Vijay Vardhan Dandriyal vs The State Of Uttarakhand & Others
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Uttarakhand High Court

Vijay Vardhan Dandriyal vs The State Of Uttarakhand & Others on 20 May, 2025

Author: Manoj Kumar Tiwari

Bench: Manoj Kumar Tiwari

                                               2025:UHC:4183-DB
      IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT
                      NAINITAL

             Writ Petition (M/B) No.257 of 2025

Vijay Vardhan Dandriyal                             ...Petitioner
                                 Vs.

The State of Uttarakhand & others            ... Respondents

Presence:
     Mr. Jitendra Chaudhary, learned counsel for petitioner.
     Mr. J.S. Bisht, learned Standing Counsel for State of
     Uttarakhand/respondents.

Coram:       Hon'ble Manoj Kumar Tiwari, J.
             Hon'ble Ashish Naithani, J.
JUDGMENT:

(per Hon'ble Justice Sri Manoj Kumar Tiwari)

Petitioner is an existing transport operator who was granted Stage Carriage Permit for Jhajra-Suddowala- Premnagar via Ballupur-Ghantaghar-Paradground- Survey Chowk- Ladpur-Raipur route. He is aggrieved by the resolution passed by Regional Transport Authority, Dehradun in which it was decided that in place of old polluting vikram/tempo vehicles, new vehicles with seating capacity between 8-13 persons, which meet the BS-6 norms, shall be permitted to ply on city routes within Dehradun. By the said decision, Secretary, Regional Transport Authority was authorized to issue such permits.

2. Petitioner contends that Regional Transport Authority Dehradun could have issued the permits, but it cannot delegate this power to its Secretary. According to petitioner, the power to grant permit is quasi judicial in nature, therefore, such power cannot be delegated by Regional Transport Authority to anyone, including its Secretary.

2025:UHC:4183-DB

3. By means of this writ petition, petitioner has sought the following reliefs:-

"A. To issue a writ, order or direction in the nature Certiorari, calling for the original record and pleased to quash the impugned agenda no.04

(a), (b) & (d) dated 16.10.2024 {Anneuxre No.2} issued by the respondent no.2 i.e. the RTA {Regional Transport Authority} Dehradun including its subsequent action in toto.

B. To issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus and pleased to make a declaration to the effect that the Rule 58 of Uttarakhand Motor Vehicle Rules 2011 framed by the State Government is ultra vires to the statue i.e. the Motor Vehicle Act 1988 and also against the competence of the State Government to make provision for delegation of a quashi judicial function of the RTA or STA as the case may be, to its Secretaries as provided under sub rule (i), (ii),

(iv) (v), (vi), (viii), (ix), (x) & (xi) of rule 58 of UK Motor Vehicle Rules 2011 and also against the mandate of the Constitution of India."

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon a judgment rendered by Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in the case of Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation vs. Pooja Travels, 2004 SCC Online Kar 503 for contending that power to issue contract carriage permit or stage carriage permit cannot be delegated to Secretary of Regional Transport Authority or State Transport Authority. Para 29 of the said judgment is reproduced below:-

"29. It is needless to observe that the concerned authorities have to initiate action against the erring contract carriage permit holders in accordance with law, if they violate the conditions mentioned therein. The observations and the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in the Judgment cited supra have to be strictly followed with all seriousness by all the "Contract Carriage Permit' holders. The concerned officials of the State machinery should strictly deal with such operators, if any violation in observing the

2025:UHC:4183-DB aforesaid dictum laid down by the Apex Court as well as the conditions laid down in the "contract carriage Permits" is found. The contract carriage permits cannot be treated as stage carriage permits.

However, as no specific instance is brought to the notice of this Court in these matters with regard to violation of the conditions of the "contract carriage permits" by the permit holders, no specific direction or order can be issued against any of such permit holders in these, matters.

For the foregoing reasons, and the discussion made above, the following order is made,

(i) Rules-55 and 56 of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Rules-1989 are declared as nullity in law and Ultra Vires of the Motor Vehicles Act and consequently, they are struck down.

