policing or prison officers' duties would be apart from doing violence to language lowering him in status. Additionally cl.(7) does not speak of any adjudicatory function. lt appears to comprehend situations where as preliminary to or an end product of an adjudicatory function in a criminal case, which may lead to imposition of a prison sentence, and a Person in exercise of the duty to be discharged by him by virtue of his office places or keeps any person in confinement. [554G, 555 F-H] In view of the finding that M.L.A. is not a public servant under clauses (12)(a), (3) and (7) of s.21 I.P.C. and no sanction under s.6 of the Prevention of Corruption 501 Act, 1947 is necessary to prosecute him. it is not necessary to ascertain which would be the authority competent to sanction prosecution of M.L.A. [557 C] In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint are all to the effect that the accused misused or abused his office as Chief Minister for corrupt motives. By the time the Court was called upon to take cognizance of those offences, the accused had ceased to hold the office of Chief Minister. The sanction to prosecute him was granted by the Governor of Maharashtra but this aspect is irrelevant for concluding that no sanction was necessary to prosecute him under s.6 on the offences alleged to have been committed by the accused. Assuming that as M.L.A. the accused would be a public servant under s.21, in the absence of any allegation that he misused or abused his office as M.L.A. that aspect becomes immaterial. Further s.6 postulates existence of a valid sanction for prosecution of a public servant for offences punishable under s. 161, 164, 165 I.P.C. and s.5 of the 1947 Act, if they are alleged to have been committed by a public servant. In view of the finding that M.L.A. is not a public servant within the meaning of the expression in s.21 I.P.C., no sanction under s.6 is necessary to prosecute him for the offences alleged to have been committed by him.

[556 G; 557 A-B]

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal no. 356 of 1983 From the judgment and order dated 25-7-83 of the Special judge, Bombay in Special Case No. 24 of 1983.

#AND Transferred Case No. 348 of 1983 AND Transferred Case No 348 of 1983 Ram Jethmalani P.R. Vakil, Ms. Rani Jethmalani, Mukesh Jethmalani, O.P. Malviya, Shailendra Bhardwaj and Harish Jagatlani for the appellant.

Dr. L.M. Singhvi, Dalveer Bhandari, A.M. Singhvi, S.S. Parkar, H. Bhardwaj, U.N. Bhandari, H.M. Singh, Ranbir Singh and S.G. Hasnain for the respondent Ashok Desai and Mrs. J. Wad for the petitioner in T.C. No. 348 of 1983.

M.N. Shroff for State of Maharashtra K. Parasaran, Attorney General, Ms. A. Subhashini, Gopal Subramanian, R.N. Poddar and C.V. Subba Rao for Union of India.

502 The Judgment of the Court was delivered DESAI, J. Respondent Abdul Rehman Antulay (hereinafter referred to as the accused) was the Chief Minister of the State of Maharashtra from 1980 till he submitted his resignation on January 20, 1982, which became effective from January 20, 1982. He thus ceased. to hold the office of the Chief Minister from January 20, 1982 but continues to be a sitting member of the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly till today.

As the contentions canvassed before this Court are mainly questions of law, facts at this stage having a peripheral relevance in the course of discussion, it is unnecessary to set out the prosecution case as disclosed in the complaint filed by complainant Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak (complainant for short) in detail save and except few a pertinent and relevant allegations. In the process the brief history or the litigation may also be traced.

The complainant moved the Governor of Maharashtra by his application dated September 1, 1981 requesting him to grant sanction to prosecute the accused as required by Sec. 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 ('1947 Act' for short) for various offences alleged to have been committed by the accused and neatly set out in the application.

