[Cites 21, Cited by 0]
Telangana High Court
Sri Azmeera Kailas vs The State Of Telangana on 26 March, 2026
Author: Juvvadi Sridevi
Bench: Juvvadi Sridevi
HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
*****
Criminal Petition No.10711 of 2024
Between:
Sri Azmeera Kailas
...Petitioner
And
The State of Telangana,
rep. by Special Public Prosecutor for ACB,
High Court for the State of Telangana,
through the Inspector of Police,
Anti-Corruption Bureau, City Range -II,
Hyderabad and another
...Respondents
JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON : 26.03.2026
THE HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE JUVVADI SRIDEVI
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers : Yes/No
may be allowed to see the Judgment ?
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be : Yes/No
marked to Law Reporters/Journals ?
3. Whether her Ladyship/ Lordship wish to : Yes/No
see the fair copy of the judgment ?
____________________
JUVVADI SRIDEVI, J
2
THE HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE JUVVADI SRIDEVI
Criminal Petition No.10711 of 2024
DATE: 26.03.2026
Between :
Sri Azmeera Kailas
...Petitioner
And
The State of Telangana,
rep. by Special Public Prosecutor for ACB,
High Court for the State of Telangana,
through the Inspector of Police,
Anti-Corruption Bureau, City Range -II,
Hyderabad and another
...Respondents
For Petitioner : Mr. C.Pratap Reddy, learned Senior
Counsel rep. Mr. C.Sunil Anand
For Respondents : Mr. T.Bala Mohan Reddy, learned Special
Public Prosecutor for ACB for respondent
No.1-State.
< Gist:
> Head Note:
? CITATIONS:
(2002) 1 SCC 149
(2009) 3 SCC 355
(2023) 1 SCC 329
2025 LawSuit (SC) 1509
(2020) 9 SCC 636
2022 Latest Caselaw 2729 Ori [CRLMC No.3407 of 2010]
MANU/SC/0393/2025
MANU/SC/0222/2024
MANU/SC/1590/2025
3
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD
THE HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE JUVVADI SRIDEVI
CRIMINAL PETITION No.10711 of 2024
26 MARCH, 2026
Between:
Sri Azmeera Kailas ... Petitioner
AND
The State of Telangana,
rep. by Special Public Prosecutor for ACB,
High Court for the State of Telangana,
Through the Inspector of Police,
Anti-Corruption Bureau, City Range-II,
Hyderabad and another ...Respondents
:ORDER:
This Criminal Petition is filed under Section 528 of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (previously Section 482 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973) by the petitioner-accused,
seeking to quash the proceedings against him in C.C.No.39 of 2025
pending on the file of the learned Principal Special Judge for SPE and
ACB Cases, Hyderabad (for short 'trial Court'), registered for the
offences under Sections 13(2) read with 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 (for short the 'Act').
2. Heard Mr. C.Pratap Reddy, learned Senior Counsel
representing Mr. C.Sunil Anand, learned counsel for the petitioner and
Mr. T.Balamohan Reddy, learned Special Public Prosecutor for ACB
appearing for respondent No.1-State.
3. Brief facts of the case:
3.1. On receiving credible information that one Dheeravathu
Koteswara Rao, Assistant Divisional Engineer, APCPDCL,
Rajendranagar, Ranga Reddy District, had acquired assets
disproportionate to his known source of income by indulging in corrupt
practices, a case in Crime No.33/ACB-CR2/2010, dated 21.12.2010
was registered against him.
3.2. During the course of investigation, the house of the
petitioner, who is a friend and colleague of the said Koteswara Rao
and had purchased certain assets jointly with him, was searched on
22.12.2010 after obtaining a search warrant from the competent Court.
During the search, documents relating to assets, income and
expenditure were seized under inventory, for the purpose of
investigation.
3.3. On analysis, it was found that the petitioner worked as a
public servant from 25.01.2002 to 22.12.2010 and he acquired assets
in the shape of a residential building and agricultural land worth
Rs.67,39,652/- (Rs.70,26,744/- as per the charge sheet) in his name
and in the name of his brother-in-law. His income from known sources
was Rs.33,14,000/- (Rs.46,84,451/- as per the charge sheet) and his
expenditure during the relevant period was calculated at
Rs.12,77,801/- (Rs.16,61,741/- as per the charge sheet), leaving likely
savings of Rs.20,36,199/- (Rs.30,22,710/- as per the charge sheet).
Thus, he was found in possession of disproportionate assets of
Rs.47,03,453/- (Rs.40,04,034/- as per the charge sheet), for which he
could not satisfactorily account for it.
3.4. Accordingly, a case in Crime No.14/ACB-CR-2/2011, dated
24.06.2011 was registered against the petitioner. After obtaining
sanction, the Investigation Officer had filed a charge sheet on
31.01.2025, which was taken cognizance of by the trial Court and
numbered as C.C.No.39 of 2025 for the aforesaid offences.