(ii) The State Transport Authority has jurisdiction to consider and dispose of the applications for grant of "Contract Carriage Permits" and "Stage Carriage Permits"

(iii) Secretary of STA/ RTA cannot be delegated with power of issuing contract carriage/stage carriage permits and to perform the duties of RTA/ STA under Rules 55 and 56 of Karnataka Motor Vehicles Rules,

And consequently

The Resolution passed by the Karnataka State Transport Authority, Bangalore in its meeting held on 20-12-1995/21-12-1995 vide Sl. No.19 of Sub.No.25/95-96 delegating the power to its Secretary to consider the applications for grant "Contract Carriage Permits" is declared as without authority of law and consequently, the same is quashed.

(iv) The impugned orders passed by the Secretaries of Regional Transport Authority/ Karnataka State Transport Authority, granting/ renewing the "Stage Carriage Permits"/ "Contract Carriage Permits" in favour of the respondents- private operators in all these writ petitions are quashed.

(v) The private operators can operate their contract carriages after obtaining permits in accordance with law, as the existing schemes framed by the State Government do not prohibit

2025:UHC:4183-DB them to do so.

vi) The Contract Carriage Operators cannot ply their buses as stage carriages. The concerned authorities of the State Government are directed to initiate action against erring contract carriage permit holders in accordance with law, in the light of the observations made above.

(vii) However, keeping in mind, the inconvenience that would be caused to public at large and as the Respondents-private operators are operating their "Contract Carriages" since long time pursuant to the impugned orders/permits, they are permitted to operate their services for a period of three months from today subject to payment of taxes, despite the aforesaid order. The private operators- respondents are at liberty to approach the concerned Regional Transport Authority/State Transport Authority as the case may be for getting the permits afresh, in accordance with law, within four weeks from today.

(vii) In case if the applications are filed by the Respondents-private operators for grant of fresh permits, the Regional Transport Authorities or State Transport Authority as the case may be directed to dispose of those applications on merits after hearing KSRTC, within three months from today.

These Writ Petitions are disposed of accordingly."

(Emphasis Supplied.)

5. Per contra, learned State Counsel submits that State Government is entitled to frame Rules under Section 96 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the Rules in question are framed by the State under the said statutory power. He further submits that Section 68, under which State Transport Authority and Regional Transport Authority are constituted and their powers are delineated, in Sub Section 5 provides that State/Regional Transport Authority may delegate its powers to an authority or person, if authorized by the Rules made under Section 96. Thus he submits that delegation of Power of RTA to Secretary is permissible, if

2025:UHC:4183-DB the Rules so permit.

6. Sub Section 5 of Section 68 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is extracted below for ready reference:-

(5) The State Transport Authority and any Regional Transport Authority, if authorised in this behalf by rules made under section 96, may delegate such of its powers and functions to such authority or person subject to such restrictions, limitations and conditions as may be prescribed by the said rules.

7. With reference to Sub Section 5 of Section 68, learned State Counsel submits that one of the important function of State and Regional Transport Authority is to grant permits; since Section 68(5) of the Act itself permits delegation of powers of State/Regional Transport Authority to an authority, therefore, challenge thrown by petitioner to the Rules is without any substance. He submits that if the Principal Act had not permitted delegation of powers of Regional/State Transport Authority to its Secretary, then it could have been argued that delegation of powers to Secretary is impermissible, thus ultra vires the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act. He submits that it is not the case here as parent act itself permits such delegation of powers, by Rules made under Section 96. He submits that the Rules, which petitioner has challenged, were framed under Section 96, therefore, there is no infirmity in Rule 58, thus any interference in the matter would be unwarranted.

8. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S.R.S. Travels By Its Proprietor K.T. Rajashekar vs. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Workers and others reported as (2025) 3 SCC 491,

2025:UHC:4183-DB upheld validity of similar provision contained in Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation and Certain Other Law (Amendment) Act, 2003, which enabled Secretary of State Transport Authority to issue permits for contract carriages, special vehicles, tourist vehicles etc. Para 42 to 56 of the said judgment are extracted below:-

"42. The next issue before us is whether STA has the power to delegate its functions, specifically, the issuance of contract carriage, special, tourist, and temporary permits, to its Secretary. In this regard, the statutory framework provides clear guidance.

43. Section 68(5) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 states:

"68. (5) The State Transport Authority and any Regional Transport Authority, if authorized in this behalf by rules made under Section 96, may delegate such of its powers and functions to such authority or person subject to such restrictions, limitations and conditions as may be prescribed by the said rules."

This provision unambiguously confers upon STA and RTA the power to delegate its functions provided that rules are framed under Section 96 of the Act. In the present context, the delegation in question concerns the grant of permits that are not stage carriage permits.

