Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. Vs. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha [1979] INSC 242 (19 November 1979)
KRISHNAIYER, V.R.
KRISHNAIYER, V.R.
DESAI, D.A.
KOSHAL, A.D.
CITATION: 1980 AIR 1896 1980 SCR (2) 146 1980 SCC (2) 593
CITATOR INFO:
E 1984 SC1805 (16) R 1992 SC 96 (14)
ACT:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 11A-Scope of- Whether the arbitrator could exercise the power conferred on a Tribunal under section 11A of the Act and interfere with the punishment awarded by the management to the workmen.
Constitution of India, 1950, Article 227-Power of the High Court to interfere with the decision of the management and revise the punishment to the delinquent workmen.
Model Standing orders made under Section 15(2) of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946-M.S.Os. 23, 24 and 25 scope of-Whether the discharge en masse of workmen valid.
Value vision of Indian Industrial Jurisprudence- Constitution of India- Articles 39, 41, 42, 43 43A and the Golden Rule for the Judicial resolution of an industrial dispute.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant manufactures steel tubes in the outskirts of Ahmedabad city. It started its business in 1960, went into production since 1964 and waggled from infancy to adulthood with smiling profits and growling workers, punctuated by smouldering demands, strikes and settlement until there brewed a confrontation culminating in a head-on collision following upon certain unhappy happenings. A total strike ensued whose chain reaction was a whole-sale termination of all employees followed by fresh recruitment of workmen defacto breakdown of the strike and dispute over restoration of the removed workmen.
As per the last settlement between the management and the workmen of 4th August, 1972, it was not open to the workmen to resort to a strike till the expiry of a period of five years; nor could the management declare a lock out till then. Any dispute arising between the parties, according to the terms arrived at were to be sorted out through negotiation or, failing that by recourse to arbitration. The matter was therefore, referred to an arbitrator and the arbitrator by his award held the action of the management warranted. The respondent challenged the decision of the arbitrator under Article 226/227 of the Constitution and the High Court of Gujarat reversed the award and substantially directed reinstatement. Hence the appeals both by the Management and the workmen.
Dismissing the appeals and modifying the awards substantially, the Court
HELD: (By Majority) Per Iyer J. On behalf of D. A. Desai J. and himself.
(i) The basic assumption is that the strike was not only illegal but also unjustified. [210 H] 147 (ii) The management did punish its 853 workmen when it discharged them for reasons of misconduct set out in separate but integrated proceedings; even though with legal finesse, the formal order was phrased in harmless verbalism.
[211 A] (iii) The action taken under the general law or the standing orders, was illegal in the absence of individualised charge sheets, proper hearing and personalise punishment if found guilty. None of these steps having been taken, the discharge orders were still born. But, the management could, as in this case it did, offer to make out the delinquency of the employees and the arbitrator had, in such cases, the full jurisdiction to adjudge de novo both guilt and punishment. [211 B-C] (iv) Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 does take in an arbitrator too, and in this case, the arbitral reference, apart from section 11A is plenary in scope. [211 C-D] (v) Article 226 of the Constitution, however restrictive in practice Is a power wide enough in all conscience, to be a friend in need when the summons comes in a crisis from a victim of injustice; and more importantly this extra-ordinary reserve power is unsheathed to grant final relief without necessary recourse to a remand. What the Tribunal may in its discretion do the High Court too under Article 226, can, if facts compel so. [211 D-E] (vi) The Award, in the instant case, suffers from a fundamental flaw that it equates an illegal and unjustified strike with brozen misconduct by every workman without so much as identification of the charge against each, after adverting to the gravamen of his misconduct meriting dismissal. Passive participation in a strike which is both illegal and unjustified does not ipso facto invite dismissal or punitive discharge. There must be active individual excess such as master-minding the unjustified aspects of the strike, e.g., violence, sabotage or other reprehensible role. Absent such gravamen in the accusation, the extreme economic penalty of discharge is wrong. An indicator of the absence of such grievous guilt is that the management, after stating in strong terms all the sins of workmen, took back over 400 of them as they trickled back slowly and beyond the time set, with continuity of service, suggestive of the dubiety of the inflated accusations and awareness of the minor role of the mass of workmen in the lingering strike.
Furthermore, even though all sanctions short of punitive discharge may be employed by a Management, low wages and high cost of living, dismissal of several hundred with disastrous impact on numerous families is of such sensitive social concern that, save in exceptional situations, the law will inhibit such a lethal step for the peace of the industry, the welfare of the workmen and the broader justice that transcends transcient disputes. The human dimensions have decisional relevance. The discharge orders though approved by the Arbitrator are invalid. [211 E-H, 212 A-B]
HELD FURTHER: 1. In a society, capital shall be the brother and keeper of labour and cannot disown this obligation of a partner in management, especially because social justice and Articles 43 and 43A are constitutional mandates. The policy directions in Articles 39, 41, 42, 43 and 43A speak at the right to an adequate means of livelihood, the right to work, humane conditions of work, living wages ensuring a decent standard of life and enjoyment of leisure and participation of workers in management of industries. De hors these 148 mandates, law will fail functionally. Suck is the value vision of Indian Industrial Jurisprudence. [155 B, G-H, 156 A]
2. Jural resolution of labour disputes must be sought in the law life complex beyond the factual blinkers of decided cases, beneath the lexical littleness of statutory tests, in the economic basics of industrial justice which must enliven the consciousness of the Court and the corpus juris. [154 F-G] The golden rule for the judicial resolution of an industrial dispute is first to persuade fighting parties, by judicious suggestions, into the peace-making zone, disentangle the differences, narrow the mistrust gap and convert them through consensual steps, into negotiated justice. Law is not the last word in justice, especially social justice. Moreover in an hierarchical system, the little man lives in the short run but most litigation lives in the long run. So it is that negotiation first and adjudication next, is a welcome formula for the Bench and the Bar, the Management and Union. [157 C-E] The anatomy of a dismissal order is not a mystery, once it is agreed that substance, not semblance, governs the decision. Legal criteria are not so slippery that verbal manipulations may outwit the Court. The fact is the index