Tripura High Court
Tripura State Electricity Corporation ... vs Shri Ananta Pada Jamatia on 25 January, 2024
HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
RSA No.22 of 2022
1.Tripura State Electricity Corporation Ltd.
Represented by the Chairman-cum-Managing Director,
Bidyut Bhavan, Banamalipur,
P.S. East Agartala, District West Tripura.
2. The Deputy General Manager (DGM),
Amarpur Electrical Division, P.S. Birganj,
District Gomati, Tripura.
3. The Senior Manager,
Tripura State Electricity Corporation Ltd.
Dalak Electric Call center,
P.S. Birganj, District Gomati, Tripura.
..........Appellant- Defendants
Versus
1. Shri Ananta Pada Jamatia,
Son of late Bimoni Jamatia,
Village- Dalak (Jamatia Para),
Amarpur, P.S. Birganj, District :-Gomati, Tripura.
2. Smti. Nibas Kumari Jamatia,
Wife of Shri Ananta Pada Jamatia,
Village- Dalak (Jamatia Para),
Amarpur, P.S. Birganj, District Gomati, Tripura.
...........Respondent-Plaintiffs
3. Shri Surjya Hari Jamatia,
S/o. Late Deb Sadhan Jamatia,
Resident of East Para Burruria,
P.S. Birganj, District Gomati, Tripura.
4. Shri Sarba Sadhan Jamatia,
S/o. Late Dwijahari Jamatia,
Resident of East Para Burruria,
P.S. Birganj, District Gomati, Tripura.
5. Shri Hadaram Reang,
S/o. Shri Abhoyram Reang,
Resident Chandrasingpara,
South Karbook, P.S. Karbook,
District Gomati, Tripura
............Proforma- Respondents.
Page 2 of 24
For Appellant(s) : Mr. N. Majumder, Adv.
For Respondent(s) : Mr. S. Lodh, Adv.
Mr. Samarjit Bhattacharjee, Adv.
Mr. A. Sengupta, Adv.
Date of Hearing : 09.01.2024
Date of delivery of
Judgment and Order : 25.01.2024
Whether fit for
Reporting : YES
HON‟BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT
Judgment & Order
This appeal is directed under Section 100 of CPC
against the judgment dated 19.02.2021 and decree dated
04.03.2021 passed by Learned Addl. District Judge, West
Tripura, Agartala in Money Appeal No.01 of 2019 modifying
the judgment dated 30.11.2018 and decree dated
15.12.2018 passed in Money Suit No.31 of 2014 by Learned
Civil Judge, Senior Division, West Tripura, Agartala.
02. The brief fact relates to this appeal are as follows:
The respondent-plaintiffs filed one suit for
compensation under the Fatal Accidents Act 1855
before the Learned Trial Court below against the
Tripura State Electricity Corporation Limited and Ors.
alleging inter-alia that the respondent-plaintiffs are the
parents of the deceased Dharma Bhakta Jamatia, who
had died on 13.05.2013 due to electrocution. It was the
case of the respondent-plaintiffs that due to severe
Page 3 of 24
cyclone in the first week of May, 2013 several electric
lines were damaged and disconnected due to falling of
trees at Dalak area situated within the territorial limits
of Amarpur Sub-division and after 5/6 days of cyclone
and tornado, the deceased and one Rabindra Hari
Jamatia were engaged by pro-respondents for
cutting/removing the trees and the tree branches from
the electricity lines on payment of wages on the reason
that the pro-respondent No.5, Hadaram Reang, one of
the staffs under the respondent-plaintiff Nos.1 and 2 of
the Original Suit were unable to climb the trees due to
backache.
03. On 13.05.2011, around 04.15 p.m the pro-
respondent Nos.3 to 5 accompanied with the deceased and
one Rabindra Hari Jamatia went to Jamatia Para near
Thalchara Bazar on call to repair as well as to restore
electricity connection at Jamatia Para. On reaching there, as
per direction and under compelling circumstances on the
pressure being created by the pro-respondent Nos.3 to 5,
the deceased and said Rabindra Hari Jamatia had climbed
the electric pole for repairing. Although they have/had no
previous experience in this matter i.e. to climb the electric
pole, so, they denied climbing of the electric pole. Before
proceeding to that area for the said purpose, electricity line
of that area was shut down by the pro-respondent Nos.3 and
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4 but during working suddenly the respondent Nos.3 and 4
continued the supply of electricity resulting which the
deceased and Rabindra Hari Jamatia fell down from the
electric pole due to electric shock and received severe injury.
Immediately, thereafter, both of them were shifted to
Amarpur hospital where the deceased succumbed to his
injuries on 13.05.2013. In this connection a police case vide
Birganj P.S case No.65 of 2013, under Section 338/304 of
IPC was registered against the pro-respondent Nos.3 to 5.
After that the respondent-plaintiffs No.1 and 2 having
claimed that the deceased being their son was 19 years old
at that time and was unmarried and also used to earn Rs.