4. Following are the submissions of learned Senior
Counsel for the petitioner:
4.1. The petitioner is innocent and has been falsely implicated in
the present case. He is in no way concerned with the offences alleged.
4.2. A house search was conducted at the residence of the
petitioner on 22.12.2010, however, a case in Crime No.14/ACB-CR-2/
2011 was registered against him on 24.06.2011 i.e., nearly six months
after the said search.
4.3. Subsequently, the Investigation Officer issued a notice,
dated 15.06.2013 calling upon the petitioner to explain the
disproportionate assets possessed by him. In response, the petitioner
submitted a detailed explanation on 12.08.2013. Further, he also
submitted an explanation to the Principal Secretary, Energy
Department, Telangana Secretariat, Hyderabad on 08.12.2014,
explaining all his assets and sources of income.
4.4. After submission of the petitioner's explanation, there was no
progress in the investigation for several years. Aggrieved by the
abnormal delay of 14 years in completing the investigation, the
petitioner approached this Court in the year, 2024 by filing the present
Criminal Petition seeking quashing of the proceedings. Only thereafter,
in a hurried manner, the Investigation Officer obtained sanction on
15.10.2024 and mechanically filed the charge sheet on 31.01.2025
without any plausible explanation for the inordinate delay of 14 years in
conducting investigation.
4.5. It is a settled principle of law that the sanctioning authority
must consider and decide the proposal of grant of sanction within a
period of three months, extendable by a further period of one month,
only in exceptional circumstances. Thus, a decision on sanction is to
be taken by the sanctioning authority within four months.
4.6. The sanction granted by the sanctioning authority is vitiated,
as the same has been accorded in a routine and mechanical manner,
after an inordinate delay of 14 years, without due application of mind
and only after filing the present criminal petition. Such prolonged and
unexplained delay in investigation and grant of sanction has caused
serious prejudice to the petitioner and deprived him of his rightful
promotions.
4.7. In support of the said contentions, learned Senior Counsel
relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mahendralal
Das v. State of Bihar 1 and drawn attention of this Court to paragraph
Nos.6 to 8, wherein, it was held as follows:
"6. In this case the prosecution has miserably failed to
explain the delay of more than 13 years by now, in granting
the sanction for prosecution of the appellant-accused of
possessing disproportionate wealth of about Rs 50,600. The
authorities of the respondent State also appear to be not
satisfied about the merits of the case and were convinced
that despite granting of sanction the trial would be a mere
formality and an exercise in futility.
7. In cases of corruption the amount involved is not material
but speedy justice is the mandate of the Constitution being in
the interests of the accused as well as that of the society.
Cases relating to corruption are to be dealt with swiftly,
(2002) 1 SCC 149
promptly and without delay. As and when delay is found to
have been caused during the investigation, inquiry or trial,
the appropriate authorities concerned are under an
obligation to find out and deal with the persons responsible
for such delay. The delay can be attributed either to the
connivance of the authorities with the accused or used as a
lever to pressurise and harass the accused as is alleged to
have been done to the appellant in this case. The appellant
has submitted that due to registration of the case and
pendency of the investigation he lost his chance of
promotion to the post of Chief Engineer. It is common
knowledge that promotions are withheld when proceedings
with respect to allegations of corruption are pending against
the incumbent. The appellant has further alleged that he has
been deprived of the love, affection and the society of his
children who were residing in a foreign country as on
account of the pendency of the investigation he could not
afford to leave the country.
8. This Court in Ramanand Chaudhary v. State of Bihar
[(2002) 1 SCC 153 : AIR 1994 SC 948 : 1994 Cri LJ 1221]
quashed the investigation against the accused on account of
not granting the sanction for more than 13 years. The facts
of the present case are almost identical. No useful purpose
would be served to put the appellant at trial at this belated
stage."
4.8. Learned Senior Counsel further relied on the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vakil Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar 2 and
drawn attention of this Court to paragraph No.29, which is as follows:
"29. We have no hesitation in holding that at least for the
period from 07.12.1990 till 28.02.2007 there is no
explanation whatsoever for the delay in investigation. Even
the direction issued by the High Court seems to have had no
effect on the prosecution and they slept over the matter for
almost seventeen years. Nothing could be pointed out by the
State, far from being established to show that the delay in
investigation or trial was in any way attributable to the
appellant. The prosecution has failed to show any
exceptional circumstance which could possibly be taken into
consideration for condoning a callous and inordinate delay of
more than two decades in investigations and the trial. The
said delay cannot, in any way, be said to be arising from any
default on the part of the appellant."