of the mind and an order fair on its face may be taken at its face value. But there is more to it than that, because sometimes words are designed to conceal deeds by linguistic engineering. The form of the order of the language in which it is couched is not conclusive. The Court will lift the veil to see the nature of the order. [171 G-H. 172 A] If two factors-motive and foundation of the order-co- exist, an interference of punishment is reasonable though not inevitable. If the severance of service is effected the first condition is fulfilled and if the foundation or causa causans of such severance is the servant's misconduct, the second is fulfilled. If the basis or foundation for the order of termination is clearly not turpitudes or stigmatic or rooted in misconduct or visited with evil pecuniary effects, then the inference of dismissal stands negated and vice versa. These canons run right through the disciplinary branch of master and servant jurisprudence, both under Article 311 and in other cases including workmen under managements. The law cannot be stultified by verbal haberdashery because the Court will lift the mask and discover the true face. [172 C-E] Masters and servants cannot be permitted to play hide and seek with the law of dismissals and the plain and proper criteria are not to be misdirected by terminological cover- ups or by appeal to psychic processes but must be grounded on the substantive reason for the order, whether disclosed or undisclosed. The Court will find out from other proceedings or documents connected with the formal order of termination what the true ground for the termination is. If thus scrutinised the; order has a punitive flavour in cause or consequence, it is dismissal. If it falls short of this test, it cannot be called a punishment. A termination effected because the master is satisfied of the misconduct and of the consequent desirability of terminating the service of the delinquent servant, it is a dismissal even if he had the right in law to terminate with an innocent order under the standing order or otherwise. Whether, in such a case the grounds are recorded in a different proceeding from the formal order does not detract from its nature. Nor the fact that, after being satisfied of the guilt, the master abandons the enquiry and proceeds to terminate. Given 149 an alleged misconduct and a live nexus between it and the termination of service the conclusion is dismissal, even if full benefits as on simple termination are given and non- injurious terminology is used. [173 E-H, 174 A] On the contrary, even if there is suspicion of misconduct, the master may say that he does not wish to bother about it and may not go into his guilt but may feel like not keeping a man he is not happy with. He may not like to investigate nor take the risk of continuing a dubious servant. There it is not n dismissal, but termination simpliciter, if no injurious record of reasons or punitive pecuniary cut back on his full terminal benefits is found.
For, in fact, misconduct is not then the moving factor in the discharge, What is decisive is the plain reason for the discharge, not the strategy of a non-enquiry or clever avoidance of stigmatising epithets. If the basis is not misconduct, the order is saved.
[174 B-D] Management of Murugan Mills v. Industrial Tribunal [1965] 2 SCR 148; Chartered Bank v. Employees' Union [1960] 3 SCR 441; Western India Automobile Association v.
Industrial Tribunal, Bombay [1949] S.C.R. 321; Assam Oil Co.
v. Workmen, [1960] 3 SCR 457; Tata Oil Mills Co. v. Workmen, [1964] 2 SCR 125 @ 130; Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co.
Ltd. v. S.C. Prasad & Anr. [1969] 3 SCR 372; L. Michael and Anr. v. M/s. Johnson Pumps India Ltd., [1975] 3 SCR 372;
Workmen of Sudder Office, Cinnamore v. Management, [1970] 2 L.L.J. 620, Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. P.S. Malvankar, [1978] 3 SCR 1000; referred to.
Every wrong order cannot be righted merely because it was wrong. It can be quashed only if it is vitiated by the fundamental flaws of gross miscarriage of justice, absence of legal evidence, perverse misreading of facts, serious errors of law on the face of the order, jurisdictional failure and the like. [182 P-G] While the remedy under Art. 226 is extraordinary and is of Anglosaxon vintage, it is not a carbon copy of English processes. Article 226 is a sparing surgery but the lancet operates where injustice suppurates. While traditional restraints like availability of alternative remedy hold back the Court, and judicial power should not ordinarily rush in where the other two branches fear to tread. judicial daring is not daunted where glaring injustice demands even affirmative action. The wide words of Article 226 are designed for service of the lowly numbers in their grievances if the subject belongs to the Court's province and the remedy is appropriate to the judicial process. There is a native hue about article 226, without being anglophilic or anglophobic in attitude. Viewed from this jurisprudential perspective the Court should be cautious both in not over stepping as if Article 226 were as large as an appeal and not failing to intervene where a grave error has crept in.
And an appellate power interferes not when the order appealed is not right but only when it is dearly wrong. The difference is real, though fine. [182 G-H, 183 A-B] The principle of law is that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is limited to holding the judicial or quasi judicial powers within the leading sings of legality and to see that they do not exceed their statutory jurisdiction and correctly administer the law laid down by the statute under the Act. So long as the hierarchy of officers and appellate authorities created by the statute function within their ambit the manner in which they do so can be no ground for interference. The power of judicial supervision of the High Court under Article 227 of tho Constitution (as it then stood) is not 150 greater than those under Article 226 and it must be limited to seeing that a tribunal functions within the limits of its authority. The writ power is large, given illegality and injustice even if its use is severely disciplinary. The amended Article 226 would enable the High Court to interfere with an Award of the industrial adjudicator if that is based on a complete misconception of law or it is based on no evidence, or that no reasonable man would come to the conclusion to which the Arbitrator has arrived. [15 E-G 1 86 D-E] Navinchandra Shanker Chand Shah v. Manager, Ahmedabad Cooperative Department Stores Ltd., [1978] 19 Guj. L.R. 108 @ 140; approved.
Rohtas Industries & Anr. v. Rohtas Industries Staff Union and Ors. [1976] 3 SCR 12: followed.
Nagendranath Bata and Anr. v. The Commissioner of Hills Divisions and Appeals, Assam & Ors., [1958] SCR 1240;
Engineering Mazdoor Sabha v. Hind Cycle Lrd. [1963] Suppl. 1 SCR 625; State of A.P. v. Sreeeama Rao, [1964] 3 SCR 25 @ 33; P. H. Kalyani v. M/s Air France, Calcutta, [1964] 2 SCR 104; referred to.
"Tribunal" simpliciter has a sweeping signification and does not exclude Arbitrator. A tribunal literally means a seat of justice, may be, a commission, a Court or other adjudicatory organ created by the State. All these are tribunal and naturally the import of the word, in Section 2(r) of the Industrial Disputes Act, embraces an arbitration tribunal. [188 E-F-H 189 A] Dawking v. Rokely, L.R. 8 Q.B. 255; quoted with approval.
