Waman Rao & Ors Vs. Union of India & Ors [1980] INSC 116 (9 May 1980)
1980 Latest Caselaw 116 SC

Waman Rao & Ors Vs. Union of India & Ors [1980] INSC 116 (9 May 1980)

CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ) CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ) BHAGWATI, P.N.

KRISHNAIYER, V.R.

TULZAPURKAR, V.D.

SEN, A.P. (J)

CITATION: 1981 SCR (2) 1 1980 SCC (3) 587

ACT:

Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 27 of 1961 as amended by Amendment Acts 21 of 1975, 47 of 1975 and 2 of 1976-Whether violates Articles 14, 19 or 31 of the Constitution-Right to challenge, if a constitutional provision which deprives any person/citizen of the benefit and protection of Articles 14, 19 and 31 is invalid. any law on the ground it is inconsistent with or that it takes away or abridges the right conferred by Part III of the Constitution-Constitution of India, Article 13(2), scope of- Constitutionality of Articles 31A, 31B and the un-amended Articles 31C of the Constitution-Doctrine of stare decisis, applicability to Articles 31A & 31B-House of the People (Extension of Duration) Act (30 of 1976) section 2 and House of the People (Extension of Duration) Act (Act 109 of 1976) section 2-Proclamation of Emergency dated December 3, 1971 and June 25, 1975, Constitution (Fortieth Amendment) Act, 1976-Validity of.

HEADNOTE:

A ceiling on agricultural holdings was imposed in Maharashtra by the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act 27 of 1961, which was brought into operation on January 26, 1962. The ceiling fixed by the Act (Principal Act) was lowered and certain other amendments were made to that Act by Acts 27 of 1975, 47 of 1975 and 2 of 1976. The validity of these Acts was challenged in the Bombay High Court. The Division Bench at Nagpur repelled that challenge by its judgment dated August 13, 1976 in Vithalrao Udhaorao Uttarwar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1977 Bombay 99. The appeals filed against the said decision were dismissed by the Supreme Court by its judgment in Dattatraya Govind Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra [1977] 2 SCR 790. The only point urged in these appeals was that the Principal Act. as amended, was void being violative of the second proviso to Article 31A(1), in so far as it created an artificial "family unit" and fixed the unit on the agricultural holdings on such family units. The argument that the violation of the particular proviso deprived the impugned laws of the protection conferred by Article 31A was rejected by the Court on the view that even if the impugned provisions were violative of the second proviso they would receive the protection of Article 31B by reason of the inclusion of the Principal Act and the amending Acts in the Ninth Schedule. The Court considered whether, in fact. the provisions of the impugned Acts were violative of the second proviso and held that it was entirely for the Legislature to decide what policy to adopt for the purpose of restructuring the agrarian system and the Court could not assume the role of an economic adviser for pronouncing upon the wisdom of such policy. The second proviso to Article 31A(1) was therefore held not to have been contravened.

The judgment of this Court in these appeals was delivered on January 27, 1977 while the proclamation of emergency was in operation. On the revocation of that proclamation, petitions were filed in the Court by the appellants 2 praying for the review of the judgment in Dattaraya Govind Mahajan on the ground that several contentions, which were otherwise open to them for assailing the constitutional validity of the impugned Acts, could not be made by reason of the emergency and that they should be permitted to make those contentions since the emergency was lifted. Fresh Writ Petitions were also filed in this Court in which those contentions were put forward. The Court acceded to the request for the review and hence the petitions.

Dismissing the petitions, the Court

HELD : (Majority view) Per Chandrachud, C.J. (On his own behalf and on behalf of Krishna Iyer, Tulzapurkar and Sen, JJ.) A. (1) The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 which introduced Article 31A into the Constitution with retrospective effect and sec. 3 of the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955 which substituted a new clause (1), sub-clauses (a) to (e) for the original clause (1) with retrospective effect, do not damage any of the basic or essential features of the Constitution or its basic structure and are valid and constitutional being within the constituent power of the Parliament. [9 F-G=45 H, 46 A-B] (2) The Agricultural Ceiling Acts, fall squarely within the terms of clause (a) of Article 31A(1). Those Acts provide for the extinguishment and modification of rights in an "estate", the expression "estate" being defined by clause (2) (a) (iii) to mean "any land held or let for purposes of agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto..". It must follow, as a necessary corollary, that the impugned Acts are entitled to the protection of Article 31A(1)(a) with the result that their provisions cannot be deemed, and there fore cannot be declared, to be void on the ground that they are inconsistent with or take away or abridge any of the rights conferred by Articles 14, 19 or 31. [17 A-C] (3) If a constitutional provision, which deprives the petitioners of the benefit and protection of Articles 14, 19 and 31 is invalid, the petitioners will be entitled to challenge the impugned laws on the ground that they are inconsistent with or that they take away or abridge the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution. Article 13(2) has a sensitive touchstone. Not only does it mandate that the State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by Part III but, it provides that any law made in contravention of the clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void. Mere abridgement, that is to say curtailment, that is to say curtailment, and not necessarily abrogation that is to say total deprivation, is enough to produce the consequence provided for by Article 13(2). [17 C-E] (4) Though the withdrawal of the application of Articles 14, 19 and 31 in respect of laws which fall under clause (a) is total and complete, that is to say, the application of those articles stands abrogated, not merely abridged, in respect of impugned enactments which indubitably fall within the ambit of clause (a), every case in which the protection of a fundamental right is withdrawn will not necessarily result in damaging or destroying the basic structure of the Constitution. The question as to whether the basic structure is damaged or destroyed in any given case would depend upon which particular Article of 3 Part III is in issue and, whether what is withdrawn is quint-essential to the basic structure of the Constitution.

[18 B-D] (5) The true position of law on the subject of Parliament's power to amend the Constitution is that though the Parliament has the power to amend each and every Article of the Constitution including the provisions of Part III the amending power cannot be exercised so as to damage or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution. [19 G-H] H. H. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, [1973] Supp. SCR 1; Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, [1976] 2 SCR 347 and Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors., [1981] 1 SCR p. 206, referred to.

(6) If Article 31A were not enacted, some of the main purposes of the Constitution would have been delayed and eventually defeated and that by the First Amendment, the constitutional edifice was not impaired but strengthened.