(2009) 3 SCC 355
4.9. Learned Senior Counsel further relied on the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vijay Rajmohan v. Central Bureau of
Investigation (Anti-Corruption Branch) 3 and drawn attention of this
Court to paragraph Nos.23 and 24, wherein, it was held as follows:
"23. Grant of sanction being an exercise of executive power,
it is subject to the standard principles of judicial review such
as application of independent mind; only by the competent
authority, without bias, after consideration of relevant
material and by eschewing irrelevant considerations. As the
power to grant sanction for prosecution has legal
consequences, it must naturally be exercised within a
reasonable period. This principle is anyway inbuilt in our
legal structure, and our constitutional courts review the
legality and proprietary of delayed exercise of power quite
frequently. In Mahendra Lal Das v. State of Bihar [(2002) 1
SCC 149] and Ramanand Chaudhary v. State of Bihar
[(2002) 1 SCC 153] this Court found it expedient to quash
the criminal proceedings due to the abnormal delay in
granting a sanction for prosecution.
24. Noticing that there is no legislation prescribing the period
within which a decision for sanction is to be taken, this Court,
in Vineet Narian [(1998) 1 SCC 226], sought to fill the gap by
setting a normative prescription of three months for grant of
sanction. (SCC p.270, para 58)
"58. I.(15) Time-limit of three months for grant of
sanction for prosecution must be strictly adhered
to. However, additional time of one month may be
allowed where consultation is required with the
Attorney General (AG) or any other law officer in
the AG's office."
4.10. He also relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu @ R.L.Chongthu v.
(2023) 1 SCC 329
State of Bihar 4 and drawn attention of this Court to paragraph No.19,
which is as follows:
"19. Coming back to the present case, why the investigation
in this case took more than a decade to be completed is lost
on us. Apparently, it was found that the licenses issued by
the appellant were also issued to a fictitious person even at
the time when the order for further investigation was taken.
Out of the 16 accused persons one person stood charge-
sheeted in terms of the first charge sheet and the remaining,
excluding the appellant and one Abhishek, were charge-
sheeted by way of the second charge sheet. When only the
actions of the appellant were subject matter of investigation
by the time permission was taken as above - 11 years is
quite obviously a timeline afflicted by delay. No reason is
forthcoming for this extended period either in the charge
sheet or at the instance of the Court having taken
cognizance of such charge sheet. In other words, the
appellant has had the cloud of a criminal investigation
hanging over him for all these years. The judgments above
referred to supra hold unequivocally that investigation is
covered under the right to speedy trial and it is also held
therein, that violation of this right can strike at the root of the
investigation itself, leading it to be quashed. At the same
time, it must be said that timelines cannot be set in stone for
an investigation to be completed nor can outer limit be
prescribed within which necessarily, an investigation must be
drawn to a close. This is evidenced by the fact that further
investigation or rather permission therefor, can be granted
even after commencement of trial. [See: Rampal Gautam v.
The State [Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) 7968 of 2016]]
Where though, Article 21 would be impacted would be a
situation where, like in the present matter, no reason
justifiable in nature, can be understood from record for the
investigation having taken a large amount of time. The
accused cannot be made to suffer endlessly with this threat
of continuing investigation and eventual trial proceedings
bearing over their everyday existence."
4.11. A perusal of the charge sheet would reveal that there is no
valid authorization to the Investigation Officer to investigate into the
crime and to file the charge sheet. In the absence of proper
authorization, the entire investigation is vitiated.
2025 LawSuit (SC) 1509
4.12. The petitioner has duly filed his annual property return
statements (APRs) for the years 2004 to 2009 on 03.02.2011. In
addition thereto, when the benefit of submitting consolidated APRs
was extended to all employees, the petitioner submitted his APRs for
the period from 2002 to 2010 in a consolidated format and the same
was acknowledged by the Department on 11.03.2011. However, the
Investigation Officer, in the charge sheet, has brushed aside the said
submission on the ground that the APRs were submitted only after the
house search conducted on 22.12.2010, which is discriminatory,
particularly when the facility of filing consolidated statements was
extended uniformly to all employees. The petitioner cannot be singled
out and prejudiced for availing a benefit that was equally available to
others.
4.13. In the departmental enquiry, it has been conclusively
established that the petitioner had filed the APRs for the years 2004 to
2009 and the disciplinary authority held that the charges were not
proved. The petitioner was thus exonerated on merits and not on any
technical grounds.
4.14. In support of the above contentions, learned Senior Counsel
relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ashoo
Surendranath Tewari v. Deputy Superintendent of Police, EOW,
CBI and another 5 and drawn attention of this Court to paragraph
Nos.12 and 13, wherein, it was held as follows:
"12. After referring to various judgments, this Court then
culled out the ratio of those decisions in paragraph 38 as
follows:-
"38. The ratio which can be culled out from these decisions
can broadly be stated as follows:
(i) Adjudication proceedings and criminal prosecution can be
launched simultaneously;
(ii) Decision in adjudication proceedings is not necessary
before initiating criminal prosecution;
(iii) Adjudication proceedings and criminal proceedings are
independent in nature to each other;
(iv) The finding against the person facing prosecution in the
adjudication proceedings is not binding on the proceeding for
criminal prosecution;
(v) Adjudication proceedings by the Enforcement Directorate
is not prosecution by a competent court of law to attract the
provisions of Article 20(2) of the Constitution or Section 300
of the Code of Criminal Procedure;
(vi) The finding in the adjudication proceedings in favour of
the person facing trial for identical violation will depend upon
the nature of finding. If the exoneration in adjudication
proceedings is on technical ground and not on merit,
prosecution may continue; and
(vii) In case of exoneration, however, on merits where
the allegation is found to be not sustainable at all and
the person held innocent, criminal prosecution on the
same set of facts and circumstances cannot be allowed
to continue, the underlying principle being the higher
standard of proof in criminal cases."
