Sri Sabyasachi Singh vs The State Of Tripura
2023 Latest Caselaw 376 Tri

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                   HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
                         AGARTALA

                          WP(C) No.542 of 2022
                                 With
                          WP(C) No.178 of 2022

Sri Sabyasachi Singh,
S/O Lt. Indrajit Singh,
resident of Arundhuti Nagar, Road No.9,
P.O. A.D. Nagar, Pin:799003, Agartala,
District: West Tripura.
                                                             ....Petitioner(s)
                        Versus
1. The State of Tripura
represented by the Principal Secretary, GA(AR)
Department, Government of Tripura, New Secretariat
PIN-799010, Agartala, West Tripura
2. The Principal Secretary,
GA(AR) Department, Government of Tripura,
New Secretariat, PIN-799010, Agartala, West Tripura.
3. Sri Pradeep Kumar Chakravarty, IAS
Inquiring Authority, Secretary, Science,
Technology & Environment Department, Government
of Tripura, Agartala, West Tripura.
                                                           ....Respondent(s)

For the Petitioner(s)                :     Mr. C.S. Sinha, Advocate
For the Respondent(s)                :     Mr. M. Debbarma, Addl. GA
Date of hearing
and delivery of
judgment & order                     :     15.05.2023
Whether fit for reporting            :     Yes

             HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARINDAM LODH
                        Judgment and Order (Oral)

              By means of filing the instant writ petition, the petitioner has

prayed for quashing the order dated 10.06.2022 whereby the Disciplinary

Authority appointed an inquiring authority other than the inquiring
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authority who held the disciplinary proceeding earlier on the same charge

and further directing the newly appointed inquiring authority to inquire

into the charge framed against the petitioner.

2.           The factual background of the case is as under:

             (i) In a departmental proceeding, Sri B.K. Sahu, IAS was the

Inquiring Authority. In his findings dated 31.03.2021, he held the

petitioner not guilty of the alleged misconduct.

             (ii) After going through the findings and conclusions of the

Inquiry Authority, the Disciplinary Authority disagreed with the findings

of Sri Sahu, the Inquiring Authority and remitted the matter for fresh

enquiry into the matter by appointing a new Inquiry Authority namely,

Sri Sriram Taranikanti, IAS under the order dated 06.07.2021.

             (iii) It is pertinent to mention herein that before issuance of

the impugned order dated 10.06.2022, the Disciplinary Authority made an

order dated 28.01.2022 appointing the Commissioner of Departmental

Inquiries(for short, Commissioner of Inquiries) for conducting a fresh

inquiry into the charges framed against the petitioner. Against the said

order dated 28.01.2022, the petitioner had filed a writ petition, which was

registered as WP(C) No.178 of 2022. However, during pendency of the

said writ petition, the Disciplinary Authority cancelled the order dated

28.01.2022 by order dated 24.02.2022(Annexure-4 to the writ petition).

The Disciplinary Authority issued another order dated 25.04.2022,

whereby the phrase "fresh inquiry" had been modified to "further
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inquiry". The petitioner had challenged the said order dated 25.04.2022

by way of filing a writ petition being numbered as WP(C) No.444 of

2022. While issuing notice upon the respondents, as an interim measure, a

direction had been passed by this Court on 23.05.2022 upon the

Disciplinary Authority asking him not to pass any effective order in the

said departmental proceeding(Annexure-6 and 7 to the writ petition).

During the pendency of WP(C) No.444 of 2022, the Disciplinary

Authority had issued the impugned order dated 10.06.2022 (Annexure-8

to the writ petition) which has been challenged in the present writ

petition, whereby and whereunder, Sri Pradeep Kumar Chakravarty, IAS

has been appointed as Inquiry Authority tempting the petitioner to file the

instant writ petition.

3.           I have heard Mr. C.S. Sinha, learned counsel appearing for

the petitioner and Mr. M. Debbarma, learned Addl. GA appearing on

behalf of the respondents.