The First and the Fourth Amendments, especially the First were made so closely on the heels of the Constitution that they ought indeed to be considered as a part and parcel of the Constitution itself. These amendments are not born of second thoughts and they do not reflect a fresh look at the Constitution in order to deprive the people of the gains of the Constitution. They are in the truest sense of the phrase, a contemporary practical exposition of the Constitution. [26 E-F, G-H, 27A] (7) Article 39 of the Constitution directs by clauses (b) and (c) that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good; that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment. These twin principles of State policy were a part of the Constitution as originally enacted and it is in order to effectuate the purpose of these Directive Principles that the First and the Fourth Amendments were passed. [27 A-B] (8) Article 31A(I) could easily have appeared in the original Constitution itself as an illustration of its basic philosophy. What remained to be done in the hope that vested interests will not distort the base of the Constitution, had to be undertaken with a sense of urgency and expediency. It is that sense and sensitivity which gave birth to the impugned amendment. The progress in the degeneracy of any nation can be rapid, especially in societies riven by economic disparities and caste barriers. We embarked upon a constitutional era holding forth the promise that we will secure to all citizens justice, social, economic and political; equality of status and of opportunity; and, last but not the least, dignity of the individual. Between these promises and the First Amendment there is discernible a nexus, direct and immediate. Indeed, if there is one place in an agriculture-dominated society like ours where citizens can hope to have equal justice, it is on the strip of land which they till and love, the land which assures to them the dignity of their persons by providing to them a near decent means of livelihood. [28 E-H] (9) The First Amendment has made the constitutional ideal of equal justice a living truth. It is like a mirror that reflects the ideals of the Constitution, it is not the destroyer of its basic structure. The provisions introduced by it and the Fourth Amendment for the extinguishment or modification of rights in lands held or let for purposes of agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto, strengthen rather than weaken the basic structure of the Constitution.

[29 A-B] 4 The First Amendment is aimed at removing social and economic disparities in the agricultural sector. It may happen that while existing inequalities are being removed, new inequalities may arise marginally and incidentally. Such marginal and incidental inequalities cannot damage or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution. It is impossible for any Government, howsoever expertly advised, socially oriented and prudently managed, to remove every economic disparity without causing some hardship or injustice to a class of persons who also are entitled to equal treatment under the law. Thus, the adoption of "family unit" as the unit of application for the revised ceilings may cause incidental hardship to minor children and to unmarried daughters. That cannot, however, furnish an argument for assailing the impugned laws on the ground that they violate the guarantee of equality. It seems ironical indeed that the laws providing for agricultural ceilings should be stigmatised as destroying the guarantee of equality when their true object and intendment is to remove inequalities in the matter of agricultural holdings. [29 B- E] The note of the Panel set up by the Planning Commission in May 1959 on the adoption of "family unit" as the unit of application for the revised ceilings and the counter- affidavit of the Deputy Secretary to the Govt. of Maharashtra show the relevance and efficacy of the family being treated as the real operative unit in the movement for agrarian reform. Considering the Indian social milieu, the Panel came to the conclusion that agricultural ceiling can be most equitably applied if the base of application is taken as the family unit consisting of husband, wife and three minor children. In view of this expert data a law passed truly for implementing the objective of Article 31A(l)(a) cannot be open to challenge on the ground that it infringes Articles 14,19 or 31. [29 E-G] B. (1). The Amendment introduced by sec. 4 of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 does not damage or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution. That Amendment must, therefore, be upheld on its own merits. [29 H] (2) The validity of Article 31A cannot be upheld by applying the doctrine of stare decisis, though the Article has continued to be recognised as valid ever since it was introduced into the Constitution. The constitutional validity of Article 31A has been recognised in the four decisions, namely. Shankari Prasad v. Union of India, [1952] SCR 89, 95; Sajjansingh v. State of Rajasthan,[1965] 1 SCR 933; I.C. Golakanath v. Union of India & Ors,[1967] 2 SCR 762 and H. H. Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalavaru v. State of Kerala, [1973] Suppl. SCR, 1 sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly and sometimes incidentally. It may be mentioned, though it has no relevance on the applicability of the rule of stare decisis, that in none of the three earlier decisions was the validity of Article 31A tested on the ground that it damaged or destroyed the basic structure of the Constitution. That theory was elaborated for the first time in Kesavananda Bharati and it was in the majority judgment delivered in that case that the doctrine found its first acceptance. Even in the two latest cases, namely, Ambika Prasad Mishra v. State of U.P., [1980] 3 SCR p. 1159, Thumati Venkaiah v. State of A.P., [1980] 3 SCR 1143 the question as to whether Article 31A can be upheld by applying the doctrine of stare decisis was never decided. Nor was the question of vires of Articles 31A, 31B and 31C (unamended) considered in these decisions.[30G-H, 31A-B, C, 32 B-C] 5 It is true to say that for the application of the rule of stare decisis, it is not necessary that the earlier decision or decisions of long standing should have considered and either accepted or rejected the particular argument which is advanced in the case on hand. Were it so, the previous decisions could more easily be treated as binding by applying the law of precedent and it will be unnecessary to take resort to the principle of stare decisis. It is, therefore, sufficient for invoking the rule of stare decisis that a certain decision was arrived at on a question which arose or was argued, no matter on what reason the decision rests or what is the basis of the decision. In other words, for the purpose of applying the rule of stare decisis, it is unnecessary to enquire or determine as to what was the rationale of the earlier decision which is said to operate as stare decisis. Therefore, the reason why Article 31A was upheld in the earlier decisions. if indeed it was, are not germane for the purpose of deciding whether this is a fit and proper case in which to apply that rule.[34 C-G] But there are four principal reasons for not invoking the rule of stare decisis for deciding upon the constitutionality of Article 31A. In the first place, Article 31A breathes its own vitality, drawing its sustenance from the basic tenets of our Constitution. The second reason is that neither in Shankari Prasad, nor in Sajjan Singh nor in Golak Nath and evidently not in Kesavananda Bharati, was the question as regards the validity as such of Article 31A raised or decided. Thirdly, the history of the World's constitutional law shows that the principle of stare decisis is treated as having a limited application only. The fourth reason is that on principle rules like stare decisis should not be invoked for upholding constitutional devices like Articles 31A, 31B and 31C which are designed to protect not only past laws but future laws also. The principle of stare decisis can apply, if at all, to laws protected by these articles, if those laws have enjoyed the protection of these articles for a long time, but the principle cannot apply to the articles themselves.

