State of Punjab (Now Haryana) & Ors Vs. Amar Singh & ANR [1974] INSC 14 (21 January 1974)

KRISHNAIYER, V.R.

PALEKAR, D.G.

SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH

CITATION: 1974 AIR 994 1974 SCC (4) 305

CITATOR INFO:

RF 1975 SC1952 (6,7) RF 1992 SC 248 (53)

ACT:

Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act (10 of 1953) Ss.10A and 18--Scope of Interpretation of Statutes.

HEADNOTE:

Section 10A(B) of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, provides that no transfer or other disposition of land which is comprised in a surplus area [as defined in s.

2(5a)], at the commencement of the Act, shall affect the utilization thereof for the resettlement of ejected tenants;

and s. 10A(C) provides that for the purpose of determining the surplus area, any judgment, decree or order of a court or other authority, which diminishes the surplus are a shall be ignored. Under the Act, land owners who had land in excess of the 'permissible area' could reserve for themselves lands to the extent of the permissible area; and the rest, excluding the permissible area of the tenants, was the surplus area of the landowner. Section 18 provides that a tenant, who has been in continuous occupation of the land comprised in his tenancy for a minimum period of 6 years, shall be entitled to purchase from the landowner, the land so held by him.

At the commencement of the Act on April 15, 1953, a landowner owned three items of property which did not form part of her reserved area. One of the items was under her self-cultivation while there were tenants on the other two.

Those tenants later gave up possession and abandoned the lands. The landowner made a gift of the 3 items to her daughter, who sold them to her husband and his brother, the 1st and 2nd respondents respectively. The Collector (Surplus Area), while determining the surplus area of the landowner, ignored the gifts and sales, and included the 3 items in the landowner's surplus area. The respondents appealed to the Commissioner. They also applied to the Assistant Collector under s. 18, for purchase of the lands in their possession on the ground of continuous occupation for 6 years. The applications were allowed on the basis of a compromise between the applicants (respondents) and the landowner, and the respondents paid the purchase price determined by the Assistant Collector. On the basis of those purchase orders the Commissioner, set aside the order of the Collector (Surplus Area) declaring the surplus area of the landowner, and directed him to inquire into the matter afresh. The collector [the Asstt. Collector who had allowed the purchases by the respondents had by then become Collector (Surplus Area)] thereupon determined the surplus area of the landowner under s. 10A(c). He, however, held that the leases granted to the respondents were collusive and that the orders of purchase under S. 18 were ineffective, and included the 3 items again in the landowner's surplus area.

The High Court allowed the Writ Petitions of the respondents on the ground that the authority acting under s. 10A(c) could not ignore the purchase orders passed under s. 18.

Allowing the appeals to this Court, HELD : Per Palekar and Krishna lyer, JJ. (Sarkaria J.

dissenting) : 1(a) The public policy of S. 10A cannot be outwitted by consent orders calculated to defeat the provision, and, without the statutory authority charged with the inquiry being satisfied about the bonafides of and eligibility for, the purchase. [175G] When high public policy finds expression in socioeconomic legislation contractual arrangements between interested individuals, sanctified into consent or compromise decrees or orders cannot be binding on the instrumentalities of the State called upon to enforce the statute, although the tribunals, enjoined to enforce the law, may take probative note of the recitals in such compromise or consent statements in proof of facts on which their jurisdiction depends. Neither the materials on 153 record in the present case, nor the recitals in the compromise, disclose the application of the judicial mind.

[174C] (b) It was found by the Collector (Surplus Area) that the leases in question have been collusively got up to dwindle the surplus area of the landowner and that the landowner had conspired with her son-in-law and big brother to retain the area in contravention of the law. Further, S. 18 applies only to persons who are legally tenants. In the present case' the lease was granted by the landowner after gifting the property to her daughter. Also, the section requires 6 years continuous occupation by the tenant; but the Collector found that the respondents had not completed the period at the time of their application under S. 18. The order in fact is thus a nullity. Therefore, it could not be contended that the orders of purchase in favour of the respondents passed by the concerned officer under S. 18 had become final and not having been set aside bind the other authority determining the surplus area.

(c) There is no provision in s. 18 to give notice to the Collector who is to declare the surplus area and so, the State (represented by the Collector), which is vitally concerned in the resettlement of ejected tenants by utilising the surplus area, has no opportunity to present its case against the fraudulent character of the proceedings under s. 18 before the Assistant Collector. The State, not being a party to that order, in any case, cannot be bound by it, whatever may be the effect as between the parties to those proceedings. Since the State is not a party it has no right of appeal or review.[172B] (2) The authority under s. 10A may ignore the order of the authority under s. 18.

(a) There is an apparent conflict between Ss. 10 and 18 and the basic judicial approach should be to harmonise the two sections. The major premise of statutory construction is that the rule of law must run close to the rule of life and the court must read into an enactment, language permitting, the meaning which promotes, the benignant intent of the legislation in preference to the one which perverts the scheme of the statute. The objects of the agrarian reform underlying the Act are : (a) to impart security of tenure;

(b) to make the tiller the owner; and (c) to trim large land holdings thus creating peasant proprietorships ensuring even distribution of land ownership. The intendment of the statute is that reservation was to be made by a landowner to enable self-cultivation, and so, landowners could eject tenants. But, since agrarian reform must promote not eviction but security of tenure, it became necessary for the State to create surplus area of a considerable extent, so that, the evicted tenants could be rehabilitated on such surplus lands, enjoying fixity of tenure and paying. rent to the owners. The success of the scheme depends on preventing leakages through private alienations, collusive awards and decrees and the like, and so, care was taken in s. 10A(C) to interdict alienations and to ignore decrees and orders which diminished the surplus pool. Such a strategic provision must receive a benignantly spacious construction. [160H, 161F, 157H] (b) There is no force in the contention that the benefit under s. 18 would be completely nullified and obliterated if s. 10A(c) were to prevail and apply to orders under s. 18.

Though S. 10A(C) uses the words 'shall be ignored it is not every order under s. 18 that would have to be ignored but only those orders which have the effect of diminishing the surplus area. The person who is entitled to purchase under s. 18 is a person lawfully inducted on the land as a tenant.