4.           Mr. Sinha, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has

submitted that the impugned order dated 10.06.2022 (Annexure-8 to the

writ petition) issued by the Disciplinary Authority is nothing but an order

of holding a fresh inquiry which is impermissible in law. Mr. Sinha,

learned counsel has further argued that Rule 15(1) of CCS(CC&A) Rules,

1965 (for short, Rules 1965) ibid empowers the Disciplinary Authority to

remit the case to the inquiring authority for further inquiry, but, there is

no provision in Rule 15 for completely setting aside the previous inquiry
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on the ground that the report of the Inquiry Authority does not appeal to

the Disciplinary Authority. According to learned counsel for the

petitioner, Rule 15 of the Rules, 1965 provides for one inquiry, and not

successive inquiries.

5.            Proceeding further, learned counsel for the petitioner has

argued that the order for further inquiry by the Inquiring Authority other

than the former Inquiring Authority, who conducted the inquiry means

that the earlier inquiry is dumped and set aside. In support of this

submission, learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the case of

K.R. Deb vs. Collector of Central Excise, Shillong reported in AIR 1971

SC 1447.

6.            Lastly, Mr. Sinha, learned counsel has argued that the action

of the Disciplinary Authority was actuated with malice against the

petitioner.

7.            Per contra, Mr. Debbarma, learned Addl. GA would contend

that the Disciplinary Authority has not committed any wrong to remit the

matter for further inquiry by an Inquiring Authority other than the

Inquiring Authority, who held the inquiry earlier on the charges levelled

against the petitioner.

8.            According to learned Addl. GA, neither under Rule 14 nor

under Rule 15 of Rules, 1965, it is postulated that Disciplinary Authority

cannot make an order to hold further inquiry by different Inquiring

Authority other than the Inquiring Authority who held the inquiry
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proceeding earlier. Learned Addl. GA has further submitted that it is

within the domain of the Disciplinary Authority to choose an Inquiry

Authority to enquire the imputations of misconduct under Articles of

Charges. As such, according to learned Addl. GA, there is no illegality or

arbitrariness in issuing the impugned order dated 10.06.2022 by the

Disciplinary Authority appointing a new Inquiring Authority, namely, Sri

Pradeep Kumar Chakravarty to enquire into the charges framed against

the petitioner.

9.           I have considered the rival submissions advanced by learned

counsel appearing for the parties and also perused the documents

enclosed with the writ petition as well as the counter-affidavit.

10.          Analysis on facts:

             At the outset, I should mention the charges levelled against

the petitioner.

10.1.        The main allegation is that the petitioner while acting as

Deputy Collector attended National Lok Adalat held on 18.12.2016.

During the process, a settlement was reached by him and the petitioners

of the Civil.Misc LA No.04 of 2013 and Civil.Misc LA No.05 of 2013

determining the value of the acquired land at Rs.5.00 lakh per kani.

According to the Disciplinary Authority, the said amount determined

during the course of settlement was excessive and there was something

fishy, thereby, questioned the integrity of the petitioner. So, he proposed a

departmental inquiry appointing an Inquiring Authority namely, Mr.
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     Sahu. Evidences were recorded by the department as well as the charged

     officer i.e. the petitioner herein. Upon conclusion of the inquiry, the

     Inquiring Authority held that the charges levelled against the petitioner

     have not been proved and the petitioner was exonerated after being held

     to be not guilty of committing any misconduct.

     10.2.        The Disciplinary Authority disagreed with the findings of

     the Inquiring Authority and proposed to make an inquiry afresh by a

     newly appointed Inquiring Authority. According to the petitioner, the

     impugned order dated 10.06.2022 is unwarranted being contrary to Rule

     15(1) of Rules, 1965 and also suffers from the vice of arbitrariness.

