Smt. Sujata Das And Anr vs Central Bureau Of Investigation And Anr
2024 Latest Caselaw 1717 Tri

Tripura High Court

Smt. Sujata Das And Anr vs Central Bureau Of Investigation And Anr on 4 October, 2024

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                  HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
                           AGARTALA
                         IA No.1 of 2024
                   In CRL.A(J) No.60 of 2024
Smt. Sujata Das and Anr.
                                                   ---Applicant(s)
                              Versus
Central Bureau of Investigation and Anr.
                                                ----Respondent(s)

Along with IA No.1 of 2024 In CRL.A(J) No.48 of 2024

Smt. Jewel Debbarma

---Applicant(s) Versus Central Bureau of Investigation, CBI and Anr.

----Respondent(s)

Along with IA No.1 of 2024 In CRL.A(J) No.49 of 2024

Sri Samir Bhattacharjee

---Applicant(s) Versus Central Bureau of Investigation, CBI and Anr.

----Respondent(s) For Applicant(s) : Mr. P. K. Biswas, Sr. Adv.

Mr. R. Nath, Adv.

Mr. P. Biswas, Adv.

Mr. S. Sarkar, Sr. Adv.

Mr. K. D. Singha, Adv.

Mr. P. Roy Barman, Sr. Adv.

Mr. S. Bhattacharjee, Adv.

For Respondent(s) : Mr. B. Majumder, DSGI.

HON‟BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT

Order 04/10/2024 Learned Senior Counsel Mr. P. K. Biswas assisted by Mr. P.

Biswas, Learned counsel and Mr. R. Nath, Learned counsel is

present for the appellant-applicants namely Smt. Sujata Das and

Rajib Nandi. Learned Senior counsel Mr. S. Sarkar assisted by Mr.

K. D. Singha is present for the appellant-applicant namely Smt.

Jewel Debbarma and Mr. P. Roy Barman, Learned Senior counsel

assisted by Mr. S. Bhattacharjee, Learned counsel is present for

the appellant-applicant namely Sri Samir Bhattacharjee.

Learned DSGI Mr. B. Majumder is present on behalf of the

CBI.

On 03.10.2024 this court has heard Learned counsels for the

rival parties in the connected interim applications and since these

interim applications have arisen out of a common judgment and

order of sentence and conviction so by this common order all the

three IAs are disposed of.

The present appellant-applicants have preferred this appeal

challenging the judgment and order of conviction and sentence

delivered by Learned Special Judge(CBI), West Tripura, Agartala

in connection with Case No.Special (CBI) 14 of 2024 and along

with the memo of appeal three separate applications have been

preferred by the present applicants under Section 389 of Cr.P.C.

for suspension of the order of conviction and sentence dated

25.07.2024 passed by Learned Special Judge (CBI), West Tripura,

Agartala in the afore noted cases till disposal of the appeal and to

release the applicants on bail during the pendency of the appeal

on any condition. In all the three interim applications Learned

DSGI has filed written objection.

In course of hearing Learned Senior counsel appearing for

the appellant-applicants Smt. Sujata Das and Rajib Nandi

submitted that although the appeal is pending for adjudication by

this court but the trial was without jurisdiction in view of Section

219 of Cr.P.C. According to Learned Senior counsel more than

three offences cannot be charged together but here in the given

case there were multiple charges, but the Learned court below did

not consider the same and erroneously hold the trial and convicted

the appellant-applicants without any basis. Learned Senior counsel

further drawn the attention of this court referring the provision of

Section 389 of Cr.P.C. and submitted that considering the nature

of allegation and sentence there is no legal bar to suspend the

sentence till disposal of the appeal otherwise the appellant-

applicants would be prejudiced. Learned Senior counsel further

submitted that there is every chance on behalf of the appellant-

applicants to succeed in the appeal, so Learned Senior counsel

urged for suspending the sentences and to release the appellants

on bail.

Learned Senior counsel Mr. S. Sarkar assisted by Mr. K. D.

Singha, Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant Smt.