13. It finally concluded: (Radheshyam Kejriwal case
[(2011) 3 SCC 581 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 721, p.598, para 39]
"39. In our opinion, therefore, the yardstick would
be to judge as to whether the allegation in the
adjudication proceedings as well as the
proceeding for prosecution is identical and the
exoneration of the person concerned in the
adjudication proceedings is on merits. In case it is
found on merit that there is no contravention of the
provisions of the Act in the adjudication
(2020) 9 SCC 636
proceedings, the trial of the person concerned
shall be an abuse of the process of the court."
4.15. Learned Senior Counsel also relied on the judgment of the
High Court of Orissa at Cuttack in Dr. Minaketan Pani v. State of
Orissa 6, wherein, the cognizance order against the accused therein
was quashed, adopting the reasoning of the decisions of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the judgments of Radheshyam Kejriwal case
[(2011) 3 SCC 581 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 721] and Ashoo
Surendranath Tewari's case (5 supra).
4.16. In the present case, the allegations against the petitioner in
the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are identical. In
such circumstances, in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgments, the proceedings against
the petitioner are liable to be quashed.
5. Following are the submissions of learned Special Public
Prosecutor for ACB:
5.1. During the course of investigation in Crime No.33/ACB-
CR2/2010, the house of the petitioner, who is a friend and colleague of
the Koteswara Rao and had purchased certain assets jointly with him,
was searched on 22.12.2010 after obtaining a search warrant from the
2022 Latest Caselaw 2729 Ori [CRLMC No.3407 of 2010]
competent Court. Upon verification of various incriminating material,
including documents pertaining to the acquisition of movable and
immovable properties, gold ornaments, net cash and other valuable
household articles recovered during the course of search conducted at
the residence of the petitioner, the Joint Director, ACB, Hyderabad,
issued Proc.No.19/JD-City-ACB/2011, dated 24.06.2011, to register a
case against the petitioner and investigate into. Accordingly, a case in
Cr.No.14/ACB-CR-2/2011, dated 24.06.2011 was registered against
the petitioner on the allegation that he was in possession of
disproportionate assets to the tune of Rs.47,03,453/- (Rs.40,04,034/-
as per the charge sheet), acquired through corrupt and dubious
means.
5.2. After completion of investigation, a notice, dated 15.06.2013
was issued to the petitioner calling upon to submit his explanation
regarding the disproportionate assets. The petitioner submitted his
detailed explanation on 12.08.2013. The Investigation Officer, after
duly considering the explanation submitted by the petitioner, found the
same to be unsatisfactory and rebutted the claims with supporting
documentary evidence.
5.3. During the course of investigation, the Investigation Officer,
after obtaining due authorization, filed an application for attachment of
the properties of the petitioner as detailed in Annexures I and II. The
trial Court, by an order dated 02.07.2013 in Crl.M.P.No.1455 of 2013,
granted orders of attachment. Since then, the properties of the
petitioner were under attachment. However, no restraint orders were
passed preventing the petitioner from enjoying the said properties and
the petitioner continued to be in possession and enjoyment of the
same without any objection.
5.4. Thereafter, a final report was prepared and submitted to the
Government on 27.11.2014 seeking sanction for prosecution. The
Director General, ACB, Telangana, addressed as many as (19) letters
between the years 2015 and 2024 to the Special Secretary to
Government, Energy (Vig A1) Department, Government of Telangana,
Hyderabad, requesting sanction for prosecution. Pursuant to such
persistent follow-up, the competent authority accorded sanction on
15.10.2024. The delay in grant of sanction is purely administrative in
nature.
5.5. Upon receipt of the sanction order vide Memorandum
C.No.149/RCA-CR.2/2011, dated 22.01.2025, the Director General,
ACB, directed the Investigation Officer to file the charge sheet against
the petitioner and accordingly charge sheet was filed before the trial
Court on 04.02.2025. The case is presently at the stage of
consideration of charges.
