V. Tulasamma & Ors Vs. V. Sesha Reddi [1977] INSC 90 (17 March 1977)
BHAGWATI, P.N.
BHAGWATI, P.N.
GUPTA, A.C.
FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA
CITATION: 1977 AIR 1944 1977 SCR (3) 261 1977 SCC (3) 99
CITATOR INFO :
R 1978 SC 361 (5) R 1979 SC 993 (3,4,5,6,7) E&R 1985 SC1695 (3,5,) RF 1987 SC2251 (7,8) RF 1991 SC1581 (6,8)
ACT:
Hindu Succession Act, 1956--S. 14(1) and (2)--Scope of.
HEADNOTE:
Section 14(1 ) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 provides that "any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner." According to the explanation to this sub-section the term "property" includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance or in any other manner whatsoever. Sub-section (2) provides that nothing in sub-s.
(1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument which prescribes a restricted estate in such property.
At the time of his death, the appellant's husband, who was the brother of the respondent, lived in a state of jointness with the respondent. On her husband's death the appellant filed a petition for maintenance. The respondent entered into a compromise with her, one of the terms of which was that the appellant should enjoy during her life time certain properties given to her and on her death those properties should revert to the respondent. 'The appellant .sold some of the properties. The respondent sought a declaration that under 1he terms of the compromise the appellant's interest, which was a limited one, could not be enlarged into an absolute interest enabling her to sell the. properties.
The District Munsiff decreed the suit. On appeal, the District Judge held that by virtue of the provisions of the 1956-Act, the appellant had acquired an absolute interest in the properties and that s. 14(2) had no application to the case because the compromise was an instrument in recognition of a pre-existing right. The High Court, on the other hand, held that the compromise was an instrument contemplated by s.14(2) and the appellant could not get an absolute interest, under s.14(1); and that since her husband died even before the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937 came into force, she could not be said to have any pre-existing right because she had got the right for the first time under the compromise.
Allowing the appeal, (Per Bhagwati and Gupta, JJ)
HELD: Since the properties were acquired by the appellant under the compromise in lieu or satisfaction of her right to maintainance it is s. 14(1) and not s.14(2) which would be applicable. The appellant must be deemed to have become full owner of the properties notwithstanding that the compromise prescribed a limited interest in the properties.
[274 C-D]
1. Under the Sastric Hindu Law a widow has a right to be maintained out of joint family property and this right would ripen into a charge if the widow took the necessary steps for having her maintenance ascertained and specifically charged on the joint family property and even if no specific charge were created, this right would be. enforceable against joint family property in the hands of a volunteer or a purchaser taking it with notice of her claim. The right of the widow to be maintained is not a ]us in rem, since it does not give any interest in the joint family property but it is ]us ad rem. When specific property is allotted to the widow in lieu of her claim for maintenance, the allotment would be in satisfaction of her jus ad rem, namely, the right to be maintained out of the joint family property. It would not be a grant for the first time without any pro-existing right in the widow, The widow would be getting the property in virtue of her preexisting right, the instrument giving the property being merely a document effectuating such pre-existing right. [273 A-C] 2(a) Section 14(1) is large in its amplitude and covers every kind of acquisition of property by:, a female Hindu including acquisition in lieu of maintenance. Where such property was possessed by her at the date of commencement of the Act or was subsequently acquired and possessed, she would become the full owner of the property. [268 G] (b) The words "any property" are large enough to cover any and every kind of property but in order to expand the reach and ambit of the, section and make it all-comprehensive, the Legislature has enacted the explanation. [268 B] (c) Whatever be the kind of property movable or immovable and whichever be. the mode of acquisition, it would be covered by sub-s. (1 ), the object of the Legislature being to wipe out the disabilities from which a Hindu female suffered in regard to ownership of property under the old Sastric Law, to abridge the stringent provisions against proprietary rights and to recognise her status as an independent and absolute owner of property. [268 D] (d) In Gummalapura Taggina Matada Kotturuswami v. Setra Veeravva [1959] Supp. 1 SCR 968, this Court construed the words "possessed of" in a broad sense and in their widest connotation to mean as "the state of owning or having in one's hand or power" which need not be actual or physical possession or personal occupation of the property by the Hindu female, but may be possession in law. It may be actual or constructive or in any other form recognised by law. [268 E-F] .
(e) Sub-section (2), which is in the nature of a proviso to sub-s.(1), excepts certain kinds of acquisition of property by a Hindu female from the operation of sub-s. (1).
[269 B] (f) Sub-section (2), must be read in the context of sub-s.(1) to. leave as large a scope for operation as possible to sub-s.(1). So read, it must be confined to cases where property is acquired by a female Hindu for the first time. as a grant without any pre-existing right under a gift, will, instrument, decree, order or award, the terms of which prescribe a restricted estate in the property. [269 H] (g) The legislative intendment in enacting sub-s.(2) was that this subsection should be applicable only to cases where the acquisition of property is made by a Hindu female for the first time without any pre-existing right.
Where. however, property is acquired by a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of her right to4 maintenance iris in virtue of a pre-existing right and such acquisition would not be within the! scope and ambit of sub-s.(2) even if the instrument allotting the property prescribes a restricted estate in the property. Where property is acquired by a Hindu remale under art instrument in virtue of a preexisting right such as a right to obtain property on partition or a right to maintenance. and under the law as it stood prior to the enactment of the Act, she should have no more than limited interest in the property a provision in the instrument giving her limited interest in the property would be merely by way of record or recognition of the true legal position and the restriction on her interest being a disability imposed by law would be wiped out and her limited interest would be enlarged under sub-s. (1). [270 D; 272 AB] In the instant case the appellant claimed maintenance out of the joint family properties in the hands of her deceased husband's brother, and the claim was decreed and in execution of the decree the respondent entered into a compromise and allotted properties to her in lieu of her claim for maintenance. The appellant must in the circumstances be deemed to have become full owner of the properties notwithstanding that the compromise prescribed a limited interest for her in the properties. It is sub-s.(1) and not subs.(2) of s. 14 which must be held to be applicable on these facts.