Jewel Debbarma submitted that as the appeal is against the fixed

term sentence so legally there is no bar to suspend the sentence

delivered by the Learned Trial court. Learned Senior counsel

further submitted that the applicant is suffering from illness and

he has drawn the attention of the court some medical papers in

connection with the treatment of the applicant and submitted that

during the course of trial all the appellant-applicants were on bail

and they did never misuse the conditions of bail or took any

attempt to temper the evidence of the prosecution. So if the

applicant is released on bail there would be no chance of

hampering or tampering the evidence on record of the prosecution

at this stage since the judgment is already been pronounced by

the Learned Trial court. Learned Senior counsel also submitted

that the applicant is suffering from illness and if the applicant

ultimately is acquitted from the charge then there would be

serious miscarriage of justice if the conviction is not suspended till

disposal of the appeal.

Learned Senior counsel Mr. P. Roy Barman assisted by Mr. S.

Bhattacharjee, Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

applicant Samir Bhattacharjee submitted that considering the

nature of allegation, charges and sentence imposed upon the

applicant in view of the provision of Section 389 of Cr.P.C. can be

allowed as there is no scope to refuse the application for

suspension of sentence delivered by the Learned Trial Court.

Learned Senior counsel further submitted that suspension of

sentence and the suspension of conviction are two different

aspects which cannot be clubbed together and Learned Senior

counsel also submitted that the conviction was for a fixed term of

imprisonment so there is no legal bar to release the applicant on

bail. Learned Senior counsel also submitted that the applicant is

suffering from severe illness and aged about 65 years and all the

connected medical papers are enclosed with the application for

suspension of sentence and Learned DSGI on behalf of CBI in the

objection did not raise any material objection to disallow the

application for suspension of sentence. So finally Learned Senior

counsel urged for considering the application for suspension of

sentence. Further Learned Senior counsel submitted that there

were no materials against him before the Learned Trial Court to

hold conviction but the Learned Trial Court below did not consider

the same.

Learned DSGI Mr. B. Majumder appearing on behalf of the

CBI taking part in the hearing strongly countered the submission

made by Learned Senior counsels and submitted that in this case

excepting the applicant Rajib Nandi all the other applicants were

convicted under Section 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act,

1988 and in a case of this nature there is no scope to suspend the

sentence as they were found to be guilty by the Learned Trial

court. Learned DSGI further submitted that since the Learned Trial

court after considering the evidence on record found the

appellants to be guilty. So legally at this stage there is no scope to

suspend the sentence till disposal of the appeals as prayed for by

the appellant-applicants. In respect of applicant Rajib Nandi

Learned DSGI also submitted that since considering the evidence

on record Learned Trial court below convicted the applicant so at

this stage there is no scope to show any lenient view in regard to

suspension of the sentence by this court and urged for rejection of

the interim applications filed by the appellant-applicants.

Now let us refer herein below the provision of Section 389 of

Cr.P.C. which provides as under:

"389. Suspension of sentence pending the appeal; release of appellant on bail.- (1) Pending any appeal by a convicted person, the Appellate Court may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order that the execution of the sentence or order appealed against be suspended and, also, if he is in confinement, that he be released on bail, or on his own bond:

[Provided that the Appellate Court shall, before releasing on bail or on his own bond a convicted person who is convicted of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years, shall give opportunity to the Public Prosecutor for showing cause in writing against such release: Provided further that in cases where a convicted person is released on bail it shall be open to the Public Prosecutor to file an application for the cancellation of the bail.] (2) The power conferred by this section on an Appellate Court may be exercised also by the High Court in the case of an appeal by convicted person to a Court subordinate thereto. (3) Where the convicted person satisfies the Court by which he is convicted that he intends to present an appeal, the Court shall,-

(i)where such person, being on bail, is sentenced to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, or

(ii) where the offence of which such person has been convicted is a bailable one, and he is on bail, order that the convicted person be released on bail, unless there are special reasons for refusing bail, for such period as will afford sufficient time to present the appeal and obtain the orders of the Appellate Court under Sub-Section (1), and the sentence of imprisonment shall, so long as he is so released on bail, be deemed to be suspended.

(4) When the appellant is ultimately sentenced to imprisonment for a term or to imprisonment for life, the time during which he is so released shall be excluded in computing the term for which he is so sentenced."