Complainant then filed the first complaint in the Court of Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 28th Esplanade, Bombay on September 11, 1981 being Criminal Case No. 76 Misc. of 1981 against the accused and others known and unknown collaborators alleging that the accused in his capacity as Chief Minister and thereby a public servant within the meaning of Sec. 21 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) has committed offences under Secs. 161, 165 IPC and Sec. 5 of the 1947 Act, Sec. 384 and Sec. 420 IPC read with Secs. 109 and 120-B IPC. The complaint runs into 31 closely typed pages and carried the list of 37 witnesses. The learned Metropolitan magistrate invited the complainant to satisfy him as to how the complaint for offences under Secs. 161, 165 IPC and Sec. 5 of the 1947 Act is maintainable without a valid sanction as contemplated by Sec. 6 of 1971 Act and ultimately held that in the absence of a valid sanction from the Governor of Maharashtra, the complaint filed by the complainant for the aforementioned three offences was not maintainable. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate accordingly held as per order dated October 6, 1981 that the complaint was maintainable only for offences alleged to have been committed by the accused under. Secs. 384 and 420 read with Secs. 109 and 120B of the IPC and directed that the case be fixed for 503 examining the complainant as required by Sec. 200 of the Cr. P.C. The complainant questioned the correctness of this order in Special Criminal Application No. 1742 of 1981 filed in the High Court of Judicature at Bombay.

In the meantime, another development had taken place which may be briefly noticed. One Shri P.B. Samant, who has also filed an identical complaint against the accused along with several others filed a Writ Petition No. 1165 of 1981 in the High Court of Judicature at Bombay challenging the method of distribution of ad hoc allotment of cement in the State of Maharashtra as being contrary to the rule of law and probity in public life. The accused as the second respondent in this petition, the first and third respondents being the State of Maharashtra and Union of India respectively. By an exhaustive speaking order dated September 23, 1981, a learned Single Judge of the High Court granted rule nisi and made it returnable on November 23, 1981. The writ petition came up for hearing before another learned Single Judge who by his judgment dated January 12, 1982 made the rule absolute. Probably as a sequel to this decision of the High Court, the accused tendered his resignation as Chief Minister on the same day and when the resignation was accepted he ceased to hold the office of the Chief Minister with effect from January 20, 1982.

Special Criminal Application' No. 1942 of 1981 filed by the complainant against the order of the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate was dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court on April 12, 1982. Not the accused but the State of Maharashtra preferred an appeal by special leave under Art. 136 of the Constitution against the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court rejecting the special criminal application; This. Court rejected the application for special leave at the threshold on July 28, 1982. (See State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak and others) Promptly, on the heels of the judgment of this Court, the Governor of Maharashtra on the same day granted the sanction under Sec. 6 of the 1947 Act to prosecute the accused in respect of specific charges set out in the order according sanction. Armed with this sanction, the complainant filed a fresh complaint in the Court of the Special Judge, Bombay registered as Criminal Case No. 24 of 1982 against the accused as Accused No. 1 and others known and unknown. In this complaint it is broadly alleged that the accused who was the Chief Minister of the State of Maharashtra between the period August 1980 to September 1981 conceived scheme of aggrandisement involving obtaining of funds from the members of the public and putting them substantially under his own control for the disbursal of the funds so obtained. The complaint proceeded to refer to the setting up of various trusts and alleged that the corner- stone of the scheme involved receipt by the accused of illegal gratification other than legal remuneration as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act, or for showing or forbearing to show in the exercise of his official functions, favour or disfavor to persons, or for rendering or attempting to render any service or disservice to such persons who dealt with the State Government in general and with public servants who formed part of the Government. It was specifically alleged that the scheme devised by the accused was a flagrant abuse of his official position as Chief Minister for obtaining control over funds which would be used for purposes conducive to the interest of the accused himself. The complainant proceeded to set out the abuse of office of Chief Minister by the accused citing various alleged instances such as distribution of adhoc cement contrary to law and the binding circulars, granting liquor Licences as and by way of distribution of Government largesse, issuing no objection certificates for letting out premises by obtaining a price for the same. The running thread through various allegations is that the accused by abusing or misusing his office of Chief Minister obtained or attempted to obtain gratification other than legal remunerations a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act as Chief Minister or for showing or forbearing to show in the exercise of his official functions, favour or disfavour to persons etc. To this complaint, the order granting sanction to prosecute the accused made by the Governor of Maharashtra was annexed and produced. After recording the verification of the complaint, the learned Special Judge took cognizance of the offences and issued process by directing a bailable warrant to be issued in the sum of Rs. 10,000 with one surety and made it returnable on September 3, 1983.

On the process being served the accused appeared and sought exemption from personal appearance which was granted for a day and the case was adjourned to October 18, 1982 for recording the evidence of the complainant and his witnesses for the prosecution.