An Arbitrator has all the powers under the terms of reference, to which both sides are party, confer. In the instant case, the Arbitrator had the authority to investigate into the propriety of the discharge and the veracity of the mis conduct. Even if section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act is not applicable, an Arbitrator under Section 10A is bound to act in the spirit of the legislation under which he is to function. A commercial Arbitrator who derives his jurisdiction from the terms of reference will by necessary implication be bound to decide according to law and when one says "according to law", it only means existing law and the law laid down by the Supreme Court being the law of land, an Arbitrator under section 10A will have to decide keeping in view the spirit of section 11A. [196 B-D] Union of India v. Bungo Steel Furniture (P) Ltd. [1967] 1 SCR 324; referred to.
Per Koshal J. (Contra)
1. The orders of discharge could not be regarded as orders of their dismissal and were on the other hand, orders of discharge simpliciter properly passed under Model Standing order 23. [235 C-D] (a) Clauses (3) and (4) of M.S.O. 25 speak of an inquiry only in the case of an order falling under sub- clause (g) of clause (1) of that M.S.O. The only sub clause of clause (1) of M.S.O. 25 to which the provisions of clauses (3) and (4) of that M.S.O. would be attracted is sub clause (g) and if an order of discharge falls under M.S.O. 23, an inquiry under clauses (3) and 151 (4) of M.S.O. 25 would not be a pre-requisite thereto even though such an a older is mentioned in sub-clause (f) clause (1) of that M.S.O. [222 H, 223 A] (b) Under M.S.O.s. 23 and 25, the Management has the powers to effect termination of the services of an employee by having recourse to either or them. In action taken under M.S.O. 23, no element of punishment is involved and the discharge is a discharge simpliciter; and that is why no opportunity to the concerned employee to show cause against the termination is provided for. Dismissal, however, which an employer may order is in its very nature, a punishment, the infliction of which therefore has been made subject to the result of an inquiry (having the semblance of a trial in a criminal proceeding). Exercise of each of the two powers has the effect of the termination of the services of the concerned employee but must be regarded, because of the manner in which each has been dealt with by the M.S.O. as separate and distinct from the other. [223 C-E] (c) To contend that once it was proved that the order of discharge of a workman was passed by reason of a misconduct attributed to him by the management, the order cannot but amount to an order of dismissal is wrong for two reasons. For one thing, clause (1) of M.S.O. 25 specifically states in sub-clauses (f) that a workman guilty of misconduct may be discharged under M.S.O. 23. This clearly means that when the employer is satisfied that a workman has been guilty of misconduct he may [apart from visiting the workman with any of the punishments specified in sub-clauses (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) of clause (1) of M.S.O. 25] either pass against him an order of discharge for which no inquiry precedent as, provided for in clauses (3) and (4) of M.S.O. 25 would be necessary, or may dismiss him after holding such an inquiry which of the two kinds of order, the employer shall pass is left entirely to his discretion. [223 E-H] It is true that the employer cannot pass a real order of dismissal in the garb of one of discharge. But that only means that if the order of termination of services of an employee is in reality intended to push an employee and not merely to get rid of him because he is considered useless, inconvenient or troublesome, the order even though specified to be an order of dismissal covered by sub clause (g) of clause (1) of M.S.O. 25. On the other hand if no such intention is made out the order would remain one of discharge simpliciter even though it has been passed for the sole reason that a misconduct is imputed to the employee.
That is how M.S.Os. 23 and 25 have to be interpreted. M.S.O.
25 specifically gives to the employer the power to get rid of "a workman guilty of misconduct' by passing an order of his discharge under M.S.O. 23. [224 A-D] Secondly, the reasons for the termination of service of a permanent workman under M.S.O. 23 have to be recorded in writing and communicated to him if he so desires, under clause (4-A) thereof. Such reasons must obviously consist of an opinion derogatory to the workman in relation to the performance of his duties, and whether such reasons consist of negligence, work shirking or of serious overt acts like theft or embezzlement, they would in any case amount to misconduct for which he may be punished under M.S.O. 25.
There being no case in which such reasons would not amount to misconduct, the result is that M.S.O. 23 would be render otiose if termination of service thereunder for misconduct could be regarded as a dismissal and such a result strikes at the very root of accepted canons of interpretation. If it was open to the Court to. "lift 152 the veil" and to hold an order of discharge to amount to dismissal merely because the motive behind it was a misconduct attributed to the employee, the services of an employee could be terminated without holding against him an inquiry such as is contemplated by clauses (3) and (4) of M.S.O. 25. [224 D-G] Bombay Corporation v. Malvankar [1978] 3 SCR 1000;
applied.
Merely because it is the reason which weighed with the employer in effective the termination of services would not male the order of such termination as one founded on misconduct, for such a proposition would run counter to the plain meaning of clause (1) of M.S.O. 25. For an order to be "founded" an misconduct, it must be intended to have been passed by way of punishment, that is, it must be intended to chastise, or cause pain in body or mind or harm or loss in reputation or money to the concerned worker. If such an intention cannot be spelled out of the prevailing circumstances, the order of discharge or the reasons for which it was ostensibly passed, it cannot be regarded as an order of dismissal. Such would be the case when the employer orders discharge or the interests of the factory or of the general body of workers. [226 A-C] Chartered Bank, Bombay v. The Chartered Bank Employees Union, [1960] 3 SCR 441; The Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. [1964] 2 SCR p. 123; The Tara Engineering and Locomotives Co. Ltd.
v. S.C. Prasad, [1969] 3 S.C.C. 372; Workmen of Sudder Office, Cinnamore v. Management, [1970] 2 L.L.J. 620 followed.
The real criterion which formed the touchstone of a test to determine whether an order of termination of services is an order of discharge simpliciter or amounts to dismissal is the real nature of the order, that is, the intention with which it was passed. If the intention was to punish, that is to chastise, the order may be regarded as an order of dismissal; and for judging the intention, the question of mala fides (which is the same thing as colourable exercise of power) becomes all important. If no mala fides can be attributed to the management, the order of discharge must be regarded as one having been passed under M.S.O. 23 even though the reason for its passage is serious misconduct.