From the judgment and order of sentence and conviction

dated 25.07.2024 delivered by Learned Special Judge (CBI) in

connection with Case No. Special (CBI) 14 of 2024 it appears that

the Learned Special Judge found all the appellant-applicants guilty

and convicted the appellant-applicants Sujata Das, Jewel

Debbarma and Samir Bhattacharjee convicted and sentenced

them to suffer RI for four years each and to pay a fine of

Rs.20,000/- each for the offence punishable under Section 409 of

IPC in default to suffer one month each and to suffer

imprisonment for three years each and a fine of Rs.15,000/- each

for the offence punishable under Section 468 of IPC in default to

suffer imprisonment twenty days each and to suffer RI for three

years each and to pay a fine of Rs.15,000/- each for the offence

punishable under Section 477A of IPC in default to suffer SI for

twenty days each and to suffer RI for four years each and to pay a

fine of Rs.20,000/- each for the offence punishable under Section

120B of IPC in default to suffer SI for twenty days each and to

suffer RI for five years and to pay a fine of Rs.20,000/- each for

the offence punishable under Section 13(2) of Prevention of

Corruption Act, 1988 in default to suffer SI for one month each.

Learned Special Judge also convicted the applicant Rajib Nandi to

suffer RI for four years and to pay a fine of Rs.20,000/- for the

offence punishable under Section 120B of IPC read with Section

409 of IPC in default to suffer SI for one month each.

In course of hearing of applications Learned counsels for the

rival parties referred few citations. Mr. S. Sarkar, Learned Senior

counsel appearing for the applicant Smt. Jewel Debbarma referred

few citations which are reproduced herein below. In Bhagwan

Rama Shinide Gosai and others v. State of Gujarat in Crl. A.

No.554 of 1999 dated 12.05.1999 reported in (1999) 4 SCC

421 wherein in para No.3, Hon'ble the Apex Court observed as

under:

"3. When a convicted person is sentenced to a fixed period of sentence and when he files an appeal under any statutory right, suspension of sentence can be considered by the appellate court liberally unless there are exceptional circumstances. Of course if there is any statutory restriction against suspension of sentence it is a different matter. Similarly, when the sentence is life imprisonment the consideration for suspension of sentence could be of a different approach. But if for any reason the sentence of a limited duration cannot be suspended every endeavour should be made to dispose of the appeal on merits more so when a motion for expeditious hearing of the appeal is made in such cases. Otherwise the very valuable right of appeal would be an exercise in futility by efflux of time. When the appellate court finds that due to practical reasons such appeals cannot be disposed of expeditiously the appellate court must bestow special concern in the matter of suspending the sentence. So as to make the appeal right, meaningful and effective. Of course appellate courts can impose similar conditions when bail is granted."

In Suresh Kumar and others v. State(NCT of

Delhi) dated 29.09.2000 reported in (2001) 10 SCC 338,

wherein in para No.5 and 6 Hon'ble the Apex Court observed as

under:

"5. This Court has stated in Bhagwan Rama Shinde Gosai v. State of Gujarat:1999 SCC (cri) 553(SCC p. 422, para 3)

3. When a convicted person is sentenced to a fixed period of sentence and when he files an appeal under any statutory right, suspension of sentence can be considered by the appellate court liberally unless there are exceptional circumstances.

6. No exceptional circumstance has been highlighted by the learned Single Judge for deviating from the aforesaid course suggested by this Court. We, therefore, allow this appeal and order the suspension of the sentence of imprisonment passed on the appellants during the pendency of the appeal before the High Court. They shall be released on bail on each of them executing a bond with two solvent sureties to the satisfaction of the trial court."

In Angana and another v. State of Rajasthan in

Crl. A. No.221 of 2009 dated 06.02.2009 reported in (2009) 2

SCC (Cri) 742, wherein in para No.16, 19 observed as under:

"16. Reference can be made to the decision of this Court in Kashmira Singh v. State of Punjab:(1977) 4 SCC 291 where this Court has observed that : (SCC pp. 292-93, para 2)