5.6. The delay in obtaining sanction, by itself, cannot be a ground
for quashing the criminal proceedings, particularly when the allegations
disclose commission of offences. In support of the said contention,
learned Special Public Prosecutor relied on the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in State rep. by the Deputy Superintendent
of Police, Vigilance and Anti Corruption Chennai City-I
Department v. G.Easwaran 7 and drawn attention of this Court to
paragraph No.14, wherein, it was held as follows:
"14. Thus, there is no doubt that the High Court committed
an error in quashing the prosecution on the ground that the
sanction to prosecute is illegal and invalid. In conclusion, we
find that the objections raised in the revision petition against
the Special Court's order dismissing the discharge
application were identical to the grounds raised in the
petition under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure, from
which the present appeal arises. Second, apart from being
congruent and overlapping, the respondent could not
demonstrate any material change in facts and circumstances
between the dismissal of the revision petition by the High
Court and the filing of the quashing petition Under Section
482 Code of Criminal Procedure. Third, the validity of the
sanction can always be examined during the course of the
trial and the problems due to the typographical error as
alleged by the State could have been explained by producing
the file at the time of trial. Fourth, it is settled that a mere
delay in the grant of sanction for prosecuting a public
authority is not a ground to quash a criminal case."
5.7. He further relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Vijay RajMohan's case (3 supra), which was relied upon by
MANU/SC/0393/2025
the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner and submitted that the
said judgment, in fact, does not support the case of the petitioner.
Paragraph No.38 reads as follows:
"38. In conclusion, we hold that upon expiry of the three
months and the additional one-month period, the aggrieved
party, be it the complainant, accused or victim, would be
entitled to approach the writ court concerned. They are
entitled to seek appropriate remedies, including directions for
action on the request for sanction and for the corrective
measure on accountability that the sanctioning authority
bears. This is especially crucial if the non-grant of sanction is
withheld without reason, resulting in the stifling of a genuine
case of corruption. Simultaneously, the CVC shall enquire
into the matter in the exercise of its powers under Sections
8(1)(e) and (f) and take such corrective action as it is
empowered under the CVC Act."
5.8. The petitioner, instead of challenging the proceedings on the
ground of delay in sanction at this stage, ought to have availed
appropriate remedies at the relevant point of time by approaching the
competent Court for necessary directions. Having failed to do so, the
petitioner cannot now seek to take advantage of the said delay to
assail the proceedings.
5.9. With regard to another contention of the petitioner that no
authorization was given to the Investigation Officer, it was submitted
that the said contention is wholly misconceived. As per G.O.Ms.No.10,
dated 07.01.1999, issued by the Secretary to Government of erstwhile
Andhra Pradesh, in exercise of powers conferred under the first
proviso to Section 17 of the Act, Inspectors of Police of the
Anti-Corruption Bureau are duly authorized to investigate into all the
offences under the Act, without prior order of a Magistrate. In the
present case, the Investigation Officers, being Inspectors of Police of
ACB are fully competent to register the case, conduct investigation and
file the charge sheet.
5.10. The exoneration of the petitioner in the departmental
proceedings does not bar criminal prosecution. The scope and
standard of proof in departmental proceedings and criminal
proceedings are entirely different. Moreover, the departmental enquiry
in the present case was conducted in violation of conduct rules and the
petitioner was exonerated on technical grounds rather than on merits.
Therefore, such exoneration cannot be relied upon to seek quashing of
the criminal proceedings.
5.11. In support of the said contentions, learned Special Public
Prosecutor relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Puneet Sabharwal v. CBI and R.C. Sabharwal v. CBI 8 and drawn
attention of this Court to paragraph Nos.40 to 42, wherein, it was held
as follows:
"40. The decision in Ashoo Surendranath (supra) is not
applicable to the present case because the decision in
Ashoo Surendranath (supra) concerned a singular
MANU/SC/0222/2024
prosecution under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code
where the sanctioning authority had, while denying sanction,
recorded on merits that there was no evidence to support the
prosecution case. In that context, the Court was of the
opinion that a criminal proceeding could not be continued.
However, in the present case, the charges were framed
under the Prevention of Corruption Act, while the Appellants
seek to rely upon findings recorded by authorities under the
Income Tax Act. The scope of adjudication in both the
proceedings are markedly different and therefore the findings
in the latter cannot be a ground for discharge of the Accused
Persons in the former. The proceedings under the Income
Tax Act and its evidentiary value remains a matter of trial
and they cannot be considered as conclusive proof for
discharge of an Accused person.
41. The Appellants herein have further sought to place
reliance on J.Sekar (supra) to argue that the letter of the
Income-Tax Department was relied upon to quash
prosecution under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act,
2002. In our opinion, this decision is again inapplicable to the
present case. In J.Sekar (supra), the criminal proceedings
had arisen based upon the information furnished by the
Income Tax Department regarding recovery of unauthorized
cash and other items during their search. It so transpired that
the Income Tax Department accepted the explanation of the
Accused regarding the recovered cash which led to closure
of the Income Tax proceedings. Thereafter, even the criminal
proceedings led to filing of a closure report on the ground
that no sufficient evidence was found for continuation of
prosecution. The proceedings under the Prevention of
Money Laundering Act, being based on the Income Tax
Department's information after their search and the
registration of FIR, were found to be unsustainable in view of
no violation being found either by the Department or in the
criminal proceeding.
