S.P. Mittal Vs. Union of India & Ors [1982] INSC 81 (8 November 1982)
MISRA, R.B. (J) MISRA, R.B. (J) CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ) BHAGWATI, P.N.
REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) ERADI, V. BALAKRISHNA (J)
CITATION: 1983 AIR 1 1983 SCR (1) 729 1983 SCC (1) 51 1982 SCALE (2)1001
CITATOR INFO :
RF 1984 SC 51 (8A) R 1987 SC 748 (19) RF 1992 SC1277 (22)
ACT:
Right to freedom of religion and to manage religious affairs-Constitution of India, 1950 Articles 25 and 26-Shri Aurobindo's teachings cannot be said to be of a religious nature-Aurobindo Society and the Auroville township do not fall within the meaning of religious denomination so as to be violative of Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution.
Words & Phrases-'Religion' and 'Religious denomination' explained.
Auroville (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1980 (Act LIX of 1980) Preamble-Parliamentary competency to enact the Act- Whether inconsistent and in conflict with the provisions of the West Bengal Societies Registration Act, 1961 (Act XXVI of 1961) Sections 22 & 23 containing in built self-contained provisions for dealing with the management of the registered societies-Constitution of India 1950 Article 245, Schedule VII, List I Entry 32-Functions of the Lists, Explained.
Auroville (Emergency Provisions) Act 1980 providing for taking over the management only of Auroville township and its activities for a limited period is not violative either of Article 14, Articles 25 and 26 or Articles 29 and 30 of the Constitution.
HEADNOTE:
Sri Aurobindo, one of the Indian sages and philosphers, after a brilliant academic and administrative career engaged himself for sometime in political activities and revolutionary literary efforts, but later on gave them up to concentrate himself with the life of medition and integral yoga at Pondicherry, in Tamil Nadu. Madam M. Alfassa a French Lady, who came to be known as the Mother became a disciple of Sri Aurobindo. Very soon more and more disciples came to join him from various parts of India and abroad and thus the Aurobindo Ashram came into being. The disciples and devoted followers of Sri Aurobindo and the Mother, with a view to propagate and practise the ideals and beliefs of Sri Aurobindo formed a Society called Sri Aurobindo Society in the year 1960, which at all material times was and is still a society duly registered under the provisions of the West Bengal Societies Registration 730 Act, 1961. This Society is completely distinct from Aurobindo Ashram in Pondicherry. The Society was established and registered for the purpose of carrying out in and outside India the several objects stated in the memorandum of the Society.
The management of the Society vested in its Executive Committee. Rules and regulations have been duly framed for the management of the Society and also for safe custody and protection of its assets, properties and funds.
Sri Aurobindo Society preaches and propagates the ideals and teachings of Sri Aurobindo, inter alia, through its numerous centres scattered throughout India by way of weekly meetings of its members.
The Mother as the founder-president also conceived of a project of setting up a cultural township known as 'Auroville' where people of different countries are expected to engage in cultural, educational and scientific and other pursuits aiming at human unity. The Society has been a channel of funds for setting up the cultural township known as Auroville.
At the initiative of the Government of India, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation being of the opinion that the Auroville project would contribute to international understanding and promotion of peace sponsored the project by proposing a resolution to this effect at its General Conference in 1966.
This resolution was unanimously adopted at this conference.
By a further resolution passed in 1968 the UNESCO invited its member States and international non-governmental organisations to participate in the development of Auroville as an international cultural township to bring together the values of different cultures and civilisations in harmonious environment with integrated living standards, which corresponds to man's physical and spiritual needs. In 1970 UNESCO had directed its Director-General to take such steps as may be feasible, within the budgetary provisions to promote the development of Auroville as an important international cultural programme. Sri Aurobindo Society received large funds in the shape of grants from different organisations in India and abroad for development of that township. The assistance included contributions from the State Governments of the value of Rs. 66.50 lakhs and the Central Government of the value of Rs. 26.14 lakhs.
After the death of the Mother on 17th of November, 1973 a number of problems of varying nature affecting the smooth running of the project cropped up. The Government of India on receiving complaints about mismanagement of the project and misuse of funds by Sri Aurobindo Society set up a committee under the chairmanship of the Governor of Pondicherry with representatives of the Government of Tamil Nadu and of the Ministry of Home Affairs in the Central Government to look into the matter. The Committee made a detailed scrutiny of the accounts of Sri Aurobindo Society relating to Auroville and found instances of serious irregularities in the management of the Society, mis- utilisation of its funds and their diversion to other purposes. Further, various other serious difficulties had arisen plaguing the Management of Auroville and rendering thereby any further growth of the township almost impossible.
731 In the circumstances the taking over of the management of Auroville became imperative to ensure growth of the township in tune with its objectives.
Keeping in view the international character of the project and considering the government's involvement in actively sponsoring the project through UNESCO, the growth and management of the project had become the primary responsibility of the Government of India. The ideals of the project formed India's highest aspirations, which could not be allowed to be defeated or frustrated. Sri Aurobindo society had lost complete control over the situation and the members of the Auroville approached the Government of India to give protection against oppression and victimisation at the hands of the said Society. There were internal quarrels between the various factions of Sri Aurobindo Society. There have also been instances of law and order situation.
Financial management of the projects has not been sound and several instances of mismanagement, diversion of funds have been revealed. A large sum of money was given by Sri Aurobindo Society to AURO construction-an agency whose status. is not at all defined, whose functions and capabilities for taking up large construction works also had not been made known. The Government in the circumstances could not be a silent spectator to the mismanagement of the project and internecine quarrels amongst its members, which if not checked could lead to the destruction of the project so nobly conceived. The Government, therefore, decided to issue a Presidential Ordinance. After the filing of the writ petition the ordinance has now been replaced by the Auroville (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1980.
The constitutional validity of the Act has been challenged on four grounds: (i) Parliament has no legislative competence to enact the impugned statute; (ii) The impugned Act infringes Articles 25, 26, 29 and 30 of the Constitution; (iii) The impugned Act is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution; and (iv) The Act was mala fide.