The principle of stare decisis permits the saving of laws the validity of which has been accepted or recognised over the years. It does not require or sanction that, in future too, laws may be passed even though they are invalid or unconstitutional. Future perpetration of illegality is no part of the doctrine of stare decisis.[34 F-H, 35 A-B, D, 36 B-E] Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 US. 393, 406;

Tramways Case (No. 1) 1914 (CLR) 54@ 58; Bengal Immunity Case [1955] 2 SCR 603; Income Tax officer, Tuticorin v. T.

S. D. Nadar, AIR 1968 SC 623; New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 590-591 [1946]; U.S. v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236, 249 [1955]; Mac Pherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 391 [1916]: State of Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 238 [1924] James. Monoroe v. Frank Pape, 5 L.Ed. 2nd U.S. 492, 523, 528, quoted with approval.

C. (1) All amendments to the Constitution which were made before April 24, 1973 and by which the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution was amended from time to time by the inclusion of various Acts and Regulations therein are valid and constitutional. Amendments to the Constitution made on or after April 24, 1973 by which the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution was amended from time to time by the inclusion of various Acts and Regulation therein, are open to challenge on the ground that they, or any one or more of them, are beyond the constituent power of the Parliament since they damage the basic or essential features of the Constitution or its basic structure in view of the Judg- 6 ment in Kesavananda Bharati. If any Act or Regulation included in the Ninth Schedule by a constitutional amendment made on or after April 24, 1973 is saved by Article 31A, or by Article 31C as it stood prior to its amendment by the Forty Second Amendment, the challenge to the validity of the relevant constitutional Amendment by which that Act or Regulation is put in the Ninth Schedule, on the ground that the Amendment damages or destroys a basic or essential feature of the Constitution or its basic structure as reflected in Articles 14, 19 or 31, will become otiose. [10 C-F=46 C-F] (2) Article 31B provides that the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule shall not be deemed to be void or ever to have become void on the ground that they are inconsistent with or take away or abridge any of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution. The provisions of the Article are expressed to be without prejudice to the generality of the provisions in Article 31A and the concluding portion of the Article supersedes any judgment, decree or order of any court or tribunal to the contrary.

This Article was introduced into the Constitution by section 5 of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, Article 31A having been introduced by section 4 of the same Amendment. Article 31B has to be read along with the Ninth Schedule because it is only those Acts and Regulations which are put in that Schedule that can receive the protection of that article. The Ninth Schedule was added to the Constitution by section 14 of the First Amendment Act, 1951.

The device or mechanism which sections 5 and 14 or the First Amendment have adopted is that as and when Acts and Regulations are put into the Ninth Schedule by constitutional amendments made from time to time, they will automatically by reason of the provisions of Article 31B, receive the protection of that article. [36F-H, 37A-B] The view of the Court that it would not be proper to invoke the doctrine of stare decisis for upholding the validity of Article 31A, must govern the question of the validity of Article 31 B. But just as there are significant similarities between Articles 31A and 31B, there is a significant dissimilarity too. Article 31A enables the passing of laws of the description mentioned in clauses (a) to (e), in violation of the guarantee afforded by Articles 14 and 19. In so far as Article 31B is concerned, it does not define the category of laws which are to receive its protection, and secondly, it affords protection to Schedule- laws against all the provisions of Part III of the Constitution. No Act can be placed in the Ninth Schedule except by the Parliament and since the Ninth Schedule is a part of the Constitution, no additions or alterations can be made therein without complying with the restrictive provisions governing amendments to the Constitution. Thus, Article 31B read with the Ninth Schedule provides what is generally described as, a protective umbrella to all Acts which are included in the Schedule, no matter of what character, kind or category they may be. Putting it briefly, whereas Article 31A protects laws of a defined category, Article 31B empowers the Parliament to include in the Ninth Schedule such laws as it considers fit and proper to include therein. Thus the fourth reason for not applying the rule of stare decisis to Article 31A that any particular law passed under clauses (a) to (e) can be accepted as good if it has been treated as valid for a long number of years but the device in the form of the Article cannot be upheld by the application of that rule, applies to Article 31B read with the Ninth Schedule by the self-same test.[37 G-H, 38 B-D, E- F] (3) The decision in Kesavananda Bharati must be treated as a landmark. The theory that the Parliament cannot exercise its amending power so as to 7 damage or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution, was propounded and accepted for the first time in Kesavananda Bharati. This is one reason for holding the laws incorporated into the Ninth Schedule before April 24,1973, on which date the judgment in Kesavananda Bharati was rendered. The second reason for drawing a line at a convenient and relevant point of time is that the first 66 items in the Ninth Schedule, which were inserted prior to the decision in Kesavananda Bharati, mostly pertains to laws of agrarian reforms.[38 G-H, 39A, B] D. (1) Article 31C of the Constitution, as it stood prior to its amendment by section 4 of the Constitution (Forty Second Amendment) Act, 1976, is valid to the extent to which its constitutionality was upheld in Kesavananda Bharati. Article 31C, as it stood prior to the Constitution (Forty Second Amendment) Act does not damage any of the basic or essential features of the Constitution or its basic structure. Once it is held that Article 31A is valid on its own merits, it must follow logically that the unamended Article 31C is also valid. The unamended portion of Article 31C is not like an unchartered ship. It gives protection to a defined and limited category of laws which are passed for giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in clause (b) or clause (c) of Article 39. It is impossible to conceive that any law passed for such a purpose can at all violate Article 14 or Article 19. In fact, far from damaging the basic structure of the Constitution, laws passed truly and bona fide for giving effect to directive principles contained in clause (b) and (c) of Article 39 will fortify that structure. [10 F-G, 40 G-H, 41 A-C] E. (1) The normal term of the Lok Sabha expired on March 18, 1976. On April 2, 1976, the Lok Sabha passed the Fortieth Amendment Act by which the Maharashtra Land Ceiling Amendment Acts were put in the Ninth Schedule as Items 157, 159 and 160. On November 24, 1976 the House of People (Extension of Duration) Amendment Act was passed extending the term of the Parliament for a further period of one year.