The cases under the section would be, (i) of tenants who are eligible to purchase by virtue of 6 years continuous occupation of land in their permissible area, and (ii) of tenants resettled on surplus area of the landowner, after 6 years continuous occupation. The purchase in the first case being from the tenant's permissible area is outside the surplus area of the landowner and does not have the effect of diminishing the landowner's surplus area. In the second case, the purchase fulfils the object of the statute of making the tiller the owner. The principal category adversely affected would be post statutory collusive tenants and perhaps some bonafide tenants, who, however do not deserve sympathy since they damage the prospects of displaced persons to be resettled. Section 18(1)(iii) apparently contemplates purchase rights for persons who had no possession when the Act came into force, but the exception was made only in case of those persons who had been deprived of their rights by unjust eviction prior to the Act coming into force. [169H-170D] 154 (3) The purchase order by the Assistant Collector under s.

18 was rightly ignored by the Collector (Surplus Area), as 'other authority' in s. 10A(c) includes the officers under s. 18. The plain meaning of the sub-section is that any order by any authority which shrinks the surplus area of the landowner is invalid to the extent laid down in that clause, and orders under s. 18, if they diminish the surplus area suffer the same fate. The High Court was wrong in inferring from the statement of objects and reasons that 'other authorities' in s. 10A(C) are arbitrators or such like agencies and not authorities under the Act. The objects and reasons relating to the clause of a bill may be read for finding the object of the law and not to control its amplitude. The purpose as revealed in the statement of objects is that the legislature wanted to ensure the invulnerability of the surplus pool provision to attacks, by ignoring judicial and quasi-judicial orders of every sort.

This object of s. 10A(C) cannot be fulfilled unless the widest meaning were given to the expression 'court or other authority'. Nor is there any basis for truncating the ambit of 'other authority'. 'Other authority' is every other authority within or without the Act. [168F, 169B, 171A-B] (4) Further, the expression 'transfer or other disposition of land' in s. 10A(b) covers leases, which by very definition, are a species of transfer of land. In the present case, the lands in dispute fell outside the landowner's reserved area and were therefore included in her surplus area. The first respondent, to be entitled to be a lessee, must prima facie show that the alienation in his favour, as a lessee, does not violate s. 10A(b) which prohibits all transfers and other dispositions which diminish .the surplus area of the landowner. Under s. 2(1), the word 'landowner' includes also the lessee and the permissible area of the tenant is excluded from the surplus area of the landowner.

Merely because of the outstanding leases in favour of the prior tenants at the commencement of the Act, the two items which were earlier leased to tenants do not ipso facto fall outside the surplus area of the landowner. That would be so only if they are comprised in the permissible area of the tenant on the relevant date but there is no evidence to that effect. In relation to the prior tenants no such claim has been set up by the first respondent, and the first respondent was not a transferee from the prior tenants, but a de novo tenant. After the prior tenants gave up possession the lands came into the actual possession of the landowner and the leases were extinguished. It follows, that one item was always in the possession of the landowner and other two came into her possession subsequent to the coming into force of the Act, that those three items of property should be computed as part of the landowner's surplus area, and that s. 10A(b) operates to invalidate the alleged leases to the respondents, since they diminish the surplus area of the landowner. The respondents, therefore, had no right, as tenants, to purchase under s.

18.[167D,167H-168D] (5) It could not be contended that even if leases are prohibited by s. 10A(b) the sub-section does not affect involuntary transfers and that since a purchase under s.18, effects an involuntary transfer it is not affected by s. 10A(b). The three sub clauses of s. 10A, read together, show that if the landowner, by any act or omission of his suffered a diminution in the surplus area by a transfer, voluntary or otherwise contrary to the right of the State Government to dispose of it, such a transfer is liable to be set aside. The expression 'transfer' is wide enough to cover transfers by operation of law, as in the present case, under s. 18. To uphold the contention of the respondents that involuntary transfers are not affected would stultify s. 10A and the scheme of the statute altogether as they would diminish the available surplus area of a landowner.

Moreover, special exclusion to save transfers by way of inheritance and compulsory land acquisition by the State would be supererogatory had involuntary transfers been automatically excluded from s. 10A(b). [172H] The Court expressed the hope that land reform measures would be quickly implemented, because, in the present case, more than a score of years notwithstanding the processes of fixing reserved areas and surplus areas' on the strength of which alone confirment of proprietary rights on tenants and resettlement of a ejected tenants could proceed, are still lingering. [176C] Mam Rai v. State of Punjab I.L.R. (1969) 2 Pun. & Har. 680;

682-683, over-ruled.

155 Chari v. Seshadri [1973] 1 S.C.C. 761, Bahadur Singh v. Muni Subrat [1969] 2 S.C.R. 432, Kaushalya Devi v. K. L. Bansal [1969] 2 S.C.R. 1048 and Ferozi Lal Jain v. Man Mal [1970] 3 S.C.C. 181, refeffed to.

Per Sarkaria J. (dissenting) (1) (a) The Collector (Surplus Area) would be entitled to ignore the order of the Asstt. Collector under S. 18 independently of s. 10A of the Act if the order based on the compromise is void and a nullity. But if it is only voidable or erroneous, it could be avoided only by way of appeal review or revision or in other appropriate proceedings, known to law and the Collector (Surplus Area) could go behind it only when it is so set aside, or if the provisions of s. 10A entitle him to do so.

(b) An order is null and void if the quasi-judicial tribunal passing it lacks inherent jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter. In the present case, the Assistant Collector who made the order under s. 18 was duly invested with jurisdiction under the section. The respondents were tenants and merely because-they were related to the landowner they could not be denied the rights and privileges under the Act. The allegations in the purchase application about the applicants' being in continuous occupation of the lands comprised in their tenancy for the requisite Period, coupled with admission by the landowner in the compromise, furnished sufficient material on the basis of which the authority could have been satisfied about the existence of all the facts essential for the exercise of his jurisdiction under s. 18. [191F, 192E] (c) It is not correct to say, that on the facts of the instant case the Assistant Collector passed the orders solely on the basis of the compromise without applying his mind to the facts of the case. Application of mind is evident from the circumstance that he assessed the price to be paid by each of the applicants who thereafter did so.