When the case was called out on October 18, 1982 an application was moved on behalf of the accused inter alia contending that the Court of the learned special Judge had no jurisdiction in view of the provision contained in Sec. 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 505 1952 ('1952 Act' for short) and that no cognizance can be taken of offences punishable under Secs. 161, 165 IPC and Sec. 5 of the 1947 Act on a private complaint. The case was at that time pending in the Court of the special Judge presided over by one Shri P.S. Bhutta. The learned special Judge by his order dated October 20, 1982 rejected both the contentions and set down the case for November 29, 1982 for recording evidence of the prosecution. The learned special Judge made it abundantly clear that under no circumstance the case would be adjourned on the next occasion and if any revision or appeal is intended to be filed against the order, the learned counsel for the accused should give advance notice to the learned counsel for the complainant.

The accused filed Criminal Revision Application No. 510 of 1982 against the order of the learned special Judge dated October 20, 1982 rejecting his application. On January 16, 1983, the Government of Maharashtra issued a notification in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 7 of 1952 Act and in modification of the earlier Government order dated April 12, 1982, directing that in Greater Bombay on and after the date of the notification the offences specified in sub-sec. (1) of sec. 6 of the 1947 Act which are investigated by the Anti-Corruption Bureau of Police in Greater Bombay, except special cases No. 14, 15 and 16 of 1977 and Special Case No. 31 of 1979 to 37 of 1979 (both inclusive) shall continue to be tried by Shri R.B. Sule. The net outcome of this notification was that Special Case No. 24 of 1982 pending in the Court of Special Judge Shri P.S. Bhutta would stand transferred to the Court of Shri R.B. Sule, Additional Special Judge for Greater Bombay.

On a reference by the learned Single Judge, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court heard and dismissed on march 7, 1983 Criminal Revision Application No. 510 of 1982 filed by the accused against the order of learned special Judge Shri P.S. Bhutta dated October 20, 1982. The Division Bench in terms held that the private com plaint was maintainable and as the required notification has already been issued, Shri R.B. Sule will have jurisdiction to try Special Case No. 24 of 1982. The learned trial Judge Shri R.B. Sue on receipt of the record of the case issued a notice on April 27, 1982 calling upon all parties to appear before him on April 21, 1983. lt appears on July 8, 1783, two applications were moved on behalf of the accused urging the learned trial Judge; (i) to discharge the accused inter alia on the ground that the charge was groundless and that even though the accused 506 had ceased to be the Chief Minister, on the date of taking cognizance of the offences, he was a sitting member of the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly and as such a public servant and in that capacity a sanction to prosecute him would have to be given by the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly and the sanction granted by the Governor would not be valid in this behalf. The second petition requested the learned Judge to postponed the case till the petition for special, leave field by the accused against the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court holding that the private complaint was maintainable is disposed of Both these applications came up for hearing before Shri R.B. Sule, who by his order dated July 25, 1783 upheld the contention of the accused that M.L.A was a public servant within the meaning of the expression in Sec. 21 (12) (a) IPC and that unless a sanction to prosecute him by the authority competent to remove him from his office as M.L.A. was obtained which in the opinion of the learned Special Judge.

was Maharashtra Legislative Assembly the accused is entitled to be discharged. So saying, the learned Judge discharged the accused. The complainant filed a petition for special leave to appeal No. 1850 of 1983 and a Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 145 of 3983 against the decision. Of the learned special Judge. Both these matters came up before this Court on August 3, 1983 when the matters were adjourned to August 10, 1983 to enable the petitioner, original complainant to file a criminal revision application against the order of the learned special Judge in the High Court. Accordingly, the complainant filed Criminal Revision Application No. 354 of 1983 in the High Court against the order of learned special Judge Shri R.B. Sule. This Court ultimately granted special leave to appeal as also rule nisi in the writ petition. By an order made by this Court, the criminal revision application filed by the petitioner stands transferred to this Court.

It may be mentioned that this Court has granted special leave to the accused against the decision of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court holding that a private complaint is maintainable etc. Criminal Appeal No. 247 of 1983 arising out of the said special leave petition is being heard along with this matter but that will be dealt with separately.