2. ... Now, the practice in this Court as also in many of the High Courts has been not to release on bail a person who has been sentenced to life imprisonment for an offence under Section 302 of the Penal Code. The question is whether this practice should be departed from and if so, in what circumstances. It is obvious that no practice howsoever sanctified by usage and hallowed by time can be allowed to prevail if it

operates to cause injustice. Every practice of the Court must find its ultimate justification in the interest of justice. The practice not to release on bail a person who has been sentenced to life imprisonment was evolved in the High Courts and in this Court on the basis that once a person has been found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment, he should not be let loose, so long as his conviction and sentence are not set aside, but the underlying postulate of this practice was that the appeal of such person would be disposed of within a measurable distance of time, so that if he is ultimately found to be innocent, he would not have to remain in jail for an unduly long period. The rationale of this practice can have no application where the Court is not in a position to dispose of the appeal for five or six years. It would indeed be a travesty of justice to keep a person in jail for a period of five or six years for an offence which is ultimately found not to have been committed by him. Can the Court ever compensate him for his incarceration which is found to be unjustified? Would it be just at all for the Court to tell a person: „We have admitted your appeal because we think you have a prima facie case, but unfortunately we have no time to hear your appeal for quite a few years and, therefore, until we hear your appeal, you must remain in jail, even though you may be innocent?‟ What confidence would such administration of justice inspire in the mind of the public? It may quite conceivably happen, and it has in fact happened in a few cases in this Court, that a person may serve out his full term of imprisonment before his appeal is taken up for hearing. Would a Judge not be overwhelmed with a feeling of contrition while acquitting such a person after hearing the appeal? Would it not be an affront to his sense of justice? Of what avail would the acquittal be to such a person who has already served out his term of imprisonment or at any rate a major part of it? It is, therefore, absolutely essential that the practice which this Court has been following in the past must be reconsidered and so long as this Court is not in a position to hear the appeal of an accused within a reasonable period of time, the Court should ordinarily, unless there are cogent grounds for acting otherwise, release the accused on bail in cases where special leave has been granted to the accused to appeal against his conviction and sentence.

The Court going by the said consideration held that:(Kashmira Singh case:(1977) 4 SCC 291, p.

291) ... that so long as the Supreme Court is not in a position to hear the appeal of an accused within a reasonable period of time, the Court should ordinarily, unless there are cogent grounds for acting otherwise, release the accused on bail where special leave has been granted to the accused to appeal against his conviction and sentence. The other consideration, however, is equally important and relevant. When a person is convicted by an appellate court, he cannot be said to be an innocent person until the final decision is recorded by the superior court in his favour.

19. In Bhagwan Rama Shinde Gosai v. State of Gujarat: (1999) 4 SCC 421, this Court has stated that when a convicted personperson is sentenced to a fixed period of sentence and when he files an appeal under any statutory right, suspension of sentence can be considered by the appellate court

liberally unless there are exceptional circumstances. The Court has observed :(SCC p. 422, para 3) "3. When a convicted person is sentenced to a fixed period of sentence and when he files an appeal under any statutory right, suspension of sentence can be considered by the appellate court liberally unless there are exceptional circumstances. Of course, if there is any statutory restriction against suspension of sentence it is a different matter. Similarly, when the sentence is life imprisonment the consideration for suspension of sentence could be of a different approach. But if for any reason the sentence of a limited duration cannot be suspended every endeavour should be made to dispose of the appeal on merits more so when a motion for expeditious hearing of the appeal is made in such cases. Otherwise the very valuable right of appeal would be an exercise in futility by efflux of time. When the appellate court finds that due to practical reasons such appeals cannot be disposed of expeditiously the appellate court must bestow special concern in the matter of suspending the sentence so as to make the appeal right, meaningful and effective. Of course, appellate courts can impose similar conditions when bail is granted."

In Bherulal v. The State of Madhya Pradesh dated

03.07.2024 Hon'ble the Apex court in para No.5 observed as

under:

"5. The law is well settled that if the sentence imposed by the trial court is for a fixed term, then ordinarily the appellate court should consider the plea for suspension of sentence liberally, unless there are any exceptional circumstances emerging from the record of the case to decline such relief. There is nothing observed by the High court in its impugned order as to why the plea for suspension of sentence deserved to be declined. The High Court has not said anything about any exceptional circumstances."

Referring the same Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Sarkar has

stated that since the conviction was for a fixed term of sentence

so there will be no bar to suspend the sentence till disposal of the

appeal.

