Tripura High Court
M/S Biswas & Sons vs Dr. Vishal Kumar on 12 November, 2025
HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
Cont.Cas(C) No.64 of 2025
M/S Biswas & Sons,
A partnership firm,
Represented by its partners, namely:
Sri Arghajit Biswas, and Sri Subhajit Biswas,
Both are sons of Late Amiyangsu Kumar Biswas,
Carrying on business at Old Motorstand,
P.S.: East Agartala, P.O.:Agartala,
Sub-Division: Sadar, District: West Tripura.
---- Petitioner(s)
Versus
Dr. Vishal Kumar, IAS,
The District Magistrate and Collector, West Tripura,
Agartala, P.O.: Agartala, West Tripura.
----Respondent-Contemnor(s)
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Somik Deb, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Dhrubajyoti Saha, Adv.
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Saktimoy Chakraborty, Adv. General
Mr. Kohinoor N. Bhattacharyya, GA
Mrs. Pinki Chakraborty, Adv.
HON‟BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT
Order
12/11/2025
Heard Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Somik Deb assisted by
Learned Counsel, Mr. Dhrubajyoti Saha appearing on behalf of the
petitioner. Also heard Learned Advocate General, Mr. Saktimoy
Chakraborty assisted by Learned Counsel, Mrs. Pinky Chakraborty along
with Learned GA, Mr. Kohinoor N. Bhattacharyya appearing on behalf of
the respondent-contemnor.
The petitioner has filed the present contempt petition under
Section 12 read with Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
invoking the powers of this Court under Article 215 of the Constitution
of India seeking initiation of contempt proceedings against the
respondent-contemnor, District Magistrate & Collector, West Tripura,
Agartala for alleged wilful disobedience of the order dated 07.10.2025
passed by this court in IA No. 1 of 2025 arising out of WP(C) No.598 of
2025.
At the time of hearing, Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Somik
Deb appearing on behalf of the petitioner, first of all drawn the
attention of this court that by order dated 07.10.2025 this Court has
stayed the "cancellation of No Objection Certificate" dated 26.09.2025
issued by respondent-contemnor till disposal of the connected writ
petition. The said order was brought to the knowledge of the
respondent-contemnor by communication dated 09.10.2025 (Annexure-
21). But, the respondent-contemnor knowing fully well the order dated
07.10.2025 passed by this court, again initiated fresh proceeding under
Section 34 of the Disaster Management Act, 2005 and vide order dated
24.10.2025 (Annexure-36) directed the closure of the petrol pump
belonging to the petitioner, which compelled the petitioner to file the
present contempt petition before this court.
In support of his contention, Learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioner drawn the attention of this court to last paragraph of the
order dated 07.10.2025 passed by this court in IA No.1 of 2025 arising
out of WP(C) No.598 of 2025 and submitted that by the said order this
court specifically mentioned that "any action on "cancellation of No
Objection Certificate" dated 26.09.2025 issued by the respondent No.3
be stayed till disposal of the writ petition". Learned Senior Counsel
further submitted that the "cancellation of No Objection Certificate"
order dated 26.09.2025 was passed based upon the report of SDM,
Sadar dated 23.09.2025 and the report of Divisional Fire Officer, West
Division, Agartala dated 18.09.2025. So, according to the Learned
Senior Counsel, despite having full knowledge of the said order dated
07.10.2025, there was no scope on the part of the respondent-
contemnor to pass the subsequent order dated 24.10.2025 under
Section 34 of the Disaster Management Act, 2005 (Annexure-36). Thus,
it is clear that the respondent-contemnor has wilfully disobeyed the
order of this court dated 07.10.2025 passed in IA No.1 of 2025 in
WP(C) No.598 of 2025.
In support of his contention, Learned Senior Counsel further
drawn the attention of this court referring Sections 25, 26, 30 and 34 of
the Disaster Management Act, 2005 and submitted that in view of the
aforesaid provisions under Disaster Management Act 2005, the
respondent-contemnor had no authority to pass such an order. It was
further submitted that the order dated 24.10.2025 (Annexure-36)
passed by the respondent-contemnor is defective one and without
jurisdiction, as the ingredients mentioned in Section 34 of the Disaster
Management Act, 2005 do not empower the District Magistrate &
Collector to exercise such jurisdiction, particularly during the pendency
of the connected writ petition.
Furthermore, Learned Senior Counsel submitted that
without the concurrence of other members of the District Authority, as
contemplated under Section 25 of the Disaster Management Act, 2005,
the respondent-contemnor had no authority to issue such an order.
Learned Senior Counsel also drawn the attention of this court referring
the relevant provisions of Petroleum Rules, 2002 and submitted that an
order of this nature could only have been passed by the Chief Controller
or the Controller of Explosives, and not by the present respondent-
contemnor. As such, the respondent-contemnor acted beyond the
jurisdiction and violated the order of this court for which he is liable to
be punished under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 read with Article
215 of the Constitution of India.
In support of his contention, Learned Senior Counsel relied
upon one citation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in All Bengal
Excise Licensees‟ Association vs. Raghabendra Singh & Ors.,
reported in (2007) 11 SCC 374 wherein in para Nos.26 to 31, 33, 38
and 40, Hon'ble the Apex Court observed as under:
"26. This Court can only say it is rather unfortunate that
such officers who are not capable of or not able to
understand the implication of the prohibitory orders
passed by the High Court should be allowed to hold such
high offices. During the course of the hearing of the
contempt application, the matter was adjourned by the
High Court to enable the respondent to consider whether
the contemnors were prepared to cancel the lottery held
on 20-3-2005, 21-3-2005 and 22-3-2005 in violation of the
Court's orders and on such adjourned date, the
contemnors did not agree to cancel the lottery. Under such
circumstances, the plea of mistake of understanding the
order cannot at all be accepted. Likewise, the High Court
was also not justified in not directing the contemnors to
cancel the lottery held on 20-3-2005, 21-3-2005 and 22-3-
2005 in violation of the solemn orders passed by the very
same Judge and in view of the clear finding of the Court
that they had acted in clear violation of the said interim
order made by the High Court.
