charges(Annexure-B to the writ petition).
After receipt of the written statement, the respondents
started inquiry against the petitioner on the basis of article of charges
framed against him wherein both the parties adduced their evidences
and finally the Inquiring Officer submitted report. According to the
petitioner, no inquiry report was supplied to him. It was also
submitted that in the month of January, 2022 the respondents issued
a promotional list to the junior of the petitioner depriving him from
getting promotion in his department as he was a senior employee of
the department and due to pendency of the departmental proceeding
case No.59/2014, the petitioner was not given promotion in the post
of "Ranger". The departmental proceeding was initiated in the year
2014 but even after elapsing of 10 years, the same could not be
concluded. So, the petitioner filed a writ petition bearing WP(C)
No.39/2022 before this Court and this Court vide judgment and order
dated 21.01.2022 directed the respondent to complete the
departmental proceeding within 4(four) months. The respondents
thereafter, filed one interlocutory application vide IA No.1 of 2022 in
WP(C) No.39/2022 but that interlocutory application of the respondent
was dismissed. Thereafter, the petitioner filed contempt case bearing
Cont.Cas(C) No.67/2023 against the respondents. However, the
respondents filed WA No.147/2022 before this Court. During
pendency of the writ appeal, the respondents issued final punishment
order on 05.10.2023 and after receipt of the copy of the punishment
order, the petitioner submitted appeal on 07.10.2023 before the
appellate Authority. However, as the appeal was not disposed of, the
petitioner again approached this Court vide WP(C) No.387/2024 and
this Court vide order dated 18.06.2024 directed the respondents
authority to dispose of the appeal within 4(four) weeks from the date
of receipt of the copy of the order dated 18.06.2024. After that, the
appellate authority disposed the appeal on 11.07.2024(Annexure-L to
the writ petition). The operative portion of the order of the appellate
authority runs as under:
punishment without any basis. So, the petitioner has filed the present
writ petition seeking the reliefs as stated above.
4. The state-respondents have contested the case by filing
counter affidavit. In para Nos.8 to 10, the state-respondents have
Copy of stay order dated 28.08.2023 passed in
IA No. 2 of 2022 in WA 147 of 2022 is annexed
herewith and marked as ANNEXURE-R/3."
Along with the counter affidavit the state-respondents
have also annexed the copy of findings of the inquiring authority
dated 18.05.2022(Annexure-R/1) and some other documents marked
as Annexure-R/2, R/3 etc and finally the State-respondents by the
counter affidavit prayed for dismissal of the writ petition.
5. At the time of hearing, Learned Counsel for the petitioner
submitted that the State-respondents made false imputation of
charges against him without any basis and to substantiate the
article of charges, the prosecution side could not adduce any
material evidence on record. The petitioner as AO, in support of his
defense adduced witnesses but the inquiring authority without
appreciation of the evidence on record came to the observation
that article of charges under Article II and III were duly proved and
article of charges under Article I could not proved by the
prosecution side and on the basis of that, the disciplinary authority
most arbitrarily and without cogent evidence on record, imposed
punishment by order dated 05.10.2023(Annexure-F to the writ
petition) which needs to be interfered with. Thereafter, challenging
the same, the petitioner preferred an appeal to the appellate
authority who also by order dated 11.07.2024 most arbitrarily
rejected the appeal preferred by the petitioner. According to the
petitioner the order dated 11.07.2024 needs to be interfered with
and set aside.
6. On the other hand Learned Addl. GA appearing on behalf
of the State-respondents submitted that the State-respondents
have submitted their counter affidavit and in the counter affidavit
the State-respondents have elaborately discussed about the
imputation of article of charges against the petitioner and relying
upon Annexure-R/1, Learned Addl. GA submitted that although
before the inquiring authority three article of charges were framed
but Article of Charge I could not be proved and Article of Charges II
and III were duly proved. The petitioner as AO could not adduce
any rebuttable evidence on record to disbelieve the said article of
charges framed against him. Learned Addl. GA submitted that there
was no infirmity in the findings of the inquiring authority dated
18.05.2022. So, the present petition is liable to be dismissed.
Learned Addl. GA further submitted that the present petitioner
could not make out any case to be interfered with the findings of
the inquiring authority and furthermore, although the petitioner
approached this Court for disposal of the departmental proceeding
and as per direction of this Court, the appellate authority disposed
of the proceeding within time. However, in dealing with the matter,
a considerable period of time was consumed. Learned Addl. GA
submitted that this cannot be a ground for interfering with the
findings of the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate
authority and prayed for dismissal of this writ petition.
7. The petitioner filed rejoinder against the counter
affidavit but on perusal of the rejoinder it appears that the same
was nothing but reiteration of the contents of the writ petition.
8. I have heard both the sides at length and perused the
documents annexed with the writ petition as well as the counter
affidavit filed by the State-respondents. I have also perused the
findings of the inquiring authority dated 18.05.2022 and the
evidence on record of the parties.