The Forty Second Amendment Act was passed on November 12, 1976. The Lok Sabha was dissolved on January 18, 1977 and both the emergencies dated December 3, 1971 and June 25, 1975 were revoked on March 21, 1977. [43 E-G] In so far as the proclamation of December 3, 1971 is concerned, there was manifest justification for that course of action. The danger to the security of the country was clear and present. From the various dates and events mentioned and furnished to the Court, it may be possible for a layman to conclude that there was no reason to continue the state of emergency at least after the formality of exchanging the prisoners of war was completed. But Courts have severe constraints which deter them from undertaking a task which cannot judicially be performed. [44 D-F, H] (2) The two Acts, the House of the People (Extension of Duration) Act, Act 30 of 1976 and the House of the People (Extension of Duration) Amendment Act 109 of 1976, by which the duration of the Lok Sabha was extended are valid and lawful. The Fortieth and the Forty Second Constitutional Amendments cannot, therefore, be struck down on the ground that they were passed by a Lok Sabha which was not lawfully in existence. [45 F-G] Section 2 of the first of these Acts, Act 30 of 1976, which was passed on February 16, 1976, provided that the period of five years in relation to the then House of the People shall be extended for a period of one year "while the Pro- 8 clamation of Emergency issued on the 3rd day of December, 1971 and on the 25th day of June, 1975, are both in operation." The second Act of Extension continues to contain the same provision. Both the proclamations of emergency were in fact in operation on February 16, 1976 when the first Act was passed as also on November 24, 1976 when the second Act, 109 of 1976, was passed. Neither the first Proclamation can be deemed not to be in existence, nor can the second Proclamation be held to have been issued mala fide and, therefore non est, since the evidence produced before the Court is insufficient for recording a decision on either of these matters. [45 C-F] Per Bhagwati, J. (Contra) The doctrine of stare decisis can be invoked for sustaining the constitutional validity of Article 31A. [50 E] Minerva Mills v. Union of India, [1981] 1 SCR p. 206 reiterated; Ambika Prasad Mishra v. State of U.P., [1980] 3 SCR p. 1159, followed.

Per Krishna Iyer, J. (Contra) Applying the principle of stare decisis, Article 31A is valid. In constitutional issues over stress on precedents is inept. Even so, great respect and binding value are the normal claim of rulings until reversed by larger Benches.

[51 C-D] Ambika Prasad Mishra v. State of U.P., [1980] 3 SCR p.

1159 reiterated.

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition Nos. 656-660, 512- 533 and 503-511 of 1977.

(Under Article 32 of the Constitution) AND Review Petitions Nos. 34, 62-65, 66-72, 73-74, 75-77, 78-81, 82, 83-84, 85, 86-87, 88, 89-90, 91-92, 93-94, 95, 95A, 96, 103-107, 110, 120, 121, 122-130 of 1977.

AND Writ Petition No. 63 of 1977. (Under Article 32 of the Constitution).

M. N. Phadke, N. M. Ghatate (Dr.), S. N. Bapat and S.

V. Deshpande for the Petitioners in RPs. 34, 62-95, 95A, 96, 103-107, 120-123 & WPs. 656-660, 503-511/77.

M. S. Gupta for the Petitioners in RPs. 110, 122- 130/77.

S. N. Kherdikar, M. N. Ingle, A. G. Ratnaparkhi and C.

K. Ratnaparkhi for the Petitioners in WPs. 512-533/77.

S. V. Gupte, Att. Genl. K. H. Bhatt, R. N. Sachthey and Miss A. Subhashini for R 1 in WPs. 503-511, 512-533, 656-660 & RPs. 34, 62-65/77.

S. V. Gupte, Att. Genl. C. J. Sawant, M. C. Bhandare, M. B. Bor & M. N. Shroff for R. 2 in WPs. 503-533 and for RR. 2 & 3 in WPs. 656-660/77.

9 S. V. Gupte, Att. Gen. and Miss A. Subhashini for the Att. Genl.

R. K. Rastogi, J. S. Rastogi and Bardridas Sharma for the State of Rajasthan in WP No. 656/77.

G. N. Dikshit and M. V. Goswami for the State of U.P.

Altaf Ahmed for the State of Jammu & Kashmir in WPs.

533 & 656/77.

FOR THE ADVOCATES GENERAL:

U. P. Singh and Shambhunath Jha (State of Bihar).

M. M. Abdul Khader and K. R. Nambiar (State of Kerala).

B. M. Patnaik and R. K. Mehta (State of Orissa).

K. M. K. Nair and N. Nettar (State of Karnataka).

K. M. K. Nair and N. Nettar (State of Tamil Nadu).

FOR THE INTERVENERS:

V. N Ganpule for Pratap Rao in W.P. 503.

R. K. Garg for Shyam Narain Tiwari in RP 34/77 & WP 512/77 R. N. Bannerjee, J. S. Sinha and J.B.D. & Co. for Panch Valley Coal Co. and Shri Bimal Poddar in WP. 512/77.

G. L. Sanghi, Miss Bhubnesh Kumari, K. J. John and J.

B. D. & Co. for the Appellant Intervener Lt. Col. Himmat Singh & Ors.

S. B. Wad for the Applicant/Intervener in WPs. 342 & 343 of 77 and RP. 63/77.

The following Order was delivered on 9th May, 1980.

(1) The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 which introduced Article 31A into the Constitution with retrospective effect, and section 3 of the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955 which substituted a new clause (1), sub-clauses (a) to (e), for the original clause (1) with retrospective effect, do not damage any of the basic or essential features of the Constitution or its basic structure and are valid and constitutional, being within the constituent power of the Parliament.