The mere fact that he did not record a finding in so many words that he was satisfied from such and such material in regard to the existence of the basic conditions necessary for making the order under s. 18 did not render his order a nullity when such material was otherwise evident on the record. Therefore, the order under s. 18 was not a nullity and it could not be ignored as non-est by the Collector (Surplus Area). [192E] K. K. Chari v. R. M. Seshadri [1973] 1 SCC 761, Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Ichchram Civil Appeal No. 2479/72 decided on 30-11-1973, Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1962 S.C. 1621=[1963]1 SCR 778 and Ittyavira Mathai v. Varkey Varkey, A.I.R, 1964 S.C. 907 (910)= [1964]1 SCR 495, followed.

(d) The Collector (Surplus Area) and the Collector acting under s. 18, are coordinate authorities exercising separate and distinct jurisdictions'. If one feels that a certain order passed by the other in the exercise of his distinct jurisdiction is erroneous it was open to that authority to get it rectified in the appropriate manner provided by the Act, that is, by way of appeal, review or revision. The provisions in regard to appeal, review and revision against an order of the Assistant Collector under s. 18 are, under ss. 24 and 25 of the Act, ss 80 to 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887. There is nothing in the Act or the Rules framed under the Act, or in the Tenancy Act, as to who can file an appeal or revision against the decision or order of the Collector exercising jurisdiction under s. 18; and, in view of the long Practice there could be no doubt that the State Government or its department can, if aggrieved or prejudiced by such a decision, go in appeal or revision against it. A person who is not a party to a decree or order, may with the leave of the Appellate Court prefer an appeal and as a rule, leave will not be refused to a person who might have been made a party to the proceedings. In any case, the State or the department could have moved the Financial Commissioner to set right the illegality or impropriety in revision. The Financial Commissioner under the Tenancy Act has wide powers in revision to correct errors committed by the inferior authorities and there is no time limit to the exercise of the revisional power. Once the application of the tenant under s. 18 has been allowed and the order is not set aside in appeal or revision, it becomes final and remains immune to an attack against its validity on any ground, including that of collusion, before the coordinate authorities under the Act dealing with the question of the determination of surplus area. In the present case the Collector (Surplus Area) could not go behind the orders under s. 18 or himself sit in appeal over them, especially when the officer who passed the two orders happended to be the same person.

[194C] 156 Amir Chand v. State of Haryana 1971 PLJ. 449, Securities Insurance Co. [1894] 2 Ch. 410, Province of Bombay v. W. L Automobile Association A.I.R. 1949 Dom. 141, Heera Singh v.

Veerka, A.I.R. 1958 Raj. 181, Shivaraja v. Siddamma A.I.R.

1963 Mys. 127, Executive Officer v. Raghavan Pillai A.I.R.

1961 Kerala 114, B. an Infant, [1958] 1 Q.B. 12; Govinda Menon v. Madhvan Nair A.I.R. 1964 Kerala 235(DB), Punjab State v. Dr. Iqbal Singh [1965] Punjab Law Journal 110, Man Raj and ors v. State of Punjab I.L.R. [1969] 2 Punj and Haryana 680 and Shyamlal v. State of Gujrat [1965] 2 S.C.R.

457, referred to.

(2)The view taken by the High Court with regard to the interpretation and inter-relation of s. 10A and s. 18 is sound and therefore s. 18 prevails over s. 10A and so, the authority under s. 10A cannot ignore the order of the authority under s. 18. [197B] (a) The two canons of interpretation applicable to the statute are, (i) if choice lies between two alternative constructions, that alternative is to be chosen which will be consistent with the smooth working of the system which the statute purports to be regulating; and that alternative is to be rejected which will introduce uncertainty friction or confusion into the working of the system and, (ii) if there is an apparent conflict between different provisions of the same enactment they should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect may be given to both. [195E] King Emperor v. Benori Lal Sarma [1944] 49 CWN 178 (PC)=72 IA 57, referred to.' (b) Section 18 is designed to promote one of the primary objects of the Act, namely of procuring ownership of the land to the tiller on easy terms. The self sufficing machinery of this section is available for purchase of their tenancies to the tenants inducted before or after April 15, 1953, by the landowner, equally with tenants settled by the Government on the surplus area. The Act does not take away the right of the landowner to induct tenants on such area. Every sale made by the operation of s.18 in favour of a tenant admitted by the landowner on the surplus area causes diminution of the surplus area or affects the utilisation thereof by the Government. Under s.10A(C) every judgment, decree or order of a court or the authority, which diminishes the surplus area shall be ignored. If sales in favour of tenants inducted by the landowner after April 15, 1953 were to be ignored under s. 10A(c) then it will reduce the working of the system of the Act to a mockery, because it will present the spectacle of manifest contradiction and absurdity of an Act giving a right with one hand and taking it away by another. The adoption of such an interpretation may not completely obliterate. s. 18 but it will certainly truncate it, with reference to the category of tenants inducted by the landowner after April 15, 1953. [195G] (3) The conflict between the two provisions can be avoided only if the general words 'other authority' in s. 10A(c) are read ejusdem generis with the specific words 'judgment, decree or order of a court' which immediately precede them.

Thus construed, the general words 'or other authority' will not take in an authority exercising jurisdiction under s. 18 of the Act. [196B-C] (4) The lease created by the landowner in the present case, ceased to subsist as soon as the Collector made orders of purchase under s. 18 in favour of the respondent. The question whether the extinct lease which preceded the purchase orders was a transfer or not, did not therefore survive for decision. [197A] Bhajan Lal v. Punjab State [1968] 70 I.L.R. 664, Bishan Singh v. Punjab State [1968]47 LLt 284 and Lakshmi Bai v. State of Haryana [1971] LXXIII Punj. L.R. 8 1 5, referred to.

Further, the land comprised in the lease of the prior tenants was far less than their permissible limit and the High Court rightly presumed that the lands were within their permissible area, since there was. no evidence that they held any other land. Surplus area has to be determined, as appears from s. 19F, with reference to the situation as on April 15, 1953, when the Act came into force. The disputed land held by the prior tenants was within their permissible area and therefore it could not be included in the surplus area of the landowner. At the time when the ,Collector (Surplus Area ) took up determination of the surplus area, these lands were still comprised in a tenancy though under a different tenant, namely the first 157 respondent. Such change of the tenant does not amount to a future acquisition of land, comprised in that tenancy, by the landowner within the contemplation of s. 19A or S. 19B of the Act. [197H-198D] Bhagwan Das v. The State of Punjab, [1966] 2 SCR 511, followed.