Dismissing the petitions, the Court HELD:
(Per Misra, J.) 1:1. The Parliament had the legislative competence to enact the Auroville (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1980 (Act LIX) of 1980. [770 D] 1:2. The subject matter of the impugned Act is not covered by Entry 32 of List II of the Seventh Schedule. Even if the subject matter of the impugned Act is not covered by any specific entry of List I or III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution it would in any case be covered by the residuary entry 97 of List I. [770 C-D] 1:3. The function of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution is not to confer powers. They merely demarcate the legislative fields. The Entries in the three Lists are only legislative heads or fields of legislation and the 732 power to legislate is given to appropriate legislature by Articles 245 to 248 of the Constitution. [766 H, 767 A] 1:4. The Auroville Act even incidentally does not trench upon the field covered by the West Bengal Societies Registration Act, 1961 as it is in no way related to Constitution, regulation and winding up of the Society. [770 B] R.C. Cooper v. Union of India [1970] 3 SCR 530 @ 563, applied.
Attorney General for Ontario v. Attorney General for the Dominion [1896] AC 348 @ 366-67; Union of India v. H.S. Dhillon [1972] 2 SCR 33 @ 45; Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic and Unani Tibia College v. The State of Delhi and Others [1962] 1 Supp. SCR 156; Katra Education Society v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others [1966] 3 SCR 328, referred to.
2:1. The words "religious denomination" in Article 26 of the Constitution must take their colour from the word 'religion' and if this be so, the expression "religious denomination" must also satisfy three conditions:
(i) It must be a collection of individuals who has a system of beliefs or doctrine which they regard as conducive to their spiritual well-being, that is, a common faith;
(ii) Common organisation: and (iii)Designation by a distinctive name. [774 B-D] 2:2. The term 'religion' has been judicially considered in the Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v.
Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiyar of Sri Shriur Mutt [1954] SCR 1005 and the following propositions of law laid down therein have been consistently followed in later cases including The Durgah Committee, Ajmer and Another v. Syed Hussain Ali & Others [1962] 1 SCR 383 @ 410-11 :
(1) Religion means "a system of beliefs or doctrines which are regarded by those who profess that religion as conducive to their spiritual well being";
(2) A religion is not merely an opinion, doctrine or belief. It has its outward expression in acts as well;
(3) Religion need not be theistic;
(4) "Religious denomination" means a religious sect or body having a common faith and organisation and designated by a distinctive name;
(5) A law which takes away the rights of administration from the hands of a religious denomination altogether and vests in another 733 authority would amount to violation of the right guaranteed under clause (d) of Article 26." [773 E-H, 774A] Per Majority [Misra, J for himself, Y. V. Chandrachud, C.J., P. N. Bhagwati and V. Balakrishna Eradi, JJ. and Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting.] 2:3. On the basis of the materials the Memorandum of Association of the Society, the several applications made by the Society claiming exemption under s. 35 and s. 80 of the Income-tax Act, the repeated uttering of Sri Aurobindo and the Mother that the society and Auroville were not religious institutions and host of other documents there is no room for doubt that neither the Society nor Auroville constitute a religious denomination and the teachings of Sri Aurobindo only represented his philosophy and not a religion. [793 D- E] Numerous Uttering by Sri Aurobindo or the Mother unmistakably show that the Ashram or Society or Auroville is not a religious institution. There can be no better proof than what Sri Aurobindo and the Mother themselves thought of their teachings and their institutions to find out whether the teachings of Sri Aurobindo and his Integral Yoga constitute a religion or a philosophy. The Uttering made from time to time by Sri Aurobindo and the Mother hardly leave any doubt about the nature of the Institution. It was on the basis that it was not a religious institution, that the Society collected funds from the Central Government, the Governments of States, other non-Governmental agencies. and from abroad. [792 B-D, 793 A] Even assuming but not holding that the Society or the Auroville were a religious denomination, the impugned enactment is not hit by Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. The impugned enactment does not curtail the freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion. Therefore, there is no question of the enactment being hit by Article 25. [793 E-F] 2:4. The impugned enactment does not stand in the way of the Society establishing and maintaining institutions for religious and charitable purposes, It also does not stand in the way of the Society to manage its affairs in matters of religion. [794 A-B] 2:5. Even assuming that the society or Auroville was a religious denomination, clause (b) of Art. 26 guarantees to a religious denomination a right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion. Besides the right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion, which is given by clause (b), the next two clauses of Art. 26 guarantee to a religious denomination the right to acquire and own property and to administer such property in accordance with law. The administration of its property by a religious denomination has thus been placed on a different footing from the right to manage its own affairs in the matters of religion. The latter is a fundamental right which no legislature can take away, whereas the former can be regulated by laws which the legislature can take away, 734 whereas the former can be regulated by laws which the legislature can validity impose. It is clear, therefore, that question merely relating to a religions group or institution are not matters of religion to which clause of article applies.[800 H, 801 A-B] 2:6. The impugned Act had not taken away the right of management in matters of religion or a religious denomination, if the Society or Auroville is a religious denomination at all, rather it has taken away the right of management of the property of Auroville. Thus the impugned Act neither violates Article 25, nor Article 26 of the Constitution. [801 C-D] The Commissioner of H. R. & C. E. Madras v. Lakshmindra Tirtha Swamiyar of Sri Sirur Mutt [1954] S.C.R. 1005; The Durgah Committee Ajmer and Another v. Syed Hussain Ali [1962] 1 S.C.R, 383; Tilkyat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v.
State of Rajasthan & others [1964] 1 S.C.R. 561; Sastri Yagnapurushadri & Others v. Muldas Bhudardas Vysya & Another [1966] 3 S.C.R. 242; Divyadassan Rajendra Ramdassji & Another v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1970] 1 S.C.R. 103;
Nalaw Ramalingayya v. The Commissioner of Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Hyderabad A.I,R. 1971 (AP) 320; T. Krishnan v. G.D.M. Committee A.I.R, 1978 Kerala 68; applied.