27. Even assuming that there was any scope for bona fide
misunderstanding on the part of the respondents, once it
was found that the respondent had disobeyed the specific
order passed earlier by the Court, the High Court should
have directed the contemnors to undo the wrong
committed by them which was done in clear breach of the
order of the Court by restoring the status quo ante by
cancelling the lottery wrongfully held by them. The
learned Judge found that the respondent contemnors had
held the lottery in violation of the Court's order and the
results of the said lottery should not be permitted to take
effect and should be treated as unlawful and invalid for
the purpose of grant of licence. The learned Single Judge
for the purpose of upholding the majesty of law and the
sanctity of the solemn order of the court of law which
cannot be violated by the executive authority either
deliberately or unwittingly should have set aside the
lottery held and should not have allowed the respondents
to gain a wrongful advantage thereby.
28. In our opinion, a party to the litigation cannot be
allowed to take an unfair advantage by committing breach
of an interim order and escape the consequences thereof.
By pleading misunderstanding and thereafter retaining the
said advantage gained in breach of the order of the Court
and the wrong perpetrated by the respondent contemnors
in contumacious disregard of the order of the High Court
should not be permitted to hold good. In our opinion, the
impugned order passed by the High Court is not
sustainable in law and should not be allowed to operate as
a precedent and the wrong perpetrated by the respondent
contemnors in utter disregard of the order of the High
Court should not be permitted to hold good.
29. The High Court has committed a grievous error of law
in holding that failure to understand the implication and
consequences of the order passed by the High Court by
highly placed government officers cannot be construed as
an act of contempt. The High Court has failed to
understand that the highly educated and highly placed
government officials have competent legal advisors and it
was not open to them to allege and contend that the
respondent contemnors did not understand the implication
of the order dated 4-1-2005. In our opinion, such officers
are required to be dealt with effectively to uphold the
dignity of the High Court and the efficiency of the system
itself.
30. The High Court committed a grave error of law by not
taking into consideration the most important fact that in
the course of the hearing of the contempt application the
matter was adjourned in order to enable the contemnor to
consider whether they were prepared to cancel the lottery
held on 20-3-2005, 21-3-2005 and 22-3-2005 and on the
adjourned date, the respondents did not agree to cancel
the lottery. In such view of the matter, the significant
stand being the plea of mistake of understanding cannot,
in our opinion, prevail. The High Court in that view of the
matter committed a grave miscarriage of justice by not
taking into consideration another most important fact that
if actually the lottery was held by mistake or by
misunderstanding of the orders, then the respondent
would have immediately rectified it and would have
cancelled the lottery but in the instant case, instead of
cancelling the lottery, the respondents have justified their
conduct from which the determined declination of obeying
the order is clearly proved. In other words, if there was a
doubt about the implication of the order of the Court, the
respondents should have approached the Court and should
have clarified their alleged confusion. But in the instant
case, the respondents have not only violated the order but
when the contempt application was moved and
opportunity was given by the Court to cancel the lottery
they refused to cancel the said lottery from which it is
proved that they deliberately held the lottery in clear
violation of the order dated 4-1-2005 having regard to the
admissions made on behalf of the contemnors that there is
violation of the order dated 4-1-2005 and also having
regard to the learned Single Judge's own finding that
"there is no doubt that the alleged contemnor disobeyed
the specific directions passed earlier by this Bench".
31. The High Court should have directed the contemnor to
cancel the lottery held on these three dates. The High
Court also failed to consider the effect of the appellant's
learned advocate's letter dated 15-3-2005 whereby it was
clearly pointed out about the subsistence of the order
dated 4-1-2005 and its subsequent extension. By the said
letter, the appellant's advocate categorically pointed out
further that in spite of the above if the lottery is held or
further action is taken for issue of excise licence, the
appellant shall be compelled to take legal action. In our
opinion, the judgment and order passed by the High Court
is bad in law and is liable to be set aside.
33. In our opinion, Respondents 1-4 had deliberately and
with mala fide motive committed contempt of the High
Court in conducting the lottery quite contrary to the order
of injunction passed by the High Court on 4-1-2005 and its
subsequent extensions. When the auction was held, the
order passed by the High Court remain operative at the
relevant time. The High Court has miserably failed in not
issuing direction to the contemnors to cancel the lottery
held on 20-3-2005, 21-3-2005 and 22-3-2005 in violation
of the solemn order passed by the High Court.
38. In the instant case, the respondents have conducted
the auction quite contrary to and in violation of an
injunction order passed by the High Court. Courts have
held in a catena of decisions that where in violation of a
restraint order or an injunction order against a party,
something has been done in disobedience, it will be the
duty of the court as a policy to set the wrong right and not
allow the perpetuation of the wrong doing. In our opinion,
the inherent power will not only be available under
Section 151 CPC, as available to us in such a case, but it is
bound to be exercised in that manner in the interest of
justice and public interest.
40. We, therefore, cancel all the auctions held on 20-3-
2005, 21-3-2005 and 22-3-2005 and direct Respondents
1-4 not to allow the successful bidders to continue the
business and shall stop them forthwith and submit a
report to this Court of strict compliance. We make it clear
that we are not expressing any opinion on the merits of
the claim made by the appellant Association in the writ
petition filed by them before the High Court which is
pending."
Referring the same, Learned Senior Counsel submitted that
the present matter is squarely covered by the aforesaid observation of
the Hon'ble Apex Court and urged for punishing the respondent-
contemnor by setting aside the impugned order dated 24.10.2025
(Annexure-36). Learned Senior Counsel further referred another citation
of the Hon'ble Apex Court in All India Regional Rural Bank Officers
Federation & Ors., reported in (2002) 3 SCC 554 wherein in para
No.4, Hon'ble the Apex Court observed as under:
"4. Mr Mukul Rohatgi, the learned Additional Solicitor-
General, however tried to impress upon us the
circumstances under which the notification had been
issued, the same being severe financial crisis and the
learned Additional Solicitor-General further urged that the
monetary benefits of the employees of the Banks will have
to be so modulated so that the Banks should not ultimately
be closed down by merely paying the salary of the
employees. Even though the financial position of the
Banks may not be disputed, but having regard to the
directions issued by this Court, while disposing of the civil
appeal and having regard to the circumstances under
which such directions had been given, it would be difficult
for us to sustain the plea of the Union Government that
the notification is in compliance with the judgment and
directions of this Court. The financial capacity of the
Government cannot be pleaded as a ground for non-
implementation of the directions of the Court inasmuch as
even in the matter of determination of the pay scale of the
employees of the Regional Rural Banks and maintenance
of parity with their counterparts, serving under the
sponsorer commercial banks, Justice Obul Reddi had not
accepted the said plea and that award reached its finality.