S.S. Munna Lal v.S.S. Raikumar, [1962] Supp. 3 SCR 418 Gummalapura Teggina Matada Kotturaswami v. Setra Verrayva [1959] Supp. I SCR 968 Mangal Singh v. Ratno, AIR 1967 SC 1786 Badri Pershad v. Smt. Kanso Devi 263 [1970] 2 SCR 95 Nirmal Chand v. Vidya Wanti (dead) by her Legal representatives. C.A. No. 609 of 1965, decided on January 21, 1969, Rani Bai v.Shri Yadunandan Ram, [1969] 3 SCR 789. referred to.
B.B. Patil, v. Gangabai, AIR. 1972 Bom. 16, Sumeshwar Misra v. Swami Nath Tiwari AIR 1970 Pat. 348, Reddayya v. Varapula Venkataraju AIR 1965 A.P. 66, Lakshmi Devi v. Shankar Jha, AIR. 1967 Mad. 429, N. Venkanagouda v. Hanamangouda, AIR 1972 Mys. 286, Smt. Sharbati Devi v. Pt. Hiralal AIR 1964 Pb. 114, Sesadhar Chandra Dev. v. Smt. Tara Sundari Dasi, AIR 1962 Cal. 438, Saraswathi Ammal v.Anantha Shenoi, AIR 1966 Ker. 66 and Kunji Thomman v. Meenakshi, ILR [1970] 2 Ker. 45 approved.
Gurunadham v. Sundarajulu, ILR [1968] 1 Mad. 467 Senthanam v. Subramania, ILR [1967] 1 Mad. 68, S. Kachapalaya Gurukkal v. V.Subramani Gurukkal, AIR 1972 Mad. 279 Shiva Pujan Rai v. Jamune Missir, ILR [1947] Pat. 1118 Gopisetti Kondaiah v. Gunda Subbrayudu, ILR [1968] A.P. 621, Ram Jag Missir v. The Director of Consolidation, U.P. AIR 1975 All.
151 and ,4lab Singh v. Ram Singh AIR 1959 J&K 92 not approved.
(per Fazal Ali, J concurring) The High Court was in error in holding that the appellant would have only a limited interest and in setting aside the alienations made by her. The compromise by which the properties were allotted to her in lieu of her maintenance were merely in recognition of her pre-existing right ,of maintenance and, therefore, her case would be taken out of the ambit of s. 14(2) and would fall within s. 14(1) read with the Explanation thereto. [311 G] The incidents and characteristics of a Hindu woman's right to maintenance are:
(i) that a Hindu woman's right to maintenance is a personal obligation so far as the husband is concerned, and it is his duty to maintain her even if he has no property.
If the husband has property then the right of the widow to maintenance becomes an equitable charge on his property and any person who succeeds to the property carries with it the legal obligation to maintain the widow. [286 D] (ii) though the widow's right to maintenance is not a right to property but it is a pre-existing right in property, that is, it is a ]us ad rein and not ]us in rem and it cannot be enforced by the widow who can get a charge created for the maintenance on the property either by an agreement or by obtaining a decree from the civil court. [286 E] (iii) that the right of maintenance is a matter of moment and is of such importance that even if the joint property is sold and the purchaser has notice of the widow's right to maintenance, the purchaser is legally bound to provide for her maintenance. [286 F] (iv) that the right to maintenance is a pre-existing right which existed in the Hindu law long before the passing of the Act of 1937 or the Act of 1946, and is, therefore, a pre-existing right. [286 G] (v) that the right to maintenance flows from the social and temporal relationship between the husband and the wife by virtue of which the wife becomes a sort of co-owner in the property of her husband, though her co-ownership is of a subordinate nature. [286 H] (vi) that where a Hindu widow is in possession of the property of her husband, she is entitled to retain the possession in lieu of her maintenance unless the person who succeeds to the property or purchases the same is in a position to make due arrangementS for her maintenance [287 A] Digest of Hindu Law, Vol. II, pp. 121, 123 and 243 by Colebrooke. Hindu Law by Golyal Chandra Sarkar Sastri, p. 533. Treatise on Hindu Law & Usage by Mayne, 11th edn.
pp. 684, 813, 816, 822, Hindu Law by Mulla, p. 597.
264 Narayan Rao Ramchandra Pant v. Ramabai, L.R. 6 I.A., 114, Lakshman Ramchandra Joshi & anr. v. Satyabhamabai, I.L.R. 2 Bom. 494, Narbadabai v. Mahadeo Narayan, Kashinath Narayan and Shamabai, I.L.R. 5 Bom. 99, Mst. Dan Kaur v. Mst. Sarla Devi, L.R. 73 LA. 208, Prataprnull Agarwalla v. Dhanabati Bibi, L.R. 63 I.A. 33, Rani Bai v. Shri Yadunandan Ram & anr. [1969] 3 S.C.R. 789, Sheo Dayal Tewaree v. Judoonath Tewaree [1898] 9 W.R. 61, Srinath Das v. Prabodh Chunder Das, 11 C.L.I. 580, Hernangini Dasi v. Kedarnath Kundu Chowdhry I.L.R. 16 Cal. 758. K.V. Thangavelu v. The Court of Words, Madras [1946] 2 M.LJ. 143, Sarojinidevi v. Subrahrnanyam I.L.R. 1945 Mad. 61, .Jayanti Subbiah v. Alamelu Mangamma I.L.R. 27 Mad. 45 and Yellawa v. Bhirnangavda I.L.R. 18 Bom. 452 referred to.
An examination of the decisions of this Court establishes the following principles of law:
(i) that the provisions of s. 14 'of the 1956 Act must be liberally construed in order to advance the object of the Act which is to enlarge the limited interest possessed by a Hindu widow which was in consonance with the changing temper of the times; [295A] (ii) it is manifestly clear that sub-s. (2) of s. 14 does not refer to any transfer which merely recognises a pre-existing right without creating or conferring a new title on the widow. This was clearly held by this Court in Badri Pershad's case. [295B] (iii) that the Act of 1956 has made revolutionary and far-reaching changes in the Hindu society and every attempt should be made to carry out the spirit of the Act which has undoubtedly supplied a long felt need and tried to do away with the invidious distinction between a Hindu male and female in matters of intestate succession. [295C] (iv) that sub-s. (2) of s. 14 is merely a proviso to sub-s. (1) of s. 14 and has to be interpreted as a proviso and not in a manner so as to destroy the effect of the main provision. [295D] Thus on a conspectus of the Shastric Hindu Law, the provisions of the 1956-' Act and the decisions of this Court the following conclusions emerge:
1. A Hindu female's right to maintenance is not an empty formality or an illusory claim but is a tangible right against property which flows from spiritual relationship between the husband and the, wife and is recognised and enjoined by pure Shastric Hindu law and has been strongly stressed even by the earlier Hindu jurists starting from Yajnavalkya to Manu. Such a right may not be a right to property but is a right against property and the husband has a personal obligation to maintain his wife and if he or the family has property the female has the legal fight to be maintained therefrom. If a charge is created for the maintenance of a female, the said right becomes a legally enforceable one. At any rate, even without a charge the claim for maintenance is a pre-existing right so that any transfer declaring or recognising such a right does not confer any new title but merely endorses or confirms the pre-existing rights. [310 BC]
2. Section 14(1) and the Explanation thereto have been couched in the widest possible terms and must be liberally construed in favour of the females so as to advance the object of the 1956-Act and promote the socio-economic ends sought to be achieved by this long needed legislation.