3. On an analysis of Articles 29 and 30 and the decided cases it is evident that the Auroville Act does not seek to curtail the right of any section of citizen to conserve its own language, script or culture conferred by Article 29. The benefit of Art. 30(1) can be claimed by the community only on proving that it is a religious or linguistic minority and that the institution was established by it. Since Auroville or the Society is not a religious denomination, Articles 29 and 30 would not be attached and, therefore, the impugned Act cannot be held to be violative of Articles 29 and 30 of the Constitution. [805 A-C] In re: The Kerala Education Bill [1959] SCR 995;
Reverend Sidhaibhai Serbhai and Others v. State of Bombay and Another [1963] 3 SCR 837 @ 856; State of Kerala v. Mother Provincial [1971] 1 SCR 734; applied.
4. The Auroville Take over Act cannot be said to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, which action was taken after full consideration of various aspects of the problem, for the reasons namely, (i) it has not been pointed out which were the other institutions where similar situations were prevailing; and (ii) there is a uniqueness with this institution inasmuch as the Government is also involved. Even a single institution may be taken as a class.
The situation prevailing in the Auroville had converted the dream of the Mother into a nightmare. There had arisen acute law and order situation in the Auroville, numerous cases were pending against various foreigners, the funds meant for the Auroville had been diverted towards other purposes and the atmosphere was getting out of hand. In the circumstances the Government intervened and promulgated the Ordinance and later on substituted it by the impugned enactment.
[814 B-D] 735 Budhan Choudhary v. The State of Bihar [1955] 1 SCR 1045: Shri Ramakrishna Dalmia v. Sri Justice S.R. Tandolkar and Others [1959] SCR 279; Raja Birakishore v. The State of Orissa [1964] 7 SCR 32, followed.
Ram Prasad Narayan Sahi and Another v. State of Bihar and Others [1953] SCR 1129; distinguished.
5:1. Whether the remedies provided under the Societies Registration Act were sufficient to meet the exigencies of the situation is not for the Court to decide but it is for the Government and if the Government thought that the conditions prevailing in the Auroville and the Society can be ameliorated not by resorting to the provisions of the Societies Registration Act but by a special enactment, that is an area of the Government and not of the Court. [818 E-F] 5:2. It is not correct to say that the facts stated in the preamble of the Act were non est. Obviously there were serious irregularities in the management of the said society. There has been mis-utilisation of funds and their diversion to other purposes. This is evident from the audit report. There was no material change in the situation on the date of the impugned ordinance or the Act, rather the situation had grown from bad to worse and the sordid situation prevailing in the Auroville so pointed out by the parties fully justified the promulgation of the Ordinance and the passing of the enactment. Of course, each party tried to apportion the blame on the other. Who so ever be responsible, the fact remains that the prevailing situation in the Auroville was far from satisfactory. The amount donated for the construction of the cultural township Auroville and other institutions was to the tune of Rs. 3 crores. It was the responsibility of the Government to see that the amount was not misutilised and the management was properly carried out. On a perusal of the audit report, which is a voluminous one, all that can be said is that on the facts found by the audit committee, the report is rather a mild one. There seems to be serious irregularities in the accounts. A substantial amount received by way of donations had not been properly spent, there being mis-utilisation and diversion of the funds. [819 B-F] 5:3. Even assuming that the facts brought to the notice of the legislature were wrong, it will not be open to the Court to hold that Act to be bad on that account. The Court would not do so even in case of a litigation which has become final on the ground that the facts or the evidence produced in the case were not correct. The Parliament had to apply its mind on the facts before it.
[819 F-H] We can normally assume that the Government would certainly appoint a responsible person as an administrator especially when there is a heavy stake in which the Government of India is also involved in as much as at the instance of the Government the UNESCO gave financial support to the institution.
[820 F-G]
6. The contention that the report of the committee was tainted as Shri Kulkarni the Chairman and Secretary were parties, is without any foundation. The allegation of the impugne Act being malafide is equally devoid of force.
736 Kiriti Joshi cannot be said to have his own axe to grind in the matter or was instrumental in getting the impugned Ordinance and the Act passed. Allegations about mala fides are more easily made than made out. Merely because he made a complaint about the situation prevailing in the management of Auroville and the Society, it cannot be said that the impugned enactment was passed at his behest. [820 H, 821 B- C] Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. (Dissenting) 1:1. Shri Aurobindo truly was a religious teacher and taught and was understood to have taught new religious doctrine and practice. Therefore, Aurobindoism, can certainly be classified if not as a new religion, as a new sect of Hinduism and the followers of Sri Aurobindo can be termed a religious denomination. Sri Aurobindo of course, disclaimed that he was founding a religion. No great religious teacher ever claimed that he was founding a new religion or a new school of religious thought. The question is not whether Sri Aurobindo refused to claim or denied that he was founding a new religion or a new school of religious thought but whether his disciples and the community thought so. There is no doubt that they did not only his disciples and followers, but religious leaders all the world over and of all faiths. Therefore, Aurobindo Society is a sect of a religious determination within the meaning of the expression in Article 26 of the Constitution. [754 G-H, 755 A-B, F-G] 1:2. The word 'religion' does not occur in the Preamble to the constitution, but the Preamble does promise to secure to its citizens "Liberty of thought, expression, belief faith and worship". The freedom of conscience and the Right to profess, propagate and practise religion guaranteed in Article 25 flow out of the idea so expressed in Preamble.
Freedom of conscience is not to be separated from the Right to profess, practise and propagate religion. They go together and together they form part of the Right to Freedom of Religion. It is clear from Article 25 that secular activity may be associated with Religion. though the guarantee of the article does not extend to such activity.