Since the financial capacity of the employer cannot be held
to be a germane consideration for determination of the
wage structure of the employees and Parliament enacted
the Act for bringing into existence these Regional Rural
Banks with the idea of helping the rural mass of the
country, the employees of such rural banks cannot suffer
on account of financial incapacity of the employer. We
have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the
issuance of notification dated 1-4-2001, by the
Government of India cannot be held to be in compliance
with the judgment and directions of this Court in S.M.G.
Bank [(2001) 4 SCC 101 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 669] . But at
the same time, we are of the opinion that the appropriate
authority need not be punished under the provisions of the
Contempt of Courts Act, even if the notification is in direct
contravention of the judgment of this Court, as we do not
find a case of deliberate violation. While, therefore, we do
not propose to take any action against the alleged
contemnors, we direct that the employees of the Regional
Rural Banks should be paid their current salaries on the
basis of determination made under the notification dated
11-4-2001, the new basic pay having been arrived at, as
on 1-4-2000 forthwith. Paragraph (i) of the aforesaid
notification dated 11-4-2001 should be immediately
implemented and the employees should be paid
accordingly. Paragraphs (ii) and (iii) of the notification are
quashed and the Central Government is directed to issue a
fresh notification for proper implementation of the
judgment of this Court. We make it clear that the period of
moratorium with regard to the payment of arrears, since is
going to be over on 31-3-2002, the arrear salary accruing
to the employees be paid to them in three equal annual
instalments, the first being on 30-4-2002, the second on
30-4-2003 and the third on 30-4-2004. This payment has
to be made as aforesaid without being in any way
dependent upon any other considerations and there
cannot be any distinction between the Regional Rural
Banks incurring loss and the Regional Rural Banks, making
profit. Further, the question of anticipated cash outflow on
account of increase in salary if exceeds 50% of the
operating profit, then the current payment would be
restricted only up to 50%, is absolutely of no relevance,
which was indicated in the impugned notification dated
11-4-2001. Having regard to the financial condition of the
Government as well as these Banks, the instalment to be
paid on 30-4-2002, pursuant to this order of ours, the
same may be deposited in the employees' provident fund
account. But all other instalments will have to be paid in
cash."
Referring the same, Learned Senior Counsel submitted that
the present case is also guided by the same principle of law laid down
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the afore-noted case.
Further, reference was made to another judgment passed
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in State of Orissa & Anr. vs.
Aswini Kumar Baliar Singh reported in (2006) 6 SCC 759, wherein
in para Nos.6 to 8, Hon'ble the Apex Court observed as under:
"6. Thus, no direction was issued by the High Court
against the State of Orissa. It is not in dispute that the
cause of action for filing the contempt petition arose as
the Inspector of Schools passed an order consequent upon
the government orders issued by the Government of
Orissa on or about 24-4-2000. The Inspector of Schools
was bound to give effect to the said orders. The said
government orders may be legal or illegal; but by no
stretch of imagination can it be said that the Inspector of
Schools committed contempt of court in complying with
the directions of the State of Orissa. For the purpose of
setting aside the order of the Inspector of Schools, the
government orders were required to be set aside. The said
government orders having been issued subsequent to the
order of the High Court, no direction indisputably had been
or could be issued in that behalf in the writ petition. A
contempt petition, in our opinion, thus, was not
maintainable.
7. Furthermore, as noticed hereinbefore, the respondent
had already initiated a proceeding before the State
Administrative Tribunal questioning the legality of the said
action on the part of the State of Orissa. The High Court in
relation thereto did not have the jurisdiction, as an
appropriate proceeding was required to be initiated before
the Tribunal at the first instance in view of the judgment
of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India
[(1997) 3 SCC 261 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 577 : AIR 1997 SC
1125] . The contemnors, in any event, have not been
impleaded as parties in their personal capacity. In the
contempt petition only the Director of Secondary
Education and the Inspector of Schools were impleaded as
parties in their official capacity. Even the State of Orissa
was not impleaded as a party respondent therein.
8. The learned counsel, however, may be correct in
contending that while exercising its contempt jurisdiction,
the High Court may, in a given case, issue appropriate
direction, although no penal action is taken against the
contemnors. But, even in respect thereof, a finding would
be required to be arrived at to the effect that the
contemnors have disobeyed the order of the Court. Only
when such a finding is arrived at, the Court may in
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction put the parties to the
same position as if its order was not violated."
Referring the same, Learned Senior Counsel has drawn the
attention of this court that even in contempt proceeding, the Court may
pass appropriate direction without taking any penal action against the
contemnor.
Learned Senior Counsel thereafter referred another citation
of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Delhi Development Authority vs.
Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd. & Anr., reported in (1996) 4 SCC
622, wherein in para Nos.17 to 23, Hon'ble the Apex Court observed as
under:
"The contemner should not be allowed to enjoy or retain
the fruits of his contempt
17. The principle that a contemner ought not to be
permitted to enjoy and/or keep the fruits of his contempt
is well settled. In Mohd. Idris v. Rustam Jehangir Babuji
[(1984) 4 SCC 216 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 587 : (1985) 1 SCR
598] this Court held clearly that undergoing the
punishment for contempt does not mean that the court is
not entitled to give appropriate directions for remedying
and rectifying the things done in violation of its orders.