[310D]
3. Section 14(2) is in the nature of a proviso and has a field of its own without interfering with the operation of s. 14(1) materially. The proviso should not be construed in a manner so as to destroy the effect of the main provision or the protection granted by s. 14(1) or in a way so as to become totally inconsistent with the main provision. [310 E]
4. Section 14(2) applies to instruments, decrees, awards, gifts etc., which create independent and new titles in favour of the females for the first time and has no application where the instrument concerned merely seeks to confirm. endorse, declare or recognise pre-existing rights.
In such cases a restricted estate in favour of a female is legally permissible and s. 14(1) will not operate 265 in this sphere. Where, however, an instrument merely declares or recognises a pre-existing right, such as to a claim to maintenance .or partition or share to which the female is entitled, the sub-section has absolutely no application and the female's limited interest would automatically be enlarged into an absolute one by force of s. 14(1) and the restrictions placed, if any, under the document would have to be ignored. Thus where a property is allotted or transferred to a female in lieu of maintenance or a share at partition, the instrument is taken out of the ambit of subs. (2) and would be governed by s. 14(1) despite any restrictions placed on the powers of the transferee. [310F-G]
5. The use of express terms like "property acquired by a female Hindu at a partition", "or in lien of maintenance", "or arrears of maintenance" etc., in the Explanation to s.
14(1) clearly makes sub-s. (2) inapplicable to these categories which have been expressly excepted from the operation of sub-s. (2). [310H]
6. The words "possessed by', in s. 14(1)are of the widest amplitude and . include the state of owning a property even though the owner is not in actual or physical possession of the same. Thus, where a widow gets a share in the: property under a preliminary decree before or at the time. when the 1956-Act had been passed but had not been given actual possession under a final decree, the property would be deemed to be possessed by her and by force of s. 14(1) she would get absolute interest in the property. It is equally well-settled that the possession of the widow, however, must be under some vestige of a claim, right or title, because the section does not contemplate the possession of any rank trespasser without any right or title.
[311 A-B]
7. That the words "restricted estate" used in s. 14(2) are wider than limited interest as indicated in s. 14(1) and they include not only limited interest but also any other kind of limitation that may be placed on the transferee.
[311 C] In the instant case, the properties in dispute were allotted to the appellant under a compromise certified by the Court. Secondly, the appellant had taken only a life interest in the properties and there was a clear restriction prohibiting her from alienating the properties. Thirdly, despite these restrictions, she continued t0 be in possession of the properties till the alienations which she had made in 1960 and 1961 were after she had acquired an absolute interest in the properties.
Smt. Naraini Devi v. Smt. Ramo Devi & ors [1976] 1 S.C.C.574 over-ruled.
S.S. Munnalal v.S.S. Rajkumar [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 418;
Eramina v. Verrupanna [1966] 2 S.C.R. 626; Mangal Singh v. Smt. Rattno [1967] 3 S.C.R. 454; Sukhram & anr. v. Gauri Shankar & anr. [1968] 1' S.C.R. 476; Badri Parshad v. Smt.
Kanso Devi [1970] 2 S.C.R. 95 and Nirmal Chand v. Vidya Wanti (dead) by her Legal Representative C.A. 609 of 1966 decided on January 21, 1969 referred to.
B.B. Patil v. Gangabai A.1.R. 1972 Bom. 16; Gaddam Reddayya v. Varapula Venkataraju & Anr. A.I.R. 1965 A.P. 66;
Sumeshwar Mishra v. Swami Nath Tiwari A.I.R. 1970 pat. 348;
H. Venkanagouda v. Hansumangouda A.I.R. 1972 Mys. 286; Smt.
Sharbati Devi v. Pt. Hiralal & Anr. A.I.R. 1964 Punjab 114;
Sasadhar Chandra Der v. Smt. Tara Sundart Desi A.I.R. 1962 Cal. 438, approved.
Narayan Patra v. Tara Patrant [1970] 36 Cuttack Law Times--A.I.R. 1970 Orissa 131; Shiva Pulan Rai & Ors. v.
Jamuna Missir & Ors. I.L.R. 47 Pat. 1118; Gopisetti Kondaiah v. Gunda Subbarayudu I.L.R. [1968] A.P. 621; Ram Jag Misir v. The Director of Consolidation, U.P. AIR 1975 All. 151;
Ajab Singh & Ors. v. Ram Singh & Ors. A.I.R. 1959 L & K. 92;
Surnadham v. Sundararajulu I.L.R. [1968] 1 Mad. 567; Kachapalaya Gurukkal v.V. Subramania Gurukkal A.I.R. 1972, Mad.
279 not approved.
266
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1360 of 1968.
(Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 22-11-1967 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Second Appeal No. 804/64).
T.S. Krishnamurthi lyer, R.K. Pillai and R. Vasudev Pillai, for the appellants.
T. V. S. Narasimhachari, for the respondents.
The Judgment of P.N. Bhagwati and A.C. Gupta, JJ. was delivered by Bhagwati, J.S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, J. gave a separate opinion.
BHAGWATI, J.--We have had the advantage of reading the judgment prepared by our learned brother S. Murtaza Fazal Ali and we agree with the conclusion reached by him in that judgment but we would prefer to give our own reasons. The facts giving rise to the appeal are set out clearly and succinctly in the judgment of our learned brother and we do not think it necessary to reiterate them.