42. The decision in J.Sekar (supra) is therefore
distinguishable on facts. In the abovementioned case, there
was an exoneration by not only the Income Tax Department,
to the effect that no case was made, there was also an
exoneration in the criminal proceedings which involved the
Scheduled Offence. In the present case, the proceedings
under the Income Tax Act which are sought to be relied upon
relate to the assessment of income of the Assessee and not
to the source of income and the allegation of
disproportionate assets under the Prevention of Corruption
Act. The said Orders cannot be the basis to abort the
criminal proceeding in the present case."
5.12. He further relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in T.Manjunath v. The State of Karnataka and others 9 and
drawn attention of this Court to paragraph No.32, wherein, it was held
as follows:
"32. The possibility of the criminal case still resulting into
conviction, irrespective of the factum of the witnesses turning
hostile being a realistic possibility, we feel that there is no
merit behind the argument of Shri Kamat that exoneration in
the departmental proceeding should lead to automatic
discharge in the criminal case. Hence, the said argument
advanced on behalf of the accused-appellant, placing
reliance on Ashoo Surendranath Tewari (supra), has no
merit and is rejected."
5.13. The petitioner had submitted his APRs on 03.02.2011, i.e.,
after the house search conducted on 22.12.2010. This clearly indicates
that the submission of APRs was an afterthought and do not
satisfactorily explain the disproportionate assets found during
investigation.
5.14. The judgments relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel
for the petitioner are not applicable to the facts of the present case, as
they pertain to the pre-amendment legal position and do not govern
the current legal position.
5.15. A prima facie case is clearly made out against the petitioner
and the matter requires full-fledged trial. Hence, he prayed to dismiss
the petition.
Manu/SC/1590/2025
6. In reply, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner fairly
conceded that the Investigation Officers in the present case were duly
authorized to investigate into the crime and to file the charge sheet.
7. On the basis of the aforesaid submissions as canvassed by
the learned counsel appearing for both sides, in the present factual
scenario, this Court finds that the following issues are primal issues
that require judicial determination, which are as under:-
(a) Whether the criminal proceedings could be quashed
for the delay in issuance of the sanction order?
(b) Whether the order of sanction suffers from illegality
due to non-application of mind?
(c) Whether the petitioner was exonerated in the
departmental proceedings on merits, after due consideration of
all material evidence?
(d) Whether exoneration in departmental proceedings
merely on the basis of APRs would ipso facto be a sufficient
ground for quashing the proceedings against the petitioner in the
present case?
(e) Whether exoneration in departmental proceeding,
without consideration of the evidence collected during the course
of investigation, in a corruption case, relating to disproportionate
assets, can be said to be exoneration on identical facts and
circumstances?
Analysis, Conclusion and Findings:-
8. (a) Whether the criminal proceedings could be quashed for
the delay in issuance of the sanction order?
8.1. Having gone through the record, it is apparent that the final
report was submitted to the Government by the Investigation Officer on
27.11.2014, for grant of sanction. Subsequently, the ACB addressed
number of letters i.e., total (19) letters to the Government, requesting
for grant of sanction. Despite the persistent efforts made by ACB, the
sanction was not accorded by the Government at that time. Thereafter,
the sanction was finally granted on 15.10.2024. Upon receipt of the
sanction, the Investigation Officer filed the charge sheet immediately
on 04.02.2025.
8.2. The chronology of events unequivocally demonstrates that
there was no delay or inaction on the part of the ACB. On the
contrary, ACB has exercised due diligence and consistently pursued
the matter with the competent authorities to ensure that the sanction
was obtained, after which the case is being proceeded without undue
delay. It appears that the delay in obtaining sanction and filing of the
charge sheet is purely administrative in nature and cannot be
attributed to any negligence or dereliction of duty on the part of the
ACB.
8.3. With regard to the delay in granting sanction, in the judgment
of Vijay Rajmohan's case (3 supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held
that the sanctioning authority is required to grant sanction within a
period of three months, along with an additional period of one month.
Upon expiry of the said period, the aggrieved party, be it the
complainant, accused or victim, shall be entitled to approach the
appropriate Writ Court and seek appropriate remedies, including
directions to expedite action on the request for sanction and to ensure
corrective measures for accountability on the part of the sanctioning
authority.
8.4. In the instant case, the petitioner failed to challenge the
legality of the delay, neither before the trial Court nor before the High
Court to seek necessary directions. This inaction constitutes a neglect
of the remedy explicitly made available under law and a failure to
utilize the statutory and judicial safeguards designed to address such
delays. While the judgment in Vijay Rajmohan's case (3 supra) was
expressly relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner,
no attempt was made to invoke the remedies available, thereby
undermining the petitioner's reliance on the delay in granting sanction.
Hence, in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
the aforesaid judgment, mere non-compliance with the mandatory
requirement of granting sanction within four (4) months cannot, by
itself, constitute a ground to quash the proceedings against the
petitioner. The delay, in the absence of any other substantive illegality,
does not entitle the petitioner to the relief claimed. Accordingly issue
(a) is answered.