The petitioners therein had given an undertaking to the
Bombay High Court. They acted in breach of it. A learned
Single Judge held them guilty of contempt and imposed a
sentence of one month's imprisonment. In addition
thereto, the learned Single Judge made appropriate
directions to remedy the breach of undertaking. It was
contended before this Court that the learned Judge was
not justified in giving the aforesaid directions in addition
to punishing the petitioners for contempt of court. The
argument was rejected holding that "the Single Judge was
quite right in giving appropriate directions to close the
breach (of undertaking)".
18. The above principle has been applied even in the case
of violation of orders of injunction issued by civil courts.
In Clarke v. Chadburn [(1985) 1 All ER 211] Sir Robert
Megarry V-C observed:
"I need not cite authority for the proposition that it
is of high importance that orders of the court
should be obeyed. Wilful disobedience to an order
of the court is punishable as a contempt of court,
and I feel no doubt that such disobedience may
properly be described as being illegal. If by such
disobedience the persons enjoined claim that they
have validly effected some charge in the rights and
liabilities of others, I cannot see why it should be
said that although they are liable to penalties for
contempt of court for doing what they did,
nevertheless those acts were validly done. Of
course, if an act is done, it is not undone merely by
pointing out that it was done in breach of the law.
If a meeting is held in breach of an injunction, it
cannot be said that the meeting has not been held.
But the legal consequences of what has been done
in breach of the law may plainly be very much
affected by the illegality. It seems to me on
principle that those who defy a prohibition ought
not to be able to claim that the fruits of their
defiance are good, and not tainted by the illegality
that produced them."
19. To the same effect are the decisions of the Madras and
Calcutta High Courts in Century Flour Mills Ltd. v. S.
Suppiah [AIR 1975 Mad 270 : (1975) 2 MLJ 54] and Sujit
Pal v. Prabir Kumar Sun [AIR 1986 Cal 220 : (1986) 90
CWN 342] . In Century Flour Mills Ltd. [AIR 1975 Mad 270
: (1975) 2 MLJ 54] it was held by a Full Bench of the
Madras High Court that where an act is done in violation of
an order of stay or injunction, it is the duty of the court, as
a policy, to set the wrong right and not allow the
perpetuation of the wrongdoing. The inherent power of the
court, it was held, is not only available in such a case, but
it is bound to exercise it to undo the wrong in the interest
of justice. That was a case where a meeting was held
contrary to an order of injunction. The Court refused to
recognise that the holding of the meeting is a legal one. It
put back the parties in the same position as they stood
immediately prior to the service of the interim order.
20. In Sujit Pal [AIR 1986 Cal 220 : (1986) 90 CWN 342] a
Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court has taken the
same view. There, the defendant forcibly dispossessed the
plaintiff in violation of the order of injunction and took
possession of the property. The Court directed the
restoration of possession to the plaintiff with the aid of
police. The Court observed that no technicality can prevent
the court from doing justice in exercise of its inherent
powers. It held that the object of Rule 2-A of Order 39 will
be fulfilled only where such mandatory direction is given
for restoration of possession to the aggrieved party. This
was necessary, it observed, to prevent the abuse of
process of law.
21. There is no doubt that this salutary rule has to be
applied and given effect to by this Court, if necessary, by
overruling any procedural or other technical objections.
Article 129 is a constitutional power and when exercised
in tandem with Article 142, all such objections should give
way. The court must ensure full justice between the
parties before it.
Claims of Prabhjot Singh and Prabhjit Singh (sons of
Tejwant Singh)
22. Prabhjot Singh Sabharwal, third respondent, stated in
his counter-affidavit filed in Interlocutory Application No.
29 of 1996 that he is in no way concerned with the several
companies pointed out by the DDA (as belonging to
Tejwant Singh and members of his family) and that he is
interested only in one company, Technological Park
Private Limited, NOIDA. He stated that he and his wife are
the directors of this company and that it does not deal in
any manner with the Delhi Development Authority. He
stated that his parents are in no way concerned with
Technological Park Private Limited. He stated "I have
separated from my father and I have no dealings with the
Delhi Development Authority". It is significant to notice
that this respondent does not say when was he separated
from his father, whether the said „separation‟ is evidenced
by writing, nor has he stated that the said separation -- or
partition, as it may be called -- was reported to the
Income Tax authorities and was accepted and recorded by
them. The affidavit is quite vague in this respect.
23. Prabhjit Singh, fourth respondent, (another son of
Tejwant Singh) has filed a separate counter-affidavit
stating that he and his wife are the directors in two
companies, Tej Properties Private Limited and Skipper
Properties Private Limited. Tej Properties is said to be an
investment company which is not carrying on any activity
at present. Skipper Properties is said to be running in a
loss. He stated that he has no connection with the other
companies pointed out by the DDA. He admitted the
transaction relating to the property at No. 3, Aurangzeb
Road, New Delhi but submitted that he is in no way
connected with the affairs of his father or with Skipper
Construction Private Limited. It is significant to notice that
this respondent does not say that he is separated or
divided from his father nor does he explain how he and his
wife became directors of Tej Properties of which his
parents were the sole directors at the time of grant of the
aforementioned lease."
Citing the above references, Learned Senior Counsel
submitted that since the respondent-contemnor has wilfully disobeyed
the order of this court, so, appropriate order be passed by this court
setting aside the order dated 24.10.2025 (Annexure-36) which is under
challenge.
Lastly, Learned Senior Counsel, referred the citation of
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Ramchandra Keshav Adke (Dead)
by Lrs. & Ors. vs. Govind Joti Chavare & Ors., reported in AIR
1975 SC 915, wherein in para Nos.24 and 25, Hon'ble the Apex Court
observed as under:
"24. Next point to be considered is, what is the
consequence of non-compliance with this mandatory
procedure?
25. A century ago, in Taylor v. Taylor [(1876) 1 Ch D 426]
Jassel, M.R. adopted the rule that where a power is given
to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be
done in that way or not at all and that other methods of
performance are necessarily forbidden. This rule has stood
the test of time. It was applied by the Privy Council, in
Nazir Ahmed v. Emperor [AIR 1936 PC 253 : LR 63 IA 372]
and later by this Court in several cases [Shiv Bahadur
Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 322 : AIR 1954 SC
1098 : 1954 SCR 1098 : 1954 Cri LJ 910; Deep Chand v.