Harchand Singh v. Punjab State, (1964) 66 P.L.R. 285; 1963 P.L.J. 144, approved(5) The expression 'transfer and other disposition of land in s.10A(b) does not include completed sales effected under s. 18. The words transfer or other disposition of land' must be restricted to voluntary dispositions of land made by the landowner and cannot be extended to cover involuntary transfers brought about by operation of law or circumstances beyond the control of the landowner. This is the only reasonable interpretation of the words 'transfer or other disposition of land' in s. 10A (b) which is consistent with s. 18 and can reconcile and keep effective both the sections. The two types of involuntary transfers. namely compulsory acquisition of land by Government or by an heir by inheritance are only illustrative of the intention of the legislature. [196 D]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals 1756 of 1967.

Nos. 1755 and From the judgment and order dated the 4th October, 1966 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil Writ Petition No.

854 and 855 of 1963.

V. C. Mahajan and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellants.

S. K. Dhingra for the respondents.

The Judgment of D. G. PALEKAR and V. R. KRISHNA IYER, JJ.

was delivered by Krishna lyer, J. R. S. SARKARIA, J. gave a dissenting, Opinion.

KRISHNA IYER, J. These two appeals by the State of Haryana challenge the High Court's approach to an interpretation of two, crucial provisions of a land reforms law, namely, Ss.

10-A and 18 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act (X Of 1953) 1953 (for short called "the Act"). Counsel for the appellants complains; that if the view upheld by the High Court of subordinating S. 10-A to S. 18 were not upset by this Court, large land' holders may extricate their surplus land in excess of the ceiling set, through legal loopholes, such as have been practised in the present case. If makebelieve deals and collusive, proceeding, he argues, may maneouvre through the legal net cast by S. 10-A of the Act interdicting alienations and orders which diminish the surplus pool intended for re-settlement by the State of ejected tenants, the agrarian reform measure would be reduced to a paper tiger or socioeconomic eyewash.

Certainly, land reforms are so basic to the national reconstruction of the new order envisaged by the Constitution that the issue raised in this case deserves our anxious attention. We have to bear in mind, the activist, though inarticulate, major premise of statutory construction that the rule of law must run close to the rule of life and the court must read into an enactment, language permitting, that meaning which promotes the benignant intent of the legislation in preference to the one which perverts the, scheme of the statute 158 on imputed legislative presumptions and 'assumed social values valid in a prior era. An aware court, informed of this adaptation in the rules of forensic interpretation, hesitates to nullify the plain object of a land reforms law unless compelled by its language, and the crux of this case is just that accent when double possibilities in the chemistry of construction crop up.

A breif survey of the relevent facts leading up to the legal controversy seeking resolution in these appeals will help focus forensic attention on the provisions of the Act which bear upon the issue. A lady by name Lachhman had considerable agricultural property, far in excess of the relatively liberal ceiling set by the Act which came into force on April 15, 1953. She had a daughter Shanti Devi and son-in-law Amar Singh, respondent in Civil Appeal No. 1755 of 1967, whose brother Indraj is the respondent in the connected appeal No. 1756 of 1967. Annexure (B) to the writ petitions is an order dated May 11, 1962 passed under the Act and the Rules by the Collector (Surplus Area) Sirsa. It is this order which has been successfully attacked in the writ petitions and is the subject-matter of the present appeals. The facts stated therein have not been reversed in the judgment of the High Court and we have to proceed on the assumption that those statements are correct. We are concerned with three khasras Nos. 177, 265 and 343, in all over 131 acres of land. At the commencement of the Act, khasra No. 177 was under Mst. Lachhman's self cultivation but there were two tenants under her, Chandu and Sri Chand, on other two plots. Together, these three, plots constitute a large slice out of her surplus areas and are now claimed by the respondents, Amar Singh and Indraj, as their own under a purchase ordered by the Assitant Collector who is the competent authority under s. 18 of the Act (Annexure A to the writ petitions). Appellant's counsel urges that the history of the derivation of title of these claimants needs to be sceptically studied, the relationship of the parties being that of mother and daughter, son-in-law and brother and the heavy impact being slicing off a good chunk from the surplus area, otherwise available for re-settlement of evicted tenants.

At the outset it must be mentioned that the two tenants, Chandu and Sri Chand who were on the land on the determinative date (April 15, 1953) presumably showed no interest in claiming rights granted to tenants under the Act, which were subject, of course, to their possessing lands less than the permissible area'. We have no information in this case what the total extent of lands in the possession of these two tenants was and whether they had chosen to keep other lands in preference to the ones under Mst. Lachhman. We need not speculate on how or why they left the suit plots but may note that they were on the holding on the key date in 1953 and if later they did not keep their possession (abandoned or surrendered) the tenancy terminated and on the facts of this case the lands came into the actual possession of the land holder, Mst. Lachhman, no other legal inference being possible than that the 159 leases were extinguished and the lands reverted to the landlady on general principles of law. In short, we have to proceed on the assumption that one plot, namely, khasra No. 177 had always. been in the self-cultivation of the landlady and that the two tenanted plots, namely, khasras Nos. 265 and 343, came into the khas possession of the landlady subsequent to the crucial date. Apprehending the statutory peril to these lands which were admittedly outside her "reserved areas" Mst. Lachhman went through the exercise of making a gift of the three lands to her daughter Smt.

Shanti (vide mutation No. 445 decided on December 24, 1953 and referred to in Annexure B). Subsequently, it is seen that Amar Singh, husband of Shanti and Indraj, brother of Amar Singh purported to apply for purchase of the landholders right in these three plots under s. 18 of the Act making Lachhman and Shanti co-respondents and alleging that they were tenants qualified for the statutory benefit.

The Assistant Collector before whom the application was made for purchase under s. 18 has said in Annexure 'A' to both the writ petitions that these two ladies "are said to be big land-owners but had not got this land reserved for their own purpose". Curiously enough, in both the purchase petitions the parties avoided even an enquiry by the Assistant Collector as is evident from the following statement from Annexure 'A'.

"Before the proceedings could start the parties have come to terms and they have actually put in court a compromise deed which they have backed up by their statements." May be, because these dubious moves if exposed to the examination of an officer might prove a fiasco, the close relations who figured as petitioner and respondents lulled the Assistant Collector into mechanically acting on the compromise without enquiring into any of the eligibility factors before a purchase could be ordered.