The short question that arises for determination in this appeal is as to whether it is sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 that applies where property is given to a Hindu female in lieu of maintenance under an instrument which in so many terms restricts the nature of the interest given to her in the property. If sub-section (1) applies, then the limitations on the nature of her interest are wiped out and she becomes the full owner of the property, while on the other hand, if sub-section (2) governs such a case, her limited interest in the property is not enlarged and she continues to have the restricted estate prescribed by the instrument. The question is of some complexity and it has evoked wide diversity of judicial opinion not only amongst the different High Courts but also within some of the High Court’s themselves. It is indeed unfortunate that though it became evident as far back as 1967 that subsections (1) and (2) of section 14 were presenting serious difficulties of construction in cases where property was received by a Hindu female in lieu of maintenance and the instrument granting such property prescribed a restricted estate for her in the property and divergence of judicial opinion was creating a situation which might well be described as chaotic, robbing the law of that modicum of certainty which it must always possess in order to guide the affairs of men, the legislature, for all these years, did not care to step in to remove the constructional dilemma facing the courts and adopted an attitude of indifference and inaction, untroubled and unmoved by the large number of cases on this point encumbering the files of different courts in the country, when by the simple expedient of an amendment, it could have silenced .judicial conflict and put an end to needless litigation. This is a classic instance of a statutory provision which, by reason of its inapt draftsmanship, has created endless confusion for litigants and proved a paradise for lawyers. It illustrates forcibly the need of an authority or body to be set up by the Government or the Legislature which would constantly keep in touch with the adjudicatory 267 authorities in the country as also with the legal profession and immediately respond by making recommendations for suitable amendments whenever it is found that a particular statutory provision is, by reason of inapt language or unhappy draftsmanship, creating difficulty of construction or is otherwise inadequate or defective or is not well conceived and is consequently counter-productive of the result. it was intended to achieve. If there is a close inter-action between the adjudicatory wing of the State and a dynamic and ever alert authority or body which responds swiftly to the draw-backs and deficiencies in the law in action, much of the time and money, which is at present expended in fruitless litigation, would be saved and law would achieve a certain amount of clarity, certainty and simplicity which alone can make it easily intelligible to the people.
Since the determination of the question in the appeal turns on the true interpretation to be placed on sub-section (2) read in the context of sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, it would be convenient at this stage to set out both the sub-sections of that section which read as follows:
"14(1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.
Explanation.---In this sub-section, "property" includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or device, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatever, and also any such property held by her as stridharas immediately before the commencement of this Act.
(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shah apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property." Prior to the enactment of section 14, the Hindu law, as it was then in operation, restricted the nature of the interest of a Hindu female in property acquired by her and even as regards the nature of this restricted interest, there was great diversity of doctrine on the subject. The Legislature, by enacting sub-section (1) of section 14, intended, as pointed by this Court in S.S. Munna Lal v.S.S. Raikumar(1) "to convert the interest which a Hindu female has in property, however, restricted the nature of that interest under the Sastric Hindu law may be, into absolute estate". This Court pointed out that the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is a codifying enactment and has made far-reaching changes in the structure of the Hindu law of inheritance, and succession. The Act confers upon Hindu females full rights of inheritance (1) [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 418.
268 and sweeps away the traditional limitations on her powers of disposition which were regarded under the Hindu law as inherent in her estate". Sub-section (1) of section 14, is wide in its scope and ambit and uses language of great amplitude. It says that any property possessed by a female Hindu,. whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. The words "any property" are, even without any amplification, large enough to cover any and every kind of property, but in order to expand the reach and ambit of the section and make it all-comprehensive, the Legislature has enacted an explanation which says that property would include "both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or device, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement" of the Act. Whatever be the kind of property, movable or immovable, and whichever be the mode of acquisition, it would be covered by subsection (1) of section 14, the object of the Legislature being to wipe out the disabilities from which a Hindu female suffered in regard to ownership of property under the old Sastric law, to abridge the stringent provisions against proprietary rights which were often regarded as evidence of her perpetual tutelege and to recongnize her status as an independent and absolute owner of property.
This Court has also in a series of decisions given a most expansive interpretation to the language of sub-section (1) of section 14 with a view to advancing the social purpose of the legislation and as part of that process, construed the words 'possessed of' also in a broad sense and in their widest connotation. It was pointed out by this Court in Gummalepura Taggina Matada Kotturuswami v. Setra Veeravva(1) that the words 'possessed of mean "the state of owning or having in one's hand or power". It need not be actual or physical possession or personal occupation of the property by the Hindu female, but may be possession in law. It may be actual or constructive or in any form recognized by law. Elaborating the concept, this Court pointed out in Mangal Singh v. Rattno(2) that the section covers all cases of property owned by a female Hindu although she may not be in actual, physical or constructive possession of the property, provided of course, that she has not parted with her rights and is capable of obtaining possession of the property. It will, therefore, be seen that sub-section (1) of section 14 is large in its amplitude and covers every kind of acquisition of property by a female Hindu including acquisition in lieu of maintenance and where such property was possessed by her at the date of commencement of the Act or was 'subsequently acquired and possessed, she would become the full owner of the property.
Now, sub-section (2) of section 14 provides that nothing contained in sub-section (1 ) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order (1) [1959] supp. 1 S.C.R. 968. (2) A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1786.
269 of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property. This provision is more in the nature of a proviso or exception to sub-section (1) and it was regarded as such by this Court in Badri Pershad v. Smt. Kanso Devi(1). It excepts certain kinds of acquisition of property by a Hindu female from the operation of sub-section (1) and being in the nature of an exception to a provision which is calculated to achieve a social purpose by bringing about change in the social and economic position of women in Hindu society, it must be construed strictly so as to impinge as little as possible on the broad sweep of the ameliorative provision contained in sub-section (1 ). It cannot be interpreted in a manner which would rob sub-section (1 ) of its efficacy and deprive a Hindu female of the protection sought to be given to her by sub-section (1 ). The language of sub-section (2) is apparently wide to include acquisition of property by a Hindu female under an instrument or a decree or order or award where the instrument, decree, order or award prescribes a restricted estate for her in the property and this would apparently cover a case where property is given to a Hindu female at a partition or m lieu of maintenance and the instrument, decree, order or award giving such property prescribes limited interest for her in the property. But that would virtually emasculate sub-section (1), for in that event, a large number of cases where property is given to a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of maintenance under an instrument, order or award would be excluded from the operation of the beneficent provision enacted in sub-section (1 ), since in ,most of such cases, where property is allotted to the Hindu female prior to the enactment of the Act, there would be a provision, in consonance with the old Sastric law then prevailing, prescribing limited interest in the property and where property is given to the Hindu female subsequent to the enactment of the Act, it would be the easiest thing for the dominant male to provide that the Hindu female shall have only a restricted interest in the property and thus make a mockery of sub-section (1).