While discharging the accused, the learned special Judge held that the material date for deciding the applicability of Sec. 6 of the 1947 Act is the date on which the court is asked to take cognizance of the offence.

Proceeding further it was held that even though the accused had ceased to hold the office of the Chief Minister on the date 507 on which cognizance was taken by the learned special Judge, Shri Bhutta, yet on that date he was a sitting M.L.A. and was therefore a public servant within the meaning of the expression in Sec. 21 (12)(a) in as much as the M.L.A. is a person in the pay of the Government or at any rate he is remunerated by fees for performance of public duty by the Government and therefore, he is a public servant. As a corollary, the learned Judge held that as on the date of taking cognizance of the offence the accused was a public servant, he could not be prosecuted without a valid sanction as contemplated by Sec. 6 of the 1947 Act. The learned Judge further held that the M.L.A. holds an office and he can be removed from that office by the Legislative Assembly because the latter has the power to expel a member which would amount to removal from office. The learned Judge further held that as there was no sanction by the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly to prosecute the accused and as the Governor had no power to sanction prosecution of the accused in his capacity as M.L.A. the accused is entitled to be discharged for the of offences under Secs. 161, 165, 120-B, 109 IPC and Sec. 5 of the 1947 Act for want of a valid sanction for prosecution, and in respect of the other offences, the accused is entitled to be discharged on the ground that the court of the special Judge had no jurisdiction to try the accused for those offences. In respect of those other offences, the learned Judge directed the complaint to be returned to the, complainant for presenting it to the proper court. It may be mentioned that by a common order in Special Case No. 3 of 1983 instituted upon the complaint of Mr. P.B. Samant, the accused was discharged.

Sec. 21 IPC defines a 'Public Servant'. The relevant clauses may be extracted as under:

"21. The words 'public servant' denote a person falling under any of the descriptions hereinafter following, namely:- Third-Every Judge including any person empowered by law to discharge, whether by himself or as a member of any body of persons, any adjudicatory functions.

Seventh: Every person who holds any office by virtue of which he is empowered to place or keep any person in confinement Twelfth-Every person- (a) in the service or pay of the Government or remunerated 508 by fees or commission for the performance of any public duty by the Government;

(b) in the service or Pay of a local authority, a corporation establishes by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act or a Government Company as defined in Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956.

Explanation 1: Persons falling under any of the above descriptions are public servants, whether appointed by the Government or not" Sec. 17 defines the expression 'Government to denote the Central Government or the Government of a State. Sec 14 defines the expression 'servant of Government to denote any officer or servant continued, appointed or employed in India by or under the authority of Government.

Sec. 19 defines the word 'Judge' as under:

"The word "Judge" denotes not only every person who is officially designated as a Judge, but also every person Who is empowered by law to give, in any legal proceeding, civil, or criminal, a definitive judgment, or a judgment which if not appealed against, would be definitive, or a judgment which, if confirmed by some other authority, would be definitive, or who is one of a body of person, which body of persons is empowered by law to give such a judgment."..

Sec. 7 provides that 'every expression which is explained in any part of the Code (IPC), is used in every part of this Code in conformity with the explanation.' Sec. 5 of the 1947 Act defines the offence of criminal misconduct and a public servant who commits an offence of criminal misconduct is liable to be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year but which may extend to seven years and shall also be- liable to fine.

Sec. 6 provides for a sanction as a pre-condition for a valid prosecution for offences punishable under Sec. 161, 164, 165 IPC and Sec. 5 of the 1947 Act. It reads as under:

"6(1) No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Section 161 or Section 165 of the Indian Penal Code, or under sub-section (2) of Section S of this Act, alleged to have been committee by a public servant, except with the previous sanction, (a) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with affairs of the Union and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government, (b) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of a State and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government, (c) in the case of ally other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his office.

(2) Where for any reason whatsoever any doubt arises whether the previous sanction as required under sub-section (1) should be given by the Central or State Government or any other authority, such sanction shall be given by that Government or authority which would have been competent to remove the public servant from his office at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed".