Mr. P. Roy Barman, Learned Senior Counsel appearing for

the applicant Samir Bhattacharjee in addition to his submission

referred one citation. In Omprakash Sahni vs. Jai Shankar

Chaudhary and Another reported in 2023 6 SCC 123 in para

Nos.21, 22 and 30 Hon'ble the Apex Court observed as under:

21. Suspension conveys postponement or temporarily preventing a state of affairs from continuing. According to the Black's Law Dictionary (Seventh Edition), the word 'suspend' means, inter

alia, to interrupt; postpone; defer; The Black's Law Dictionary (Seventh Edition) describes the word 'suspension' to mean, inter alia, an act of temporarily delaying, interrupting or terminating something. Attributing the same meaning to the word 'suspend' as pointed out above, New Oxford Dictionary of English (1998 Edition) describes suspend as temporarily preventing from continuing or being enforced or given effect or defer or delay an action, event or judgment.

22. Thus, when we speak of suspension of sentence after conviction, the idea is to defer or postpone the execution of the sentence. The purpose of postponement of sentence cannot be achieved by detaining the convict in jail; hence, as a natural consequence of postponement of execution, the convict may be enlarged on bail till further orders.

30. In Kishori Lal v. Rupa and Others, reported in (2004) 7 SCC 638, this Court has indicated the factors that require to be considered by the courts while granting benefit under Section 389 of the CrPC in cases involving serious offences like murder etc. Thus, it is useful to refer to the observations made therein, which are as follows:

4. Section 389 of the Code deals with suspension of execution of sentence pending the appeal and release of the appellant on bail. There is a distinction between bail and suspension of sentence. One of the essential ingredients of Section 389 is the requirement for the appellate court to record reasons in writing for ordering suspension of execution of the sentence or order appealed against. If he is in confinement, the said court can direct that he be released on bail or on his own bond. The requirement of recording reasons in writing clearly indicates that there has to be careful consideration of the relevant aspects and the order directing suspension of sentence and grant of bail should not be passed as a matter of routine.

5. The appellate court is duty-bound to objectively assess the matter and to record reasons for the conclusion that the case warrants suspension of execution of sentence and grant of bail. In the instant case, the only factor which seems to have weighed with the High Court for directing suspension of sentence and grant of bail is the absence of allegation of misuse of liberty during the earlier period when the accused-respondents were on bail.

6. The mere fact that during the trial, they were granted bail and there was no allegation of misuse of liberty, is really not of much significance. The effect of bail granted during trial loses significance when on completion of trial, the accused persons have been found guilty. The mere fact that during the period when the accused persons were on bail during trial there was no misuse of liberties, does not per se warrant suspension of execution of sentence and grant of bail. What really was necessary to be considered by the High Court is whether reasons existed to suspend the execution of sentence and thereafter grant bail. The High Court does not seem to have kept the correct principle in view."

As already stated Learned DSGI appearing for the CBI in

course of his submission opposed the application for suspension of

sentence filed by the applicants and in support of his objection

relied upon two citations. In Preet Pal Singh vs. The State of

Uttar Pradesh reported in AIR 2020 SC 3995 in para No.36

observed as under:

"36.There is a difference between grant of bail under Section 439 of the CrPC in case of pre-trial arrest and suspension of sentence under Section 389 of the CrPC and grant of bail, post conviction. In the earlier case there may be presumption of innocence, which is a fundamental postulate of criminal jurisprudence, and the courts may be liberal, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, on the principle that bail is the rule and jail is an exception, as held by this Court in Dataram Singh v. State of U.P. and Anr. (supra). However, in case of post conviction bail, by suspension of operation of the sentence, there is a finding of guilt and the question of presumption of innocence does not arise. Nor is the principle of bail being the rule and jail an exception attracted, once there is conviction upon trial. Rather, the Court considering an application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail, is to consider the prima facie merits of the appeal, coupled with other factors. There should be strong compelling reasons for grant of bail, notwithstanding an order of conviction, by suspension of sentence, and this strong and compelling reason must be recorded in the order granting bail, as mandated in Section 389(1) of the Cr.P.C."

Learned DSGI further referred another citation in K.C.