9. On perusal of the findings of the inquiring authority it
comes to fore that the inquiring authority has elaborately discussed
about the evidence on record of the parties and finally came to the
conclusion that the Article of Charge I was not proved but came to
the observation that Article of Charges II and III were duly proved.
10. Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in a case reported in
2024 SCC OnLine SC 1908 in State of Rajasthan & Ors v.
Bhupendra Singh in Civil Appeal Nos.8456-8549 of 2024 [@
Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos.12773-76 of 2021] in para
Nos. 23, 24 observed as under:
23. The scope of examination and interference under Article
226 of the Constitution of India (hereinafter referred to as
the „Constitution‟) in a case of the present nature, is no
longer res integra. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. S Sree
Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723, a 3-Judge Bench stated:
„7. ... The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding
under Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal
over the decision of the authorities holding a
departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is
concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by
an authority competent in that behalf, and according to
the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the
rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is
some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the
duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which
evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the
delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the
function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under
Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an
independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may
undoubtedly interfere where the departmental
authorities have held the proceedings against the
delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of
natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules
prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities
have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision
by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and
the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be
influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the
conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary
and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have
arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the
departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise
properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be
some legal evidence on which their findings can be
based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not
a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before
the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article
226 of the Constitution.‟
(emphasis supplied)
24. The above was reiterated by a Bench of equal strength in
State Bank of India v. Ram Lal Bhaskar, (2011) 10 SCC 249.
Three learned Judges of this Court stated as under in State of
Andhra Pradesh v. Chitra Venkata Rao, (1975) 2 SCC 557:
„21. The scope of Article 226 in dealing with
departmental inquiries has come up before this Court.
Two propositions were laid down by this Court in State of
A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao [AIR 1963 SC 1723 : (1964) 3
SCR 25 : (1964) 2 LLJ 150]. First, there is no warrant for
the view that in considering whether a public officer is
guilty of misconduct charged against him, the rule
followed in criminal trials that an offence is not
established unless proved by evidence beyond
reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court must be
applied. If that rule be not applied by a domestic tribunal
of inquiry the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of
the Constitution is not competent to declare the order of
the authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid.
The High Court is not a court of appeal under Article 226
over the decision of the authorities holding a
departmental enquiry against a public servant. The Court
is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by
an authority competent in that behalf and according to
the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the
rules of natural justice are not violated. Second, where
there is some evidence which the authority entrusted
with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which
evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the
delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the
function of the High Court to review the evidence and to
arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The
High Court may interfere where the departmental
authorities have held the proceedings against the
delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of
natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules
prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities
have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision
by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and
the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be
influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the
conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary
and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have
arrived at that conclusion. The departmental authorities
are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole
judges of facts and if there is some legal evidence on
which their findings can be based, the adequacy or
reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be
permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a
proceeding for a writ under Article 226.
xxx
23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under
Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The Court
exercises it not as an appellate court. The findings of fact
reached by an inferior court or tribunal as a result of the
appreciation of evidence are not reopened or questioned
in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on
the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not
an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In
regard to a finding of fact recorded by a tribunal, a writ
can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said
finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit
admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously
admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the
impugned finding. Again if a finding of fact is based on no
evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law
which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of
fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged on the
ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced
before the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to
sustain a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence
led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from
the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Tribunal. See Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan
[AIR 1964 SC 477 : (1964) 5 SCR 64].
24. The High Court in the present case assessed the
entire evidence and came to its own conclusion. The High
Court was not justified to do so. Apart from the aspect
that the High Court does not correct a finding of fact on
the ground that the evidence is not sufficient or
adequate, the evidence in the present case which was
considered by the Tribunal cannot be scanned by the
High Court to justify the conclusion that there is no
evidence which would justify the finding of the Tribunal
that the respondent did not make the journey. The
Tribunal gave reasons for its conclusions. It is not
possible for the High Court to say that no reasonable
person could have arrived at these conclusions. The High
Court reviewed the evidence, reassessed the evidence
and then rejected the evidence as no evidence. That is
precisely what the High Court in exercising jurisdiction to
issue a writ of certiorari should not do.
xxx
26. For these reasons we are of opinion that the High
Court was wrong in setting aside the dismissal order by
reviewing and reassessing the evidence. The appeal is
accepted. The judgment of the High Court is set aside.
Parties will pay and bear their own costs.‟
(emphasis supplied)"
Further, in para No.26 the Hon'ble Apex Court further
observed as under:
"26. In Union of India v. K.G. Soni, (2006) 6 SCC 794, it
was opined:
„14. The common thread running through in all these
decisions is that the court should not interfere with the
administrator's decision unless it was illogical or suffers
from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the
conscience of the court, in the sense that it was in
defiance of logic or moral standards. In view of what has
been stated in Wednesbury case [Associated Provincial
Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., [1948] 1 K.B.
223 : [1947] 2 All ER 680 (CA)] the court would not go
into the correctness of the choice made by the
administrator open to him and the court should not
substitute its decision to that of the administrator. The
scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in the
decision-making process and not the decision.