State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 1527 : (1962) 1 SCR 662 :
(1961) 2 Cri LJ 705] , to a Magistrate making a record
under Sections 164 and 364 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1898. This rule squarely applies "where,
indeed, the whole aim and object of the legislature would
be plainly defeated if the command to do the thing in a
particular manner did not imply a prohibition to do it in
any other." [Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes, 11th
Edn., pp. 362-63] The rule will be attracted with full force
in the present case, because non-verification of the
surrender in the requisite manner would frustrate the very
purpose of this provision. Intention of the legislature to
prohibit the verification of the surrender in a manner other
than the one prescribed, is implied in these provisions.
Failure to comply with these mandatory provisions,
therefore, had vitiated the surrender and rendered it non
est for the purpose of Section 5(3)(b)."
Referring the same, Learned Senior Counsel drawn the
attention of this court that the present matter is also covered by the
principle of law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the
afore-noted case.
Finally, Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the order
dated 07.10.2025 passed by this Court in IA No.1 of2025 in WP(C)
No.598 of 2025 has neither been challenged by the respondent-
contemnor nor any prayer is made before this court for vacating the
said order and the same still stands good. It is further submitted that
during the pendency of the connected writ petition, such action on the
part of the respondent-contemnor shows that the same was pre-
planned with a view to harass the petitioner. According to Learned
Senior Counsel, if at this stage the subsequent action of the
respondent-contemnor is not stayed, then the very purpose of the writ
petition would be frustrated. Further, as mentioned under Section 2(b)
of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, the respondent-contemnor be held
responsible and punished for wilful disobedience of the said order dated
07.10.2025. Learned Senior Counsel finally urged for setting aside the
order dated 24.10.2025 (Annexure-36) passed by the said respondent-
contemnor as the same is in total violation and disregard of the order
dated 07.10.2025 passed by this Court in IA No.1 of 2025 in WP(C)
No.598 of 2025.
On the other hand, Learned Advocate General, Mr. S.M.
Chakraborty appearing on behalf of the respondent-contemnor, first of
all, drawn the attention of this Court that, admittedly, the respondent-
contemnor neither challenged the order dated 07.10.2025 passed by
this Court nor he disobeyed the said order. Learned Advocate General
vehemently opposed the submission made by Learned Senior Counsel,
Mr. Somik Deb appearing on behalf of the petitioner and submitted that
the present contempt proceeding is not maintainable because the facts
alleged in this petition constitutes a new cause of action, and for that
this Court has got no authority to pass any mandamus in view of
Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Further, there is also
scope for filing separate writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India or amendment of the writ petition. In support of
his contention, Learned Advocate General, Mr. S.M. Chakraborty drawn
the attention of this Court to the definition of "civil contempt" as
mentioned in Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which
provides as under:
"2.(b) "civil contempt" means wilful disobedience to any
judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of
a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a
court."
Referring the same, Learned Advocate General admitted
that there was no "wilful disobedience" of the order of this Court by the
respondent-contemnor by issuing order dated 24.10.2025 (Annexure-
36), and as such, Learned Advocate General urged for dismissal of this
contempt petition.
Learned Advocate General further submitted that the
subsequent action of the respondent-contemnor was in no way
connected with the earlier matter which is subjudiced before this court
and in that matter, this court has already granted stay and the present
matter constitute a new cause of action. Learned Advocate General
further submitted that for the new cause of action, the petitioner
without filing any separate writ petition cannot take the benefit of this
Court by invoking the jurisdiction under Section 12 of the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971. According to Learned Advocate General separate
proceeding was initiated by the respondent-contemnor for maintaining
public safety. Learned Advocate General further submitted that for the
sake of personal interest, administration cannot sit idle.
In support of his contention, Learned Advocate General
drawn the attention of this court referring one citation of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court of India in A.K. Jayaprakash (Dead) through Lrs.
vs. S.S. Mallikarjuna Rao & Anr., reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC
1732 wherein in para No.19, Hon'ble the Apex Court observed as
under:
"19. Insofar as the claim for pension is concerned, it is
evident that no such relief was ever sought in the Civil
Appeal Nos. 6732-6733 of 2009 or any other earlier
proceedings or submissions moved by the Petitioner, nor
was there any adjudication to the said effect by the courts
below. Contempt jurisdiction is not a forum for asserting
new claims or seeking substantive reliefs which were
neither raised nor granted earlier. In Jhareswar Prasad
Paul v. Tarak Nath Ganguly, (2002) 5 SCC 352, this Court
held that contempt proceedings cannot be used to
circumvent proper adjudication mechanisms. Accordingly,
the prayer for pension cannot be entertained at this
stage."
Referring the same, Learned Advocate General submitted
that contempt jurisdiction is not a forum for asserting new claims or
seeking substantive reliefs which were neither raised nor granted earlier
and the contempt proceeding cannot be used to circumvent proper
adjudication mechanism. So, the present contempt proceeding is not
maintainable and liable to be dismissed.