Article 26 guarantees that every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right, subject to public order, morality and health, to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes, to manage its own affairs in matters of religion, to own and acquire movable and immovable property and to administer such property in accordance with law. Several provisions of the constitution where the expression 'religion' and 'religious denomination' are used are either those which are concerned with equality and equal opportunity or those which are concerned with freedom of religion. [742 D, F, G-H, 743 A, C] 1:3. Reading Art. 25 in the background of the proclamation regarding Liberty in the Preamble to the constitution, it is clear that (i) the constitution views religion as comprising thought, expression, belief, faith or worship, as involving the conscience and as something which may be professed, practised and propagated and which is any man's attribute in the same manner as race, sex, language, residence etc: (ii) economic, financial, political or other secular activity may be associated with religious practice though such activity is not covered by the guarantee of freedom of conscience and the right freely to 737 profess, practise and propagate, religion; and so Religion is a matter of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship, a matter involving the conscience and a matter which may be professed, practised and propagated by anyone and which may even have some secular activity associated with it. [744 F-H, 745 A] 1:4. Religion undefined by the constitution, is incapable of precise judicia definition either. In the background of the provisions of the constitution and the light shed by judicial precedent, it can at best be said that religion is a matter of faith. It is a matter of belief and doctrine. It concerns the conscience i.e. the spirit of man. It must be capable of overt expressions in work and deed, such as worship or ritual. So religion is a matter of belief and doctrine concerning the human spirit expressed overtly in the form of ritual and worship. Some religions are easily identifiable as religious; some are easily identifiable as not religious. There are many in the penumbral region which instinctively appear to some as religion and to others as not religions. There is no formula of general application. There is no knife-edge test.
Primarily, it is a question of the consciousness of the community, how does the fraternity or sodality (if it is permissible to use the word without confining it to Roman Catholic Groups) regard itself, how do others regard the fraternity or sodality. A host of other circumstances may have to be considered, such as, the origin and the history of the community, the rituals observed by the community, what the founder, if any, taught, what the founder was understood by his followers to have taught, etc. In origin, the founder may not have intended to found any religion at all. He may have merely protested against some rituals and observances, he may have disagreed with the interpretation of some earlier religious tenets. What he said, what he preached and what he taught, his protest, his distant, his disagreement might have developed into a religion in the course of time, even during his life-time. He may be against religion itself, yet, history and the perception of the community may make a religion out of what was not intended to be a religion and he may be hailed as the founder of a new religion. [750 B-G] And, whatever the ordinary features of a religious denomination may be considered to be, all are not of equal importance and surely the common faith of the religious body is more important than the other features. [751 C] The Commissioner of HR and C.E., Madras v. Lakshmindra Tirtha Swamiyar of Sri Shirur Mutt [1954] S.C.R. 1005;
Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. The State of Bombay [1954] S.C.R. 1055; Durgah Committee of Ajmer v. Sayed Hussain Ali
Maharaj v. The State of Rajasthan and Others [1964] 1 S.C.R.
561; Raja Virakishore v. State of Orissa [1964] 7 S.C.R. 32;
Sasti Yagnapurushadji and Others v. Muldas Bhudardas Vaisnya and Another [1966] 3 S.C.R. 242; referred to.
1:5. Judidial definitions are not statutory definitions; they are mere explanations, every word of which is not to be weighed in golden scales. Law has a tendency to harden with the passage of time and judicial pronouncements are made to assume the form of statutory pronouncements. So soon as a word or expression occurring in the statute is judicially defined, the tendency is to try to interpret the language employed by the judges in the judicial definition.
That is wrong. Always words and expressions to be interpreted are those employed in 738 the statute and not those used by judges for felicitous explanation, Judicial definition is explanatory and not definitive. [751 C-E] 1:6. Religious denomination has not to owe allegiance to any parent religion. The entire following of a religion may be no more than the religious denomination. This may particularly be so in the case of small religious groups or 'developing' religions, that is, religions in the formative stage. So Aurobindoism can be termed as a religious denomination. The world and India treated and respected Shri Aurobindo as a religious teacher and the founder of a new religion. [751 E-G] 2:1. Auroville (Emergency Provisions) Act. 1980 did not take away or purport to take away the management of the Shri Aurobindo Society. Parliament concerned itself with the management of Auroville only and with no other activity of the Shri Aurobindo Society, including 'its affairs in matters of religion'. In fact, section 4(2) makes it explicit that, except for matters relating to the management of Auroville, the provisions of the West Bengal Societies Registration Act, 1961, under which the Society was registered, shall continue to apply to the Society in the same manner as before. [755 G-H, 757 C-D] 2:2. The management of the International, cultural township of Auroville cannot be said to be a matter of religion. Auroville is a township and not a place of the worship. It is a township dedicated, not to the practice and the propagation of any religious doctrine but to promote international understanding and world peace, surely, a secular and not a religious activity. The highest that can be said in favour of Auroville being a religious institution or its management being a religious matter, is that it was conceived by the Mother and shaped and sculpted by Shri Aurobindo's disciples and followers in the pursuit of one of the ideas and ideals of Shri Aurobindo, a great religious teacher. On the other hand, the ideal itself, that is, the promotion of international understanding and world peace is by no means a religious ideal and it was because of the nature of the ideal that the Government of India and the UNESCO adopted the project. Shri Aurobindo himself was not a mere religious teacher. He was a visionary, a humanist and a nationalist who had blossomed into an internationalist.
Therefore, Auroville, though the child of the Mother and though nurtured by the devotees of Shri Aurobindo, has an individuality, distinctly secular of its own. Hence, Auroville (Emergency Provisions) Act which provides for the taking over the management of Auroville for a limited period does not offend the rights guaranteed by Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. [757 E-H, 758 C] 2:3. The rights guaranteed by Articles 29 and 30 cannot be said to have been infringed by the Auroville Emergency provisions Act. No section of citizens having a culture and no religious minority has been denied the right to establish and administer an educational institution of its choice.
[758 D-E] 739 & ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 5879 of 1980.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India) AND Writ Petition No. 5877 of 1980.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India) AND Transfered Case No. 29 of 1981.
(Calcutta High Court Writ Petition No. 11508 of 1981) With Civil Appeal No. 2819 of 1980.
(Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated 21st November, 1980 of the Division Bench of the High Court of Calcutta in F.M.A.T. No. 3408 of 1980) Soli J. Sorabji, K.K. Venugopal, S. Rangarajan, S.
Balakrishnan, M.K.D. Namboodiry, P. Radhakrishnan, N.A.
Subrahmaniam, C.S. Vaidyanathan, M.N. Krishna Mani and Vinnet Kumar for the Petitioners and Appellant.
L.N. Sinha, Attorney General, K. Parasaran, Solicitor General, M.K. Banerji, Additional Solicitor General, Govind Swaminadhan, for R. 3, N. Nettar and Miss A. Subhashini for Respondents Nos. 1 to 4.