With a view to eradicating the evil of bribery and corruption, the Government of India set up a Committee to make recommendations for the improvement of the laws relating to bribery and corruption under the Chairmanship of Dr. Bakshi Tek Chand. The recommendations of the Committee led to the enactment of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 By the 1952 Act, power was conferred on the State Government to appoint special offences as may be necessary for such area or areas as may be specified in the notification to try the following offences namely; offences punishable under Sections 161, 162, 163, 164, 165 and 165A IPC and Sec. 5 of the 1947 Act and any conspiracy to commit or any attempt to commit or any abetment of 510 any of the offences hereinabove mentioned; See. 7 conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the special Judges appointed under See. 6. Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 7 provides for specific territorial jurisdiction of a special Judge. Sub-sec. (3) conferred power on the special Judge also to try any offence other than an offence specified in. Sec. 6 with which the accused may, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, be charged at the same trial. Sec. 8 prescribed the procedure to be followed by the special Judge in the trial of the offences. The Court of special Judge was deemed to be a Court of Sessions trying cases without a jury within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court for the purposes of Chapter XXXI and XXXII of the Code of Criminal Procedure as provided by Sec. 9.

The appellant, the original complainant, contends that the learned special Judge was in error in holding that M.L.A. is a public servant within the meaning of the expression under Sec. 21(12)(a). The second submission was that if the first question is answered in the affirmative, it would be necessary to examine whether a sanction as contemplated by Sec. 6 is necessary. If the answer to the second question is in the affirmative it would be necessary to identify the sanctioning authority. The broad sweep of the argument was that the complainant in his complaint has alleged that the accused abused his office of Chief Minister and not his office, if any, as M.L.A. and therefore, even if on the date of taking cognizance of the offence the accused was M.L.A., nonetheless no sanction to prosecute him is necessary as envisaged by Sec. 6 of the 1947 Act. lt was urged that as the allegation against the accused in the complaint is that he abused or misused his office as Chief Minister and as by the time the complaint was filed and cognizance was taken, he had ceased to hold the office of the Chief Minister no sanction under Sec. 6 was necessary to prosecute him for the offences alleged to have been committed by him when the accused was admittedly a public servant in his capacity as Chief Minister.

On behalf of the accused, it was contended that not only the accused would be a public servant as falling within the meaning of tile expression in Sec. 21(12)(a) but he would also be a public servant within the contemplation of clauses (3) and (7) of Sec. 21. The next limb of the argument was that if an accused hold plurality of Offices, each of which confers on him the status of a public servant and even if it is alleged that he has abused or misused one office as a public servant notwithstanding, the fact that there no allegation of abuse or misuse of other office held as public servant, sanction of each authority competent to remove him from each of the offices would be a sine qua non under Sec. 6 before a valid prosecution can be launched against the accused.

On these rival contentions some vitat and some not so vital points arise for consideration, some easy of answer and some none-too easy. For their scientific and logical treatment they may be formulated.

(a) What is the relevant date with reference to which a valid sanction is a pre-requisite for the prosecution of a public servant for offences enumerated in Sec. 6 of the 1947 Act? (b) If the accused holds plurally of offices occupying each of which makes him a public servant, is sanction of each one of the competent authorities entitled to remove him from each one of the offices held by him necessary and if anyone of the competent authorities fails or declines to grant sanction, is the Court precluded or prohibited from taking cognizance of the offence with which the public servant is charged ? (c) Is it implicit in Sec. 6 of the 1947 Act that sanction of that competent authority alone is necessary, which is entitled to remove the public servant from the office which is alleged to have been abused for misused for corrupt motives? (d) Is M.L.A. a public servant within the meaning of the expression in Sec. 21(12)(a) IPC ? (e) Is M.L.A. a public servant within the meaning of the expression in Sec.21(3) and Sec. 21(7) ICP ? (f) Is sanction as contemplated by Sec. 6 of the 1947 Act necessary for prosecution of M.L.A. ? (g) If the answer to (f) is in the affirmative, which is the Sanctioning Authority competent to remove M.L.A. from the office of Member of the Legislative Assembly? Re. (a): The 1947 Act was enacted, as its long title shows, to make more effective provision for the prevention of bribery and corruption. Indisputably, therefore, the provisions of the Act must receive 512 such construction at the hands of the court as would advance the object and purpose underlying the Act and at any rate not defeat it. If the words of the statute are clear and unambiguous, it is the plainest duty of the court to give effect to the natural meaning of the words used in the provision. The question of construction arises only in the event of an ambiguity or the plain meaning of the words used in the statute would be self-defeating. The court is entitled to ascertain the intention of the legislature to remove the ambiguity or the plain meaning of the words used in the statute would be self-defeating. The court is entitled to ascertain the intention of the legislature to remove the ambiguity by construing the provision of the statute as a whole keeping in view what was the mischief when the statute was enacted and to remove which the legislature enacted the statute. This rule of construction is so universally accepted that it need not be supported by precedents. Adopting this rule of construction, whenever a question of construction arises upon ambiguity or where two views are possible of a provision, it would be the duty of the court to adopt that construction which would advance the object underlying the Act namely, to make effective provision for the prevention of bribery and corruption and at any rate not defeat it.