300/- (Rupees three hundred only) per day and contributed
the whole amount to maintain the family, filed the case
claiming compensation of Rs.7,00,000/-(Rupees seven lakhs
only) for the premature death of their son due to negligence
on the part of the respondents before the Learned Court
below. All the defendants in the original suit contested the
case by filing their separate written statements and denied
the assertions of the respondent-plaintiffs in their plaint
rather the respondent-defendant Nos.1 and 2 contended that
the branch line of Dalak Jamatia Para was made isolated
from the main line due to storm on 07.05.2013. On
12.05.2013 the staff of Electric Sub-Division as well as call
center made some repairing removing the branches of trees
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fallen on the electric line and the electric line was charged on
12.05.2013 up to Duluma(Daluma) T.S.R camp after
isolating the faulty branch line. It was the further case of the
respondent-appellant Nos.1 and 2 that on the day of alleged
incident some people of Dalak Jamatia Para tried to remove
the trees of that branch line at their own interest for having
electricity supply and thereby they tried to connect the
branch line and therefore the accident occurred. It was
further asserted that there was no negligence or actionable
wrong on their part and the respondent Nos.3 to 5 even
have/had no authority to engage any labour and that the suit
was not maintainable in absence of the provisions of the
Employees Compensation Act. It was further asserted that
the answering defendants were not liable for such death and
also not liable for making any payment of compensation as
claimed by the respondent-plaintiffs.
04. Upon the pleadings of the parties the Learned
Trial Court below framed the following issues:
"(1)Whether the suit is maintainable in its
present form and nature?
(2)Whether there is any cause of action for filing
the suit by the plaintiff?
(3)Whether the deceased Dharma Bhakta Jamatia
died on 13.05.2015 (sic.)(actually it should be
13.05.2013) caused by electrocution due to
actionable wrong/ negligence/ carelessness on
the part of the defendants No. 1 and 2?
(4)Whether defendant No.6 has(sic) compelled
the deceased Dharma Bhakta Jamatia to climb on
the electric post for purpose of reparing though
the deceased Dharma Bhakta Jamatia has(sic)
declined initially to climb the electric post as he
was not acquainted or conversant with the
electric reparing work?
(5)Whether the defendants No.1 & 2 are liable for
making any payment of compensation as claimed
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by the plaintiffs if so what be the quantum of
compensation?
(6)Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to get any
other relief or reliefs?"
05. Before the Learned Trial Court the respondent-
plaintiffs have adduced two witnesses and relied upon some
documentary evidences which were marked as exhibits and
the appellant-defendants have also adduced three witnesses
and finally after hearing both the sides Learned Trial Court
below passed the judgment and order on 30.11.2018. The
operative portion of the judgment/order of the Learned Court
below is reproduced below:
"In the result, the instant suit preferred by the
Plaintiffs namely Sri Ananta Pada Jamatia and
Smt. Nibas Kumari Jamatia is decreed on contest
with costs and it is ordered that Defendant No. 1
namely Tripura State Electricity Corporation Ltd.,
represented by its Chairman-cum-Managing
Director shall pay Rs. 5,00,000/- (Rupees five
lakhs) only as damages to the Plaintiffs with
interest @ 8.5% per annum from the date of
institution of the suit to the date of realization of
the said amount and on realization of the said
amount of Rs. 5,00,000/- with requisite interest,
the entire amount shall be apportioned equally
among the two Plaintiffs. The entire amount shall
be paid by Defendant No.1 to the Plaintiffs within
three months from the date of this Judgment."
06. Challenging that judgment, the defendants Nos.1
and 2 of the original suit preferred an appeal before the
Court of Learned District Judge, West Tripura, Agartala and
the case was consigned to the Court of Learned Addl. District
Judge, Court No.2, West Tripura, Agartala for disposal
according to law and the Learned First Appellate Court after
hearing both the sides modified the said judgment of the
Learned Trial Court below by judgment and order dated
Page 7 of 24
19.02.2021. The operative portion of the order of the
Learned First Appellate Court is reproduced below:
"In the result, the appeal fails, but the decree so
passed by the trial court stands modified. The
respondent Nos. 1 and 2 (plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 in
original suit) are entitled to get amount of
compensation to the tune of Rs. 16,50,000/-
(Rupees sixteen lakhs fifty thousands only) along
with 6% interest per annum thereon from the
date of filing the original suit on 02.09.2014 till
the date of realization. The appellants shall make
payment of the amount so awarded within a
period of three months failing which the awarded
amount shall carry 9% interest per annum from
the date of filing the original suit on 02.09.2014
till the date of realization.
The judgment and decree of the Trial Court stands
modified to the extent as indicated above.
To feel contrive for their (parties) reproachable
conduct there is no order as to costs."