9. (b) Whether the order of sanction suffers from illegality due to
non-application of mind?
9.1. It is the contention of the petitioner that the sanction order
was issued in a mechanical manner by the sanctioning authority,
without due application of mind.
9.2. On a plain reading, the sanction order clearly reflects the
application of mind by the sanctioning authority after considering the
relevant material placed before it. The sanction order, dated
15.10.2024 represents an independent decision of the department
which was taken on the basis of the material placed before it. The
petitioner failed to demonstrate any failure of justice arising from the
irregularity in the sanction order. It is not known as to why the
petitioner had not raised any objection regarding the validity of
sanction at the initial stage of taking cognizance, before the trial Court.
9.3. It is well settled that the validity or propriety of an order
granting sanction can be raised and examined at the time of final
arguments before the trial Court. Sections 19(3) and 19(4) of the Act
clearly provide that any error, omission or irregularity in the grant of
sanction does not vitiate the proceedings, unless it results in a failure
of justice. The legislative intent embodied in these provisions is to
prevent the derailment of trial proceedings on hyper-technical grounds
and to ensure that minor irregularities in the grant of prosecution
sanction do not defeat the substantive cause of justice. A mere
allegation of the petitioner that the sanction was granted mechanically,
without pointing to any specific illegality or procedural impropriety,
does not warrant interference at this stage and issue (b) is answered
accordingly.
10. (c) Whether the petitioner was exonerated in the departmental
proceedings on merits, after due consideration of all material
evidence?
(d) Whether exoneration in departmental proceedings merely
on the basis of APRs would ipso facto be a sufficient ground for
quashing the proceedings against the petitioner in the present
case?
(e) Whether exoneration in departmental proceeding, without
consideration of the evidence collected during the course of
investigation, in a corruption case, relating to disproportionate
assets, can be said to be exoneration on identical facts and
circumstances?
10.1. Having given anxious consideration to the material placed on
record, it is evident that the petitioner joined Government service as an
Assistant Engineer in APCPDCL on 25.01.2002 and was initially
posted at Munagala, Nalgonda District on 15.11.2003. He was
subsequently transferred to Champapet, Ranga Reddy District on
13.04.2007 and later deputed to GHMC on 07.11.2007. Upon
promotion as Assistant Divisional Engineer on 25.07.2008, he was
posted at Kodangal, Mahaboobnagar District and thereafter transferred
to Ibrahimbagh, Ranga Reddy District on 23.10.2009, where he
continued until the date of house searches and registration of FIR.
10.2. While so, a charge sheet, dated 19.10.2024 was issued to
the petitioner alleging: (i) non-submission of APRs for the period 2002-
2009 and failure to intimate the department regarding his wife's
agricultural income and (ii) failure to obtain prior permission for
acquisition and disposal of immovable properties, in violation of Rules
7 and 5(1) of the APSEB Employees Conduct Regulations, 1978 (for
short the 'Regulations, 1978'). Such acts were alleged to amount to
lack of devotion to duty, failure to maintain integrity and conduct
unbecoming of a Government servant. An Inquiry Officer was
appointed and a comprehensive oral enquiry was conducted on
11.06.2025 and 16.06.2025 at the TGSPDCL Corporate Office,
Hyderabad.
10.3. The petitioner submitted his APRs for the years 2002 to
2010 on 03.02.2011. Further, the Chief General Manager (HRD),
APCPDCL, by letter dated 22.03.2014, informed that no prior
permissions had been granted for purchase or sale of movable or
immovable properties, as the petitioner had not furnished any prior
intimation in respect of such transactions in his name and his family
members.
10.4. In response to the charge sheet, the petitioner submitted his
explanation denying all the allegations and contended that the charges
are not maintainable. He stated that he had duly submitted his APRs
for the years 2002 to 2010 under proper acknowledgement. He further
submitted that the income derived by his wife from agriculture was duly
intimated to the department and the same was reflected in the
respective year-wise APRs. Therefore, it cannot be said that he failed
to inform the department about his wife's agricultural activities and
income.
10.5. With regard to the second charge, the petitioner, in his
explanation, contended that the assets in question were acquired from
lawful sources, including interest income earned by his wife on her
stridhanam received at the time of marriage, agricultural income of his
wife, his own salary savings, housing loan obtained from a bank, loans
from friends and relatives, sale proceeds of gold and silver articles, chit
fund amounts and capital gains from the sale of house sites belonging
to him and his wife. He further stated that his brother-in-law
contributed 1/3rd share of the cost of Item No.2 of the assets and was
the owner thereof as such he had not shown the said asset in his
APRs.
10.6. It is the further contention of the petitioner in the
departmental proceedings that after the relevant document relating to
Item No.2 was seized by ACB officials, his brother-in-law made several
attempts to secure its return and ultimately filed Crl.M.P.No.640 of
2011 in Cr.No.14/ACB-CR-II/2011 before the trial Court seeking return
of document bearing No.2397 of 2008. He also submitted a
representation, dated 27.01.2012 to the Principal Secretary, Energy
Department, asserting his ownership over the said property and
requesting that it should not be attached as that of the petitioner.