Section 6 bars the court from taking cognizance of the offences therein enumerated allegel to have been committed by a public servant except with the previous sanction of the competent authority empowered to grant the requisite sanction. Sec. 8 of 1952 Act prescribes procedure and powers of special Judge empowered to try offences set out in Sec. 6 of 1947 Act. Construction of Sec. 8 has been a subject of vigorous debate in the cognate appeal. In this appeal we will proceed on the assumption that a special Judge can take cognizance of offences he is competent to try on a private complaint. Sec. 6 creates a bar to the court from taking cognizance of offences therein enumerated except with the previous sanction of the authority set out in clause (a), (b) & (c) of sub-Sec. (1). The object underlying such provision was to save the public servant from the harassment of frivolous or unsubstantiated allegations. The policy underlying Sec. 6 and similar sections, is that there should not be unnecessary harassment of public servant. (Sec C.R. Bansi v. State of Maharashtra(1)). Existence thus of a valid sanction is a pre-requisite to the taking of cognizance of the enumerated offences alleged to have been committed by a public servant. The bar is to the taking of cognizance of offence by the court. Therefore, when the court is called upon to take cognizances of such offences, it must enquire whether there is a valid sanction to prosecute the public servant for the offence alleged to have been committed by 513 him as public servant. Undoubtedly, the accused must be a public servant when he is alleged to have committed the offence of which he is accused because Sections 161, 164, 165 IPC and Sec. 5(2) of the 1947 Act clearly spell out that the offences therein defined can be committed by a public servant. If it is contemplated to prosecute public servant who has committed such offences, when the court is called upon to take cognizance of the offence, a sanction ought to be available otherwise the court would have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence. A trial without a valid sanction where one is necessary under Sec. 6 has been held to be a trial without jurisdiction by the court. (See R.R. Chari v. State of U.P.(1) and S.N. Bose v. State of Bihar(2) In Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed v: State of A.P.(3), it was held that a trial without a sanction renders the proceedings ab initio void. But the terminus a quo for a valid sanction is the time when the court is called upon to the cognizance of the offence. If therefore, when the offence is alleged to have been committed, the accused was a public servant but by the time the court is called upon to take cognizance of the offence committed by him as public servant, he has ceased to be public servant, no sanction would be necessary for taking cognizance of the offence against him. This approach is in accord with the policy underlying Sec. 6 in that a public servant is not to be exposed to harassment of a frivolous or speculative prosecution. If he has ceased to be a public servant in the meantime, this vital consideration ceases to exist. As a necessary corollary, if the accused has ceased to be a public servant at the time when the court is called upon to take cognizance of the offence alleged to have been committed by him as public servant, Sec. 6 is not attracted.

This aspect is not more res integra. In S.A. Venkataraman v. The State(4) this Court held as under:

"In or opinion, in giving effect to the ordinary meaning of the words used in s. 6 of the Act, the conclusion is inevitable that at the time a court is asked to take cognizance not only the offence must have been committed by a public servant but the person accused is still a public servant removable from his office by a competent authority before the provisions of s. 6 can apply. In the present appeals, admittedly, the appellants had cease to be public servants alleged to have been committed by them as public servants.

Accordingly, the provisions of s.6 of the Act 514 did not apply and the prosecution against them was not vitiated by the lack of a previous sanction by a competent authority".