(2) Section 5 of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act 1951 introduced Article 31B into the Constitution which reads thus:

"31B. Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in article 31A, none of the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule nor any of the provi- 10 sions thereof shall be deemed to be void, or ever to have become void, on the ground that such Act, Regulation or provision is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by, any provisions of this Part, and notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court or tribunal to the contrary, each of the said Acts and Regulations shall, subject to the power of any competent Legislature to repeal or amend it, continue in force." In Kesavananda Bharati (1973, Suppl. SCR 1) decided on April 24, 1973 it was held by the majority that Parliament has no power to amend the Constitution so as to damage or destroy its basic or essential features or its basic structure. We hold that all amendments to the Constitution which were made before April 24, 1973 and by which the 9th Schedule to the Constitution was amended from time to time by the inclusion of various Acts and Regulations therein, are valid and constitutional. Amendments to the Constitution made on or after April 24, 1973 by which the 9th Schedule to the Constitution was amended from time to time by the inclusion of various Acts and Regulations therein, are open to challenge on the ground that they, or any one or more of them, are beyond the constituent power of the Parliament since they damage the basic or essential features of the Constitution or its basic structure. We do not pronounce upon the validity of such subsequent constitutional amendments except to say that if any Act or Regulation included in the 9th Schedule by a constitutional amendment made after April 24, 1973 is saved by Article 31A, or by Article 31C as it stood prior to its amendment by the 42nd Amendment, the challenge to the validity of the relevant Constitutional Amendment by which that Act or Regulation is put in the 9th Schedule, on the ground that the Amendment damages or destroys a basic or essential feature of the Constitution or its basic structure as reflected in Articles 14, 19 or 31, will become otiose.

(3) Article 31C of the Constitution, as it stood prior to its amendment by section 4 of the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976, is valid to the extent to which its constitutionality was upheld in Kesavananda Bharati. Article 31C, as it stood prior to the Constitution (42 Amendment) Act does not damage any of the basic or essential features of the Constitution or its basic structure.

(4) All the Writ Petitions and Review Petitions relating to the validity of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands Ceiling Acts are dismissed with costs. The stay orders granted in these matters will stand vacated. We quantify the costs at Rs. five thousand which will be borne equally by the petitioners in Writ Petitions Nos. 656-660 of 11 1977; 512-533 of 1977; and 503 to 511 of 1977. The costs will be payable to the Union of India and the State of Maharashtra in equal measure.

(5) Writ Petition No. 63 of 1977 (Baburao Samant vs. Union of India) will be set down for hearing.

(6) Reasons for this Order will follow later.

The following Judgments were delivered:

CHANDRACHUD, C.J. A ceiling on agricultural holdings was imposed in Maharashtra by the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 27 of 1961, which was brought into operation on January 26, 1962. The ceiling fixed by that Act (the Principal Act), was lowered and certain other amendments were made to that Act by Acts 21 of 1975, 47 of 1975 and 2 of 1976. The validity of these Acts was challenged in the Bombay High Court in a large group of over 2660 petitions. A Division Bench of the High Court sitting at Nagpur repelled that challenge by a judgment dated August 13, 1976, in Vithalrao Udhaorao Uttarwar v.

State of Maharashtra The High Court held that the provisions of the aforesaid Acts were not open to challenge on the ground that they were inconsistent with or took away or abridged any of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution, since those Acts were placed in the Ninth Schedule by the Constitution 17th Amendment Act, 1964, and the Constitution 40th Amendment Act, 1976, and also because of the promulgation of Emergency as a result of which, the rights under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution could not be enforced. The High Court also repelled the challenge to the validity of Article 31B itself by holding that far from damaging the basic structure of the Constitution, the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, which introduced Article 31B into the Constitution, fortified that structure by subserving a fundamental constitutional purpose. Certain provisions of the Principal Act and of the Amending Acts.

particularly the concept of 'family unit' were challenged before the High Court on the ground, inter alia, that they were outside the purview of Article 31A. On an overall consideration of the movement of agrarian reforms, with particular reference to the relevant statistics in regard to Maharashtra, the High Court rejected that challenge too on the ground that those provisions formed a part of an integral scheme of agrarian reforms under which large agricultural holdings had to be reduced and the surplus land distributed amongst the landless and others.

The appeals filed against the decision of the Bombay High Court were dismissed by this Court by a judgment dated January 27, 1977 in Dattatraya Govind Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra. The only point urged in those appeals was that the Principal Act, as amended, was void being violative of the second proviso to Article 31A(1), in so far as it created an artificial 'family unit' and fixed the ceiling on the agricultural holdings of such family units. The argument was that the violation of the particular proviso deprived the impugned laws of the protection conferred by Article 31A. That argument was rejected by the Court on the view that even if the impugned provisions were violative of the second proviso, they would receive the protection of Article 31B by reason of the inclusion of the Principal Act and the Amending Acts in the Ninth Schedule. The Court considered whether, in fact, the provisions of the impugned Acts were violative of the second proviso and held that it was entirely for the legislature to decide what policy to adopt for the purpose of restructuring the agrarian system and the Court could not assume the role of an economic adviser for pronouncing upon the wisdom of such policy. The second proviso to Article 31A(1) was therefore held not to have been contravened.

The judgment of this Court in the appeals aforesaid was delivered on January 27, 1977 while the proclamation of emergency was in operation. On the revocation of that proclamation, petitions were filed in this Court by the appellants praying for the review of the judgment in Dattatraya Govind Mahajan (Supra) on the ground that Several contentions, which were otherwise open to them for assailing the constitutional validity of the impugned Acts, could not be made by reason of the emergency and that they should be permitted to make those contentions since the emergency was lifted. Fresh Writ Petitions were also filed in the Court in which those contentions were put forward. The Court having accepted the request for the review of the judgment in Dattatraya Govind Mahajan, (supra) these matters have come before us for consideration of the other points involved in the appeals.

In these proceedings, the main challenge now is to the constitutionality of Articles 31A, 31B and the unamended Article 31C of the Constitution. The various grounds of challenge to the Principal Act and the Amending Acts were met on behalf of the respondents by relying on the provisions of these Articles which throw a protective cloak around laws of a certain description and variety, by excluding challenge thereto on the ground that they are violative of certain articles of the Constitution.

The reply of the appellants and the petitioners to the defence of the respondents is, as it could only be, that the very provisions of the Constitution on which the respondents rely for saving the impugned laws are invalid, since these particular provisions of the Constitution, which were introduced by later amendments, damage or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution within the meaning of the ratio of the majority judgment in Keshavananda Bharati.