07. Challenging that Judgment, the defendant Nos.1
and 2 of the original suit as appellants have preferred this
Second Appeal before the High Court. At the time of
admission of appeal by order dated 23.05.2022 following
substantial question of law was framed:
"Whether the Ld. Court below committed error in
deciding the issue involved here in?"
08. Thereafter, on 09.01.2024 again after hearing the
contesting parties further another following substantial
question of law was framed:
"Whether the judgment of the Learned appellate
Court is perverse?"
09. At the time of hearing, Learned Counsel, Mr. N.
Majumder representing the appellants drawn the attention of
the Court that the present appellants have preferred this
appeal only on the ground that the Learned Trial Court at the
time of delivering the judgment wrongly made improper
Page 8 of 24
calculation of compensation and came to a wrong finding.
Learned Counsel further submitted that Learned Trial Court
determined the amount of compensation/damage to
Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees two lakhs only) but at the time of
delivering judgments/order determined the same to
Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees five lakhs only) without any
reasoning which was not legally permissible. Learned
Counsel further referring the judgment of Learned First
Appellate Court drawn the attention of this Court that
Learned First Appellate Court also wrongly
calculated/decided the amount of compensation/damage
which prompted the present appellants to challenge the
same by this Second Appeal. No other arguments were
advanced by the Learned Counsel for the present appellants.
10. On the other hand, Learned Counsel Mr. Samarjit
Bhattacharjee for the respondent-plaintiffs No.1 and 2
submitted that there was no error in the judgment of the
Learned First Appellate Court and the Learned First Appellate
Court after considering all the legal aspects based on the
findings of Hon'ble the Apex Court has rightly delivered the
judgment which needs no interference. Rather Learned
Counsel submitted that the Learned First Appellate Court did
not consider any amount as consortium which may be taken
into consideration by this Appellate Court and urged before
the Court to consider the same in the light of judgment of
Page 9 of 24
the Hon'ble Apex Court. Learned Counsel in course of
hearing also referred some citations. Learned Counsel, Mr. S.
Lodh for the pro-respondent No.5 did not submit anything
challenging the judgment of the First Appellate Court and
Learned Counsel, Mr. A. Sengupta representing the
proforma-respondent Nos.3 and 4 also refused to say
anything against the judgment of the Learned First Appellate
Court, rather the Learned Counsels of the proforma-
respondents submitted that Learned First Appellate Court
considering all the aspects delivered the judgment and they
also defended the judgment of the First Appellate Court.
11. As I have already stated that the Learned Counsel
for the appellant, at the time of hearing did not submit
anything regarding the findings of the Learned Courts below,
rather he confined his arguments only to the extent of
determination of compensation by the Learned Trial Court as
well as Learned First Appellate Court and also urged before
the Court to intervene the same.
12. There is no dispute on record regarding the fact of
accident on the alleged day i.e. on 13.05.2013 and the death
of victim Dharma Bhakta Jamatia due to electrocution. Now,
we are to see as to whether the Learned First Appellate
Court has committed any error in determining the amount of
compensation modifying the judgment of the Learned Trial
Court below. As already submitted, Learned Counsel, Mr.
Page 10 of 24
Samarjit Bhattacharjee, in course of hearing referred some
citations.
13. In Sarla Verma (Smt) and Others vs. Delhi
Transport Corporation and Another dated 15.04.2009
reported in (2009) 6 SCC 121, Hon'ble the Supreme Court
in Para 34 to 38 have observed as under:
"34. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 was amended
by Act 54 of 1994, inter alia, inserting Section
163-A and the Second Schedule with effect from
14-11-1994. Section 163-A of the MV Act contains
a special provision as to payment of
compensation on structured formula basis, as
indicated in the Second Schedule to the Act. The
Second Schedule contains a table prescribing the
compensation to be awarded with reference to
the age and income of the deceased. It specifies
the amount of compensation to be awarded with
reference to the annual income range of Rs.3000
to Rs.40,000. It does not specify the quantum of
compensation in case the annual income of the
deceased is more than Rs.40,000. But it provides
the multiplier to be applied with reference to the
age of the deceased. The table starts with a
multiplier of 15, goes up to 18, and then steadily
comes down to 5. It also provides the standard
deduction as one-third on account of personal
living expenses of the deceased. Therefore, where
the application is under section 163-A of the Act,
it is possible to calculate the compensation on the
structured formula basis, even where
compensation is not specified with reference to
the annual income of the deceased, or is more
than Rs.40,000, by applying the formula: (2/3 x
AI x M), that is two-thirds of the annual income
multiplied by the multiplier applicable to the age
of the deceased would be the compensation.
Several principles of tortious liability are excluded
when the claim is under section 163-A of MV Act.