     10.3.        At the outset, the impugned order dated 10.06.2022 is

     necessary to be reproduced here-in-below, for convenience in extenso:

                    "GOVERNMENT OF TRIPURA
             GENERAL ADMINISTRATION(AR) DEPARTMENT

NO.F.11(5)-GA(AR)/2019/971-975              Dated, Agartala, the 10th June, 2022

                                     ORDER

WHEREAS, an enquiry under Rule 14 of the CCS(CC&A) Rules, 1965 is being held against Shri Sabyasachi Singh, the then Land Acquisition Officer, O/o the DM, North Tripura, Dharmanagar;

AND WHEREAS, the undersigned considers that an Inquiring Authority should be appointed to enquire into the charge framed against him;

AND WHEREAS, the Commissioner of Departmental Inquiries (CDI) was appointed as Inquiring Authority vide order No.F.11(5)- GA(AR)/2019/726-29 dated 25-04-2022 but the present Inquiring Authority is over burden and therefore, the Government has decided to appoint another Inquiring Authority in place of the present Inquiring Authority.

NOW THEREFORE, in pursuance of sub-rule (2) of Rule-14 of the CCS(CC&A) Rules, 1965 and the Notification No.F.5(1)-

GA(AR)/2002(P-I) dated 28th September, 2004, the undersigned hereby appoints the Shri Pradeep Kr. Chakravarty, IAS, Secretary to the Government of Tripura as Inquiring Authority to inquiry into the charge framed against Shri Singh.

This is in partial modification of the earlier order No.F.11(5)- GA(AR)/2019/726-29 dated 25-04-2022 issued by the GA(AR) Department.

-sd illegible-

(L.H. Darlong) Principal Secretary to the Government of Tripura (Disciplinary Authority)"

11. Legal issues arising out of the impugned order dated

10.06.2022:

On perusal of the aforesaid order tempts this Court to make a

query to learned Addl. GA as to the fact that whether there is any

document to justify the reason assigned to the Disciplinary Authority.

Since the present Inquiry Authority was overburdened, he had to appoint

a new Inquiring Authority. Further query made by this Court is that

whether the present Inquiring Authority had informed the Disciplinary

Authority that he was overburdened and he was not in a position to hold

the inquiry.

11.1. Mr. Debbarma, learned Addl. GA has fairly submitted that

there is no such evidence to justify that the Inquiring Authority who

conducted the inquiry earlier and held the petitioner not guilty was

overburdened or informed the Disciplinary Authority about his inability

to conduct fresh or further inquiry.

12. In view of this, I am constrained to observe that the

Disciplinary Authority appears to be acted arbitrarily and unreasonably in

exercising his administrative duties and responsibilities. It is fair

expectation that the statutory authorities will not deviate from the path of

fairplay. It is settled proposition of law that fairness and fairplay is an

integral part of all administrative actions.

13. Now coming to the question of appointing a new Inquiring

Authority, in my opinion, the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority

remitting the matter back with further direction that the Articles of

Charges framed against the petitioner is to be enquired by a different

Inquiry Authority is not sustainable in law being inconsistent to Rule

15(1) of Rules, 1965. Legal position is very clear in this regard that

before appointing a new Inquiry Authority, the Disciplinary Authority is

under obligation to justify that the earlier Inquiry Authority is not

available to conduct further enquiry. To appoint a new inquiring authority

or officer, the Disciplinary Authority has to come to a specific finding

that the inquiring officer who held the inquiry earlier is not available or

has expressed his inability to conduct the inquiry and in my considered

view, this fact has to be informed to the delinquent officer i.e. the charged

officer disclosing the reasons why the Disciplinary Authority would

appoint a new inquiring authority/officer to inquire into the matter for fair

ends of justice.

14. Undoubtedly, the Disciplinary Authority is empowered to

disagree with the findings of the inquiring authority and to pass an order

of penalty or to remit the matter for further inquiry by the inquiring

authority but, the law forbids the Disciplinary Authority not to hold fresh

inquiry. He may only pass an order for further inquiry when he finds a

grave lacunae or procedural defects vitiating the first inquiry and not

because of the fact that the first inquiry report had gone in favour of the

delinquent/charged officer.

(emphasis supplied)

15. Furthermore, even if an order of further inquiry is passed,

Rule 15(1) of Rules, 1965 does not contemplate that the earlier inquiry be

totally dumped for good and a fresh inquiry be conducted. The language

of Rule 15(1) of Rules, 1965 is very clear and unambiguous. The phrase

used in this rule is "The Inquiring Authority" and not "an Inquiring

Authority". This categorically implies that the further inquiry is to be

held by the same inquiring authority who held the earlier inquiry.