(2) The arbitrator could not exercise tho power conferred on a Tribunal under section 11A of the 1947 Act and could not therefore interfere with the punishment awarded by the Management to the workmen (even if the discharge could be regarded a punishment). [235 D-E] Throughout the I.D. Act, while 'arbitrator' would include an umpire, a Tribunal would not include an arbitrator but would mean only an Industrial Tribunal constituted under the Act unless the context makes it necessary to give the word a different connotation. In sub section (1) of section 11, the word 'Tribunal' has been used in accordance with the definition appearing in clause (r) section 2 because an arbitrator is separately mentioned in that sub-section. In sub-sections (2) and (3) of that section a Board, a Labour Court, a Tribunal and a National Tribunal have been invested with certain powers. A Tribunal as contemplated by sub-sections (2) and (3) then, would not include an arbitrator. [233 A-B] It is a well settled canon of interpretation of statutes that the language used by the Legislature must be regarded as the only source of its intention unless such language is ambiguous, in which situation the Preamble to the Act, the statement of objects of and Reasons for bringing it on the statute book and 153 the purpose underlying the legislation may be taken into consideration for ascertaining such intention. That the purpose of the legislation is to fulfil a socio-economic need, or the express object underlying it does not come into the picture till an ambiguity is detected in the language and the Court must steer clear of the temptation to mould the written word according to its own concept of what should have been enacted. It is thus not permissible for the Supreme Court to take the statements of objects and Reasons or the purpose underlying the enactment into consideration, while interpreting section 11A of the I.D. Act. [231 F-G, 234 Cl
3. The High Court exceeded the limits of its jurisdiction in interfering with the said punishment, in the instant case, purporting to act in the exercise of its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. [235 E-F] The High Court, while discharging its functions as envisaged by that Article, does not sit as a Court of Appeal over the Award of the Arbitrator but exercises limited jurisdiction which extends only to seeing that the arbitrator has functioned within the scope of his legal authority. In this view of the matter it was not open to the High Court to revise the punishment (if the discharge is regarded as such) meted out by the Management to the delinquent workmen and left intact by the arbitrator whose authority in doing so has not been shown to have been exercised beyond the limits of his jurisdiction. [234 G-E, 235 A-C] Nagendra Nath Bora and Anr. v. The Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam and Ors., [1958] SCR 1240;
P. H. Kalyani v. M/s Air France, Calcutta, [1964] 3 SCR 25, of A.P. v. Sree Rama Rao, [1964] 3 SCR 25; Navinchandra Shakerchand Shakerchand Shah v. Manager Ahmedabad Cooperative Stores Ltd, [1978] 15 Guj. L.R. 108; referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 1212, 2089 and 2237 of 1978.
From the Judgment and order dated 15-6-1978 of the Gujarat High Court in Special Civil Application No. 1150 of 1976.
Y.S. Chitale, J.C. Bhatt, A.K. Sen, J.M. Nanavati, D.C. Gandhi, A.G. Menses, K.J. John and K.K. Manchanda for the Appellants in C.A. 1212 and 2237/78 and RR. 1 in CA 2089.
V.M. Tarkunde, Y.S. Chitale, P.H. Parekh and N.J. Mehta for the Appellant in CA 2089 and R. 1 in CA 1212.
M.C. Bhandare and B. Datta for the Intervener in CA 1212 (Ahmedabad Nagar Employee Union).
R.K. Garg, Vimal Dave and Miss Kailash Mehta for the Intervener Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha in CA 1212.
The Judgment of V.R. Krishna Iyer, and D.A. Desai, JJ was delivered by Krishna Iyer, J.A.D. Koshal, J. gave a dissenting Opinion.
154 KRISHNA IYER, J.-Every litigation has a moral and, these appeals have many, the foremost being that the economics of law is the essence of labour jurisprudence.
The case in a nutshell- An affluent Management and an indigent work force are the two wings of the Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. which manufactures steel tubes in the outskirts of Ahmedabad city and is scarred by an industrial dispute resulting in these appeals. This industry, started in 1960, went into production since 1964 and waggled from infancy to adulthood with smiling profits and growing workers, punctuated by smouldering demand, strikes and settlements, until there brewed a confrontation culminating in a head-on collision following upon certain unhappy happenings. A total strike ensued, whose chain reaction was a wholesale termination of all the employees, followed by fresh recruitment of workmen, de facto breakdown of the strike and dispute over restoration of the removed workmen. This cataclysmic episode and its sequel formed the basis of a Section 10A arbitration and award, a writ petition and judgment, inevitably spiralling up to this Court in two appeals one by the Management and the other by the Union-which have been heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment.
The arbitrator held the action of the Management warranted while the High Court reversed the Award and substantially directed reinstatement.
The Judge Perspective A few fundamental issues, factual and legal, on which bitter controversy raged at the bar, settle the decisional fate of this case. A plethora of precedents has been cited and volumes of evidence read for our consideration by both sides. But the jural resolution of labour disputes must be sought in the law-life complex, beyond the factual blinkers of decided cases, beneath the lexical littleness of statutory texts, in the economic basics of industrial justice which must enliven the consciousness of the court and the corpus juris. This Court has developed Labour Law on this road basis and what this Court has declared holds good for the country. We must first fix the founding faith in this juristic branch before unravelling the details of the particular case.
Viewing from this vantage point, it is relevant to note that the ethical roots of jurisprudence, with economic overtones, are the clan vital of any country's legal system.
So it is that we begin with two quotations-one from the old Testament and the other from Gandhiji, the Indian New Testament-as perspective-setters. After all, 155 industrial law must set the moral-legal norms for the modus vivendi between the partners in management, namely, Capital and Labour. Cain reported, when asked by God about his brother Abel, in the Old Testament: 'Am I my brother's keeper ?', 'Yes' was the implicit answer in God's curse of Cain. In the fraternal economics of national production, worker is partner in this biblical spirit. In our society, Capital shall be the brother and keeper of Labour and cannot disown this obligation, especially because Social Justice and Articles 43 and 43A are constitutional mandates.
Gandhiji, to whom the Arbitrator has adverted in passing in his award, way back in March 1946, wrote on Capitalism and Strikes h the Harijan:
"How should capital behave when labour strikes ? This question is in the air and has great importance at the present moment. One way is that of suppression named or nicknamed 'American'. It consists in suppression of labour through organised goondaism. Everybody would consider this as wrong and destructive. The other way, right and honorable, consists in considering every strike on its merits and giving labour its due-not what capital considers as due, but what labour itself would so consider and enlightened public opinion acclaims as just.