Learned Advocate General further referred another citation
of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India reported in (2019) 18 SCC 150
[titled as K. Arumugam vs. V. Balakrishnan & Ors.] wherein in
para Nos.18 and 19 Hon'ble the Apex Court observed as under:
"18. In the contempt jurisdiction, the court has to confine
itself to the four corners of the order alleged to have been
disobeyed. Observing that in the contempt jurisdiction, the
court cannot travel beyond the four corners of the order
which is alleged to have been floated, in Sudhir Vasudeva
v. M. George Ravishekaran [Sudhir Vasudeva v. M. George
Ravishekaran, (2014) 3 SCC 373] , speaking for the Bench,
Ranjan Gogoi, J., held as under : (SCC pp. 381-82, para 19)
"19. The power vested in the High Courts as well
as this Court to punish for contempt is a special
and rare power available both under the
Constitution as well as the Contempt of Courts Act,
1971. It is a drastic power which, if misdirected,
could even curb the liberty of the individual
charged with commission of contempt. The very
nature of the power casts a sacred duty in the
courts to exercise the same with the greatest of
care and caution. This is also necessary as, more
often than not, adjudication of a contempt plea
involves a process of self-determination of the
sweep, meaning and effect of the order in respect
of which disobedience is alleged. The courts must
not, therefore, travel beyond the four corners of
the order which is alleged to have been flouted or
enter into questions that have not been dealt with
or decided in the judgment or the order violation of
which is alleged. Only such directions which are
explicit in a judgment or order or are plainly self-
evident ought to be taken into account for the
purpose of consideration as to whether there has
been any disobedience or wilful violation of the
same. Decided issues cannot be reopened; nor can
the plea of equities be considered. The courts must
also ensure that while considering a contempt plea
the power available to the Court in other corrective
jurisdictions like review or appeal is not trenched
upon. No order or direction supplemental to what
has been already expressed should be issued by
the Court while exercising jurisdiction in the
domain of the contempt law; such an exercise is
more appropriate in other jurisdictions vested in
the Court, as noticed above. The above principles
would appear to be the cumulative outcome of the
precedents cited at the Bar, namely, Jhareswar
Prasad Paul v. Tarak Nath Ganguly [Jhareswar
Prasad Paul v. Tarak Nath Ganguly, (2002) 5 SCC
352 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 703] , V.M. Manohar
Prasadv. N. Ratnam Raju [V.M. Manohar Prasad v.
N. Ratnam Raju, (2004) 13 SCC 610 : 2006 SCC
(L&S) 907] , Bihar Finance Service House
Construction Coop. Society Ltd. v. Gautam
Goswami [Bihar Finance Service House
Construction Coop. Society Ltd. v. Gautam
Goswami, (2008) 5 SCC 339] and Union of India v.
Subedar Devassy PV [Union of India v. Subedar
Devassy PV, (2006) 1 SCC 613] ."
(emphasis supplied)
19. Applying the above principles to the present case, it is
clear that the Single Judge fell in error in entertaining the
contempt petition and further erred in directing the TWAD
Board to pay compensation @ Rs 600 per square foot
which works out to more than Rs 4,00,00,000. It is public
money and having implications on the public exchequer,
the public money cannot be allowed to be taken away by
an individual by filing contempt petition thereby arm-
twisting the authorities. The order passed by the learned
Single Judge affirmed by the Division Bench is ex facie
erroneous and liable to be set aside."
Referring the same, Learned Advocate General submitted
that in a contempt proceeding, the Court has to confine itself to the four
corners of the order alleged to have been disobeyed. But, here in the
case at hand, the subsequent order passed by the respondent-
contemnor was not connected to the earlier order and it had no nexus
with the earlier order for disobeying the order of this court and as such,
the present contempt proceeding is not maintainable.
Reference was further made to another citation of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India reported in (2019) 8 SCC 280 [titled
as Ashok Kumar & Ors. vs. Depinder Singh Dhesi & Ors.], wherein
in para No.17, Hon'ble the Apex Court observed as under:
"17. Mr Maninder Singh, learned Senior Advocate, was,
therefore completely justified in relying upon the following
observations passed by this Court in J.S. Parihar v. Ganpat
Duggar [J.S. Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar, (1996) 6 SCC 291 :
1996 SCC (L&S) 1422] : (SCC pp. 293-94, para 6)
"6. The question then is whether the Division
Bench was right in setting aside the direction
issued by the learned Single Judge to redraw the
seniority list. It is contended by Mr S.K. Jain, the
learned counsel appearing for the appellant, that
unless the learned Judge goes into the correctness
of the decision taken by the Government in
preparation of the seniority list in the light of the
law laid down by three Benches, the learned Judge
cannot come to a conclusion whether or not the
respondent had wilfully or deliberately disobeyed
the orders of the court as defined under Section
2(b) of the Act. Therefore, the learned Single
Judge of the High Court necessarily has to go into
the merits of that question. We do not find that the
contention is well founded. It is seen that,
admittedly, the respondents had prepared the
seniority list on 2-7-1991. Subsequently
promotions came to be made. The question is
whether seniority list is open to review in the
contempt proceedings to find out whether it is in
conformity with the directions issued by the earlier
Benches. It is seen that once there is an order
passed by the Government on the basis of the
directions issued by the court, there arises a fresh
cause of action to seek redressal in an appropriate
forum. The preparation of the seniority list may be
wrong or may be right or may or may not be in
conformity with the directions. But that would be a
fresh cause of action for the aggrieved party to
avail of the opportunity of judicial review. But that
cannot be considered to be the wilful violation of
the order. After re-exercising the judicial review in
contempt proceedings, a fresh direction by the
learned Single Judge cannot be given to redraw the
seniority list. In other words, the learned Judge
was exercising the jurisdiction to consider the
matter on merits in the contempt proceedings. It
would not be permissible under Section 12 of the
Act. Therefore, the Division Bench has exercised
the power under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High
Court Ordinance being a judgment or order of the
Single Judge; the Division Bench corrected the
mistake committed by the learned Single Judge.
Therefore, it may not be necessary for the State to
file an appeal in this Court against the judgment of
the learned Single Judge when the matter was
already seized of the Division Bench."
Referring the same, Learned Advocate General submitted
that the matter is squarely covered by the said observation of the
Hon'ble Apex Court.