Articles 14, 19, 31A. 31B, 31C (as unamended) and 368, which are relevant for our purpose, are familiar to lawyers and laymen alike, so great is their impact on law and life.

Article 14, the saviour of the rule of law, injuncts that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. Article 19 confers upon the citizens rights like the freedom of speech and expression, the right to assemble peaceably, the right to form associations, the right to move freely throughout the territory of India, the right to reside and settle in any part of India, and the right to practise any profession or to carry on any trade, business or calling. These rights make life meaningful and, without the freedoms conferred by Article 19, the goal of the Preamble will remain a dream unfulfilled. The right to property conferred by Articles 19(1)(f) and 31 was deleted by the 44th Amendment with effect from June 20, 1979.

Article 31A(1) (a) provides that:

Notwithstanding anything contained in article 13, no law providing for- (a) the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein or the extinguishment or modification of any such rights, shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by article 14 or article 19.

Article 31B provides that:

Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in article 31A, none of the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule nor any of the provisions thereof shall be deemed to be void, or ever to have become void, on the ground that such Act, Regulation or provision is 14 inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by, any provisions of this Part, and notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court or tribunal to the contrary, each of the said Acts and Regulations shall, subject to the power of any competent Legislature to repeal or amend it, continue in force.

Article 31C, as it existed prior to its amendment by the 42nd Amendment Act, which came into force on January 3, 1977, provided that:

Notwithstanding anything contained in article 13, no law giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in clause (b) or clause (c) of article 39 shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by article 14 or article 19; and no law containing a declaration that it is for giving effect to such policy shall be called in question in any court on the ground that it does not give effect to such policy.

Articles 31A and 31B were introduced into the constitution by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, the former with retrospective effect from the date of the enactment of the Constitution. Article 31C (unamended) was introduced by the Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, with effect from April 20, 1972. The last clause of that article, which gave conclusiveness to the declaration regarding the policy of the particular Act, was struck down as invalid in Kesavananda Bharati (supra). That part now lives an italicized existence in official publications of the Indian Constitution. The words "the principles specified in clause (b) or clause (c) of article 39' were substituted by the words "all or any of the principles laid down in Part IV", by the 44th Amendment, with effect from June 20, 1979.

We are concerned with Article 31C as it stood originally but, of course, without the concluding part struck down in Kesavananda Bharati (supra).

Article 368 of the Constitution reads thus:

"368. (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, Parliament may in exercise of its constituent power amend by way of addition, variation or repeal any provision of this Constitution in accordance with the procedure laid down in this article.

(2) x x x x x 15 (3) Nothing in article 13 shall apply to any amendment made under this article.

(4) No amendment of this Constitution (including the provisions of Part III) made or purporting to have been made under this article (whether before or after the commencement of section 55 of the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment Act 1976) shall be called in question in any court on any ground.

(5) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that there shall be no limitation whatever on the constituent power of Parliament to amend by way of addition, variation or repeal the provisions of this Constitution under this article." Clauses (4) and (5) above were inserted by section 55 of the 42nd Amendment Act 1976 with effect from January 3, 1977.

Those clauses were declared unconstitutional, as being beyond the amending power of the Parliament, by a very recent decision of this Court in Minerva Mills which was pronounced on July 31, 1980. The judgment of the Court on the invalidity of clauses (4) and (5) was unanimous. The question as to whether Articles 31A(1)(a), 31B and the un-amended Article 31C are valid shall have to be decided on the basis that clause (5) of Article 368 is ineffective to enlarge the Parliament's amending power so as to empower it to make amendments which will damage or destroy any of the basic features of the Constitution and Clause (4) is ineffective to take away the power of the courts to pronounce a constitutional amendment invalid, if it damages or destroys any of the basic features of the Constitution.

Thus, the main question arising before us has to be decided by applying the ratio of Kesavananda Bharati (supra), in its pristine form. It is quite another matter that learned counsel led by Shri M. N. Phadke question whether any ratio at all is discernible from the majority judgments in Kesavananda (supra).

The first question to which we have to address ourselves is whether in enacting Article 31A (1) (a) by way of amendment of the Constitution, the Parliament transgressed its power of amending the Constitution. As stated earlier, Article 31A was inserted in the Constitution by section 4 of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 with retrospective effect from the commencement of the Constitution.

16 Article 31A(1), as introduced by the 1st Amendment on June 18, 1951, read thus:

31A. (1) Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this part, no law providing for the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein or for the extinguishment or modification of any such rights shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by, any provisions of this Part.

Article 31A was amended, with the same degree of retrospective effect again, by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955. Two alterations, not substance-wise material, were made by the 4th Amendment. The opening non- obstante clause which originally extended to "anything in the foregoing provisions of this Part", that is to say Part III, was substituted by a clause restricted to "anything contained in Article 13". Secondly, whereas under the Article as conceived originally, the challenge to laws of agrarian reform was excluded on the broader ground of their inconsistency, abrogation, or abridgement of any of the rights conferred by "any provisions of" Part III, under the amended article the challenge is excluded in relation to the violation of the three specific articles, namely, Articles 14, 19 and 31. The 4th Amendment introduced clauses (a) to (e) in Article 31A, the content of clause (a) being the same as that of old clause (1). Clauses (b) to (e) were added newly by the 4th Amendment, comprehending laws of four other categories like laws providing for the taking over of the management of any property by the State for a limited period, laws providing for amalgamation of two or more corporations, laws providing for extinguishment or modification of rights of persons interested in corporations; and laws providing for extinguishment or modification of rights accruing under any agreement, lease or licence relating to minerals. We are not concerned in these matters with the provisions of clauses (b) to (e), though we would like to state expressly and specifically that whatever is relevant on the question of the validity of clause (a) will apply with equal force to the validity or otherwise of clauses (b) to (e).

By section 7 of the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 the reference to Article 31 was deleted from the concluding portion of Article 31A(1) with effect from June 20, 1979, as a consequence of the deletion, by section 2 of the 44th Amendment, of clause (f) of Article 19(1) which gave to the citizens the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property. The deletion of the right to property from the array of fundamental rights will not deprive the petitioners of the arguments which were available to them prior to the coming into 17 force of the 44th Amendment, since the impugned Acts were passed before June 20, 1979 on which date Article 19(1)(f) was deleted.