In my opinion, employers and employed are equal partners, even if employees are not considered superior. But what we see today is the reverse. The reason is that the employers harness intelligence on their side. They have the superior advantage which concentration of capital brings with it, and they know how to make use of it...... Whilst capital in India is fairly organised, labour is strike in a more or less disorganised condition in spite of Unions and Federation. Therefore, it lacks the power that true combination gives.
Hence, my advice to the employers would be that should willingly regard workers as the real owners of the concerns which they fancy they have created.
Tuned to these values are the policy directives in Articles 39, 41, 42, 43 and 43A. They speak of the right to an adequate means of livelihood, the right to work, humane conditions of work, living wage ensuring a decent standard of life and enjoyment of leisure and participation of workers in management of industries. De hors these man- 156 dates, law will fail functionally. Such is the value-vision of Indian Industrial Jurisprudence.
The Matrix of facts-A Pre-view The nidus of facts which enwomb the issues of law may be elaborated a little more at this stage. In the vicinity of Ahmedabad City, the appellant is a prosperous engineering enterprise which enjoys entrepreneureal excellence and employs over 800 workmen knit together into the respondent Union called the Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha (the Sabha, for short). Fortunately, the industry has had an innings of escalating profits but the workmen have had a running complaint a raw deal. Frequent demands for better conditions, followed by negotiated settlements, have been a lovely feature of this establishment, although the poignant fact remains that till the dawn of the seventies, the gross wages of the workmen have hovered round a harrowing hundred rupees or more in this thriving Ahmedabad industry.
The course of this precarious co-existence was often ruffled, and there was, now and then, some flare-up leading to strike, conciliation and even reference under Section 10.
When one such reference was pending another unconnected dispute arose which, alter some twists and turns, led to an industrial break-down and a total strike. The episodic stages of this bitter battle will have to be narrated at length a little later. Suffice it to say that the Management jettisoned all the 853 workman and recruited some fresher to take their place and to keep the wheels of production moving. In the war of attrition that ensued, labour lost and capitulated to Capital. At long last, between the two, a reference to arbitration of the disputes was agreed upon under Section 10A of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 (the Act, for short). The highlight of the dispute referred for arbitration was whether the termination orders issued by the Management against the workmen whose names were set out in the annexure to the reference were "legal, proper and justified"; if not, whether the workmen were 'entitled to any reliefs including the relief of reinstatement with continuity of service and full back wages'. The arbitrator's decision went against the Sabha while, on a challenge under Article 226, the High Court's judgment virtually vindicated its stand. This is the hang of the case. The substantial appeal is by the Management while the Sabha has a marginal quarrel over a portion of the judgment as disclosed in its appeal. The 'jetsam' workmen, a few hundred in number, have been directed to be reinstated with full or partial back pay and this is the bitter bone of contention.
157 A stage-by-stage recapitulation of the developments is important to get to grips with the core controversy.
Sri Ashok Sen, for the appellant-Management, and Sri Tarkunde for the respondent-Sabha, have extensively presented their rival versions with forceful erudition. Sri R.K. Garg, of course, for some workmen has invoked with passion the socialist thrust of the Constitution as a substantive submission and, as justificatory of the workmen's demands, relied on the glaring contrast between the soaring profits and the sagging wages, while Sri Bhandare has pressed the lachrymose case of the several hundreds of 'interregnal' employees whose removal from service, on reinstatement of the old, might spell iniquity.
Olive Branch Approach: At this stage we must disclose an effort at settlement we made with the hearty participation of Sri Ashok Sen and Sri Tarkunde at the early stages of the hearing.
The golden rule for the judicial resolution of an industrial dispute is first to persuade fighting parties, by judicious suggestions, into the peace-making zone, disentangle the differences, narrow the mistrust gap and convert them, through consensual steps, into negotiated justice. Law is not the last word in justice, especially social justice. Moreover, in our hierarchical court system the little man lives in the short run but most litigation lives in the long run. So it is that negotiation first and adjudication next, is a welcome formula for the Bench and the Bar, Management and Union. This 'olive Branch' approach brought the parties closer in our court and gave use a better understanding of the problem, although we could not clinch a settlement. So we heard the case in depth and felt that some of the legal issues did merit this court's declaratory pronouncement, settlement or no settlement.
Mercifully, counsel abbreviated their oral arguments into an eight-day exercise, sparing us the sparring marathon of 28 laborious days through which the case stretched out in the High Court.
Orality ad libitem may be the genius of Victorian era advocacy but in our 'needy' Republic with crowded dockets, forensic brevity is a necessity. The Bench and the Bar. must fabricate a new shorthand form of court methodology which will do justice to the pockets of the poor who seek right and justice and to the limited judicial hours humanly available to the court if the delivery system of justice is not to suffer obsolescence.
The facts: Back to the central facts. Proof of the 'efficient' management of the Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. is afforded by the testimony of larger turnover and profits, year after year, from the beginning down 158 to date. The mill was commissioned in January 1964 but by the accounting year 1971-72 the turnover had leapt to Rs. 560 lakhs. It scaled to Rs. 680 lakhs the next year, to Rs. 1136 lakhs the year after and to Rs. 20 crores in 1974-75.
This enterprise entered the export trade and otherwise established itself as a premier manufactory in the line.
Steel shortage is the only shackle which hampers its higher productivity. But its increasing shower of prosperity was a sharp contrast, according to Sri Garg, to the share of the wage bill. The worker started on a magnificent sum per mensem of Rs. 100/- in toto even as late as 1970, although some workmen, with more service, were paid somewhat higher.
The extenuatory plea of the Management, justificatory of this parsimony, was that other mill-hands were receiving more niggardly wages in comparable enterprises. Probably, unionisation, under these luridly low-paid circumstances, caught on and a workers' union was born somewhere around 1966. A sensible stroke of enlightened capitalism persuaded the Management to enter into agreements with the Union, somewhat improving emoluments and ameliorating conditions.
By 1968, the Sabha, a later union, came into being and commanded the backing of all or most of the mill-hands. By March 1969, the Sabha presented a charter of demands, followed by resistance from the Management and strike by the workers. By July 1969, a settlement with the Sabha was reached. Agreements relating to the various demands brought quiet and respite to the industry although it proved temporary.
A vivid close-up of the sequence and consequence of the dramatic and traumatic events culminating in the reference to arbitration and the impugned award is essential as factual foundation for the decision of the issues. Even so, we must condense, since labyrinthine details are not needed in a third tier judgment. Broad lines with the brush bring out the effect, not minute etches which encumber the picture.