35. There are however discrepancies/errors in
the multiplier scale given in the Second Schedule
table. It prescribes a lesser compensation for
cases where a higher multiplier of 18 is applicable
and a larger compensation with reference to
cases where a lesser multiplier of 15, 16, or 17 is
applicable. From the quantum of compensation
specified in the table, it is possible to infer that a
clerical error has crept in the Schedule and the
„multiplier' figures got wrongly typed as 15, 16,
17, 18, 17, 16, 15, 13, 11, 8, 5 & 5 instead of 20,
19, 18, 17, 16, 15, 14, 12, 10, 8, 6 and 5.
36. Another noticeable incongruity is, having
prescribed the notional minimum income of non-
earning persons as Rs.15,000/- per annum, the
Page 11 of 24
table prescribes the compensation payable even
in cases where the annual income ranges
between Rs.3000 and Rs.12,000. This leads to an
anomalous position in regard to applications
under Section 163-A of the MV Act, as the
compensation will be higher in cases where the
deceased was idle and not having any income,
than in cases where the deceased was honestly
earning an income ranging between Rs.3000 and
Rs.12,000 per annum. Be that as it may.
37. The principles relating to determination of
liability and quantum of compensation are
different for claims made under Section 163-A of
the MV Act and claims under Section 166 of the
MV Act. (See Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs.
Meena Variyal): 2007 (5) SCC 428). Section 163-
A and the Second Schedule in terms do not apply
to determination of compensation in applications
under Section 166. In Trilok Chandra: 4 (1996) 4
SCC 362, this Court, after reiterating the
principles stated in Susamma Thomas: (1994) 2
SCC 176, however, held that the operative
(maximum) multiplier, should be increased as 18
(instead of 16 indicated in Susamma Thomas):
(1994) 2 SCC 176, even in cases under Section
166 of the MV Act, by borrowing the principle
underlying Section 163-A and the Second
Schedule.
38. This Court observed in Trilok Chandra 4
(1996) 4 SCC 362:
"17. Section 163-A begins with a non
obstante clause and provides for
payment of compensation, as indicated
in the Second Schedule, to the legal
representatives of the deceased or
injured, as the case may be. Now if we
turn to the Second Schedule, we find a
table fixing the mode of calculation of
compensation for third party accident
injury claims arising out of fatal
accidents. The first column gives the
age group of the victims of accident,
the second column indicates the
multiplier and the subsequent
horizontal figures indicate the quantum
of compensation in thousand payable to
the heirs of the deceased victim.
According to this table the multiplier
varies from 5 to 18 depending on the
age group to which the victim belonged.
Thus, under this Schedule the maximum
multiplier can be up to 18 and not 16 as
was held in Susamma Thomas case:
(1994) 2 SCC 176."
"18. ...Besides, the selection of
multiplier cannot in all cases be solely
dependent on the age of the deceased.
For example, if the deceased, a
bachelor, dies at the age of 45 and his
dependents are his parents, age of the
parents would also be relevant in the
choice of the multiplier......What we
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propose to emphasise is that the
multiplier cannot exceed 18 years'
purchase factor. This is the
improvement over the earlier position
that ordinarily it should not exceed
16..."
Referring the same, Learned Counsel, Mr. S.
Bhattacharjee representing the respondent plaintiffs
submitted that at the time of calculation, Learned Trial Court
below determined the multiplier 17 but the Learned First
Appellate Court after hearing both the sides in view of the
principles of the aforesaid judgment determined the
multiplier as 18 and accordingly, rightly and reasonably
determined the amount of compensation and furthermore,
the Learned First Appellate Court also in exercise of the
power provided under Order XLI, Rule 33 of CPC modified
the quantum of compensation awarded by Learned Trial
Court and rightly delivered the judgment.
14. Further in V. Mekala vs. M. Malathi and
Another dated 25.04.2014 reported in (2014) 11 SCC
178, Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Para 20 observed as
under:
"20.Therefore, in the light of the principles laid
down in the aforesaid case, it would be just and
proper for this Court, and keeping in mind her
past results we take 10,000 as her monthly
notional income for computation of just and
reasonable compensation under the head of loss
of income. Further, the High Court has failed to
take into consideration the future prospects of
income based on the principles laid down by this
Court in catena of cases referred to supra.
Therefore, the appellant is justified in seeking for
re-enhancement under this head as well and we
hold that the appellant claimant is entitled to
50% increase under this head as per the principle
laid down by this Court in Santosh Devi: (2012) 6
Page 13 of 24
SCC 421. The relevant paragraph reads as under:
(SCC pp. 426-27, para 13)
"13. In Sarla Verma case: (2009) 6 SCC
121, another two-Judge Bench
considered various factors relevant for
determining the compensation payable
in cases involving motor accidents,
noticed apparent divergence in the
views expressed by this Court in
different cases, referred to large
number of precedents including the
judgments in U.P. SRTC v. Trilok
Chandra: (1996) 4 SCC 362, Nance v.
British Columbia Electric Railway Co.