The Explanation to sub-section (1) which includes within the scope of that sub-section property acquired by a female Hindu at a partition or in lieu of maintenance would also be rendered meaningless, because there would hardly be a few cases where the instrument, decree, order or award giving property to a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of maintenance would not contain a provision prescribing restricted estate in the property. The social purpose of the law would be frustrated and the reformist zeal underlying the statutory provision would be chilled. That surely could never have been the intention of the Legislature in enacting sub-section (2). It is an elementary rule of construction that no provision of a statute should be construed in isolation but it should be construed with reference to the context and in the light of other provisions of the statute so as, as far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute. Sub-section (2) must, therefore, be read in the context of sub-section (1) so as to leave as large a scope for operation as possible to sub-section (1) and so read, it must be confined to cases where property is acquired by a female Hindu for the first time as a grant without any pre-existing (1) [1970] 2 S.C.R. 95.
270 right, under a gift, will, instrument, decree, order or award, the terms of which prescribe a restricted estate in the property. This constructional approach finds support in the decision in Badri Prasad's case (supra) where this Court observed that sub-section (2) "can come into operation only if acquisition in any of the methods enacted therein is made for the first time without there being any pre-existing right in the female Hindu who is in possession of the property". It' may also be noted that when the Hindu Succession Bill 1954, which ultimately culminated into the Act, was referred to a Joint Committee of the Rajya Sabha, clause 15(2) of the Draft Bill, corresponding to the present subsection (2) of section 14, referred only to acquisition of property by a Hindu female under gift or will and it was subsequently that the other modes of acquisition were added so as to include acquisition of property under an instrument, decree, order or award. This circumstance would also seem to indicate that the legislative intendment was that sub-section (2) should be applicable only to cases where acquisition of property is made by a Hindu female for the first time without any pre-existing right-a kind of acquisition akin to one under gift or will. Where, however, property is acquired by a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of right of maintenance, it is in virtue of a pre-existing right and such an acquisition would not be within the scope and ambit of sub-section (2), even if the instrument, decree, order or award allotting the property prescribes a restricted estate in the property.
This line of approach in the construction of sub-section (2) of section 14 is amply borne out by the trend of judicial decisions in this Court. We may in this connection refer to the decision in Badri Parasad's case (supra). The facts in that case were that one Gajju Mal owning selfacquired properties died in 1947 leaving five sons and a widow. On August 5, 1950, one Tulsi Ram Seth was appointed by the parties as an arbitrator for resolving certain differences which had arisen relating to partition of the properties left by Gujju Mal. The arbitrator made his award on December 31, 1950 and under clause 6 of the award, the 'widow was awarded certain properties and it was expressly stated in the award that she would have a widow's estate in the properties awarded to her. While the widow was in possession of the properties, the Act came into force and the question arose whether on the coming into force of the Act, she became full owner of the properties under subsection (1) or her estate in the properties remained a restricted one under sub-section (2) of section 14. This Court held that although the award gave a restricted estate to the widow in the properties allotted to her, it was subsection (1) which applied and not sub-section (2), because inter alia the properties given to her under the award were on the basis of a pre-existing right which she had as an heir off .her husband under the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937 and not as a new grant made for the first time. So also in Nirmal Chand v. Vidya Wanti (dead) by her legal representatives(1), there was a regular partition deed made on December 3, 1945 between Amin chand, a coparcener and (1) C.A. No. 609 of 1965, decided on January 21, 1969.
271 Subhrai Bai, the widow of a deceased coparcener, under which a certain property was allotted to Subhrai Bai and it was specifically provided in the partition deed that Subhrai Bai would be entitled only to the user of the property and she would have no right to alienate it in any manner but would only have a life interest. Subhrai Bai died in 1957 subsequent to the coming into force of the Act after making a will bequeathing the property in favour of her daughter Vidyawati. The right of Subhrai Bai to bequeath the property by will was challenged on the ground that she had only a limited interest in the property and her case was covered by sub-section (2) and not sub-section (1). This contention was negatived and it was held by this Court that though it was true that the instrument of partition prescribed only a limited interest for Subhrai Bai in the property, that was in recognition of the legal position which then prevailed and hence it did not bring her case within the exception contained in sub-section (2) of section 14. This Court observed:
"If Subhrai Bai was entitled to a share in her husband's properties then the suit properties must be held to have been allotted to her in accordance with law. As the law then stood she had only a life interest in the properties taken by her. Therefore the recital in the deed in question that she would have only a life interest in the properties allotted to her share is merely recording the true legal position. Hence it is' not possible to conclude that the properties in question were given to her subject to the condition of her enjoying it for her life time. Therefore the trial court as well as the first Appellate Court were right in holding that the facts of the case do not fall within s. 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1955." It will be seen from these observations that even though the property was acquired by Subhrai Bai under the instrument of partition, which gave only a limited interest to her in the property, this Court held. that the case fell within subsection (1) and not sub-section (2). The reason obviously was that the property was 'given to Subbrai Bai in virtue of a pre-existing right inhering in her and when the instrument of partition provided that she would only have a limited interest in the property, it merely provided for something which even otherwise would have been the legal position under the law as it then stood. It is only when property is acquired by a Hindu female as a new grant for the first time and the instrument, decree; order or award giving the property prescribes the terms on which it is to be held by the Hindu female, namely, as a restricted owner, that subsection (2) comes into play and excludes the applicability of sub-section (1). The object of sub-section (2), as pointed out by this Court in Badri Persad's case (supra) while quoting with approval the observations made by the Madras High Court in Rangaswami Naicker v. Chinnammal(1), is "only to remove the disability of women imposed by law and not to interfere with contracts, grants or decree etc. by virtue of which a woman's right was restricted" and, therefore, where property is acquired by a Hindu female under the instrument in virtue of a pre-existing (1) A.I.R. 1964 Mad. 387.