An agreement of futuristic import with which we may begin the confrontational chronicle is that of April 1970.
Clause 6 thereof runs thus:
"Management of the Company agrees to implement recommendations of the Central Wage Board for Engineering Industries as and when finally declared and all the increments granted to workmen from time to time under this agreement shall be adjusted with those recommendations provided that such adjustment shall not adversely affect the wages of workman." The engineering industry, where India is forging ahead, was apparently exploitative towards labour, and to make amends for this un- 159 healthy position, the Central Wage Board was appointed in 1964 although it took six long years to recommend revision of wages to be implemented with effect from 1-1-1969.
Meanwhile, the masses of workers were living 'below the broad line' Saintly patience in such a milieu was too much to expect from hungry demands and pressing for the recommendations of the Wage Board to be converted into immediate cash. But, as we will presently unravel, Wage Board expectations' were proving teasing illusions and premises of unreality because of non-implementation, viewed from the Sabha's angle. The Management, on the other hand, had a contrary version which we will briefly consider.
Luckily, agreed mini-increases in wages were taking place during the years 1970, 1971 and 1972. Likewise, bonus was also the subject of bargain and agreement. But in September 1971, an allegedly violent episode broke up the truce between the two, spawned criminal cases against workers, led to charges of go-slow tactics and lock-outs and burst into suspension, discharge and dismissal of workmen.
The crisis was tided over by continued conciliations and two settlements. We are not directly concerned with the cluster of clauses therein save one. 64 workmen had been discharged or dismissed, of whom half the number were agreed to be reinstated. The fate of the other half (32 workers) was left for arbitration by the Industrial Tribunal. The dark clouds cleared for a while but the sky turned murky over again, although the previous agreement had promised a long spell of normalcy. The Sabha, in October 1972, met and resolved to raise demands of which the principal ones were non-implementation of the Wage Board recommendations, bonus for 1971 and wages during the lockout period. The primary pathology of industrial friction is attitudinal. The Management could have (and, indeed, did, with a new Union) solved these problems had they regarded the Sabha as partner, not saboteur. Had the bitter combativeness of the Sabha been moderated, may be the showdown could have been averted.
Apportioning blame does not help now, but we refer to it here because Sri Ashok Sen, with feeling fury, fell foul of the criticism by the High Court that the Management had acted improperly in insisting on arbitration, and argued that when parties disagreed, arbitral reference was the only answer and the workers' fanatical rejection of arbitration made no sense We need not delve into the details of the correspondence relied on by either side to reach the truth.
For, the Unions case is that in the prior settlement between the two parties arbitral reference came only after negotiations failed. That was why they 160 pressed the Management to reason together, avoiding wrestling with each other before a slow-moving umpire.
Sri Tarkunde, for the Sabha, urged that the workmen were not intransigent but impatient and pleaded for a negotiated settlement since the main point in dispute, namely the implementation of the Central Engineering Wage Board's recommendations, was too plain to admit of difference, given good faith on both sides. We will examine the substance of this submission later but it needs to be emphasised that workmen, surviving on starving wages and with notoriously fragile staying power, are in no mood for adjudicatory procedures, arbitral or other, if the doors of negotiation are still ajar. The obvious reason for this attitude is that the litigative length of the adjudicatory apparatus, be it the tribunal, the court or the arbitrator, is too lethargic and long-winded for workmen without the wherewithal to survive and is beset with protracted challenges either by way of appeal upon appeal or in the shape of writ petitions and, thereafter, appeals upon appeals. The present case illustrates the point. Where workmen on hundred rupees a month demand immediate negotiation the reason is that privations have no patience beyond a point. Now and here, by negotiation, is the shop- floor glamour. In this very matter, although the controversy before the arbitrator fell within a small compass, he took a year and ninety printed pages to decide, inevitably followed by a few Years and hundred and thirty printed pages of judgment in the High Court and a longer spell in this Court with slightly lesser length of judgment. Which workman under Third World Conditions can withstand this wasting disease while hunger leaves no option save to do or die ? Raw life, not rigid logic, is the mother of law.
After the demands were raised by the Union, the main issue being implementation of the Wage Board recommendations, a stream of correspondence, meetings and inchoate settlements ensued, but the crucial question, which would have meant 'cash and carry' for the workmen, baffled solution. Do negotiate since the application of the Wage Board recommendations are beyond ambiguity, was the Sabha's peremptory plea. We differ; therefore, go to arbitration, was the Management's firm response. A stalemate descended on the scene.
No breakthrough being visible, the Sabha charged the Management by its letter of January 25, 1973 with breach of clause 6 of the Agreement of August 4, 1972 which ran thus:
"That the parties agree that for a period of 5 years from the date of this settlement all disputes will be solved by mutual negotiations or, failing that, by joint arbitration under 161 Section 10A of the I.D. Act, 1947. Neither party shall take any direct action including go-slow, strike and lock-out for a period of 5 years from the date of this settlement." Various aspersions of anti-labour tactics were included in the Sabha's letter but the most money-loaded item was the grievance about the Wage Board recommendations. The temper, by now, was tense.
The Management, on the same day, (January 25, 1973) set out its version on the notice board and the High Court's summary of it runs thus .