10.7. The petitioner also stated that his wife, along with her friend,
had purchased two house plots bearing Nos.31 and 32 admeasuring
564.6 square yards in Sy.No.746 situated at Kodad Village and
Mandal, Nalgonda District and subsequently sold the same to one
N.Sudhir Kumar, through registered sale deeds bearing document
Nos.2944 of 2006 and 4692 of 2008 respectively. All the relevant
details were duly enclosed in his APRs and he had also submitted
consolidated APRs for the period from 2002 to 2010 in the year 2010,
in compliance with the Circular issued by TGSPDCL.
10.8. Thereafter, the Inquiry Officer recorded the statements of the
petitioner, Sri G.Jagan Mohan Reddy, Personnel Officer and Sri Bukya
Ravi Naik, brother-in-law of the petitioner and marked Exhibits I to III.
In the course of such inquiry, the petitioner himself admitted that he
had not obtained prior permission for purchase and disposal of
properties, though he sought to justify the same by stating that such
transactions were reflected in his APRs. The evidence of Sri G.Jagan
Mohan Reddy, Personnel Officer, Estt-I/Corporate Office/TGSPDCL,
Hyderabad, reflects that the petitioner had submitted APRs for the
years 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 and had not obtained prior
permission from the competent authority for purchase or sale of
immovable properties. Thus, the foundational fact regarding non-
obtaining of prior permission stands admitted.
10.9. As per the statement of Sri Bhukya Ravi Naik, who is
brother-in-law of the petitioner, would show that he is the owner of
1/3rd share of Item No.2 of the assets and had paid the corresponding
1/3rd consideration.
10.10. Based on the depositions of the witnesses, the defence of
the petitioner and the material available on record, the Inquiry Officer,
exonerated the petitioner on the ground that large number of
employees had not submitted APRs during the period 2002-2009 or
obtained prior permission during the relevant period and the action
against the petitioner alone would not be feasible. This Court is unable
to approve such reasoning. The liability of a Government servant
under the Conduct Regulations is individual in nature and non-
compliance by others cannot be a valid ground to absolve the
petitioner of his statutory obligations. The approach of the Inquiry
Officer, therefore, suffers from a fundamental infirmity, as it shifts the
focus from the petitioner's conduct to a generalized administrative
practice. It is, therefore evident that the petitioner was absolved of the
charges on technical grounds alone and not on merits.
10.11. Further, it is evident that the disciplinary authority failed to
examine the Investigation Officers, who were engaged in carrying
investigation, in the present case and take into consideration the material
collected during the course of investigation, including the circumstances
surrounding acquisition and disposal of properties and the financial
sources thereof. The departmental proceedings appear to have been
concluded without proper examination of such material, thereby
rendering the findings incomplete. In that view of the matter, the
exoneration of the petitioner cannot be said to be based on a
comprehensive evaluation of all relevant facts and circumstances.
10.12. As seen from the record, the petitioner himself admitted that
he did not obtain prior permission for acquisition and disposal of
immovable properties. No satisfactory explanation was offered by the
petitioner as to why such mandatory requirement was not complied with.
10.13. Additionally, as per the material referred to in the charge
sheet, the petitioner had not filed income tax returns during the relevant
check period i.e., from 25.01.2002 to 22.12.2010 and filed the same for
the assessment years 2012-13 and 2013-14. Similarly, his wife also filed
income tax returns for the assessment years 2010-11, 2011-12 and
2012-13 i.e., after the check period. These circumstances, though not
conclusive by themselves, raise serious questions which require detailed
examination.
10.14. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the
opinion that exoneration of the petitioner in the departmental
proceedings, being based on limited and incomplete consideration of
material, does not have any bearing on the criminal proceedings. It is
well settled that departmental proceedings and criminal proceedings
operate in distinct fields and findings in one do not automatically
conclude the other, particularly when the standard of proof and the
nature of evidence differ. The case on hand involves disputed questions
of fact relating to acquisition of assets, sources of income and
compliance of statutory requirements, which cannot be adjudicated at
this stage in proceedings of this nature. The truth or otherwise of the
allegations can only be determined upon appreciation of oral and
documentary evidence during a full-fledged trial.
10.15. Accordingly, the issues (c), (d) and (e) are answered against
the petitioner.
11. For the aforesaid reasons, this Court is of the view that there
are no grounds to quash the proceedings against the petitioner.
Accordingly, this Criminal Petition is dismissed. However, since the
crime pertains to the year 2011, the trial Court is directed to conclude the
trial as expeditiously as possible, in accordance with law, without being
influenced by any of the observations made by this Court in this order.
Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand
closed.
____________________
JUVVADI SRIDEVI, J
Date: 26.03.2026
Note: L.R. Copy to be marked.
B/o.
rev
