Ajay Kumar Verma And Another ... vs State Of Uttarakhand And Others
2021 Latest Caselaw 1603 UK

              HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND
                      AT NAINITAL
                      Writ Petition No.977 of 2021 (M/S)

Ajay Kumar Verma and another                                             .....Petitioners

                                            Vs.

State of Uttarakhand and others                                          ...Respondents


Advocate: Mr. Anand Kumar Pandey, Advocate for the petitioners.
          Mr. P.C. Bisht, Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State.
          Mr. Vipul Sharma, Advocate for respondent no.3.

Hon'ble Sharad Kumar Sharma, J.

The petitioners have come up with the case in the writ petition that they were the bhumidhar, who stood recorded over the land lying in Khasra No.403 having an area of 0.05 hectares, situated in village Dhanpur, Tehsil Rudrapur, District Udham Singh Nagar.

2. The counsel for the petitioners contends that according to the Khatauni entries, they were recorded as Shreni 1 Kashtakar, but their case in the writ petition is that the respondents way back in 1990, had taken over the land belonging to the petitioners for the purpose of construction of the motor road called as Tirathpur, Dhanpur motor road.

3. The grievance of the petitioners raised in the writ petition is that the land thus taken over in 1990, they had not been paid with any compensation and hence they have filed the present writ petition seeking a writ of mandamus, directing the respondents to award the compensation of the land to them with interest at the prevalent circle rate for the aforesaid land, which has been taken over for the said purpose by the respondents in 1990.

4. This Court is of the view that, if the cause of action, which has been agitated by the petitioners in the writ petition, is concerned particularly that as pleaded in para 9, they have referred to several representations and lastly they have submitted the representation on 30.02.2021 and hence they submitted that they were consistently pursuing the matter but no compensation was paid to them.

5. Considering the age of taking over of the land in 1990, now filing of a writ petition on 22.04.2021 after a lapse of 31 years of taking over of the land and that too by the then State of Uttar Pradesh, this Court is of the view that the writ petition is highly belated and suffers from vices of latches and also is of the considered view that in view of the judgment laid down by the High Court, which are detailed hereunder:-

1. AIR 1970 Supreme Court 470, (5 Judges) Rabindranath Bose and Ors. vs. The Union of India (UOI) and Ors. Para 36 of the judgment is quoted hereunder:-

"36. But in so far as the attack is based on the 1952 Seniority rules, it must fail on another ground. The ground being that this petition under Article 32 of the Constitution has been brought about 15 years after the 1952 Rules were promulgated and effect given to them in the Seniority List prepared on August 1, 1953. Learned counsel for the petitioners says that this Court has no discretion and cannot dismiss the petition under Article 32 on the ground that it has been brought after inordinate delay. We are unable to accept this contention. This Court by majority in M/s. Tilokchand Moti Chand's case [1969] S.C. Cas 110 held that delay can be fatal in certain circumstances. We may mention that in Laxmanappa Hanumantappa Jamkhandi v. The Union of India and Anr. Mahajan, C. J. observed as follows :

From the facts stated above it is plain that the proceedings taken under the impugned Act XXX of 1947 concluded so far as the Investigation Commission is concerned in September 1952, more than two years before this petition was presented in this Court. The assessment orders under the Income tax Act itself were made against the petitioner in November 1953.

In these circumstances, we are of the opinion that he is entitled to no relief under the provisions of Article 32 of the

Constitution. It was held by this Court in Ramjilal v. Income tax Officer, Mohindergarh that as there is a special provision in Article 265 of the Constitution that no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law, Clause (1) of Article 31 must therefore be regarded as concerned with deprivation of property otherwise than by the imposition or collection of tax, and inasmuch as the right conferred by Article 265 is not a right conferred by Part III of the Constitution, it could not be enforced under Article 32. In view of this decision it has to be held that the petition under Article 32 is not maintainable in the situation that has arisen and that even otherwise in the peculiar circumstances that have arisen, it would not be just and proper to direct the issue of any of the writs the issue of which is discretionary with this Court.

(emphasis supplied)"

2. AIR 1970 Supreme Court 769, Durga Prasad vs. The Chief Controller of Imports and Exports and others. Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the judgment are quoted hereunder:-

"6. The Appellant in this case had claimed a mandamus or a direction to the respondents to issue to the appellant import licence for art silk yarn of the value of Rs. 8,03,530.45. It is well-known that the exchange position of this country and the policy of the Government regarding international trade varies from year to year and it would be rather odd for this court to direct that an import licence be granted in the year 1968 in respect of alleged default committed by the Government in 1959 or 1962. In these matters it is essential that persons who are aggrieved by orders of the Government should approach the High Court after exhausting the remedies provided by law, rule or order with utmost expedition.

7. The learned counsel for the appellant contends that this matter involved fundamental rights and this Court atleast should not refuse to give relief on the ground of delay. But we are exercising our jurisdiction not under Article 32 but under Article 226, and as observed by Gajendragadkar, C.J., in the passage extracted above, even in the case of alleged breach of fundamental rights the matter must be left to the discretion of the High Court."

6. Mere filing of representations and then filing the writ petition that too for an inordinate period of 31 years, cannot permit the petitioners to take the benefit of latches for his own derelictions in pursuing the matter diligently at an appropriate time claiming the compensation of the land allegedly taken over by the respondents.

7. In view of the aforesaid reasoning, I do not find any merits in the writ petition. The writ petition is highly barred by latches and hence the same is accordingly, dismissed.

(Sharad Kumar Sharma, J.) 05.05.2021 Arti