Again, Learned Advocate General referred another
citation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Jhareswar Prasad
Paul & Anr. vs. Tarak Nath Ganguly & Ors., reported in (2002) 5
SCC 352 wherein in para Nos. 11 and 12, Hon'ble the Apex Court
observed as under:
"11. The purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the
majesty and dignity of the courts of law, since the respect
and authority commanded by the courts of law are the
greatest guarantee to an ordinary citizen and the
democratic fabric of society will suffer if respect for the
judiciary is undermined. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
has been introduced under the statute for the purpose of
securing the feeling of confidence of the people in general
for true and proper administration of justice in the
country. The power to punish for contempt of court is a
special power vested under the Constitution in the courts
of record and also under the statute. The power is special
and needs to be exercised with care and caution. It should
be used sparingly by the courts on being satisfied
regarding the true effect of contemptuous conduct. It is to
be kept in mind that the court exercising the jurisdiction
to punish for contempt does not function as an original or
appellate court for determination of the disputes between
the parties. The contempt jurisdiction should be confined
to the question whether there has been any deliberate
disobedience of the order of the court and if the conduct of
the party who is alleged to have committed such
disobedience is contumacious. The court exercising
contempt jurisdiction is not entitled to enter into
questions which have not been dealt with and decided in
the judgment or order, violation of which is alleged by the
applicant. The court has to consider the direction issued in
the judgment or order and not to consider the question as
to what the judgment or order should have contained. At
the cost of repetition, be it stated here that the court
exercising contempt jurisdiction is primarily concerned
with the question of contumacious conduct of the party,
which is alleged to have committed deliberate default in
complying with the directions in the judgment or order. If
the judgment or order does not contain any specific
direction regarding a matter or if there is any ambiguity in
the directions issued therein then it will be better to direct
the parties to approach the court which disposed of the
matter for clarification of the order instead of the court
exercising contempt jurisdiction taking upon itself the
power to decide the original proceeding in a manner not
dealt with by the court passing the judgment or order. If
this limitation is borne in mind then criticisms which are
sometimes levelled against the courts exercising contempt
of court jurisdiction "that it has exceeded its powers in
granting substantive relief and issuing a direction
regarding the same without proper adjudication of the
dispute" in its entirety can be avoided. This will also avoid
multiplicity of proceedings because the party which is
prejudicially affected by the judgment or order passed in
the contempt proceeding and granting relief and issuing
fresh directions is likely to challenge that order and that
may give rise to another round of litigation arising from a
proceeding which is intended to maintain the majesty and
image of courts.
12. Judging the case in hand on the touchstone of the
principles noted above, we find that the directions issued
by the Division Bench in the impugned judgment in effect
granted substantive reliefs not covered by the
judgment/order passed in the original proceeding. In the
judgment, no direction was issued by the High Court that
the writ petitioners will be admitted to the cadre of Upper
Division Clerks/Assistants in the Directorate. As noted
earlier, they have all along been holding the posts of
Clerk-cum-Cash Collector which are ex cadre posts. Entry
of such persons into the cadre of Upper Division
Clerks/Assistants has to be considered taking into account
various aspects of the matter. It is one thing to say that
the benefits under the government order may be extended
to the writ petitioners also and extending benefits of the
government order to the writ petitioners is one thing and
directing their entry into the existing cadre of Office
Assistants is a different thing. Such a dispute can only be
determined on consideration of all relevant aspects of the
matter and cannot be and should not be ordered in the
summary proceeding for taking action for contempt of
court. If the High Court felt that the grievance of the writ
petitioners relating to the question of their entry into the
cadre of Upper Division Clerks/Assistants has not been
dealt with by the Court and specific direction has not been
issued while disposing of the writ petitions/appeals then
the appropriate course was to leave it to the parties (writ
petitioners) to agitate the matter before the competent
forum. Further the question of entry of holders of ex cadre
posts, like the writ petitioners, into an existing cadre is a
matter of policy which the Government has to decide. Be it
noted here that on consideration of the matter the High
Court held that no action for contempt of court need be
taken against the respondents in the writ petition for
deliberate disobedience of the judgment or order passed
by the High Court. Thereafter it was not open to the court
to pass any order granting substantive relief to the
applicants (writ petitioners) on the plea that the question
raised was also a part of their grievance in the writ
petition."
Referring the same, Learned Advocate General submitted
that in a contempt jurisdiction, the court has to consider the direction
issued in the judgment or order and not to consider the question as to
what the judgment or order should have contained. Here, in the case at
hand, the action of the respondent-contemnor does not attract any
wilful disobedience of the order of this court and, as such, the present
contempt petition is not maintainable.
Lastly, Learned Advocate General referred another
citation of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2014) 3 SCC 373
[titled as Sudhir Vasudeva, Chairman & Managing Director, Oil &
Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. & Ors. vs. M. George Ravishekaran
& Ors.], wherein in para No. 19, Hon'ble the Apex Court observed as
under:
"19. The power vested in the High Courts as well as this
Court to punish for contempt is a special and rare power
available both under the Constitution as well as the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It is a drastic power which,
if misdirected, could even curb the liberty of the individual
charged with commission of contempt. The very nature of
the power casts a sacred duty in the Courts to exercise the
same with the greatest of care and caution. This is also
necessary as, more often than not, adjudication of a
contempt plea involves a process of self-determination of
the sweep, meaning and effect of the order in respect of
which disobedience is alleged. The Courts must not,
therefore, travel beyond the four corners of the order
which is alleged to have been flouted or enter into
questions that have not been dealt with or decided in the
judgment or the order violation of which is alleged. Only
such directions which are explicit in a judgment or order
or are plainly self-evident ought to be taken into account
for the purpose of consideration as to whether there has
been any disobedience or wilful violation of the same.
Decided issues cannot be reopened; nor can the plea of
equities be considered. The Courts must also ensure that
while considering a contempt plea the power available to
the Court in other corrective jurisdictions like review or
appeal is not trenched upon. No order or direction
supplemental to what has been already expressed should
be issued by the Court while exercising jurisdiction in the
domain of the contempt law; such an exercise is more
appropriate in other jurisdictions vested in the Court, as
noticed above. The above principles would appear to be
the cumulative outcome of the precedents cited at the Bar,
namely, Jhareswar Prasad Paul v. Tarak Nath Ganguly
[(2002) 5 SCC 352 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 703] , V.M. Manohar
Prasad v. N. Ratnam Raju [(2004) 13 SCC 610 : 2006 SCC
(L&S) 907], Bihar Finance Service House
ConstructionCoop. Society Ltd. v. Gautam Goswami
[(2008) 5 SCC 339] and Union of India v. Subedar Devassy
PV [(2006) 1 SCC 613]."
Referring the same, Learned Advocate General submitted
that the Court must not travel beyond the four corners of the order
which is alleged to have been flouted or enter into question that have
not been dealt with or decided in the judgment or the order violation of
which is alleged.