15. To put it differently, unless the punishment
imposed by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate
Authority shocks the conscience of the court/tribunal,
there is no scope for interference. Further, to shorten
litigations it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose
appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in
support thereof. In the normal course if the punishment
imposed is shockingly disproportionate, it would be
appropriate to direct the disciplinary authority or the
Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed.‟
(emphasis supplied)
Again, in para Nos.27 and 28, Hon'ble the Apex Court observed as
under:
"27. The legal position was restated by two learned Judges in
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Man Mohan Nath Sinha, (2009) 8
SCC 310:
„15. The legal position is well settled that the power of
judicial review is not directed against the decision but is
confined to the decision-making process. The court does
not sit in judgment on merits of the decision. It is not
open to the High Court to reappreciate and reappraise
the evidence led before the inquiry officer and examine
the findings recorded by the inquiry officer as a court of
appeal and reach its own conclusions. In the instant
case, the High Court fell into grave error in scanning the
evidence as if it was a court of appeal. The approach of
the High Court in consideration of the matter suffers from
manifest error and, in our thoughtful consideration, the
matter requires fresh consideration by the High Court in
accordance with law. On this short ground, we send the
matter back to the High Court.‟
28. Turning our gaze back to the facts herein, we find that
the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench acted as
Courts of Appeal and went on to re-appreciate the evidence,
which the above-enumerated authorities caution against. The
present coram, in Bharti Airtel Limited v. A.S. Raghavendra,
(2024) 6 SCC 418, has laid down:
„29. As regards the power of the High Court to
reappraise the facts, it cannot be said that the same is
completely impermissible under Articles 226 and 227 of
the Constitution. However, there must be a level of
infirmity greater than ordinary in a tribunal's order,
which is facing judicial scrutiny before the High Court, to
justify interference. We do not think such a situation
prevailed in the present facts. Further, the ratio of the
judgments relied upon by the respondent in support of
his contentions, would not apply in the facts at hand.‟
(emphasis supplied)"
11. From the aforesaid principle of law laid down by Hon'ble
the Apex Court it comes to fore that the Court cannot interfere with
the administrator's decision unless it is illogical or suffers from
procedural impropriety or is shocking to the conscience of the
Court, in the sense that it is in the defiance of logic or moral
standards.
12. Here, in the case at hand, on perusal of the relevant
documents it appears that the State-respondents had given all
opportunities to the present petitioner to defend his case properly
right from filing of written statement to adducing of evidence and
during hearing. Learned Counsel for the petitioner could not satisfy
this Court as to how the petitioner was prejudiced by the findings
of the respondents authority because prior to holding inquiry, the
petitioner submitted written statement of defense and before the
inquiring authority he had given the scope to cross-examine the
witnesses of the prosecution and also he had given the opportunity
to adduce his evidence. Not only that at the time of imposition of
penalty by the disciplinary authority he was again given the
opportunity to submit his statement of defense, if any. Thus, it
appears to this Court that the present petitioner has failed to
satisfy the Court regarding violation of principles of natural justice
by the State-respondents.
13. In a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India the jurisdiction of the Court is very limited to interfere with
the findings of the disciplinary authority unless there is evidence on
record regarding serious violation of natural justice. Even there is
very little scope to review or re-asses the evidence on record on
the basis of which the inquiring authority found and determined the
petitioner to be held guilty for the article of charges.
14. As already stated, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, in
course of hearing of argument failed to satisfy the Court any
compelling reason for interference with the findings of the
disciplinary authority save and except the grounds of delay.
However, on perusal of the relevant documents it appears that
admittedly there was a delay of 10 years in disposal of the matter
resulting which further promotion of the petitioner was withheld.
Although, it is the settled position of law that promotion cannot be
claimed as a matter of right. The disciplinary authority based on
the findings of the inquiring authority imposed the penalty of
withholding one increment of pay without cumulative effect and
also ordered that the period of suspension with effect from
13.01.2014 to 18.06.2014 be treated as "spent on duty for all
purposes". But the said imposition of penalty as per Rule 11 of
CCS(CC&A) Rules, 1965 appears to be harsh for the petitioner after
elapsing of a long period which in my considered view, needs to be
modified.
15. So, after hearing both the sides and also after going
through the materials on record it is ordered that the petitioner be
inflicted penalty of "censure" in place of withholding of one
increment of pay without cumulative effect and accordingly the
order of the disciplinary authority dated 05.10.2013 and the
consequent order of the appellate Court dated 11.07.2024 needs to
be modified.
16. In the result, the writ petition filed by the petitioner is
disposed of with the observation that the petitioner be imposed
with the penalty of "censure" in place of withholding of one
increment of pay without cumulative effect and accordingly, the
order of the disciplinary authority dated 05.10.2013 and
consequential order of the appellate authority dated 11.07.2024
stands modified to the extent as stated above.
With this observation, the present writ petition is
disposed of.
Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed.
JUDGE
Snigdha
MOUMIT Digitally signed by
MOUMITA DATTA
A DATTA Date: 2025.05.14
18:14:48 +05'30'