T.S. Krishnamoorthy Iyer and Raju Ramchandran for Respondent No. 5.
F.S. Nariman, Anil B. Divan, P.H. Parekh, Mrs. Vineeta Sengupta, Gautam Philip and Sanjeev Agarwal for Respondent Nos. 6 to 240 in WPs. & CA.
P.P. Rao, P.C. Kapur and R. Venkataramani for interveners 1-88.
740 FOR APPLICANT/INTERVENERS A.B. Patel: - R.B. Datar Indra Sen: - N.M. Kshatriya, R.K. Habbu: - B.R. Aggarwala, Catholic Bishop Con- - P.A. Francis, J.B. Dadachanji ference of India: and D.N. Mishra The following Judgments were delivered CHINNAPPA REDDY, J. I have the good fortune of having before me the scholarly judgment of my brother Misra J., I agree with my brother Misra, J that the Writ Petitions must fail. With much that he has said, also, I agree. But with a little, to my own lasting regret, I do not agree. It is, therefore, proper for me to explain the points of my disagreement.
Quite a considerable part of the hearing of the petitions was devoted to a debate on the question, what is Religion ? Religion: Everyone has a religion, or at least, a view or a window on religion, be he a bigot or simple believer, philosopher or pedestrian, atheist or agnostic.
Religion, like 'democracy' and 'equality' is an elusive expression, which everyone understands according to his pre- conceptions. What is religion to some is pure dogma to others and what is religion to others is pure superstition to some others. Karl Marx in his contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law described religion as the 'Opium of the people'. He said further "Basically religion is a very convenient sanctuary for bourgeois thought to flee to in times of stress. Bertrand Russell, in his essay 'Why I am not Christian', said, "Religion is based, I think, primarily and mainly upon fear." It is partly the terror of the unknown and partly, as I have said, the wish to feel that you have a kind of elder brother, who will stand by you in all your troubles and disputes. Fear is the basis of the whole thing-fear of the mysterious, fear of defeat, fear of death. Fear is the parent of cruelty, and, therefore, it is no wonder if cruelty and religion have gone hand in hand. As a worshipper at the alter of peace, I find it difficult to reconcile myself to religion, which throughout the ages, has justified war calling it a Dharma Uddha, a Jehad or a 741 Crusade. I believe that by getting mixed up with religion, ethics has lost 'much of its point, much of its purpose and a major portion of its spontaneity'. I apprehend I share the views of those who have neither faith nor belief in religion and who consider religion as entirely unscientific and irrational. Chanting of prayer appears to me to be mere jingoism and observance of ritual, plain superstition. But my views about religion. my prejudices and my predilections, if they be such, are entirely irrelevant. So are the views of the credulous, the fanatic, the bigot and the zealot. So also the views of the faithful, the devout, the Acharya, the Moulvi, the Padre and the Bhikshu each of whom may claim his as the only true or revealed religion. For our present purpose, we are concerned with what the people of the Socialist, Secular, Democratic Republic of India, who have given each of its citizens Freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practise and propogate religion and who have given every religious denomination the right to freely manage its religious affairs, mean by the expressions'religion' and 'religious denomination'. We are concerned with what these expressions are designed to mean in Arts. 25 and 26 of the Constitution. Any Freedom or Right involving the conscience must naturally receive a wide interpretation and the expression 'religion' and 'religious denomination' must therefore, be interpreted in no narrow, stifling sense but is a liberal, expansive way.
Etymology is of no avail. Religion is derived from 'religare' which means "to bind". Etymologically, therefore, every bond between two people is a religion, but that is not true. To say so is only to indulge in etymological deception. Quite obviously, religion is much more than a mere bond uniting people.
Quite obviously, again, religion is not to be confined to the traditional, established, well-known or popular religions like Hinduism, Mahomedanism, Buddhism and Christianity. There may be and, indeed, there are, in this vast country, several religions, less known or even unknown escept in the remote corners or in the small pockets of the land where they may be practised. A religion may not be wide-spread. It may have little following. It may not have even a name, as indeed most tribal religions do not have. We may only describe them by adding the suffix 'ism' to the name of the founder-teacher, the tribe, the area or the deity. The nomenclature is not of the essence. Again, a band of persons, large or small, may not be said to be 742 adherents of a religion merely because they share some common beliefs and common interests and practise common rites and ceremonies; nor can pietistic recitation and solemn ritual combine to produce religion, on that account only. Secret societies dedicated to secular tasks and indulging in queer oaths and observances, guilds and groups of persons who meet but to dine and wine but who subject their members to extravagant initiation ceremonies, village and tribal sorcerers and coven of witches who chant rant and dance in the most weird way possible are all far removed from religion. They appear to lack the 'spiritual connection'. But, all this is unsatisfactory. We are not arriving at any definition of religion. We are only making peripheral journeys and not getting any nearer to the core of the problem presented to us.
Let us examine the relevant provisions of the Constitution for such light as they may throw on the meaning of the expressions 'religion' and religious denomination'.
They are not defined. The word 'religion' does not occur in the Preamble to the Constitution, but the Preamble does promise to secure to its citizens "Liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship". The Freedom of conscience and the Right to profess, propagate and practice religion,flow of the idea so expressed in the Preamble. In Part-III of the Constitution, under the head "Right to Freedom of Religion", there are four Articles. Art25(i) guarantees to all persons, subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of Part-III of the Constitution, freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion. Freedom of conscience is not to be separated from the Right to profess, practice and propagate religion. They go together and together they form part of the Right to Freedom of Religion.
Clause (2) of Art. 25, however, stipulates that the freedom and the right guaranteed by cl. (1) shall not prevent the State from making any law regulating or restricting, any economic, financial, political or other secular activity which may be associated with religious practice. Or to provide for social welfare and reform or to throw open Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus. So, the Article makes it clear that secular activity may be associated with Religion, though the guarantee of the article does not extend to such activity, Art. 26 guarantees that every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right, subject to public order, morality and health, to establish and maintain institutions for 743 religious and charitable purposes, to manage its own affairs in matters of religion, to own and acquire movable and immovable property and to administer such property in accordance with law. Art. 27 prohibits compulsion for payment of taxes for promotion of any particular religion. Art. 28 bars religious instruction in any institution wholly maintained out of State funds and prevents compulsion to attend any religious instruction or religious worship in educational institutions recognised by the State or receiving aid out of State funds.