There is no doubt, nor indeed is it disputed, that the Agricultural Lands Ceiling Acts, which are impugned in these proceedings, fall squarely within the terms of clause (a) of Article 31A(1). Those Acts provide for the extinguishment and modification of rights in an 'estate', the expression 'estate' being defined by clause (2) (a) (iii) to mean "any land held or let for purposes of agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto....". It must follow, as a necessary corollary, that the impugned Acts are entitled to the protection of Article 31A(1) (a) when the result that their provisions cannot be deemed, and therefore cannot be declared, to be void on the ground that they are inconsistent with or take away or abridge any of the rights conferred by Articles 14, 19 or 31.

This is the reason why and the contest in which the validity of Article 31A(1)(a) is itself assailed by the petitioners. If a constitutional provision, which deprives the petitioners of the benefit and protection of Articles 14, 19 and 31, is invalid, the petitioners will be entitled to challenge the impugned laws on the ground that they are inconsistent with or that they take away or abridge the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution. Article 13(2), has a sensitive touchstone. Not only does it mandate that the State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by Part III but, it provides that any law made in contravention of the clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void. Mere abridgement, that is to say curtailment, and not necessarily abrogation, that is to say total deprivation, is enough to produce the consequence provided for by Article 13(2).

The validity of the constitutional amendment by which Article 31A(1)(a) was introduced is challenged by the petitioners on the ground that it damages the basic structure of the Constitution by destroying one of its basic features, namely, that no law can be made by the legislature so as to abrogate the guarantees afforded by Articles 14, 19 and 31. It is tautologous to say so but, if we may so put it, the obliteration of the rights conferred by these Articles, which Article 31A (1) (a) brings about, is total and complete because, as the clear and unequivocal language of that Article shows, the application of these three articles stands totally withdrawn in so far as laws falling within the ambit of clause (a) are concerned. It is no argument to say that the withdrawal of the application of certain articles in Part III in respect of laws of a defined category is not total abrogation of the articles because they will continue to apply to other situations and other laws. In any given case, what is decisive 18 is whether, in so far as the impugned law is concerned, the rights available to persons affected by that law under any of the articles in Part III is totally or substantially withdrawn and not whether the articles, the application of which stands withdrawn in regard to a defined category of laws, continue to be on the Statute Book so as to be available in respect of laws of other categories. We must therefore conclude that the withdrawal of the application of Articles 14, 19 and 31 in respect of laws which fall under clause (a) is total and complete, that is to say, the application of those articles stands abrogated, not merely abridged, in respect of the impugned enactments which indubitably fall within the ambit of clause (a). We would like to add that every case in which the protection of a fundamental right is withdrawn will not necessarily result in damaging or destroying the basic structure of the Constitution. The question as to whether the basic structure is damaged or destroyed in any given case would depend upon which particular Article of Part III is in issue and whether what is withdrawn is quint-essential to the basic structure of the Constitution.

The judgment of this Court in Kesavananda Bharati (supra) provoked in its wake a multi-storied controversy, which is quite understandable. The judgment of the majority to which seven out of the thirteen Judges were parties, struck a bridle path by holding that in the exercise of the power conferred by Article 368, the Parliament cannot amend the Constitution so as to damage or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution. The seven learned Judges chose their words and phrases to express their conclusion as effectively and eloquently as language can do. But, at this distance of time any controversy over what was meant by what they said is plainly sterile. At 'this distance of time', because though not more than a little less than eight years have gone by since the decision in Kesavananda Bharati (supra) was rendered, those few years are packed with constitutional events of great magnitude. Applying the ratio of the majority judgments in that epoch-making decision, this Court has since struck down constitutional amendments which would otherwise have passed muster. For example, in Smt. Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain Art. 329A(4) was held by the Court to be beyond the amending competence of the Parliament since, by making separate and special provisions as to elections to Parliament of the Prime Minister and the Speaker, it destroyed the basic structure of the Constitution. Ray C.J. based his decision on the ground that the 39th Amendment by which Art. 329A was introduced violated the Rule of Law 19 (p. 418); Khanna J. based his decision on the ground that democracy was a basic feature of the Constitution, that democracy contemplates that elections should be free and fair and that the clause in question struck at the basis of free and fair elections (pp. 467 and 471); Mathew J. struck down the clause on the ground that it was in the nature of legislation ad hominem (p. 513) and that it damaged the democratic structure of the Constitution (p. 515); while one of us, Chandrachud J., held that the clause was bad because it violated the Rule of Law and was an outright negation of the principle of equality which is a basic feature of the Constitution (pp. 663-665). More recently, in Minerva Mills, (supra) clauses (4) and (5) of Article 368 itself were held unconstitutional by a unanimous Court, on the ground that they destroyed certain basic features of the Constitution like judicial review and a limited amending power, and thereby damaged its basic structure. The majority also struck down the amendment introduced to Article 31C by section 4 of the 42nd Amendment Act, 1976.

The period between April 24, 1973, when the judgment in Kesavananda Bharati (supra) was delivered and now is of course a short span in our constitutional history but the occasional challenges which evoked equal responses have helped settle the controversy over the limitations on the Parliament's power to amend the Constitution. Khanna J. was misunderstood to mean that fundamental rights are not a part of the basic structure of the Constitution when he said in Kesavananda Bharati (supra):

I have no doubt that the power of amendment is plenary and would include within itself the power to add, alter or repeal the various articles including those relating to fundamental rights. (p. 688) But he clarified the true position in his judgment in the Election Case (supra) (pages 497-499), by drawing the attention of doubters to a significant qualification 'which he had engrafted on the above statement, at pages 688 and 758 of his judgment in Kesavananda Bharati (supra). The qualification was that subject to the retention of the basic structure or framework of the Constitution, the power of amendment was plenary. The law on the subject of the Parliament's power to amend the Constitution must now be taken as well-settled, the true position being that though the Parliament has the power to amend each and every article of the Constitution including the provisions of Part III, the amending power cannot be exercised so as to damage or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution. It is by the application of this principle that we shall have to decide upon the 20 validity of the Amendment by which Article 31A was introduced. The precise question then for consideration is whether section 4 of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 which introduced Article 31A into the Constitution damages or destroys the basic structure of the Constitution.