44. This is further clarified in Rule 56(1)(d) of the KMV Rules, which reads as follows:

"56. Delegation of powers by State transport authority.- (1) The State Transport Authority may, by a general or special resolution recorded in its proceedings, delegates-

(d) its power to grant a permit other than a stage carriage permit on an application made to the Chairman or Secretary or any officer of the Motor Vehicles Department not below the rank of a Regional Transport Officer with reference to the notification issued under sub-section (2) of Section 69."

45. The language of Rule 56(1)(d) explicitly differentiates between the grant of stage carriage permits, which involve complex and inherently quasi-judicial considerations, and other types of permits that are essentially administrative in nature. The fact that only the grant of stage carriage permits is excluded from delegation

2025:UHC:4183-DB underscores the legislature's intention: routine and time-sensitive permits such as contract carriage, special, tourist, and temporary permits can be efficiently processed through delegation to a competent officer like the Secretary, thereby ensuring that administrative functions are not unduly delayed by the need for a full board's involvement.

46. The respondents argue that permit-granting is a quasi-judicial function that must be exercised solely by the composite body of STA or RTA, as such functions require deliberation by multiple high-ranking officials, ensuring that decisions are made with due consideration and dissenting opinions. They contend that delegating this power to a single officer would undermine the judicial character of the decision-making process. However, this argument does not withstand if we have a closer analysis of the statutory provisions.

47. Firstly, even if one accepts that the grant of permits has a quasi-judicial element, it is an established principle of administrative law that quasi-judicial functions may be delegated if the enabling statute expressly provides for such delegation. Here, Section 68(5) of the MV Act, coupled with the specific language of Rule 56(1)(d) of the KMV Rules makes it clear that the legislature intended for STA to delegate certain routine permit functions. The exclusion of stage carriage permits from this delegation does not imply that all permit functions are inherently non-delegable; rather, it reflects a calibrated approach that distinguishes between complex adjudicatory functions and routine administrative tasks.

48. Secondly, from a practical standpoint, STA is entrusted with a wide range of responsibilities under the Motor Vehicles Act, and its workload necessitates delegation to ensure timely service delivery. The Secretary, being a high-ranking officer with substantial expertise in transport administration, is well equipped to handle routine permit applications. The delegation mechanism is not a blank check for arbitrary decision-making; it operates within the boundaries and conditions prescribed by the enabling rules framed under Section 96 of the MV Act. This ensures that, while administrative efficiency is achieved, there remains adequate oversight and accountability through the broader STA framework.

49. Moreover, the High Court's reasoning in this regard appears to have conflated the inherent quasi-judicial nature of certain decisions with the

2025:UHC:4183-DB broader statutory power of delegation. The High Court held that because permit-granting is quasi- judicial, it cannot be delegated to a single officer. However, this view fails to recognise that delegation does not remove judicial oversight from the process. Instead, it merely streamlines routine functions that do not require the full deliberative process of STA.

50. In Newtech Promoters & Developers (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P., this Court has affirmed that even quasi-judicial functions may be delegated if the statute provides for it and if appropriate safeguards are in place. The relevant paras of this judgment are reproduced hereunder: (SCC p. 45, paras 114-16)

"114. It is a well-established principle of interpretation of law that the court should read the section in literal sense and cannot rewrite it to suit its convenience; nor does any canon of construction permit the court to read the section in such a manner as to render it to some extent otiose. Section 81 of the Act positively empowers the Authority to delegate such of its powers and functions to any member by a general or a special order with an exception to make regulations under Section 85 of the Act. As a consequence, except the power to make regulations under Section 85 of the Act, other powers and functions of the Authority, by a general or special order, if delegated to a Single Member of the Authority is indeed within the fold of Section 81 of the Act.

115. The further submission made by the learned counsel for the promoters that Section 81 of the Act empowers even delegation to any officer of the Authority or any other person, it is true that the Authority, by general or special order, can delegate any of its powers and functions to be exercised by any member or officer of the Authority or any other person but we are not examining the delegation of power to any third party. To be more specific, this Court is examining the limited question as to whether the power under Section 81 of the Act can be delegated by the Authority to any of its member to decide the complaint under Section 31 of the Act. What has been urged by the learned counsel for the promoters is hypothetical which does not arise in the facts of the case. If the

2025:UHC:4183-DB delegation is made at any point of time which is in contravention to the scheme of the Act or is not going to serve the purpose and object with which power to delegate has been mandated under Section 81 of the Act, it is always open for judicial review.