Apart from Articles 25 to 28, the word 'religion' occurs in Arts. 15(1), 15(2), 16(2), 16(5), 23(2), 29(2) and 30 of the Constitution.
Art. 15(1) prescribes that the State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them.
Art. 15(2) provides, in particular, that no citizen shall, on ground only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them, be subject to any disability, liability restriction or condition with regard to access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment; or the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained wholly or partly out of State funds or dedicated to the use of the general public.
Art.16(2) guarantees that no citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them, be ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect of any employment or office under the State. Art. 16(5) exempts from the right guaranteed under Art. 16 the operation of any law which provides that the incumbent of an office in connection with the affairs of any religious or denominational institution or any member of the governing body thereof shall be a person professing a particular religion or belonging to a particular denomination.
Art. 23(2), while enabling the State to impose compulsory service for public purposes, prohibits the State from making any discrimination on grounds only of religion, race, caste or class or any of them.
744 Art. 29(2) provides that no citizen shall be denied admission to any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds on grounds of religion, race, caste, language or any of them.
Art. 30(1) guarantees to all minorities, whether based on religion or language the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. Art.
30(2) further provides that the State shall not, in granting aid to educational institutions, discriminate against any educational institutions on the ground that it is under the management of a minority, whether based on religion or language.
It is readily seen that the several provisions of the Constitution where the expressions 'religion' and 'religious denomination' are used are either those which are concerned with equality and equal opportunity or those which are concerned with freedom of religion. Art. 15(1), Art. 16(2), Art. 23(2), Art. 29(2) are the several equality and equal opportunity clauses of the Constitution which bar discrimination on the ground of religion, and they place religion in equation with race, caste, sex, place of birth, residence and language for the purposes of the various aspects of equality dealt with by them. Art. 30 recognises the existence of minority groups based on religion along with minority groups based on language. Arts. 25 to 28 deal with the Right to Freedom of Religion which, as we said earlier is traceable to the idea of "Liberty of Thought, Expression, Belief, Faith and Worship" in the Preamble to the Constitution. Art. 25 guarantees freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion, but saves laws regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity which may be associated with religious practice. Reading Art. 25 in the background of the proclamation regarding Liberty in the Preamble to the Constitution, we may safely conclude that the Constitution views religion, as comprising thought, expression, belief, faith or worship, as involving the conscience and as something which may be professed, practised and propagated and which is any man's attribute in the same manner as race, sex language, residence etc. We also see that economic, financial, political or other secular activity may be associated with religious practice though such activity is not covered by the guarantee of freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion. So, the Constitution considers Religion as a matter of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship, a matter 745 involving the conscience and a matter which may be professed, practised and propagated by anyone and which may even have some secular activity associated with it. We have already said that any Freedom or Right involving the conscience must naturally receive a wide interpretation and the expressions 'Religion' and 'Religious Denomination' must, therefore, be interpreted in no narrow, stifling sense but in a liberal, expansive way.
How has the Court looked at the expression 'religion and 'religious denomination' and how has the Court attempted to define them ? We begin with the well-known Shirur Mutt case where Mukherjea J, speaking for himself and six of his colleagues, examined the question in some detail and, of course, with great erudition. We must first notice that the Court, there, was considering the question of the vires of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act 1951 which was sought to be made applicable to the institution known as Shirur Mutt, one of the eight Mutts situated at Udipi and reputed to have been founded by Shri Madhwa Charya, the renowned exponent of 'dualistic thesim' in the Hindu Religion. The trustees and the beneficiaries of the Mutt, it was claim and established, were the followers of Shri Madhwa Charya. The question arose whether the spiritual fraternity constituted by the followers of Shri Madhwa Charya could be said to be a 'religious denomination' within the meaning of Art. 26, entitling them to manage their own affairs in 'matters of religion'. The Court noticed that while cl. (b) of Art. 26 guaranteed to a religious denomination the right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion, other clauses of the Article dealt with the right of a religious denomination to acquire and own property and to administer such property in accordance with law. The administration of its property by a religious denomination having thus been placed on a different footing from the right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion, the Court said:
"the latter is a Fundamental Right which no legislature can take away, whereas the former can be regulated by laws which the legislature can validly impose. It is clear, therefore, that questions merely relating to administration of properties belonging to a religious group or institution are not matters of religion to which clause (b) of the Article applies." 746 Mukherjea, J, then proceeded to consider what were matters of religion ? He noticed that 'religion' was a term which was hardly susceptible of any rigid definition. He rejected the definition given in Davis v. Benson as neither precise nor adequate and went on to say, "Religion is certainly a matter of faith with individuals or communities and it is not necessarily theistic. There are well known religions in India like Buddhism and Jainism which do not believe in God or in any Intelligent First Cause. A religion undoubtedly has its basis in a system of beliefs or doctrines which are regarded by those who profess that religion as conducive to their spiritual well being, but it would not be correct to say that religion is nothing else but a doctrine or belief. A religion may not only lay down a code of ethical rules for its followers to accept, it might prescribe rituals and observavances, ceremonies and modes of worship which are regarded as integral parts of religion, and these forms and dress." Mukherjea,J., accepted the following observations of Latham, CJ in Vide Adelaide Company v. The Commonwealth(1), as fully applicable to the protection of religion as guaranteed by the Indian Constitution:
"It is sometimes suggested in discussions on the subject of freedom of religion that, though the civil Government should not interfere with religious opinions, it nevertheless may deal as it pleases with any acts which are done in pursuance of religious belief without infringing the principle of freedom of religion. It appears to me to be difficult to maintain this distinction as relevant to the interpretation of section 116. The section refers in express terms to the exercise of religion, and, therefore, it is intended to protect from the operation of any Commonwealth laws acts which are done in the exercise of religion. Thus the section goes far beyond protecting liberty of opinion. It protects also acts done in pursuance of religious belief as part of religion." 747 Mukherjea, J., thereafter, pointed out that freedom of religion under the Indian Constitution also was not confined to religious beliefs only, it extended to religious practices as well subject to the restrictions which the Constitution itself had laid down. Under Art. 26(b) he said, a religious denomination or organisation enjoyed complete autonomy in the matter of deciding as to what rites and ceremonies were essential according to the tenets of their religion they held and no outside authority had any jurisdiction to interfere with their decision in such matters. But, he said, the scale of expenses to be incurred in connection with the religious observances would be a matter of administration of property belonging to the religious denomination and to be controlled by secular authorities in accordance with any law laid down by a competent legislature. He added, "It should be noticed, however, that under Art. 26 (d), it is the Fundamental Right of a religious denomination or its representative to administer its properties in accordance with the law; and the law, therefore, must leave the right of administration to the religious denomination itself, subject to such restrictions and regulations as it might choose to impose a law which takes away the right of administration from the hands of a religious denomination altogether and vests it in any other authority, would amount to a violation of the right guaranteed under cl. D of Art. 26".