Ltd.: 1951 AC 601, Davies v. Powell
Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd. (No. 2
): 1942 AC 601 and made an attempt to
limit the exercise of discretion by the
Tribunals and the High Courts in the
matter of award of compensation by
laying down straightjacket formula
under different headings, some of
which are enumerated below: (Sarla
Verma Case: (2009) 6 SCC 121, SCC pp.
133-34, para 24)
Question (i)-Addition to income for
future prospects
24. In Susamma Thomas: (1994) 2 SCC
121 this Court increased the income by
nearly 100%, in Sarla Dixit: (1996) 3
SCC 179 the income was increased only
by 50% and in Abati Bezbaruah: (2003)
3 SCC 148 the income was increased by
a mere 7%. In view of the
imponderables and uncertainties, we
are in favour of adopting as a rule of
thumb, an addition of 50% of actual
salary to the actual salary income of the
deceased towards future prospects,
where the deceased had a permanent
job and was below 40 years. (Where
the annual income is in the taxable
range, the words "actual salary" should
be read as "actual salary less tax".) The
addition should be only 30% if the age
of the deceased was 40 to 50 years.
There should be no addition, where the
age of the deceased is more than 50
years. Though the evidence may
indicate a different percentage of
increase, it is necessary to standardise
the addition to avoid different
yardsticks being applied or different
methods of calculation being adopted.
Where the deceased was self-employed
or was on a fixed salary (without
provision for annual increments, etc.),
the courts will usually take only the
actual income at the time of death. A
departure therefrom should be made
only in rare and exceptional cases
involving special circumstances.
Therefore, taking both the aspects into account,
the total amount of compensation under this head
Page 14 of 24
is calculated as Rs 22,68,000 [(Rs 10,000 x
70/100 + Rs 10,000 x 70/100 x 50/100) x 12 x
18]"
15. In National Insurance Company Limited vs.
Pranay Sethi and Others dated 31.10.2017 reported in
(2017) 16 SCC 680, Hon'ble the Apex Court relying upon
the earlier judgment Sarla Verma(supra) in Para 10 and
11 have observed as under:
"10. The three-Judge Bench further apprised
itself that in Sarla Verma: (2009) 6 SCC 121 the
Court had undertaken the exercise of comparing
the multiplier indicated in Susamma Thomas:
(1994) 2 SCC 176, Trilok Chandra (1996) 4 SCC
362, and New India Assurance Co. Ltd v.
Charlie: (2005) 10 SCC 720 for claims
under Section 166 of the Act with the multiplier
mentioned in the Second Schedule for claims
under Section 163-A and compared the formula
and held that the multiplier shall be used in a
given case in the following manner:(Reshma
Kumari Case: (2013) 9 SCC 65, SCC p.86, para 29)
"29. ...‟42. We therefore hold that the
multiplier to be used should be as
mentioned in Column (4) of the Table
above (prepared by applying Susamma
Thomas (1994) 2 SCC 176, Trilok
Chandra (1996) 4 SCC362 and Charlie:
(2005) 10 SCC 720, which starts with
an operative multiplier of 18 (for the
age groups of 15 to 20 and 21 to 25
years), reduced by one unit for every
five years, that is, M-17 for 26 to 30
years, M-16 for 31 to 35 years, M-15 for
36 to 40 years, M-14 for 41 to 45 years,
and M-13 for 46 to 50 years, then
reduced by two units for every five
years, that is, M-11 for 51 to 55 years,
M-9 for 56 to 60 years, M-7 for 61 to 65
years and M-5 for 66 to 70 years." Sarla
Verma Case: (2009) 6 SCC 121, SCC p.
140, para 42)".
11. After elaborately analysing what has been
stated in Sarla Verma: (2009) 6 SCC 121, the
three-Judge Bench referred to the language
employed in Section 168 of the Act which uses
the expression "just". Elucidating the said term,
the Court held that it conveys that the amount so
determined is fair, reasonable and equitable by
accepted legal standard and not on forensic
lottery. The Court observed "just compensation"
does not mean "perfect" or "absolute
compensation" and the concept of just
compensation principle requires examination of
the particular situation obtaining uniquely in an
individual case. In that context, it referred to Taff
Page 15 of 24
Vale Railway Co. v. Jenkins: 1913 AC 1 and held:
(Reshma Kumari case: (2013) 9 SCC 65, SCC p.
88, para 36.
"36. In Sarla Verma: (2009) 6 SCC 121,
this Court has endeavoured to simplify
the otherwise complex exercise of
assessment of loss of dependency and
determination of compensation in a
claim made under Section 166. It has
been rightly stated in Sarla Verma:
(2009) 6 SCC 121that the claimants in
case of death claim for the purposes of
compensation must establish (a) age of
the deceased; (b) income of the
deceased; and (c) the number of
dependants. To arrive at the loss of
dependency, the Tribunal must consider
(i) additions/deductions to be made for
arriving at the income; (ii) the
deductions to be made towards the
personal living expenses of the
deceased; and (iii) the multiplier to be
applied with reference to the age of the
deceased. We do not think it is
necessary for us to revisit the law on
the point as we are in full agreement
with the view in Sarla Verma: (2009) 6
SCC 121."