"The notice stated that during the course of the meeting with the representatives of the Sabha held on January 20, 1973 the Company had expressed its willingness to implement the Wage Board recommendations according to its interpretation on and with effect from January 1, 1969 without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the workmen and leaving it open to the parties to take the matter to arbitration for resolution of the points of dispute. The Sabha, however, had turned down this suggestion and it came to the notice of the Company that workmen were being instigated by making false representations. The Company clarified that on and with effect from January 1, 1972 every workman would be entitled to the benefits of Wage Board recommendations, irrespective of whether the concerned workman had put in 240 days attendance." The Sabha's answer was a strike two days later. This event of January 27 was countered quickly by the Management restating its attitude on the Wage Board recommendations, asserting that the strike was illegal and in breach of the settlement of August 4, 1972 and wholly unjustified because the offer of reference to arbitration, negotiations failing, had been spurned by the Sabha. The notice wound up with a command and a caveat:
"If the workmen do not immediately resume duty, the Company would not be under any obligation to continue in service those 32 workmen who have been taken back in service pursuant to the settlement dated August 4, 1972. Besides, if (the workmen) continue causing loss to the Company from time to time in this manner, the Company will not also be bound to implement the Wage Board, recommendations on and with effect from January 1, 1969, which may also be noted. The Company hereby withdraws all its proposals unless the Workmen withdraw the strike and resume work within two days." 162 This threat was dismissed by the workmen as a brutum fulmen and the strike continued. The Management, therefore, came up on the notice board castigating the Sabha with irresponsible obduracy in waging an illegal and unjustified strike. A warning of the shape of things to come was given in this notice. The High Court has summed it up thus:
"The Company gave an intimation that in view of such obstinate attitude on the part of the Sabha and the workmen, it had decided to withdraw its earlier offer to implement the Wage Board recommendations on and with effect from January 1, 1969 as already cautioned in the notice dated January 27, 1973. The said decision must be taken to have been thereby communicated to the workmen and Sabha. The notice further stated that having regard to the obdurate, unreasonable and illegal attitude adopted by the workmen and Sabha, the Company had decided to take disciplinary proceedings against the defaulting workmen. In this connection, the attention of the workmen was drawn to the fact that the strike was illegal not only because of the terms of the settlement dated August 4, 1972 but also because of the pendency of the reference relating to reinstatement of 32 workmen before the Industrial Court and, that, therefore, the Company was entitled to take disciplinary action against them. Finally, the Company appealed to the workmen to withdraw their illegal and unjustified strike forthwith and to resume work." These exercises notwithstanding, the strike raged undaunted, the production was paralysed and the Management retaliated by an elaborate notice which dilated on its preparedness to negotiate or arbitrate and the Sabha's unreason in rejecting the gesture and persisting on the war path. The stern economic sanction was brought home in a critical paragraph:
"By this final notice the workmen are informed that they should withdraw the strike and resume work before Thursday, February 15, 1973. If the workmen resume duty accordingly, the management would be still willing to pay salary according to the recommendations of the Wage Board on and with effect from January 1, 1969. Furthermore, the management is ready and willing to refer to the arbitration of the Industrial Tribunal the question as to whether the management has implemented the settlement dated August 4, 1972 and all other labour problems. In spite of this, if the workmen do not resume duty before Thursday, February 15, 1973.
then the Company will terminate the services of all workmen who are on strike and thereafter it will run the 163 factory by employing new workmen. All workmen may take note of this fact." The count-down thus began. February 15, 1973 arrived, and the Management struck the fatal blow of discharging the strikers-all the labour force, 853 strong-and recruiting fresh hands and thus work was resumed by February 19, 1973.
This public notice was allegedly sent to the Sabha and circulated to such workmen as hovered around the factory. It is common case that the notice of February 15,1973, was not sent to individual workmen but was a signal for action. The drastic consequence of disobedience was spelt out in no uncertain terms:
"The workmen are hereby informed that they should resume duty on or before Monday, February 19, 1973 failing which the Management will presume that the workmen want to continue their strike and do not wish to resume work until their demands as aforesaid are accepted by the management.
Parallel negotiations were going on even while mailed fist manoeuvres were being played up-thanks to the basic goodwill and tradition of dispute settlements that existed in this company. Even amidst the clash of arms, bilateral diplomacy has a place in successful industrial relations.
The Management and the Sabha allowed the talks to continue which, at any rate, clarified the area of discord. One thing that stood out of these palavers was that both sides affirmed the pre-condition of negotiations before arbitration over differences although the content, accent and connotation of 'negotiations' varied with each side. No tangible results flowed from these exercises and the inevitable happened on February 21, 1973 when the Management blotted out the entire lot of 853 workmen from the roster, by separate orders of discharge from service, couched in identical terms. The essential terms read thus :
"Your services are hereby terminated by giving you one month's salary in lieu of one month's notice and accordingly you are discharged from service.
You should collect immediately from the cashier of the factory your one month's notice-pay and due pay, leave entitlements and gratuity, if you are entitled to the same. The payment will be made between 12 noon and 5 p.m.
If and when you desire to be employed, you may apply ill writing to the Company in that behalf and on receipt of the application, a reply will be sent to you in the matter." 164 Casual workmen were issued separate but similar orders.
The Management did record its reasons for the action taken, on February 20, 1973 and forwarded them to the Sabha and to the individual workmen on request. The anatomy of this proceeding is of critical importance in deciding the character of the action. Was it a harm less farewell to the workmen who were unwilling to rejoin or a condign punishment of delinquent workmen ? The separate memorandum of Reasons refers to the strike as illegal and unjustified and narrates the hostile history of assault by workmen of the officers, their go-slow tactics and sabotage activities, their contumacious and a host of other perversities vindicating the drastic action of determining the services of all the employees. The concluding portion reads partly stern and partly non- committal:
"In the interest of the Company it is decided to terminate the services of all the workmen who are on illegal and unjustified strike since 27th January, 1973.
Under the circumstances, it is decided that the services of all the workmen who are on illegal and unjustified strike should be terminated by way of discharge simpliciter. These workmen, however, may be given opportunity to apply for employment in the Company and in case applications are received for employment from such employees, such applications may be considered on their merits later on.
It may be mentioned here that while arriving at the aforesaid decision to terminate the services of the workmen, various documents, notices, correspondence with the Union and others, records of production, etc.
have been considered and therefore the same are treated as part of the relevant evidence to come to the conclusion as aforesaid.
FINAL CONCLUSION The services of all the workmen who are on illegal and unjustified strike since 27-1-1973 should be terminated by way of discharge simpliciter and they should be offered all their legal dues immediately.
The Administrative Manager is hereby directed to pass orders on individual workers as per draft attached.
We thus reach the tragic crescendo when the Management and the workmen fell apart and all the workmen's services were severed. Whether each of these orders using, in the contemporaneous reasons, 165 the vocabulary of misconduct but, in the formal part, the expression 'discharge simpliciter', should be read softly as innocent termination or sternly as penal action, is one of the principal disputes demanding decision.
We may as well complete the procession of events before taking up the major controversies decisive of the case. The total termination of the entire work force of 853 employees was undoubtedly a calamity of the first magnitude in a country of chronic unemployment and starving wages.