272 right, such as a right to obtain property on partition or a fight to maintenance and under the law as it stood prior to the enactment of the Act, she would have no more than limited interest in the property, a provision in the instrument giving her limited interest in the property would be merely by way of record or recognition of the true legal position and the restriction on her interest being a "disability imposed by law" would be wiped out and her limited interest would be enlarged under sub-section (1). But where property is acquired by a Hindu female under an instrument for the first time without any pre-existing right solely by virtue of the instrument, she must hold it on the terms on which it is given to her and if what is given to her is a restricted estate, it would not be enlarged by reason of sub-section (2). The controversy before us, therefore, boils down to the narrow question whether in the 'present case the properties were acquired by the appellant under the compromise in virtue of a pre-existing right or they were acquired for the first time as a grant owing its origin to the compromise alone and to nothing else.
Now, let us consider how the properties in question came to be acquired by the appellant under the compromise. The appellant claimed maintenance out of the joint family properties in the hands of the respondent who was her deceased husband's brother. The claim was decreed in favour of the appellant and in execution of the decree for maintenance, the compromise was arrived at between the parties allotting the properties in question to the appellant for her maintenance and giving her limited interest in such properties. Since the properties were allotted to the appellant in lieu of her claim for maintenance, it becomes necessary to consider the nature of the right which a Hindu widow has to be maintained out of joint family estate. It is settled law that a widow is entitled to maintenance out of her deceased husband's estate, irrespective whether that estate may be in the hands of his male issue or it may be in the hands of his coparceners. The joint family estate in which her deceased husband had a share is liable for her maintenance and she has a right to be maintained out of the joint family properties and though, as pointed out by this Court in Rant Bai v. Shri Yadunanden Ram,(1) her claim for maintenance is not a charge upon any joint family property until she has got her maintenance determined and made a specific charge either by agreement or a decree or order of a court, her right is "not liable to be defeated except by transfer to a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of her claim or even with notice of the claim unless the transfer was made with the intention of defeating her right". The widow can for the purpose of her maintenance follow the joint family property "into the hands of any one who takes it as a volunteer or with notice of her having set up a claim for maintenance". The courts have even gone to the length of taking the view that where a widow is in possession of any specific property for the purpose of her maintenance, a purchaser buying with notice of her claim is not entitled to possession of that property without first securing proper maintenance for her, vide Rachawa & Ors. v. Shivayanappa (2) cited with approval in Ranibai's case (supra). It is, therefore, clear (1) [1969] 3 S.C.R. 789.
(2) I.L.R. 18 Bom. 679.
273 that under the Sastric Hindu Law a widow has a right to be maintained out of joint family property and this right would ripen into a charge if the widow takes the necessary steps for having her maintenance ascertained and specifically Charged in the joint family property and even .if no specific charge i.s created, this right would be enforceable against joint family property in the hands of a volunteer or a purchaser taking it with notice of her claim. The right of the widow to be maintained is of course not a ]us in rein, since it does not give her any interest in the joint family property but it is certainly jus ad rem, i.e., a right against the joint family property. Therefore, when specific property is allotted to the widow in lieu of her claim for maintenance, the allotment would be in satisfaction of her jus ad rem, namely, the right to be maintained out of the joint family property. It would not be a grant for the first time without any pre-existing right in the widow. The widow would 'be getting the property in virtue of her pre-existing right, the instrument giving the property being merely a document effectuating such preexisting right and not making a grant of the property to her for the first time without any antecedent right or title.
There is also another consideration which is very relevant to this issue and it is that, even if the instrument were silent as to the nature of the interest given to the widow in the property and did not, in so many terms, prescribe that she would have a limited interest, she would have no more than a limited interest in the property under the Hindu law as it stood prior to the enactment of the Act and hence a provision in the instrument prescribing that she would have only a limited interest in the property would be, to quote the words of this Court in Nirmal Chand's case (supra), "merely recording the true legal position" and that would not attract the applicability of sub-section (2) but would be governed by sub-section (1) of section 14. The conclusion is, therefore, inescapable that where property is allotted to a widow under an instrument, decree, order or award prescribes a restricted estate for her in the property and sub-section (2) of section 14 would have no application in such a case.
We find that there are several High Courts which have taken the same view which we are taking in the present case.
We may mention only a few of those decisions, namely, B.B. Patil v. Gangabai(1), Sumeshwar Misra v. Swami Nath Tiwari,(2) Reddayya v. Varapula Venkataraju,(3) Lakshmi Devi v. Shankar Jha (4) N. Venkanegouda v. Hanemangouda,(5) Smt.
Sharbati Devi v. Pt. Hiralal,(6) Sesadhar Chandra Dev v. Smt. Tara Sundari Dasi,(7) Saraswathi Ammal v. Anantha Shenoi (8) and Kunji Thomman v. Meenakshi(9). It is (1) A.I.R. (1972) Bom. 16 (2) A.I.R. (1970) Pat. 348.
(3) A.I.R. (1965) A.P. 66 (4) A.I.R. (1967) Mad.429 (5) A.I.R. (1972) Mys. 286.
(6) A.I.R. (1964) Pub. 114.
(7) A.I.R. (1962) Cal. 438.
(8) A.I.R. (1966) Ker. 56.
(9) I.L.R. (1970) 2 Ker. 45.
3-436SCI/77 274 not necessary to refer to these decisions since we have ourselves discussed the question of construction of subsections (1) and (2) of section 14 on Principle and pointed out what in our view is the correct construction of these provisions. We may only mention that the judgment of Palekar, J., as he then was, in B.B. Patii v. Gangabai (supra) is a well reasoned judgment and it has our full approval.
The contrary view taken in Gurunadham v. Sundarajulu,(1) Santhanam v. Subramania,(2) S. Kachapalava Gurukkal v. I7.
Subramania Gurukkal(3), Shiva Pujan Rai v. Jamuna Missir,(4) Gopisetti Kondaiah v. Gunda Subbarayudu(5), Ram Jag Misir v.
The Director Consolidation, U.p.(6) and Ajab Singh v. Ram Singh (7) does not, in our opinion, represent the correct law on the subject and these cases must be held to be wrongly decided.
In the circumstances, we reach the conclusion that since in the present case the properties in question were acquired by the appellant under the compromise in lieu or satisfaction of her right of maintenance, it is sub-section (1 ) and not sub-section (2) of section 14 which would be applicable and hence the appellant must be deemed to have become full owner of the properties notwithstanding that the compromise prescribed a limited interest for her in his properties. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court and restore that of the District Judge, Nellore. The result is that the suit will stand dismissed but with no order as to costs.