(emphasis supplied)
Referring the aforesaid citations Learned Counsel,
Mr. S Bhattacharjee further submitted that the Learned First
Appellate Court after taking into consideration all the aspects
determined the monthly notional income of the deceased as
Rs. 15,000/- (Rupees fifteen thousand only) per month
considering the inflation of money in India in the year 2013
as the accident took place in that year and determined the
compensation accordingly and urged this Court to uphold the
judgment of the Learned First Appellate Court. Further, it
was asserted by the Learned Counsel for the respondent-
plaintiffs that at the time of alleged accident, the deceased
was at his 20 years of age as per exhibit-2 relied upon by
the respondent-plaintiffs before the Learned Court below and
Page 16 of 24
accordingly, Learned Court below rightly determined the
multiplier as 18.
16. In Kurvan Ansari Alias Kurvan Ali and
Another vs. Shyam Kishore Murmu and Another dated
16.11.2021 reported in (2022) 1 SCC 317, Hon'ble the
Supreme Court in Para 16 and 17 observed as under:
"16. In view of the above, we deem it appropriate
to take notional income of the deceased at Rs
25,000 (Rupees twenty-five thousand only) per
annum. Accordingly, when the notional income is
multiplied with applicable multiplier 15, as
prescribed in Schedule II for the claims
under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act,
1988, it comes to Rs 3,75,000 (Rs.25,000 x
Multiplier 15) towards loss of dependency. The
appellants are also entitled to a sum of Rs. 40,000
each towards filial consortium and Rs.15,000
towards funeral expenses. Thus, the appellants
are entitled to the following amounts towards
compensation:
(a) Loss of Dependency : Rs. 3,75,000-00
(b)Filial Consortium(Rs.40,000 x 2):Rs.80,000-00
(c) Funeral Expenses : Rs. 15,000-00
-----------------
Total : Rs. 4,70,000-00
17. Accordingly, the appellants are entitled for a
sum of Rs.4,70,000 (Rupees four lakhs seventy
thousand only) towards total compensation with
interest @ 6% p.a. from the date of claim petition
till the date of realisation. The enhanced
compensation shall be apportioned between the
appellants as ordered by the Tribunal. The entire
compensation shall be paid to the appellants by
Respondent No 2 insurance company, and we
keep it open to the insurance company to recover
the same from Respondent 1 owner of the
motorcycle by initiating appropriate proceedings
as the motorcycle was driven by the driver who
was not possessing valid driving licence on the
date of the accident."
17. In Roop Lal and Another vs. Suresh Kumar
Yadav and Others dated 04.01.2022 reported in (2022)
SCC OnLine All 25, Hon'ble the Apex Court in Para 12 and
13 observed as under:
"12. Recently, the Hon‟ble Apex Court has decided
the controversy ans(sic.) settled the law
regarding the death of a child in Kurvan Ansari @
Kurvan Ali v. Shyam Kishore Murmu, (2021) 4
TAC 673 (Supreme Court). In this case, the
Hon‟ble Apex Court has stated that in spite of
repeated directions, Scheduled-II of Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988 is not yet amended. Therefore,
fixing notional income of Rs.15,000/- per annum
for non earning members is not just and
reasonable. It is further stated by the Apex Court
that in view of the judgments in the cases of
Puttamma v. K.L. Narayana Reddy (2014) (1) TAC
926 and Kishan Gopal v. Lala, (2013) 4 TAC 5. It
is a fit case to increase the notional income by
taking into account the inflation, devaluation of
the rupees and cost of living.
13. With the aforesaid observations, the Hon‟ble
Apex Court took the notional income of the
deceased at Rs. 25,000/- per annum, hence we
are of the considered view that notional income of
the deceased must be assumed Rs. 25,000/- per
annum as he was non-earning member.
Accordingly, when the notional income is
multiplied with applicable multiplier „15‟ as
prescribed in Scheduled-II for the claims under
Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, it
comes to Rs. 3,75,000/- towards loss of
dependency. The appellant nos. 1 and 2 are also
entitled to a sum of Rs.40,000/- each towards
filial consortium and Rs.15,000/- funeral
expense. Hence, the appellant nos. 1 and 2 are
entitled to the following amount towards
compensation;
(i)Loss of Dependency : 25,000/- X 15 =
Rs.3,75,000/-
(ii) Filial consortium : 40,000/- X 2 = Rs.80,000/-
(iii)Funeral expenses : Rs.15,000/-
(iv)Total compensation : Rs.4,70,000/-"
Referring the said judgments, Learned Counsel
Mr. Bhattacharjee further submitted that in view of the
principles of the aforesaid judgment, Learned First Appellate
Court ought to have considered the filial consortium of Rs.