Mukherjea, J also considered the question whether the followers of Madhwacharya could be considered a religious denomination and whether Sivalli Brahmins constituted a section of that religious denomination. The meaning of the word denomination was culled out from the Oxford Dictionary where it has been defined to mean 'a collection of individuals classed together under the same name. a religious sect or body having a common faith and organisation and designated by a distinctive name".
Reference was then made to "a galaxy of religious teachers and philosophers who founded the different sects and sub- sects of the Hindu religion that we find in India at the present day". It was emphatically stated that each one of such sects or sub-sects could certainly be called a religious denomination as it was designated by a distinctive name-in many cases it was the name of the founder-and had a common faith and common spiritual organisation. It was observed," the followers of Ramanuja, who are known by the name of Shri Vaishnobas, undoubtedly constitute a religious denomination; and so do the 748 followers of Madhwacharya and other religious teachers. It is a fact well-established by tradition that the eight Udipi Maths were founded by Madhwacharya himself and the trustees and the beneficiaries of these Maths profess to be followers of that teacher. The High Court has found that the Math in question is in charge of Sivalli Brahmins who constitute a section of the followers of Madhwacharya. As Art. 26 contemplates not merely a religious denomination, but also a section thereof, the Math or the spiritual fraternity represented by it can legitimately come within the purview of this article." So, in the Shirur Mutt case, Mukherjea J expressed difficulty in defining the term 'religion' with exactitude, but explained it as something founded upon beliefs or doctrines, regarded by those professing the religion as conductive to their spiritual well-being and attended by practices and observances viewed by the religious community as integral to the religion. Mukherjea J, however, found less difficulty in defining 'religious denomination' in the same terms as in the Oxford Dictionary.
Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. The State of Bombay and Ors.(1) was decided by five of the Learned Judges who constituted the Bench which decided the Shirur Mutt case.
What was said in the Shirur Mutt was reiterated and it was again emphasised that religion was not merely an opinion, doctrine or belief and that it had its outward expression in acts as well. The following observations of Davar J, in Jamshedjee v. Sunnabal(2) were approved: "If this is the belief of the community, and it is proved undoubtedly to be the belief of the Zoroastrian community,-a secular judge is bound to accept that belief-it is not for him to sit in judgment on that belief, he is not right to interfere with the conscience of a donor who makes a gift in favour of what he believes to be the advancement of his religion and the welfare of his community or mankind". I have stated almost at the outset that judges' faith or lack of faith in religion is irrelevant in deciding what are matters of religion.
In the Durgah Committee Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali & others(3) the Court reiterated the position that the freedom guaranteed by Art. 25(1) was not only the right to entertain such religious beliefs as 749 my appeal to his conscience but also afforded him the right to exhibit his belief in his conduct by such outward acts as may appear to him proper in order to spread his ideas for the benefit of others. A note of caution was, however, struck and it was said that practices in order to qualify as matters of religion should be regarded by the said religion as its essential and integral part. Otherwise, it was pointed out, even purely secular practices which were not an essential or an integral part of religion were apt to be clothed with a religious form and stake a claim for treatment as religious practices. Mukherjea J's definition of 'religious denomination' in the Shirur Mutt case was also accepted and the case was permitted to be argued on the broad and general ground that the Chishtia Soofies constituted either a religious denomination or a section of a religious denomination.
In Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. The State of Rajasthan and Ors.(1) the question was whether the famous Nath Dwara Temple was a public temple? It was held that it was a public temple. It was assumed that the followers of Vallabha constituted a religious denomination.
In Raja Virakishore v. State of Orissa(2)-one of the arguments sought to be advanced before the Supreme Court was that the worshippers of Lord Jagan Nath constituted a religious denomination and that the Shri Jagan Nath Temple Act, which took away the right of management from the denomination, contravened the Fundamental Right guaranteed by Art. 26(d) of the Constitution. The answer of the State was that the temple did not pertain to any particular sect, cult or creed of Hindus, but was a public temple above all sects, cults and creeds and, therefore, it was not the temple of any particular denomination The Court however, did not permit the worshippers to raise the argument as the state of pleadings were found to be defective.
In Sasti Yagnapurushad ji and Ors. v. Muldas Bhudardas Vaishya and Anr.(1) the question arose whether the Swaminarayan sect followed a religion distinct and separate from the Hindu religion and whether, consequently, the temple belonging to the sect was outside the ambit of Bombay Hindu Places of Public Worships (Entry 750 Authorisation) Act ? Gajendragadkar, CJ, on an exhaustive consideration of various Hindu Texts and the texts and history of the Swaminarayan sect, came to the conclusion that the Swaminarayan sect was not a religion, distinct and separate from the Hindu Religion.
It is obvious that religion, undefined by the Constitution, is incapable of precise judicial definition either. In the background of the provisions of the Constitution and the light shed by judicial precedent, we may say religion is a matter of faith. It is a matter of belief and doctrine. It concerns the conscience i.e. the spirit of man. It must be capable of overt expression in word and deed, such as, worship or ritual. So, religion is a matter of belief and doctrine, concerning the human spirit, expressed overtly in the form of ritual and worship. Some religions are easily identifiable as religions, some are easily identifiable as not religions. There are many in the penumbral region which instinctively appear to some as religion and to others as not religions. There is no formula of general application. There is no knife-edge test.