There is another, set of facts which needs mention at this stage. Even before the purchase proceedings were initiated by the writ petitioners, the Collector had, as early as April 1961, declared the surplus area of Lachhman ignoring alienations and including the three khasra numbers. But on appeals carried both by the landholder and her son-in-law and his brother the Commissioner ordered a further enquiry.

Meanwhile, purchase proceedings were started and by a quick compromise, orders of purchase were obtained. But all these proved exercises in futility because the Collector, Surplus Area, again ignored the leases to the writ petitioners as collusive and the orders of purchase as ineffective in the impugned order, Annexure B. However the High Court set aside Annexure 'B' so that the petitioners before it, the son-in-law and his brother, were restored to their purchases, and the State lost the lands from the surplus. pool. The aggrieved State canvasses the correctness of. the supersession of s. 18 and of certain other legal reasoning approved by the Court, as its impact on the working of the land reform scheme would be disastrous. Anyway, the law laid down in this case was affirmed by a Full Bench of that Court. Having regard to all those circumstances a series analysis and attempt at harmonisation of the various provisions of the Act is necessary now.

160 A flash back to the genetic evolution of the act and the legislative mutations by amendatory effort to make the law effective, and to unmake judicial decisions which weakened the working of it will help understand the current biochemistry of the Act. Any interpretation unaware of the living aims ideology and legal anatomy of an Act will miss its soul substance--a flaw which we feel, must be avoided particularly in socio-Economic legislation with a dynamic will and mission. Now to the legislation itself. A brief introduction is found in the reference order of the Full Bench (Shamsher Bahadur, J.) in Mam Raj v. State of Punjab :

(1) "The Act passed on 15th of April, 1953, was not the first legislation on the subject and the contours of many of the concepts had already taken shape in the two earlier enactments on the subject, namely, the Punjab Tenants (Security of Tenure) Act, 1950 (Act No. 22 of 1950) and Punjab Tenants (Security of Tenure) Amendment Act, 1951 (President's Act 5 of 1951). The Act, which at once consolidated and amended the existing law on the subject, was designed "to provide for the security of land tenure and other incidental matters". As is clear from the preamble, the primary object was the protection of tenants whose ejectments recently from holdings held by landowners owning vast tracts of lands, had taken place on a massive scale. In restoring the rights of tenants ejected after 15th of August, 1947, care was taken that landlords with small holdings were not subjected to harassment by the tenants. For this reason, the concepts of "small landowner", "permissible area" and "reservation" were introduced. A small landowner was described as a person whose entire holding in the State of Punjab did not exceed the permissible area which though fixed at 100 standard acres in the Act of 1950 was reduced to 30 standard acres in the Act. A Landowner owning larger areas was entitled to reserve the permissible area, and many of the provisions of the Act dealt with the manner and exercise of this right of reservation. The right of the landowner to eject tenants from the reserved or permissible areas was recognized in the Act though under section 9-A(introduced by Punjab Act II of 1955) the tenants liable to ejectment on this score had to be accommodated in surplus areas, a minimum period of ten years' tenancy was fixed under section 7 in respect of tenants who were in occupation of land outside the reserved areas and the right of the tenants who had been ejected after the 15th August, 1947, for restoration to the tenancies was recognised.

Provisions were made for the exercise of the other rights of the tenants, the most important of these being the right to purchase the leased lands under section 18 of the Act." The triple objects of the agrarian reform projected by the Act appear to be (a) to impart security of tenure (b) to make the tiller the owner, and (c) to trim large land holdings, setting sober ceilings. To convert these political slogans into legal realities to combat the evil of mass evictions, to create peasant proprietorships and to ensure even dis(1) I.L.R. [1969] 2 Pun. & Har. 680; 682-683.

161 tribution of land ownerships a statutory scheme was fashioned, the cornerstone of which was the building up of a reservoir of land carved out of the large landholdings and made available for utilization by the State for re-setting ejected tenants.

The scheme of agrarian re-organisation contemplated by the statutes is simple. The legislature fixed a limit on ownership expressively described as "permissible area" landowners who exceeded this area were allowed to reserve for themselves the best lands they desired to keep and this parcel or parcels of land was meaning fully designated as "reserved area". Of course, if he failed to intimate his selection within six months from the commencement of the Act to the Patwari concerned, the prescribed authority was empowered to select the parcel or parcels of land which such person was entitled to retain for himself. The legislature found that many land-owners had failed to make the reservation in time and so by the Amending Act 46 of 1957 a further period of six months from the commencement of the later Act was given for selecting the land/lands they meant to keep, and further again gave the prescribed authority power to select the parcel or parcels of land on behalf of the defaulting landholders. The intendment of the statute was that the reserved area war, to be self cultivated and so land-owners were competent to eject tenants from the reserved area, although, generally speaking, evictions had been barred. As a matter of fact, landholders were directed to start self cultivation within six months from the date of reservation or the date on which they got possession by eviction. Small holders, i.e., persons who owned less than the permissible area were not only not disturbed by the statute in regard to their ownership but were also allowed to evict tenants from their parcels of land so that they may also become self-cultivators. This process of making the proprietor cultivator naturally would result in the coexistence of possession and ownership at the cost of ejectment of tenants from their holdings. Since agrarian reform must promote not eviction of lessees but security of tenure for them it became necessary for the State to create a considerable surplus pool of lands coughed up by large owners who held beyond the permissible areas. All the tenant refugees from resumed lands were to be rehabilitated on surplus lands and such tenants, enjoying fixity of tenure ,Would continue to pay rents to the owners. Another limb of the peasant proprietorship plan was the conferment of the right to purchase the landlord's right on long-standing tenants with six years continuous occupancy. if the scheme in the book had worked well on the ground the Act would have paved the way for a new rural map of economic relations even though the problem of the landless poor may perhaps have survived. Such was the conspectus of the legislative scheme.

It is obvious that this blue-print for a peaceful transformation of agrarian relations assumes the availability of a large surplus area on which the State can settle tenants from the reserved areas and small landholders' holdings. Thus the key to the success of the scheme is the maximising of the surplus land reservoir and sealing off legal leakages 162 through private alienations, collusive orders and decrees and the like, and so care was taken to interdict alienations and ignore decrees and orders which diminished the surplus pool.