80,000/-(Rs.40,000X2), but the Learned First Appellate
Court erred in considering the filial consortium at the time of
determination of the amount of compensation, which may
kindly be awarded in favour of respondent-plaintiffs.
18. Finally, Learned Counsel urged before the Court
that there is no scope to interfere with the judgment passed
by Learned First Appellate Court and submitted before the
Court to uphold the judgment of the Learned First Appellate
Court.
19. I have heard arguments of both the sides at
length and gone through the records of the Learned Court
below. As I have already stated that the Learned Counsel for
the appellants at the time of hearing only confined his
arguments regarding calculation/determination of
compensation by the Learned Trial Court as well as the
Learned First Appellate Court. Excepting that no further
arguments were raised by Learned Counsel for the
appellants. After going through the records of the Learned
Court below, it appears that there is no dispute on record in
respect of death of the deceased, Dharma Bhakta Jamatia on
the alleged day i.e. on 13.05.2013. Now here in the Second
Appeal, the main question for consideration is as to whether
the Learned First Appellate Court rightly determined the
amount of compensation at the time of delivering the
judgment. After hearing the Learned Counsel for the
contesting parties and also after going through the judgment
of the Learned Trial Court as well as the Learned First
Appellate Court, it appears that the Learned Trial Court in
determining the amount of compensation relied upon the
Second Schedule of M.V. Act and determined the amount
compensation in view of the provision under Section 163-A
of M.V. Act on structured formula basis. But the Learned First
Appellate Court, at the time of delivering the judgment and
in view of the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court of India as stated above, determined the compensation
amount/damage taking multiplier 18 instead of 17 as taken
up for consideration by the Learned Trial Court. Since on the
date of accident the age of deceased was 20 years, so, in
view of the judgment of National Insurance Company Limited
Vs. Pranay Sethi and Ors.(supra) which confirmed the
judgment of Sarla Verma (Smt) and Others v. Delhi
Transport Corporation and Another(supra), in my considered
view, Learned First Appellate Court rightly determined the
amount of compensation and furthermore, taking into
consideration, the multiplier as 18, the Learned First
Appellate Court in exercise of the power conferred under
Order XLI, Rule 33 of CPC modified the amount of
compensation determined by the Learned Trial Court.
Furthermore, Learned First Appellate Court determined the
notional income of the deceased at the rate of Rs. 15,000/-
(Rupees fifteen thousand only) per month and thereafter
deducted 50% towards personal and living expenses of the
deceased, and after deducting personal expenses he
calculated the amount of compensation as Rs. 16,20,000/-
(Rupees sixteen lakhs and twenty thousand only) and along
with that amount, Learned First Appellate Court added Rs.
30,000/- (Rs. 15,000 as funeral expenses+ Rs. 15,000 as
loss of estate), in view of the judgment of National
Insurance Company Limited Vs. Pranay Sethi and
Ors.(supra). In Para 52 of the said judgment the Hon'ble
Apex Court observed as under:
"52. As far as the conventional heads are
concerned, we find it difficult to agree with the
view expressed in Rajesh. It has granted Rs.
25,000/- towards funeral expenses, Rs.
1,00,000/- loss of consortium and Rs. 1,00,000/-
towards loss of care and guidance for minor
children. The head relating to loss of care and
minor children does not exist. Though Rajesh
refers to Santosh Devi, it does not seem to follow
the same. The conventional and traditional heads,
needless to say, cannot be determined on
percentage basis because that would not be an
acceptable criterion. Unlike determination of
income, the said heads have to be quantified. Any
quantification must have a reasonable foundation.
There can be no dispute over the fact that price
index, fall in bank interest, escalation of rates in
many a field have to be noticed. The court cannot
remain oblivious to the same. There has been a
thumb rule in this aspect. Otherwise, there will be
extreme difficulty in determination of the same
and unless the thumb rule is applied, there will be
immense variation lacking any kind of consistency
as a consequence of which, the orders passed by
the tribunals and courts are likely to be unguided.
Therefore, we think it seemly to fix reasonable
sums. It seems to us that reasonable figures on
conventional heads, namely, loss of estate, loss of
consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs.
15,000/-, Rs. 40,000/- and Rs. 15,000/-
respectively. The principle of revisiting the said
heads is an acceptable principle. But the revisit
should not be fact-centric or quantum-centric. We
think that it would be condign that the amount
that we have quantified should be enhanced on
percentage basis in every three years and the
enhancement should be at the rate of 10% in a
span of three years. We are disposed to hold so
because that will bring in consistency in respect
of those heads."
20. Further, in Para 11, of the judgment of Pranay
Sethi(supra) as referred above, certain observations were
also made.
21. In course of hearing none of the Learned Lawyers
of either of the parties could satisfy the Court as to whether
Section 163-A of M.V Act read with the Second Schedule of
M.V Act or Section 166 of M.V Act would be applied for
determination of compensation in the given case or not.