Primarily, it is a question of the consciousness of the community, how does the fraternity or sodality (if it is permissible to use the word without confining it to Roman Catholic groups) regard itself, how do others regard the fraternity or sodality. A host of other circumstances may have to be considered, such as, the origin and the history of the community, the beliefs and the doctrines professed by the community, the rituals observed by the community, what the founder, if any, taught, what the founder was understood by his followers to have taught, etc. In origin, the founder may not have intended to found any religion at all. He may have merely protested against some rituals and observances;
he may have disagreed with the interpretation of some earlier religious tenets. What he said, what he preached and what he taught, his protest, his dissent, his disagreement might have developed into a religion in the course of time, even during his life-time. He may be against religion itself, yet, history and the perception of the community may make a religion out of what was not intended to be a religion and he may be hailed as the founder of a new religion. There are the obvious examples of Buddhism and Jainism and for that matter Christianity itself. Neither Buddha nor Mahavira, nor Christ ever thought of founding a new religion, yet three great religions bear their names.
If the word 'religion' is once explained, though with some difficulty, the expression 'religious denomination' may be defied 751 with less difficulty. As we mentioned earlier Mukherjea J, borrowed the meaning of the word denomination from the Oxford Dictionary and adopted it to define religious denomination as "a collection of individuals classed together under the same name, a religious sect or body having a common faith and organisation and designated by a distinctive name". The followers of Ramanuja, the followers of Madhwacharya, the followers of Vallabha, the Chishtia Soofies have been found or assumed by the Court to be religious denominations. It will be noticed that these sects possessed no distinctive name except that of their founder- teacher and had no special organisation except a vague, loose-un-knit one. The really distinctive feature about each one of these sects was a shared belief in the tenets taught by the teacher-founder. We take care to mention here that whatever the ordinary features of a religious denomination may be considered to be, all are not of equal importance and surely the common faith of the religious body is more important than the other features. It is, perhaps, necessary to say that judicial definitions are not statutory definitions, they are mere explanations, every word of which is not to be weighed in golden scales. Law has a tendency to harden with the passage of time and judicial pronouncements are made to assume the form of statutory pronouncements. So soon as a word or expression occur in the statute is judicially defined, the tendency is to try to interpret the language employed by the judges in the judicial definition as if it has been transformed into a statutory definition.
That is wrong. Always, words and expressions to be interpreted are those employed in the statute and not those used by judges for felicitous explanation. Judicial definition, we repeat, is explanatory and not definitive.
One remark requires to be added here. Religious denomination has not to owe allegiance to any parent religion. The entire following of a religion may be no more than the religious denomination. This may particularly be so in the case of small religious groups or `developing' religions, that is, religions in the formative stage.
We may now consider whether Aurobindoism-if one may be excused for using the word `Aurobindoism' to describe what Shri Aurobindo taught and practised and what he was understood by his followers to have taught and practised-was a religion and whether the followers of Shri Aurobindo could be called a religious denomination.
Shri Aurobindo was a poet, a savant, a philosopher and a mystic. Was he or was he not a religious teacher? 752 The Encyclopaedia Brittanica (1978 Edition) describes him as "seer, poet and Indian nationalist who originated the philosophy of cosmic salvation through spiritual evolution, a divine existence that will appear through the development of the "agnostic man" to usher in a transcendant spiritual age in which man and the universe are destined to become divine". The Encyclopaedia goes on to say, "he devoted himself for the rest of his life solely to the development of his unique philosophy. There (at Pondicherry) he founded an ashrama (retreat) as an international cultural centre for spiritual development, attracting students from all over the world. The only requirement for entrance was a sincere wish to develop spiritually." "According to Aurobindo's theory of cosmic salvation, the paths to union with Brahman are two-way streets, or channels, Enlightment comes to man from above, while the spirital mind (supermind) of man strives through logic illumination to reach up-ward from below. When these two forces blend in an individual, agnostic man is created. This logic illumination transcends both reason and intuition and eventually leads to the freeing of the individual from the bonds of individuality and, by extension all mankind will eventually achieve mukti (liberation)".
"Thus, Aurobindo created a dialectic mode of salvation not only for the individual but for all mankind. Energy of sachidananda ("existence, thought, joy") comes down from Brahman (thesis) to meet energy from the supermind of man striving upward toward spirituality (antithesis) and melds in man to create a new spiritual superman (synthesis). From these evolved divine beings, a divine universe also evolved." Under the head `History of Hinduism'. Encyclopaedia Brittanica again refers to Aurobindo and says:
"Another modern teacher whose doctrines have had some influence outside India was Sri Aurobindo, who began his career as a revolutionary. He withdrew from politics, however, and settled in Pondicherry, then a French possession. There he established an ashrama (a retreat) and achieved a high reputation as a sage. His followers looked on him as the first incarnate manifestation of super-beings whose evolution he prophesied, and apprently he did not discourage this belief. After his death, the leadership of the Aurobindo Ashram was taken over by "the Mother", Mme Mira 753 Richard, and a French-woman who had been one of his leading disciples." The Encyclopaedia Brittanica refers to Aurobindo again under the head `Idealism' and says :
"Aurobindo, reinterpreting the Indian Idealistic heritage in the light of his own Western education, rejected the maya doctrine of illusion, replacing it with the concept of evolution, aguring that the "illumination of individuals will lead to the emergence of a divine community". Aurobindo founded the influential Pondicherry Ashram, a religious and philosophical community, and headed it until his death." The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (1972 Edition) says, "Shri Aurobindo was an Indian metaphysician and founder of new religious movement with head-quarters at Pondicherry-The religious movement associated with him has increased its following in India, and has made some converts in the West.........God must `descent' into human experience. This illumination of individual will lead to the emergence of a divinised community...............Aurobindo produced a synthesis between older Indian religious ideas and the world affirming attitudes of Christian th