At this stage it may be useful to sketch out the broad outlines of the statute with specific reference to its provisions, and changes. The Act of 1953 had been amended often, for the professed reason, atleast once, that judicial pronouncements have had the effect of defeating the objectives with which the law was enacted. Substantial amendments were made in 1955, 1957 and 1962. The objects and reasons of Punjab Act 14 of 1962, which brought in certain significant restrictions on alienations and acquisitions of large landholders starts off in the statement of objects thus :

"Some of the recent judicial pronouncements have the effect of defeating the objectives with which the Punjab Security of land Tenures Act, 1953, was enacted and amended from time to time. It was intended that the surplus area of every land-owner recorded as such in the revenue records should be made utilisable for the settlement of ejected tenants." Certain specific decisions and their impact on the legislative operation were mentioned, and then the statement of objects proceeded :

"In order to evade the provisions of s. 10-A of the Parent Act interested persons, being relations, have obtained decrees of courts for diminishing the surplus area. Clause (4) of the Bill seeks to provide that such decrees should be ignored in computing the surplus area." We. mention this only to emphasize that the legislature has been anxious to, guard against erosion of the surplus pool by alienatory maneouvres or even decrees and orders obtained through judicial or quasi-judicial processes.

The Act defines "permissible area" "in relation to landowner or a tenant as 30 standard acres and where such 30 standard acres on being converted into ordinary acres exceed 60 acres, such 60 acres." (s. 2(3), The landlord who has a vaster extent may utilise the specific lands he wants to keep for himself and this is called "reserved area." Section 2(4) defines "reserved area" as "the area lawfully reserved under the Punjab Tenants (Security of Tenures Act) 1950 (Act XXII of 1950). as amended by President's Act of 1951,..." The area other than the reserved area, ie. the balance left over, is defined as ,surplus area". Section 2 (5-a) defines "surplus area" a concept introduced by Act XI of 1955. It is useful to extract the definition which runs thus :

"Surplus Area" means the area other than the reserved area, and, where, no area has been reserved, the area in excess of the permissible area selected under section 5-B or the area which is deemed to be surplus area under sub-section (1) of section 5-C and includes the area in excess of the permissible area selected under section 19-B, but it will not include a tenants permissible area 163 Provided that it will include the reserved area, or part thereof, where such area or part has not been brought under self-cultivation within six months of reserving the same or getting possession thereof after rejecting a tenant from it, whichever is later, or if the land-owner admits a new tenant, within three years of the expiry of the said six months".

At this stage it may be mentioned that landowner is not only entitled to self-cultivate his reserved area but is obliged to do, so within the period stipulated in the proviso to s.2(5-a) test such un-self-cultivated land become surplus area. But for fear that absentee landlords may pretend to be self-cultivating while really leasing out their lands to close relations, the statute defines "self cultivation" as cultivation by the' land-owner personally or through his wife or children or through prescribed relations. It may be noted that a son-in-law is not one of those relations (vide rule 5 of the Punjab Security of land Tenures Rules, 1956.).

Sections 5, 5-A and 5-B deal with the reservation of land by large landholders and the procedure in that behalf What is important to note is that in the present case the landholder has made her reservation and the properties in dispute fall outside it and are therefore included in the surplus area.

Immunity from eviction of tenants is conferred by s. 9 but a landlord is entitled to eject a tenant from the area reserved under this Act. However, such ejectment shall not be given effect to by way of disposession unless the displaced tenant"is accommodation surplus area in accordance with the provisions of s. 10-A or......' Of course, if the tenant is a close relation of the landlord within the prescribed category this protection does not enure to him as per the second proviso to s-9-A. It is not worthy that a son-in law is not one such relative. It is obvious that a large number of tenants would be ejected by small landholders and large landholders from their reserved areas under s. 9 of the Act. Naturally, legislative concern for their rehabilitation found expression in s. 10-A(a) which runs thus 10-A(a) The State Government or any officer empowered by it in this behalf, shall be competent to Utilize any surplus area for the resettlement of tenants ejected, or to be ejected, under clause (i) of sub-section (1) of s. 9." The success of the scheme, therefore, depends on the extent of the surplus pool. For one thing, large landholders, when deprived of their excess area, as well as small landholders, in order to be viable, have to secure actual possession of what they are eligible to keep, this being the legislative justice shown to landowners by the Act. Actual possession could follow only if the potential for re-settlement of dispossessed tenants were sufficient. That is why the legislature has jealously protected the surplus pool which plays a pivotal role in the whole programme. For this purpose s. 10-A(b) was brought in in 1955 and it reads 164 "10-A(b) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force and save in the case of land acquired by the 'State Government under any law for the time being in force or by an heir by inheritance no transfer or other disposition of land which is comprised in a surplus area at the commencement of this Act, shall affect the utilization there of in clause (a)." Plainly, there is a wide interdict against any transfer of other disposition of land comprised in the surplus area, if it will affect the utilisation thereof for the re-settlement of tenants ejected or to be ejected under cl. (i) of sub-s.

(1) of s. 9. Such a strategic provision which takes care of the surplus reservoir of land must receive a benignantly spacious construction. There can, therefore, be no doubt that the expression "transfer or other disposition of land" must definitely cover leases which, by very definition, are a species of transfer of land. It looks as if other devices were resorted to by large land-owners to defeat the surplus area scheme of s. 10-A. Courts and other authorities were approached and, through their processes, decrees and orders were secured whereby lands out of the surplus area could be salvaged by the land-owner. The legislature finding this anti-ceiling phenomenon clamped down a blanket ban on the adverse operation of "any judgment, decree or order of a court or other authority, obtained after the commencement of this Act and having the effect of diminishing" the area of a person which could have been declared a,-, his surplus area.

Section 10-A(c) may be usefully reproduced in this context.

"10-A(c) For the purposes of determining the surplus area of any person under this section, any judgment, decree or order of a court or other authority, obtained after the commencement of this Act and having the effect of diminishing the area of such person which could have been declared as his surplus area shall be ignored." It is extremely important to remember that while this provision was enacted in 1962 and while s. 10-A(b) prohibiting alienations was passed in 1955, both these provisions were given retrospective effect as from the decisive date, namely, April 15, 1953. The deep concern of the legislature is clear from all this.