And this view has been consistently followed in C.R. Bansi's case and K.S. Dharmadatan v. Central Government & Ors.(1) It therefore appears well-settled that the relevant date with reference to which a valid sanction is sine qua non for taking cognizance of an offence committed by a public servant required by Sec. 6 is the date on which the court is called upon to take cognizance of the offence of which he is accused.

The accused tendered resignation of his office as Chief Minister and ceased to hold the office of Chief Minister with effect from January 20, 1982. The complaint from which the present appeal arises and which was registered as Criminal Case No. 24/82 appears to have been filed on August 9, 1982 and the cognizance was taken by the learned Magistrate on the same day. It unquestionably transpires that long before the date on which the cognizance was taken by the learned special Judge, the accused had ceased to hold the office of the Chief Minister and as such had ceased to be a public servant. In other words, he was not public servant in his capacity as Chief Minister on August 9, 1982 when the court took cognizance of the offence against him. A fortiori no sanction as contemplated by Sec. 6 was necessary before cognizance of the offence could be taken against the accused for offences alleged to have been committed in his former capacity as public servant. Re: (b) and (c): It was strenuously contended that if the accused has held or holds a plurality of offices occupying each one of which makes him a public servant, sanction of each one of the competent authorities entitled to remove him from each one of the offices held by him, would be necessary and if anyone of the competent authorities fails or declines to grant sanction, the court is precluded or prohibited for taking cognizance of the offence with the public servant is charged. This submission was sought to be repelled urging that it is implicit in Sec. 6 that sanction of that authority alone is necessary which is competent to remove the public servant from the office which he is alleged to have misused or abused for corrupt motives. Sec. 6(1)(c) is the only provision relied upon on behalf of the accused to contend that as M.L.A. he was a public servant on the date of taking cognizance of the offences, and therefore, sanction of that authority comepetent to remove him from that office is a since qua non for taking cognizance of offences. Sec. 6 (1)(c) bars taking cognizance of an 515 offence alleged to have been committed by public servant except with the previous sanction of the authority competent to remove him from his office.

In order to appreciate the rival contentions the fact situation relevant to the topic under discussion may be noticed. At a general election held in 1980, accused was elected as Member of the Legislative Assembly of Maharashtra State from Shrivardhan Assembly Constituency. He was appointed as Chief Minister of Maharashtra State, and he was holding that office at the time he is alleged to have committed the offences set out in the complaint filed against him. He tendered his resignation of the office of the Chief Minister and ceased to hold that office with effect from January 20, 1982. However, he continued to retain his seat as M.L.A. The contention is that as M.L.A., he was a public servant, a submission seriously controverted, which we would presently examine and that he was such public servant even on the date on which the court took cognizance of the offences set out in the complaint without a valid sanction and therefore the court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offences. In support of the submission it was urged that if the policy underlying Sec. 6 and similar provisions like Sec. 197 Cr. P.C. was to spare the harassment to the public servant consequent upon launching of frivolous or speculative prosecutions, the same would be defeated if it is held that the sanction to prosecute is necessary from an authority competent to remove the public servant from the office which he is alleged to have misused or abused. Proceeding along this line it was urged that even if the accused has ceased to be a public servant in one capacity by ceasing to hold the office which he is alleged to have misused or abused yet if he continued to be a public servant in another capacity, the authority competent to remove him from the latter office would have to decide whether the prosecution is frivolous or speculative and in larger public interest to thwart it by declining to grant the sanction. It was also urged that if a public servant has to discharge some public duty and perform some public functions and he is made to cool his heels in law courts, public interest would suffer by keeping him away from his public duty and therefore, to advance the object underlying Sec. 6, the court must hold that if the public servant who is being prosecuted holds more than one public office occupying each one of which makes him public servants, a sanction to prosecute of each competent authority entitled to remove him from each office is necessitous before taking cognizance of offences against him. It was urged that this approach would advance and 516 buttress the policy underlying Sec. 6 and the contrary view would defeat the same.