FAZAL ALI, J. This is a defendant's appeal by special leave against the judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh dated November 22, 1967 and arises in the following circumstances.
Venkatasubba Reddy, husband of appellant No. 1 Vaddeboyina Tulasamma--hereinafter to be referred to as 'Tulasamma'--died in the year 1931 in a state of jointness with his step brother V. Sesha Reddy and left behind Tulasamma as his widow. On October 11, 1944 the appellant Tulasamma filed a petition for maintenance in forma pauperis against the respondent in the Court of the District Munsif, Nellore.
This application was set ex parte on January 13, 1945 bug subsequently the petition.was registered as a suit and an ex parte decree was passed against the respondent on June 29, 1946. On October 1, 1946 the respondent filled an interlocutory application for recording a compromise alleged to have been arrived at between the parties out of Court on April 9, 1945. The appellant Tulasamma opposed this application which was ultimately dismissed on October 16, 1946. An appeal filed by the respondent to the District Judge,Nellore was also dismissed. Thereafter Tulasamma put the decree in (1) I.L.R. (1968) 1 Mad. 487.
(2) I.L.R. (1967) 1 Mad. 68.
(3) A.I.R. (1972) Mad. 279.
(4) I.L.R.. (1947) Pat. 1118.
(5) I.L.R. (1968) A.P. 621.
(6) A.I.R. (1975) ALl. 151.
(7) A.I.R. (1969) J & K 92.
275 execution and at the execution stage the parties appear to have arrived at a settlement out of Court which was certified by the Executing Court on July 30, 2949 under O. XXI r.
2 of the Code of Civil Procedure . Under the compromise the appellant Tulasamma was allotted the Schedule properties, but was to enjoy only a limited interest therein with no power of alienation at all. According to the terms of the compromise the properties were to revert to the plaintiff after the death of Tulasamma. Subsequently Tulasamma continued to remain in possession of the properties even after coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956--hereinafter to be referred to as. 'the 1956 Act, or 'the Act of 1956'. By two registered deeds dated April 12, 1960 and May 26, 1961, the appellant leased out some of the properties to defendants 2 & 3 by the first deed and sold some of the properties to defendant 4 by the second 'deed. The plaintiff/respondent filed a suit on July 31, 1961 before the District Munsiff, Nellore for a declaration that the alienation made by the widow Tulasamma were not binding on the plaintiff and could remain valid only till the life-time of the widow. The basis of the action filed by the plaintiff was that as the appellant Tulasamma had got a restricted estate only under the terms of the compromise her interest could not be enlarged into an absolute interest by the provisions of the 1956 Act in view of s. 14(2) of the said Act. The suit was contested by the appellant Tulasamma who denied the allegations made in the plaint and averred that by virtue of the provisions of the 1956 Act she had become the full owner of the properties with absolute right of alienation and the respondent had no locus standi to file the present suit. The learned Munsiff decreed the suit of the plaintiff holding that the appellant Tulasamma got merely a limited interest in the properties which could be enjoyed during her lifetime and that the alienations were not binding on the reversioner. Tulasamma then filed an appeal before the District Judge Nellore, who reversed the finding of the Trial Court, allowed the appeal and dismissed the plaintiff's suit holding that the appellant Tulasamma had acquired an absolute interest in the properties by virtue of the provisions of the 1956 Act. The learned Judge further held that sub-s. (2) of s. 14 had no application to the present case, because the compromise was an instrument in recognition of a pre-existing right. The plaintiff/respondent went up in second appeal to the High Court against the judgment of the District Judge. The plea of the plaintiff/respondent appears to have found favour with the High Court which held that the case of the appellant was clearly covered by s. 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act and as the compromise was an instrument as contemplated by s. 14(2) of the 1956 Act Tulasamma could not get an absolute interest under s. 14(1) of the Act. The High Court further held' that by virtue of the compromise the appellant Tulasamma got title to the properties for the first time and it was not a question of recognising a preexisting right which she had none in view of the fact that her husband had died even before the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937. We might further add that the facts.
narrated above have not been disputed by counsel for the parties.
The appeal has been argued only on the substantial questions of law which turn. upon the interpretation of sub-ss. (1) & (2) of s. 14 276 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. It is common ground that in this case as also in the other connected appeals, the properties in suit were allotted under a compromise or an instrument in lieu of maintenance. It is also admitted that the appellant Tulasamma was in possession of the properties at the time when the 1956 Act came into force. Finally it is also not disputed that the compromise did purport to confer only a limited interest on the widow restricting completely her power of alienation. We have now to apply the law on the facts mentioned above. Similar points were involved in the other two appeals Nos. 135 of 1973 and 126 of 1972. We have heard all the, three appeals together and in all these appeals counsel for the parties have confined their arguments only to the questions of law without disputing the findings of fact arrived at by the Courts below..
Thus the two points that fall for determination in this appeal may be stated thus:
.lm18 (1) whether the instrument of compromise under which the properties were given to the appellant Tulasamma before the 1956 Act in lieu of maintenance falls within s.
14(1) or is covered by s. 14(2) of the 1956, Act and (2) Whether a Hindu widow has a right to property in lieu of her maintenance, and if such a right is conferred on her subsequently by way of maintenance it would amount to mere recognition of a preexisting right or a conferment of new title so as to fall squarely within s. 14(2) of the 1956 Act.
There appears to be serious divergence of judicial opinion on the subject and the High Courts have taken contrary views on this point. Some High Courts, particularly, Bombay, Punjab, Calcutta and Patna have veered round to the view that a right of maintenance claimed by a Hindu widow is a pre-existing right and any instrument or document or transaction by which the properties are allotted to the widow in lieu of her maintenance would only be recognition of a pre-existing right and would not confer any new title on the window. Following this line of reasoning the aforesaid High Courts have held that the properties allotted to the Hindu widow even though they conferred a limited interest would fall clearly within the ambit of s. 14(1) of the 1956 Act by virtue of which the limited interest would be enlarged into an absolute interest on the coming into force of the 1956 Act. On the other hand the Orissa, Allahabad, Madras and Andhra Pradesh High Courts have taken a contrary view and have held that as the Hindu widow's right to maintenance is not a right to property, property allotted to her in lieu of maintenance confers on her a right or title to the property for the first time and therefore such Conferment is protected by s. 14(2) of the 1956 Act and is not covered by s. 14(1). Unfortunately, however, there is no decision of this Court which is directly in point, though there are some decisions which tend to support the view taken by the Bombay High Court.