Nevertheless, under certain circumstances, discharge of employees may well be within the powers of the Management subject to the provisions of the Act. With all the strikers struck off the rolls there was for a time the silence of the grave. The conditional invitation to the employees to seek de novo employment by fresh applications which would be considered on their merits, left the workers cold. So the factory remained closed until April 28, 1973 when, with new workers recruited from the open market, production recommenced. Among the militants, the morale which kept the strike going, remained intact but among the others the pressure to report for employment became strong. Re- employment of discharged workmen began and slowly snowballed, so that by July 31, 1973 a substantial number of 419 returned to the factory.
The crack of workman's morale was accelerated by escalating reemployment and the Management's restoration of continuity of service and other benefits for re-employed hands. The Employer relied on this gesture as proof of his bond fides. Meanwhile, there were exchanges of letters between and 'trading' of charges against each other. The Management alleged that the strikers were violent and prevented loyalists' return while the Sabha was bitter that goondas were hired to break the strike and promote blacklegs. These imputations have a familiar ring and their impact on the legality of the discharge of workmen falls for consideration a little later. The stream of events flowed on. The Sabha protested that the Management was terrorising workmen, exploiting their sagging spirit and illegally insisting on fresh applications for employment while they were in law continuing in services. With more 'old workers' trickling back for work and their discharge orders being cancelled, the strike became counter-productive. Many overtures on both sides were made through letters but this epistolary futility failed to end the imbroglio and brought no bread. The worker wanted bread, job, and no phyrric victory.
A crescent of hope appeared on the industrial sky. The Management but out a 'final offer' on May 31, 1973, calling on all workmen 166 to rejoin last the remaining vacancies also should be filled by fresh recruits. The Sabha responded with readiness to settle and sought some clarifications and assurances. The employer informed :
"Our offer is open till 10-6-1973. From 11-6-1973 we shall recruit new hands to the extent necessary.
Thereafter workers who will not have reported for work shall have no chance left for re-employment with us.
We repeat that those workers who will report for work will be taken back in employment with continuity of their services, that the orders of discharge passed against them on 21-2-1973 shall be treated as cancelled and they will also be paid the difference in wages from 1969 as per the recommendations of the Wage Board." The Sabha was willing and wrote back on June 8, 1973 but sought details about the attitude of the Management to the many pending demands. Meanwhile, the sands of time were running out and so the Sabha telegraphed on 9th June that the workers were willing to report for work but were being refused work. They demanded the presence of an impartial observer. The reply by the Management repelled these charges, but there was some thaw in the estrangement, since the time for return to work of the strikers was extended upto 16-6-73. An apparent end to a long strike was seemingly in sight with the Sabha sore but driven to surrender. On 13- 6-73 the Sabha Secretary wrote back:
"This is a further opportunity to you even now to show your bona fides. If you confirm to take all the workmen discharged on 21-2-1973 as stated in your various letters and to give them intimation and reasonable time to join, l will see that your offer is accepted by the workmen." Here, at long last, was the Management willing to 'welcome' back all the former employees and the Sabha limping back to the old wheels of work. Was the curtain being finally drawn on the feud ? Not so soon, in a world of bad blood and bad faith; or may be, new developments make old offers obsolete and the expected end proves an illusion.
Anyway, the victor was the Management and II the vanquished the Sabha and the re-employment offered was watered down. In our materialist cosmos, often Might is Right and victory dictates morality ! 167 Hot upon the receipt of the Sabha's letter accepting the offer the Management back-tracked or had second thoughts on full re-employment. For, they replied with a long catalogue of the Sabha's sins, set out the story of compulsion to keep the production going and explained that since new hands had come on the scene full re-employment was beyond them. In its new mood of victorious righteousness, the Management modified the terms of intake of strikers and saddled choosy conditions on such absorption suggestive of breaking the Sabha's solidarity:
"As on the present working of the Company, the Company may still need about 250 more workers including those to be on the casual list as per the employment position prior to the start of the strike.
You may, therefore, send to us immediately per return of post the list of the workers who can and are willing to join duty immediately so as to enable us to select and employ the workmen as per the requirement of the Company. Further, it would also be necessary for you to state in your reply that you have called off the strike and have advised the workers to resume the work as otherwise it is not clear from your letter as to whether you are still advocating the continuance of the strike or that you have called off the strike.
Therefore, unless we have a very definite stand known from you on this issue, it may not be even now possible for us to enter into any correspondence with you.
We may again stress that if your tactics of prolonging the issue by correspondence are continued the management would be constrained to fake new recruits and in that case, at a later date it may not be even possible to employ as many workmen as may be possible to employ now." Nothing is more galling, says Sri Tarkunde, than for a Union which has lost the battle and offered to go back to work to be told that it should further humiliate itself by formally declaring the calling off of the strike. Sentiment apart, the Sabha had agreed to go back, but then the Management cut down the number to be re employed to 250 and, even this, on a selective basis. This selection could well be to weed out Union activists or to drive a wedge among the Union members. These sensitive thoughts and hard bargains kept the two apart. The Sabha, wounded but not wiped 168 out, did not eat the humble pie. The Management, on account of the intervening recruitments and injuries inflicted-by the strike, did not budge either.
At this point we find that out of 853 employees who had been sacked 419 had wandered back by July 31, leaving 434 workmen at flotsam. Their reinstatement became the focus of an industrial dispute raised by the Sabha. A few more were left out of this jobless mass, and through the intercession of the Commissioner of Labour both sides agreed to resolve their disagreement by arbitral reference under Sec. 10A of the Act, confining the dispute to reinstatement of 400 workmen discharged on February 21 1973. A reference under Sec. 10A materialised. The 'Labour litigation' began in May 1975 and becoming 'at each remove a lengthening chain' laboured from deck to deck and is coming to a close, hopefully, by this decision. Is legal justice at such expensive length worth the candle or counter-productive of social justice? Is a streamlined alternative beyond the creative genius of Law India? An aside As urgent as an industrial revolution is an industrial law revolution, if the rule of law were at all to serve as social engineering. The current forensic process needs thorough overhaul because it is over-judicialised and under- professionalised, lacking in social orientation and shop- floor know-how and, by its sheer slow motion and high price, defects effective and equitable solution leaving both Managements and Unions unhappy. If Parliament would heed, we stress this need. Industrial Justice desiderates specialised processual expertise and agencies.
This factual panorama, omitting a welter of debatable details and wealth of exciting embellishments, being not germane to the essential issues, leads us to a formulation of the decisive questions which alone need engage our discussion. The Management might have been