Offences prescribed in Sec. 161, 164 and 165 IPC and Sec. 5 of the 1947 Act have an intimate and inseparable relation with the office of a public servant. A public servant occupies office which renders him a public servant and occupying the office carries with it the powers conferred on the office. Power generally is not conferred on an individual person. In a society governed by rule of law power is conferred on office or acquired by statutory status and the individual occupying the office or on whom status is conferred enjoys the power of office or power flowing from the status. The holder of the office alone would have opportunity to abuse or misuse the office. These sections codify a well-recognised truism that power has the tendency to corrupt. It is the holding of the office which gives an opportunity to use it for corrupt motives. Therefore, the corrupt conduct is directly attributable and flows from the power conferred on the office. This interrelation and interdependence between individual and the office he holds is substantial and not serverable. Each of the three clauses of sub-s. (1) of Sec. 6 uses the expression `office' and the power to grant sanction is conferred on the authority competent to remove the public servant from his office and Sec. 6 requires a sanction before taking cognizance of offences committed by public servant. The offence could be committed by the public servant by misusing or abusing the power of office and it is from that office, the authority must be competent to remove him so as to be entitled to grant sanction. The removal would bring about cessation of interrelation between the office and abuse by the holder of the office. The link between power with opportunity to abuse and the holder of office would be severed by removal from office. Therefore, when a public servant is accused of an offence of taking gratification other than local remuneration for doing or forbearing to do an official act (Sec. 161 IPC) or as a public servant abets offences punishable under Secs. 161 and 163 (Sec. 164 IPC) or as public servant obtains a valuable thing without consideration from person concerned in any proceeding or business transacted by such public servant (Sec. 165 IPC) or commits criminal misconduct as defined in Sec. 5 of the 1947 Act, it is implicit in the various offences that the public servant has misused or abused the power of office held by him public servant. The expression `offices' in the three sub-clauses of Sec. 6(1) would clearly denote that office which the public servant misused or abused for corrupt motives for which he is to be prosecuted and in respect of which a sanction to prosecute him is necessary by the competent authority entitled to remove him from that office which he has abused.

517 This interrelation between to office and its abuse if serered would render Sec. 6 devoid of any meaning. An this interrelation clearly provides a clue to the understanding of the provision in Sec. 6 providing for sanction by a competent authority who would be able to judge the action of the public servant before removing the bar, by granting sanction, to the taking of the cognizance of offences by the court against the public servant. Therefore, it unquestionably follows that the sanction to prosecute can be given by an authority competent to remove the public servant from the office which he has misused or abused because that authority alone would be able to know whether there has been a misuse or abuse of the office by the public servant and not some rank outsider. By a catena of decisions, it has been held that the authority entitled to grant sanction must apply its mind to the facts of the case, evidence collected and other incidental facts before according sanction. A grant of sanction is not an idle formality but a solemn and sacrosanct act which removes the umbrella of protection of government servants against frivolous prosecutions and the aforesaid requirements must therefore, be strictly complied with before any prosecution could be launched against public servants. (See Mohd. Iqbal Ahmad v. State of Andhra Pradesh). The Legislature advisedly conferred power on the authority competent to remove the public servant from the office to grant sanction for the obvious reason that that authority alone would be able, when facts and evidence are placed before him, to judge whether a serious offence is committed or the prosecution is either frivolous or speculative. That authority alone would be competent to judge whether on the facts alleged, there has been an abuse or misuse of office held by the public servant. That authority would be in a position to know what was the power conferred on the office which the public servant hold, how that power could be abused for corrupt motive and whether prima facie it has been so done. That competent authority alone would know the nature and functions discharged by the public servant holding the office and whether the same has been abused or misused. It is the vertical hierarchy between the authority competent to remove the public servant from that office and the nature of the office hold by the public servant against whom sanction is sought which would indicate a hierarchy and which would therefore, permit inference of knowledge about the functions and duties of the office and its misuse or abuse by the public servant. That is why the legislature clearly provided that that authority alone would be competent to grant sanction which is entitled to remove the public servant against whom sanction is sought from the office.

518 Now if the public servant holds two offices and he is accused of having abused one and from which he is removed but continues to hold the other which is neither alleged to have been used nor abused, is a sanction of the authority competent to remove him from the office which is neither alleged or shown to have been abused or misused necessary? The submission is that if the harassment of the public servant by a frivolous prosecution and criminal waste of his time in law courts keeping him away from discharging public duty, are the objects underlying Sec. 6, the same would be defeated if it is held that the sanction of the latter authority is not necessary. The submission does not commend to use. We fail to see how the competent authority entitled to remove the public servant from an