Learned Advocate General further submitted that no order
or direction supplemental to what has been already expressed should be
issued by the Court while exercising jurisdiction in the domain of the
contempt law; such an exercise is more appropriate in other
jurisdictions vested in the Court. Learned Advocate General also
submitted that without seeking any specific relief on the subsequent
action, by filing separate petition, there is no scope on the part of the
petitioner to get any redress for quashing/setting aside the order dated
24.10.2025 (Annexure-36) issued by the respondent-contemnor and
urged for dismissal of this content petition.
I have given anxious hearing of both the sides.
Here, in the instant matter, at this stage, it is to be decided
whether the order dated 24.10.2025 (Annexure-36) attracts wilful civil
contempt as mentioned in Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act,
1971?
For the sake of convenience, I would like to mention
hereinbelow the last part of the order dated 07.10.2025 passed by this
Court in IA No. 1 of 2025 in WP(C) No.598 of 2025:
"Situated thus, in the considered opinion of this Court, the
petitioner has got a good prima facie case and accordingly,
any action on "cancellation of No Objection Certificate"
dated 26.09.2025 issued by the respondent No.3 be stayed
till disposal of the writ petition."
For the sake of brevity, I have also seen the order dated
26.09.2025 (Annexure-6) passed by the District Magistrate & Collector.
The said order was passed based upon the report of SDM, Sadar dated
23.09.2025 and the report of Divisional Fire Officer, West Division,
Agartala dated 18.09.2025 which has been stayed by this Court by
order dated 07.10.2025 till disposal of the writ petition.
The said order dated 07.10.2025 was brought to the
knowledge of the respondent-contemnor by submitting one written
communication dated 09.10.2025 (Annexure-21), which was received
by the office of the respondent-contemnor on that day itself. Thus, it
appears that on 09.10.2025, the respondent-contemnor had full
knowledge about the order dated 07.10.2025.
The respondent-contemnor in this contempt proceeding has
filed one counter affidavit. In the last part of para No.19 of the counter
affidavit, the respondent-contemnor submitted that "However, after
passing of interim order dated 07/10/2025 in IA I OF 2025 ARISING
OUT OF WP(C) 598 of 2025, the Respondent-contemnor has not
proceeded in the strictest sense of the order, as the Respondent-
contemnor holds each and every order and direction of this Hon'ble
Court at highest esteem".
However, surprisingly, the respondent-contemnor has
issued one show-cause notice upon the present petitioner on
09.10.2025 (Annexure-25), on the basis of the report of Divisional Fire
Officer, West Division, Agartala dated 18.09.2025, which was taken into
consideration in the order dated 07.10.2025 passed by this court. The
respondent-contemnor, knowing fully the order of this Court, again
proceeded to take further action against the petitioner adopting other
methods. After receiving the show-cause notice, reply was submitted by
the petitioner to the respondent-contemnor on 13.10.2025. Again, on
14.10.2025 (Annexure-29) an order was passed by the respondent-
contemnor under Section 30 of the Disaster Management Act, 2005
wherein it was mentioned that the report of the Divisional Fire Officer
dated 18.09.2025 has been challenged by the petitioner, meaning
thereby, on 14.10.2025, at the time of issuing order by District
Magistrate & Collector, it was within his knowledge that this Court has
stayed the order dated 26.09.2025 (Annexure-6) where the
aforementioned report dated 18.09.2025 was taken into consideration.
The respondent-contemnor, having full knowledge directed the
Divisional Fire Officer (for short, DFO) to further submit detailed enquiry
report on 16.10.2025. Accordingly, the DFO submitted report on
16.10.2025 and thereafter on 17.10.2025 (Annexure-31), the
respondent-contemnor again issued another notice upon the petitioner
to appear for hearing on 22.10.2025 on this subject under Section 30 of
the Disaster Management Act, 2005.
Reply was submitted by the petitioner and on 24.10.2025
(Annexure-34) another order under Section 152 of BNSS, 2023 was
issued by the respondent-contemnor against the petitioner fixing
03.11.2025 for hearing. More interestingly, on the same day i.e. on
24.10.2025, the respondent-contemnor has passed the impugned order
under Section 34 of the District Management Act, 2005 (Annexure-36)
directing closure of the petrol pump belonging to the petitioner, which
shows that the respondent-contemnor bypassing the earlier order dated
07.10.2025 passed by this Court in IA No.1 of 2025 in WP(C) No.598 of
2025 wilfully disobeyed the said order on the same subject matter
invoking separate jurisdiction, which shows arbitrariness on the part of
the respondent-contemnor. Furthermore, the order passed by the
respondent-contemnor was in excess of the jurisdiction and beyond the
statutory provisions prescribed under Disaster Management Act, 2005.
Even, the alleged complaint was not supported by any signature of any
persons. As such, question arises as to how the respondent-contemnor
proceeded on such a complaint and initiated further mala fide action.
However, it is pertinent to mention herein that similar
matters in issues have already been dealt with by this Court in an
earlier writ petition bearing No.WP(C) No.206 of 2011 filed by the
petitioner, which has attained finality as per order dated 09.09.2016.
So, after hearing elaborate arguments of both the sides and
also after carefully going through the citations referred by Learned
Counsels of both the parties, it appears to this Court that the citations
referred by Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner are applicable to
the subject matter in issue. By his subsequent action, the respondent-
contemnor has violated the order passed by this court on 07.10.2025 in
the connected IA during pendency of the connected writ petition
thereby attracting civil contempt as defined under Section 2(b) of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
In the result, the respondent-contemnor is found guilty of
wilful disobedience of the order dated 07.10.2025 passed by this Court
in IA No.1 of 2025 in WP(C) No.598 of 2025. Accordingly, for having
committed such wilful disobedience of the said order, the subsequent
order dated 24.10.2025 (Annexure-36) issued by the respondent-
contemnor is held to be illegal and without jurisdiction and thereby,
stands quashed/set aside.
However, considering the facts and circumstances of the
case, the respondent-contemnor is asked to pay a cost of Rs. 2,000/- to
the petitioner within a period of 15 days from today.
With this observation, the present contempt petition stands
disposed of.
Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed.
JUDGE
Snigdha
AMRITA Digitally signed
by AMRITA DEB
DEB Date: 2025.11.13
16:10:23 +05'30'