In the work-a-day civil law, it is said that the measure of the permissibility of an amendment of a pleading is how far it is consistent with the original: you cannot by an amendment transform the original into the opposite of what it is. For that purpose, a comparison is undertaken to match the amendment with the original. Such a comparison can yield fruitful results even in the rarefied sphere of constitutional law. What were the basic postulates of the Indian Constitution when it was enacted ? And does the 1st Amendment do violence to those postulates ? Can the Constitution as originally conceived and the amendment introduced by the 1st Amendment Act not endure in harmony or are they so incongruous that to seek to harmonize them will be like trying to fit a square peg into a round aperture ? Is the concept underlying section 4 of the 1st Amendment an alien in the house of democracy?--its invader and destroyer ? Does it damage or destroy the republican framework of the Constitution as originally devised and designed? These questions have a historical slant and content: and history can furnish a safe and certain clue to their answer.

The relevant part of the statement of Objects and Reasons of the 1st amendment says:

During the last fifteen months of the working of the Constitution, certain difficulties have been brought to light by judicial decisions and pronouncements specially in regard to the chapter on fundamental rights. The citizen's right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by article 19(1) (a) has been held by some courts to be so comprehensive as not to render a person culpable even if he advocates murder and other crimes of violence. In other countries with written constitutions, freedom of speech and of the press is not regarded as debarring the State from punishing or preventing abuse of this freedom. The citizen's right to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business conferred by article 19(1)(g) is subject to reasonable restrictions which the laws of the State may impose "in the interests of the general public." While the words cited are comprehensive enough to cover any scheme of nationalisation which the State may undertake, it is desirable to place 21 the matter beyond doubt by a clarificatory addition to article 19(6). Another article in regard to which unanticipated difficulties have arisen is article 31.

The validity of agrarian reform measures passed by the State Legislatures in the last three years has, in spite of the provisions of clauses (4) and (6) of article 31, formed the subject-matter of dilatory litigation, as a result of which the implementation of these important measures, affecting large numbers of people has been held up.

The main objects of this Bill are, accordingly, to amend article 19 for the purposes indicated above and to insert provisions fully securing the constitutional validity of zamindari abolition laws in general and certain specified State Acts in particular. The opportunity has been taken to propose a few minor amendments to other articles in order to remove difficulties that may arise.

In Shankari Prasad v. Union of India, Patanjali Sastri, C.J. explained the reasons that led to the insertion of Articles 31A and 31B by the 1st Amendment thus:

What led to that enactment is a matter of common knowledge. The political party now in power, commanding as it does a majority of votes in the several State Legislatures as well as in Parliament, carried out certain measures of agrarian reform in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh by enacting legislation which may compendiously be referred to as Zamindari Abolition Acts. Certain Zamindars, feeling themselves aggrieved, attacked the validity of those Acts in Courts of law on the ground that they contravened the fundamental rights conferred on them by Part III of the Constitution. The High Court at Patna held that the Act passed in Bihar was unconstitutional while the High Courts at Allahabad and Nagpur upheld the validity of the corresponding legislation in Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh respectively. Appeals from those decisions are pending in this Court. Petitions filed in this Court by some other zamindars seeking the determinations of the same question are also pending.

At this stage, the Union Government, with a view to put an end to all this litigation and to remedy what they considered to be certain defects brought to light in the working of the Constitution, brought forward a Bill to amend the Constitution, which after undergoing amendments in various particulars, 22 was passed by the requisite majority as the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951.

Article 31A was further amended with retrospective effect by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act 1955, the object of which was explained as follows in the Statement of Objects and Reasons of that Amendment:

It will be recalled that the zamindari abolition laws which came first in our programme of social welfare legislation were attacked by the interests affected mainly with reference to article 14, 19 and 31, and that in order to put an end to the dilatory and wasteful litigation and place these laws above challenge in the courts, articles 31A and 31B and the Ninth Schedule were enacted by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act. Subsequent judicial decisions interpreting articles 14, 19 and 31 have raised serious difficulties in the way of the Union and the States putting through other and equally important social welfare legislation on the desired lines, e.g., the following:- (i) While the abolition of zamindaries and the numerous intermediaries between the State and the tiller of the soil has been achieved for the most part, our next objectives in land reform are the fixing of limits to the extent of agricultural land that may be owned or occupied by any person, the disposal of any land held in excess of the prescribed maximum and the further modification of the rights of land owners and tenants in agricultural holdings.

(ii) x x x x x x (iii) x x x x x x (iv) x x x x x x It is accordingly proposed in clause 3 of the Bill to extend the scope of article 31A so as to cover these categories of essential welfare legislation.

The Constitution (First Amendment) Act was moved in the Provisional Parliament on May 12, 1951 as Bill No. 48 of 1951. It was referred to a Select Committee and after the receipt of its report, it was debated in the Parliament on various dates in May and June. It received the Presidential assent on June 18, 1951.

The speeches made in the Provisional Parliament by Jawaharlal Nehru and other national leaders who had participated in the freedom 23 movement show, in a significant measure, the genesis of the 1st Amendment and its avowed purpose.

While moving that the Bill be referred to a Select Committee, Jawaharlal Nehru said:

This Bill is not a very complicated one: nor is it a big one. Nevertheless, I need hardly point out that it is of intrinsic and great importance. Anything dealing with the Constitution and change of it is of importance. Anything dealing with Fundamental Rights incorporated in the Constitution is of even greater importance. Therefore, in bringing this Bill forward I do so and the Government does so in no spirit of lightheartedness, in no haste, but after the most careful thought and scrutiny given to this problem.

I might inform the House that we have been thinking about this matter for several months, consulting people, State Governments, Ministers of Provincial Governments, consulting when occasion offered itself, a number of Members of this House, referring it to various Committees and the like and taking such advice from competent legal quarters as we could obtain, so that we have proceeded with as great care as we could possibly give to it. We have brought it forward now after that care, in the best form that we could give it, because we thought that the amendments mentioned in this Bill are not only necessary, but desirable, and because we thought that if these changes are not made, perhaps not only would great difficulties arise, as they have arisen in the past few months, but perhaps some of the main purposes of the