Right from the beginning one of the primary objects of the statute had been to enable tenants to purchase the Landlord's right and become full owners and in this behalf was enacted S. 18 which has figured very much in the controversy in these appeals, It states :

"18(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law, usage or contract, a tenant of a landowner other than a small land-owner(i) who has been in continuous occupation of the land comprised in his tenancy for a minimum period of six years, or (ii)........

(iii).......

165 shall be entitled to purchase from the landowner the land so held by him but not included in the reserved area of the landowner, in the case of a tenant falling within clause (i) or clause (ii) at any time, and in the case of a tenant falling within clause (iii)within a period of one year from the date of commencement of this Act:

Provided that....

Provided further that.. . .

The further sub-sections of s. 18 deal with the process of purchase, the Assistant Collector being the authority empowered to order such purchase.

In the appeals before us there is an apparent competition for primacy between s. 18 and s. 10-A(b) and (c), and perhaps it may be relevant to refer to s. 23 also. This last section reads:

"No decree or order of any court or authority and no notice of ejectment shall be valid save to the extent to which it is consistent with the provisions of this Act.

As we will presently see we are called upon to reconcile the claims and contentions put forward by either side on the strength of the provisions we have just mentioned.

Let us interpret and apply the law to the facts of this case. The learned judge, Narula, J., stated at the outset:

"I have to take the fact as found by the Collector for the purposes of determining the surplus area of the landowner and consequently for determining the rights of the petitioners so far as they are sought to be interfered with by the impugned order." We agree. The same judge formulated the legal questions falling for decision in these words:

(1) Whether the expressions "transfer" or "other disposition of land" in clause (b) of section 10-A of the Act, include involuntary transfer of a part of the holding of a landowner by operation of an order forcing the landowner to sell a part of his holding to a tenant under section 18 of the Act;

(2) Whether the order of any other authority referred to in clause (c) of section 10-A of the Act includes an order of the authorities under the Act itself passed under section 18 thereof in favour of a tenant, which order has become final either at its original stage or at the appellate or revisional stage; and (3) In case of conflict between section 10-A and section 18 of the Act, which of the two provisions has supervening effect or overrides the other." We do not wholly agree with this itemisation but it is good enough to focus attention of the relevant area of legal controversy. one further point pressed in both courts may be noticed, viz., that the order of purchase of the concerned officer not having been set aside binds the other 166 authority determining the surplus area and so the question is whether one officer under the Act could ignore an order by another officer under a different provision of the Act, having regard to comity of courts and jurisdictions. As indicated already, the principal discussion in the judgment under appeal has turned on the claim to primacy of s. 18 as against s. 10-A and so it is as well that we state right now what stand we propose to take in resolving apparent conflicts in the provisions of a socially-oriented, project implementing legislation. Every such statute has a soul and an integrated personality-minor deformities may mar this unity, especially when piecemeal amendments and unskilled drafting occur. The basic judicial approach must be to discover this soul of the law and strive to harmonise the many limbs to sub serve the pervasive spirit and advance the social project of the enactment. Seeming confrontations between provisions must be resolved into a cooperative coexistence. This interpretative activism persuades us in this case to reconcile what the High Court has conceived to be a conflict between s. 10-A and s. 18.

Here, there are 3 khasra nos., two of which (nos. 265 and 343) were outstanding on tenancy with Chandu and Sri Chand at the relevant date, April 15, 1953 (which admittedly, is the date with reference to which "Permissible area", "reserved area" and "surplus area" have to be fixed). The third item, khasra no. 177, had on the relevant date been with the landowner directly. The High Court treats them as two ,categories, not without reason. What was with tenants on the relevant date may well be part of their permissible area since 'landowner' in s.2(1) includes a lessee.

Moreover, a permissible area of a tenant is excluded by definition from 'surplus area', obviously because the tenant can stabilise himself on his permissible area and it is not intended to dislodge him there from for re-settling other tenants under s. 10-A. Therefore, Narula, J., concludes:

" A survey of the above-mentioned provision of the Act leave no doubt that if Chandu and Sri Chand who were the tenants of the land now comprised in the tenancy of Amar Singh on April 15, 1953, had continued to be the tenants of that parcel of land, subsequently the land in their tenancy could not be included in the permissible area of the landowner. On the other hand it would have been the right of Chandu and Sri Chand to either get the said land declared as heir own permissible area or to exercise their right under section 18(1) of the Act by making an application under sub-section (2) thereof to purchase the said parcel of land." The learned Judge proceeds to negative the argument that the legal result is different when the sitting tenants on the relevant date have quit and new tenants have been inducted subsequently: "Surplus area and Permissible area of a landowner has to be determined in view of the situation as it existed on the 15th of April, 1953 and subsequent alienations have to be completely ignored. Though subsequent acquisitions by the landowner may in certain circumstances be included in the., surplus area as accretions, no such thing can happen in respect of that parcel of land which could not be included in the sur167 plus area of the landowner on 15th of April, 1953, which was again not with the landowner on the date when the Collector sought to determine his/her surplus area. In other words, once a piece of land is excluded from the surplus area of a landowner on account of its forming the subject matter of the holding of a tenant in occupation (who is not related to the landowner in the prohibited manner) on the 15th of April, 1953, the mere subsequent change of the holder of the tenancy will not make the tenancy premises revert to the surplus area of the landowner. It is, therefore, clear that the land comprised in Khasras Nos. 265 and 343 (subject matter of the tenancy in favour of Amar Singh) could not fall within the definition of surplus area in the hands of the landowner and Section 10-A of the Act could not apply to it." We are afraid there is a fallacy in this reasoning. It is true that a mere change in tenancy by transfer of the lease as such, as distinguished from a landlord inducting a new tenant on land the prior lease over which has been terminated and possession restored to the landlord, may not perhaps offend s.10-A although situations may arise even in such cases leading to a different conclusion. We need not investigate this possibility further. In the present case, the exclusion of the two khasras from the surplus area depends on their being part of the permissible area of Chandu and Sri Chand. To salvage the lease in his favour, Amar Singh, the new tenant, must prima facie show that this alienation does not violate s.10-A(b) which prohibits all transfers and other dispositions which diminish the surplus area of the landowner concerned. He has, therefore, to make out (a) that the demised lands do not form part of the landlord's surplus area or (b) that, as was vehemently argued but may with little legal qualms be rejected, a lease is not a 'transfer or other disposition of property'. The High Court has disposed of this latter submission with the simple but impeccable observation"that the creation of a lease is a transfer or a demise referred to in s.105 of the Transfer of Property Act admits of no doubt". The purpose of the prohibitive provision is to strike at every alienatory essay and the natural meaning of 'transfer' or other disposition of land. apart from the contextual compulsion, embraces leases. The contention that even wide words must oblige the landlord's plea for a narrow meaning, viz., absolute transfer of ownership, is beyond us to accept.