Learned Trial Court below determined the amount of
compensation under Section 163-A of M.V Act following the
Second Schedule and on the other hand, Learned First
Appellate Court determined the amount of compensation
under Section 166 of M.V Act. But nowhere in the judgment,
Learned First Appellate Court made any observation as to
why he has considered to determine the compensation under
Section 166 of M.V Act. Learned First Appellate Court
observed that in view of the power conferred under Order
XLI Rule 33 of CPC he has modified the award but that power
cannot be exercised for determination of compensation in
upper limit, as he applied.
22. In this regard, I would like to refer herein below
the Para Nos. 31 to 34 of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme
Court of India reported in (2013) 9 SCC 65 in Reshma
Kumari And Others vs. Madan Mohan and Another
dated 02.04.2013, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has
observed as under:
"31. Section 168 of the 1988 Act provides the
guideline that the amount of compensation shall
be awarded by the Claims Tribunal which appears
to it to be just. The expression, "just" means that
the amount so determined is fair, reasonable and
equitable by accepted legal standards and not a
forensic lottery. Obviously "just compensation"
does not mean "perfect‟‟ or „„absolute‟‟
compensation. The just compensation principle
requires examination of the particular situation
obtaining uniquely in an individual case.
32. Almost a century back in Taff Vale Railway Co.
v. Jenkins (1913) AC 1 the House of Lords laid
down the test that award of damages in fatal
accident action is compensation for the
reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit by
the deceased‟s family. The purpose of award of
compensation is to put the dependants of the
deceased, who had been breadwinner of the
family, in the same position financially as if he
had lived his natural span of life; it is not
designed to put the claimants in a better financial
position in which they would otherwise have been
if the accident had not occurred. At the same
time, the determination of compensation is not an
exact science and the exercise involves an
assessment based on estimation and conjectures
here and there as many imponderable factors and
unpredictable contingencies have to be taken into
consideration.
33. This Court in C.K. Subramania Iyer v. T.
Kunhikuttan Nair (1969) 3 SCC 64 , reiterated the
legal philosophy highlighted in Taff Vale Railway
(1913) AC 1 for award of compensation in claim
cases and said that there is no exact uniform rule
for measuring the value of the human life and the
measure of damages cannot be arrived at by
precise mathematical calculations. Obviously,
award of damages in each case would depend on
the particular facts and circumstances of the case
but the element of fairness in the amount of
compensation so determined is the ultimate
guiding factor.
34. In Susamma Thomas (1994) 2 SCC 176, this
Court, though with reference to Section 110-B of
the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, stated that the
multiplier method was the accepted norm of
ensuring the just compensation which will make
for uniformity and certainty of the awards. We
are of the opinion that this statement in Susamma
Thomas (1994) 2 SCC 176 is equally applicable to
the fatal accident claims made under Section
166 of the 1988 Act. In our view, the
determination of compensation based on
multiplier method is the best available means and
the most satisfactory method and must be
followed invariably by the tribunals and courts."
So, after going through the principle of the
aforesaid citation, we can safely come to the conclusion that
the award of damages in fatal accident action is
compensation for the reasonable expectation of pecuniary
benefits by the deceased family and further it appears that in
fatal accident claim cases it would be prudent if the claims
are made under Section 166 of the MV Act. So, in my
considered view, the Learned First Appellate Court after
taking into consideration all aspects has rightly and
reasonably had delivered the judgment modifying the
judgment of the Learned Trial Court although nothing was
expressed by the First Appellate Court as to why he opted to
determine compensation under Section 166 of M.V Act.
23. Thus, after considering the factual and legal
aspects and after hearing both the sides and also after going
through the compensation determined by the Learned First
Appellate Court it appears that in view of the principles of
the aforesaid judgment as referred above, the Learned First
Appellate Court at the time of delivering the judgment has
rightly and reasonably after taking into consideration all
aspects had delivered the judgment and there was no
infirmity in the judgment delivered by the Learned First
Appellate Court modifying the judgment of Learned Trial
Court. So, this Court does not find any merit in appeal to
interfere the judgment of the Learned First Appellate Court.
For want of evidence nothing is considered to be
granted/awarded as consortium as prayed for.
24. Thus, this present appeal stands bereft of merit
and accordingly, it is dismissed. The substantial question of
law accordingly answered in negative against the present
appellants of this case.
25. In the result, the appeal filed by the appellants is
hereby dismissed on contest with costs. Pending application,
if any, also stands disposed of. The judgment dated
19.02.2021 and decree dated 04.03.2021 delivered by
Learned Addl. District Judge, West Tripura, Agartala in
Money Appeal No.01 of 2019 is hereby upheld and
accordingly it is affirmed.
Prepare decree accordingly and send down the
LCRs.
JUDGE
MOUMITA Digitally signed by MOUMITA DATTA
DATTA
Date: 2024.01.29 14:29:12 +05'30'
Purnita