116. The further submission made by the learned counsel for the appellants that Section 81 of the Act permits the Authority to delegate such powers and functions to any member of the Authority which are mainly administrative or clerical, and cannot possibly encompass any of the core functions which are to be discharged by the Authority, the judicial functions are non- delegable, as these are the core functions of the Authority. The submission may not hold good for the reason that the power to be exercised by the Authority in deciding complaints under Section 31 of the Act is quasi-judicial in nature which is delegable provided there is a provision in the statute. As already observed, Section 81 of the Act empowers the Authority to delegate its power and functions to any of its members, by general or special order."

51. Lastly, the practical impact of not allowing delegation would be to overload STA with routine functions, potentially causing undue delays and inefficiencies in the permit-issuance process. Such delays could disrupt the balance of public transport service delivery, which the legislature clearly sought to improve by liberalising the regime for non-stage carriage permits. In this light, the delegation of routine permit-granting powers is not only legally permissible but is also necessary to meet the practical demands of an evolving transport sector.

52. In view of the above analysis, we conclude that the power of STA to delegate the issuance of contract carriage, special, tourist, and temporary permits to its Secretary is fully supported by the statutory provisions of Section 68(5) of the MV Act, and Rule 56(1)(d) of the KMV Rules, 1989. The delegation is a rational and necessary administrative measure that facilitates prompt and efficient processing of permit applications without undermining the oversight function of STA. Consequently, we reject the respondents' arguments and hold that the High Court's reasoning on the non-delegability of permit- granting power is flawed. The power to delegate,

2025:UHC:4183-DB as provided by law, remains intact, and any decision to the contrary is unsustainable in light of both legislative intent and practical necessity.

53. In view of the discussions and analysis above, we hold that:

53.1. Section 3 of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation and Certain Other Law (Amendment) Act, 2003, which repeals the Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976, is constitutional.

53.2. The State Transport Authority (STA) possesses the power to delegate its functions under Section 68(5) of the MV Act, as expressly provided by the statute and further clarified by Rule 56(1)(d) of the KMV Rules.

54. Consequently, we direct that the appeals of the respondent Corporation (KSRTC) are dismissed, while the appeals filed by the private bus operators and Karnataka State Road Transport Authority are allowed.

55. The impugned orders of the High Court that denied the delegation power of STA are set aside, and it is confirmed that the Secretary of STA is empowered to grant non-stage carriage permits (including contract carriage, special, tourist, and temporary permits) in accordance with Section 68(5) of the MV Act and Rule 56(1)(d) of the KMV Rules, subject to the limitations and conditions prescribed therein.

56. The appropriate authorities are directed to take all necessary measures to implement the above findings and ensure that the delegation of permit-granting power is exercised in a manner consistent with the statutory provisions and the objectives of efficient public transport administration. All pending applications are disposed of."

9. Now coming back to the facts of the present case.

Petitioner is plying city bus in Dehradun City. He is opposing the decision taken by Regional Transport Authority as he apprehends that his business would be affected if new vehicles are permitted within the City. Regional Transport Authority has resolved to grant temporary permits to new vehicles, which meet BS-6 Pollution norms with a view to phase out old polluting vehicles. Such temporary permits to new vehicles are yet

2025:UHC:4183-DB to be issued. Thus, no cause of action is available to the petitioner as of now, as temporary permits contemplated in the decision taken by the Regional Transport Authority have not be issued.

10. In view of the authoritative judicial pronouncement by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S.R.S. Travels (supra), this Court do not find any reason to interfere in the matter. The delegation of powers provided for in Rule 58 of the Uttarakhand Motor Vehicles Rules, 2011 is referable to Section 68(5) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, thus intra vires. In such view of the matter, the writ petition is dismissed. No order as to cost.

(Ashish Naithani, J.) (Manoj Kumar Tiwari, J.) 20.05.2025 Arti ARTI SINGH

DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND, ou=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND, 2.5.4.20=487ed955e722ba65aab55409e686c12fb83a19325e8b66890fbee418e7b69c0d, postalCode=263001, st=UTTARAKHAND, serialNumber=26DC90E00D839E3E8714131F235087D2D87E133C57E7F4A7B2E734BE2521F982, cn=ARTI SINGH Date: 2025.06.13 18:12:15 +05'30'