Sareen vs. C.B.I. Chandigarh reported in AIR 2001 SC 3320

in para No.11 and 12 Hon'ble the Apex Court observed as under:

"11. Corruption by public servants has now reached a monstrous dimension in India. Its tentacles have started grappling even the institutions created for the protection of the republic. Unless those tentacles are intercepted and impeded from gripping the normal and orderly functioning of the public offices, through strong legislative, executive as well as judicial exercises the corrupt public servants could even paralyse the functioning of such institutions and thereby hinder the democratic polity. Proliferation of corrupt public servants could garner momentum to cripple the social order if such men are allowed to continue to manage and operate public institutions. When a public servant was found guilty of corruption after a judicial adjudicatory process conducted by a court of law, judiciousness demands that he should be treated as corrupt until he is exonerated by a superior court. The mere fact that an appellate or revisional forum has decided to entertain his challenge and to go into the issues and findings made against such public servants once again should not even temporarily absolve him from such findings. If such a public servant becomes entitled to hold public office and to continue to do official acts until he is judicially absolved from such findings by reason of suspension of the order of conviction it is public interest which suffers and sometimes even irreparably. When a public servant who is convicted of corruption is allowed to continue to hold public office it would impair the morale of the other persons manning such office, and consequently that would erode the already

shrunk confidence of the people in such public institutions besides demoralising the other honest public servants who would either be the colleagues or subordinates of the convicted person. If honest public servants are compelled to take orders from proclaimed corrupt officers on account of the suspension of the conviction the fall out would be one of shaking the system itself. Hence it is necessary that the court should not aid the public servant who stands convicted for corruption charges to hold only public office until he is exonerated after conducting a judicial adjudication at the appellate or revisional level. It is a different matter if a corrupt public officer could continue to hold such public office even without the help of a court order suspending the conviction.

12. The above policy can be acknowledged as necessary for the efficacy and proper functioning of public offices. If so, the legal position can be laid down that when conviction is on a corruption charge against a public servant the appellate court or the revisional Court should not suspend the order of conviction during the pendency of the appeal even if the sentence of imprisonment is suspended. It would be a sublime public policy that the convicted public servant is kept under disability of the conviction in spite of keeping the sentence of imprisonment in abeyance till the disposal of the appeal or revision."

Referring the same Learned DSGI submitted that since the

conviction was under 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,

1988, so at this stage there is no scope before this court to

consider the application for suspension of sentence till disposal of

the appeal and urged for rejection of all the applications.

It is the admitted position that during the trial of the case

before the Learned Trial court all the appellant-applicants were on

bail. There is also no evidence on record that they have misused

the liberty granted to them by the Learned Trial court.

So after hearing both the sides and also after going through

the judgment of the Learned court below and also after perusal of

the citations referred by Learned counsel of the rival parties it

appears that the present appeal is pending for disposal. It is also

on record that all the appellant-applicants were on bail during trial

and there is no evidence on record that they have misused the

liberty granted to them during the trial of the case. As referred by

Learned Senior Counsel Mr. P. K. Biswas appearing for the

applicants Smt. Sujata Das and Rajib Nandi at this stage there is

no scope to consider the serious infirmities as projected by the

Learned Senior counsel as because at this stage this court is

dealing only with the application for suspension of sentences not

on merit of the appeal. Learned DSGI submitted that in course of

hearing could not satisfy the court showing any exceptional

circumstances to reject the application for suspension of sentence

delivered by the Learned Trial court.

However, considering the nature of imprisonment and

sentences it appears that the sentence imposed by the Learned

Trial court is for a fixed term of sentence and also the appellant-

applicants Jewel Debbarma and Samir Bhattacharjee are suffering

from illness and they requires medical examination for their

further better treatment. So considering the materials on record

and also considering the applications for suspension of sentence

and also objection submitted by the respondent this court is

inclined to consider all the three interim applications filed by the

appellant-applicants and accordingly the sentence dated

25.07.2024 delivered by Learned Special Judge(CBI) in connection

with Case No.Special (CBI) 14/2024 be suspended till disposal of

the appeal subject to execution of bail bond of Rs.1,00,000/-(one

lakh) with one surety of like amount each to the satisfaction of the

Learned Trial court with direction that they shall not leave the

state without prior permission of the Learned Trial court. The

applicants are accordingly asked to execute bond to the Learned

court below. In the event of execution of bond necessary release

warrant be issued by the Learned Trial court if the appellants are

in jail.

With this observation and direction all the three interim

applications are disposed of.

A copy of this order accordingly be communicated to the

Learned Senior Counsels in the course of the day for their

information and compliance and also a copy of this order be

immediately transmitted to the Learned court below for

information and compliance.

A copy of this order be kept in the connected IAs.

                                                                       JUDGE




 MOUMITA                    Digitally signed by MOUMITA
                            DATTA

 DATTA                      Date: 2024.10.04 16:16:25
                            +05'30'
Moumita