277 Before, however, resolving this important dispute it may be necessary to consider the real legal nature of the incident of a Hindu widow's right to maintenance. In order to determine this factor we have to look to the concept of a Hindu marriage. Under the Shastric Hindu Law, a marriage, unlike a marriage under the Mohammadan Law which is purely contractual in nature, is a sacrament--a religious ceremony which results in a sacred and a holy union of man and wife by virtue of which the wife is completely transplanted in the household of her husband and takes a new birth as a partner of her husband becoming a part and parcel of the body of the husband. To a Hindu wife her husband is her God and her life becomes one of selfless service and unstinted devotion and profound dedication to her husband. She not only shares the life and love the joys and sorrows, the troubles and tribulations of her husband but becomes an integral part of her husband's life and activities. Colebrooke in his book 'Digest of Hindu Law' Vol. II describes the status of wife at p. 158 thus:
"A wife is considered as half the body of her husband, equally sharing the fruit of pure and impure acts; whether she ascend "the pile after him, or survive for the benefit of her husband, she is a faithful wife." This being the position after marriage, it is manifest that the law enjoins a corresponding duty on the husband to maintain his wife and look after her comforts and to provide her food and raiments. It is well settled that under the Hindu! Law the husband has got a personal obligation to maintain his wife and if he is possessed of properties then his wife is entitled as of right to be maintained out of such properties. The claim of a Hindu widow to be maintained is not an empty formality which is to be exercised as a matter of concession or indulgence, grace or gratis or generosity but is a valuable spiritual and moral right which flows from the spiritual and temporal relationship of the husband an wife. As the wife is in a sense a part of the body of her husband, she becomes co-owner of the property of her husband though in a subordinate sense. Although the right of maintenance does not per se create a legal charge on the property of her husband, yet the wife can enforce this right by moving the Court for passing a decree for maintenance by creating a charge. This right is available only so long as the wife continues to be chaste. Thus the position is that the right of maintenance may amount to a legal charge if such a charge is created either by an agreement between the parties or by decree.
There are a number of authorities which have taken the view that even if the property is transferred and the transferee takes the property with notice of the right of the widow to be maintained out of the property, the purchaser takes the obligation to maintain the widow out of the property purchased and the wife or widow can follow the property in the hands of the purchaser for the limited purpose of her maintenance. We shall, however, deal with these authorities a little later.
278 Colebrooke in his 'Digest of Hindu Law Vol. 1I, quotes the.
Mahabharata at p. 121 thus:
"Where females are honoured, there the deities are pleased; but where they are unhonoured, there all religious acts become fruitless." This clearly illustrates the high position which is bestowed on Hindu women by the Shastric Law. Again Colebrooke in his book Vol. II at p. 123, while describing the circumstances under which the maintenance is to be given to the wife, quotes Manu thus:
"MANU :--Should a man have business abroad, let him assure a fit maintenance to his wife, and then reside for a time in a foreign country; since a wife, even though virtuous, may be tempted to act amiss, if she be distressed by want of subsistence:
While her husband, having settled her maintenance, resides abroad, let her continue firm in religious austerities; but if he leave no support, let her subsist by spinning an other blameless arts." This extract clearly shows that there is a legal obligation on the part of the husband to make arrangements for his wife's due maintenance even if he goes abroad for business purposes. Colebrooke again quotes Yajnawalkya at p. 243 of his book Vol. thus:
"When the father makes an equal partition among his sons, his wives must have equal shares with them, if they have received no wealth either from their lord or from his father.
If he makes an equal partition among his sons by his own choice, he must give equal shares to such of his wives also as have no male issue." This shows that when a partition is effected, the Hindu Law enjoins that the wife must get an equal share with the sons, thus reinforcing the important character of the right of maintenance which a Hindu wife or widow possesses under the Hindu Law.
Similarly Gopalchandra Sarkar Sastri dealing with the nature and incidents of the Hindu widow's right to maintenance observes in his treatise 'Hindu Law' at p. 533 thus:
"When the husband is alive, he is personally liable for the wife's maintenance, which is also a legal charge upon his property, this charge being a legal incident of her marital co-ownership in all her husband's property ......But after his death, his widow's right of maintenance becomes limited to his estate, which, when it passes to any other heir, is charged with the same ......... There cannot be any doubt that under Hindu law the wife's or widow's maintenance is a legal charge on the husband's estate; but the Courts appear to hold, 279 in consequence of the proper materials not being placed before them, that it is not so by itself, but is merely a claim against the husband's heir, or an equitable charge on his estate; hence the husband's debts are held to have priority, unless it is made a charge on the property by a decree." The view of the author appears to be that the Courts hold that the right of maintenance of a widow does not amount to a legal charge and this is so because proper materials were not placed before the Courts. In other words, the author seems to indicate that the original Hindu Law contained clear provisions that the right of! maintenance amounts to a charge on the property of her husband and the obligation runs; with the property so that any person who inherits the property also takes upon the obligation to maintain the widow. Sastri quotes from the original texts various extracts regarding the nature and extent of the right of maintenance of the Hindu women some of which may be extracted thus:
"The support of the group of persons who should be maintained, is the approved means of attaining heaven, but hell is the man's portion if they suffer; therefore he should carefully maintain them.
The father, the mother, the Guru (an elderly relation worthy of respect), a wife, an offspring, poor dependants, a guest, and a religious mendicant are declared to be the group of persons who are to be maintained.--Manu, cited in Srikrishna's commentary on the Dayabhaga, ii, 23.
It is declared by Manu that the aged mother and father, the chaste wife, and an infant child must be maintained even by doing a hundred misdeeds,--Manu cited in the Mitak' shara while dealing with gifts." The last extract dearly shows the imperative nature of the duty imposed on the owner of the property to maintain wife, aged mother, father etc. even at the cost of perpetrating a hundred misdeeds.
Similarly Sastri in his book quotes Yajnavalkya at p. 523 thus:
"Property other than what is required for the maintenance of the family may be given." The learned author highlights the importance of the right maintenance as being