(emphasis supplied)

16. For convenience, Rule 15(1) of Rules, 1965 may be

abstracted here-in-below:

"15. Action on the inquiry report (1) The Disciplinary Authority, if it is not itself the Inquiring Authority may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, remit the case to the Inquiring Authority for further inquiry and report and the Inquiring Authority shall thereupon proceed to hold the further inquiry according to the provisions of Rule 14, as far as may be.

17. In the case of K.R. Deb (supra), a Constitution Bench of the

Hon'ble Supreme Court had clarified the law in clear terms, where it

was held thus:

"It seems to us that Rule 15, on the face of it, really provides for one inquiry but it may be possible if in a particular case there has been no proper enquiry because some serious defect has crept into the inquiry or some important witnesses were not available at the time of the inquiry or were not examined for some other reason, the Disciplinary Authority may ask the Inquiry Officer to record further evidence. But there is no provision in rule 15 for completely setting aside previous inquiries on the ground that the report- of, the Inquiring Officer or Officers does not appeal to the disciplinary, Authority-. The Disciplinary Authority has enough powers to reconsider the evidence itself and come to its own conclusion under rule 9. In our view the rules do not contemplate an action such as was taken by the Collector on February 13, 1962. It seems to us that the Collector, instead of taking responsibility himself, was determined to get" some officer to report against the appellant. The procedure adopted was not only not warranted by the rules but was harassing to the appellant."

18. Applying the aforesaid law on the subject in issue, I may

clearly hold that the action of the Disciplinary Authority appointing a

new Inquiring Authority to inquire into the charges levelled against the

petitioner is not only unwarranted but also suggests harassing to the

petitioner. On further perusal of the impugned order dated 10.06.2022,

in my considered view, the said impugned order is an order of fresh

inquiry and not further inquiry. The language that "inquiry into the

charge framed against Shri Singh" makes it crystal clear that the newly

appointed Inquiring Authority has been asked to inquire into the charge

afresh. The order does not suggest from which stage the inquiry would

begin and what are the defects in the earlier inquiry, which according to

Disciplinary Authority, have vitiated the proceedings without specifying

the stage from which further inquiry is to be commenced or not

entrusting the further inquiry to the said inquiring officer except for the

reason that the said Inquiring Officer is not available or incapacitated to

hold the inquiry. Such a procedure cannot be termed as a further inquiry,

but, a fresh inquiry or a de-novo inquiry. As held by the Apex Court in

K.R. Deb(supra), there is no provision in Rule 15, ibid, for completely

setting aside the previous inquiries on the ground that the report does not

appeal to the Disciplinary Authority. Further, in the said judgment, the

Constitution Bench has held that it may be possible if in a particular case

there has been no proper inquiry because some serious defect has crept

into the inquiry or some important witnesses were not available at the

time of the inquiry or were not examined for some other reason. It is

further held that the reasons given by the Disciplinary Authority to remit

the case to another Inquiring Authority are not anything to do with any

defects crept into the previous inquiry or any witnesses have been

omitted from examining during the inquiry proceedings. On the other

hand, the reasons given by the Disciplinary Authority are either quite

extraneous or factually incorrect.

19. In the instant case also, the reasons assigned by the

Disciplinary Authority to remit the case to another Inquiring Authority

are not anything to do with any serious procedural defects crept into the

previous inquiry or some relevant witnesses have not been examined

during previous inquiry. More importantly, in the case in hand, the

Disciplinary Authority has failed to justify the reasons stated in the

impugned order dated 10.06.2022 in entrusting the inquiry to another

Inquiring Authority. To say the least, the reasons given by the

Disciplinary Authority ex facie are factually incorrect which leads this

Court to hold that the impugned order dated 10.06.2022 suffers from the

vice of arbitrariness.

20. For the reasons stated and the legal position on the subject

being analysed here-in-above, the impugned order dated 10.06.2022

calls for interference by this Court and accordingly, it is interfered

consequent to which the same is set aside and quashed.

In the result, the instant writ petition stands allowed and thus

disposed of.

Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed.

JUDGE

Snigdha