Do the lands, khasras nos. 265 and 343, because 61 outstanding leases on April 15, 1953, swim out of the surplus area ipso facto? We think not. For that they must be comprised in the permissible area of the tenant. Here we have no information placed by him who wants to prove it affirmatively that these plots lie within the permissible area of 30 standard acres, by definition of Chandu and Sri Chand. That they did not continue in possession after the Act is not disputed. If that were in possession of other lands either as owners or tenants, and such holding was 30 acres or more, it was open to them to relinquish these lands being in excess of their permissible area, in which case, not being the permissible area of the tenant and being in excess of the reserved area of the landlord, these lands would be surplus area of the landlord within the definition under s.2(5-a). In the absence of proof that the lands in dispute were comprised in the permissible area of the prior it is not possible to hold that they do not come within the 168 surplus area of the landlord, Mst. Lacchman. On the contrary, the likely inference flowing from the disappearance from the scene of Chandu and Sri Chand their failure to claim to remain as tenants or to purchase is that these were not their permissible area. It is not as if every bit of land that is with a tenant on the relevant date is his permissible area. it has to fulfill the requirement of s.2(3). No such test has been satisfied here. Nor can it be argued that even if a tenant gives up his interest in the holding the statute will haunt him with rights. 'Permissible area' is not a concept in the abstract but, as s.2(3) mentions, is 'in relation to a landowner or a tenant'. In relation to Chandu and Sri Chand no claim to permissible area or consequential rights has been set up and Amar Singh is not a transferee from them but a de novo tenant. It follows that the two khasras should be computed as part of the surplus area of Mst. Lacchman and s.10-A(b) operates to invalidate the alleged lease to Amar Singh as its clear impact is to diminish the surplus area of the landowner. He had, therefore, no right as a tenant to purchase under s. 18.

The more serious question raised turns on the effect of the purchase orders, Annexure A, on s.10-A(c). The High Court reasoned-and this was repeated before us as counsel's argument-that while it is true that for determining the surplus area of a person 'any judgment, decree or order of a court or other authority' obtained after the commencement of the Act and having the effect of diminishing his surplus area 'shall be ignored', this mandate does not apply to orders of authorities under the Act, like the Assistant Collector exercising powers under s. 18. The learned judge quotes the object of s. 10-A(c):

"In order to evade the provisions of section 10-A of the parent Act interested persons, being relations, have obtained decrees of Courts for diminishing the surplus area.

Clause 4 of the Bill seeks to provide that such decrees should be ignored in computing the surplus area." From this the Court infers that 'other authorities' in s. 10-A(c) are arbitrators or such like agencies and not authorities under the Act. It is useful to read the objects and reasons relating to the clause of a bill to illumine the idea of the law not to control its amplitude. Moreover, the purpose, as revealed in the statement of object is plain.

The legislature wanted to insure the invulnerability of the surplus pool provision to attacks, by ignoring judicial and quasi-judicial Orders of every sort. In this behalf two provisions were made namely ss. 10-A. and a. 23, primarily the former. In fact, we are concerned only with s.10-A(b) and (c).

The High Court has taken the view that s. 10-A(b) cannot affect involuntary transfers and since a purchase effected under S. 18 effects an involuntary transfer it is not hit by s. 10-A(b). The further view taken is that the expression "other authority" in s. 10-A(c) refers only to authorities other than those under the Act; the Assistant Collector who has ordered the purchase under s. 10 being outside s. 10A(c), his order cannot be ignored by the Collector on the strength of S. 10-A (c).A third point converging to the same conclusion taken by the 169 Court is that when an order under s. 18 has become final, the Collector acting under S. 10-A(c) cannot but be bound by it until it is set aside in appeal or revision or other appropriate proceedings even though the Assistant Collector's order under s. 18 was passed on a compromise between the parties.

We may now consider the soundness of these grounds separately. The object of s. 10-A(c) cannot be fulfilled unless the widest meaning were given to the expression "court or other authority". Nor is there any basis for truncating the ambit of "other authority" in the manner the High Court has done. "Other authority" is every other authority within or without the Act. The reason given by Narula, J., to exclude the officer passing orders under s. 18 from "other authorities" is that "the result would be that the benefit sought to be conferred by s. 18 on the tenants would be completely nullified and obliterated". In this connection he further observed :

"In every case, order under section 18 of the Act, would be passed after the Act came into force. If an order under section 18 has to be ignored by the operation of clause (c) of section 10-A, every order under section 18, must be ignored while declaring the permissible area of the Landowner. There is no discretion in the authorities to apply the provisions of clause (c) of s. 10-A or not to apply them. The provision is mandatory, if, therefore, clause (c) of section 10-A could be utilised for abrogating the effect of an order under section 18 of the Act, the whole scheme of the Act of distribution of land to the tenants and for conferring a right on a tenant to purchase the land within the limits of permissible area, would be flouted." Having given serious consideration to the pros and cons we are not satisfied that this argument is valid; on the contrary, if upheld it may stultify s. 10-A and the scheme of the statute altogether. Obviously, if every order of purchase sanctioned under s. 18 can successfully diminish surplus area of a landowner, a spate of such, orders would be procured by previous arrangement between the landowner and his nominee tenants or even bona fide alienees. The present case is a capital illustration of the fraud and collusion that may follow on such an interpretation.

Indeed, there is no provision in s. 18 to give notice to the Collector who is to declare the surplus area and so the State which is vitally concerned in the re-settlement of ejected tenants utilising the surplus area has no opportunity to present its case against the fraudulent character of the proceedings under s. 18 before the Assistant Collector. The State, not being a party to that order, in any case cannot be bound by it, whatever may be the effect as between the parties to those proceedings. We are concerned here with a challenge by the State to the efficacy of the order, Annexure A, and so we cannot muzzle the plea of the State that the order under s. 18 is void if there are good grounds to hold with it.

Nor is there force in the