The Singareni Collieries Company ... vs Y. Radha Krishna
2026 Latest Caselaw 548 Tel

Telangana High Court

The Singareni Collieries Company ... vs Y. Radha Krishna on 9 April, 2026

          IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
                          AT HYDERABAD
     THE HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SRI APARESH KUMAR SINGH
                              AND
            THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE G.M.MOHIUDDIN

                          I.A.No.1 of 2026
                               in/and
                     WRIT APPEAL No.53 of 2026

                           DATE: 09.04.2026
Between:
The Singareni Collieries Company Limited,
Rep. by its Chairman & Managing Director
and 3 others
                                                           ....Appellants
                                    And
Y. Radha Krishna                                          ....Respondent
                               JUDGMENT

Heard Sri P.Sri Harsha Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for

Singareni Collieries Company Limited for appellants and Sri

K.Thirumala Rao, learned counsel for respondent and perused the

record.

2. This Interlocutory Application vide I.A. No.1 of 2026, is filed by

the appellants seeking condonation of delay of 250 days in preferring

the accompanying writ appeal. The said writ appeal is directed against

the order dated 24.01.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in

W.P.No.30349 of 2023, whereby the writ petition came to be allowed

and the appellants were directed to extend the benefit of pay parity to

the respondent (writ petitioner) by stepping up his salary on par with

his junior, Sri D. Venkat Reddy.

3. Before entering upon the merits of the Writ Appeal, it becomes

necessary to examine the issue of limitation, as the appeal is

presented with a delay of 250 days. Such delay, being prima facie

significant, calls for a careful consideration and cannot be treated as a

matter of routine.

Factual matrix (in brief)

4. The respondent was appointed as a Fitter Trainee in the

appellants-Company on 23.07.1989 and was subsequently promoted

to Fitter Helper (Category-II) on 23.10.1990, Fitter (Category-IV) on

03.10.1991, Fitter (Category-V) on 01.03.1995. Respondent's

grievance is that his junior, one D. Venkat Reddy, appointed on

26.08.1990, is drawing higher basic pay. The disparity is stated to

have arisen as the said junior received both an annual increment and

a promotional increment in the year 1995, whereas the respondent

was granted only a promotional increment. The respondent sought

rectification of the said anomaly by way of representation on

06.11.2017, which came to be rejected by the appellants vide

proceedings dated 25.12.2017 on the ground that there were no

applicable guidelines under the JBCCI for such rectification.

5. Aggrieved thereby, the respondent filed W.P.No.30349 of 2023,

which was allowed by the learned Single Judge by order dated

24.01.2025, setting aside the rejection order and directing the

appellants to extend pay parity to the respondent on par with his

junior.

6. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellants-Company has

preferred the present writ appeal along with I.A.No.1 of 2026 seeking

condonation of delay in filing the appeal.

Submissions on behalf of the appellants

7. Learned counsel for the appellants, while seeking condonation

of delay of 250 days in filing the writ appeal arising out of the order

dated 24.01.2025 passed in W.P.No.30349 of 2023, advanced the

following submissions:

i) That the certified copy of the order of the learned Single Judge,

dated 24.01.2025, was received by the appellants on

12.04.2025. Thereafter, the matter was processed through the

requisite official channels in the appellants-company, namely

the Singareni Collieries Company Limited (SCCL). The General

Manager, Ramagundam-III Area, is stated to have initiated a

note on 28.04.2025 seeking approval from the competent

authority for preferring a writ appeal, and the final approval for

filing the appeal was accorded on 19.06.2025.

ii) That the delay occasioned is not gross or deliberate, but is

attributable to the procedural requirements inherent in a public

sector undertaking. It is urged that the delay of 250 days is on

account of such administrative processing.

iii) That the delay is neither intentional nor willful, but has

occurred due to bona fide administrative reasons, as the the

appellants were required to follow due procedure in obtaining

necessary approvals, and the same inevitably consumed time. It

is contended that the appellants have a substantial case on

merits, particularly having regard to the issues arising out of

service jurisprudence, and that no prejudice would be caused to

the respondent if the delay is condoned and the matter is

adjudicated on merits.

iv) That the order of the learned Single Judge gives rise to

substantial questions of law, including the interpretation of

service rules governing employees of the appellants-Company;

the applicability of the guidelines issued by the JBCCI; and the

scope and application of the principle of "equal pay for equal

work" in the context of pay fixation and time-bound promotional

schemes, as was considered by the learned Single Judge while

directing parity of pay with the junior employee.

Submissions on behalf of respondent

8. Learned counsel for respondent opposed the application for

condonation of delay and advanced the following submissions:

i) That the delay of 250 days, as stated by the appellants, is

inordinate and wholly inexcusable and the explanation is

incomplete and fails to account for the entire period of delay. It

is pointed out that though the order was passed on 24.01.2025

and is stated to have been received on 12.04.2025, there is no

explanation whatsoever for the period between 12.04.2025 and

28.04.2025, when the file was allegedly initiated, nor is there

any explanation for the substantial period between 19.06.2025,

when approval was allegedly granted, and the actual filing of the

appeal on 07.01.2026. This unexplained gap of more than six

months, is fatal to the case of the appellants.

ii) That by allowing such a long delay to occur, the appellants

have, accepted the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated

24.01.2025, under which the respondent was granted the

benefit of stepping up of pay on par with his junior. It is further

submitted that the respondent, who is due to retire on

31.08.2027, has gained a vested right to receive the benefits of

the said order, and any interference at this stage would cause

serious prejudice and irreparable loss to him.

iii) That the reasons assigned by the appellants do not constitute

"sufficient cause" within the meaning of Section 5 of the

Limitation Act, 1963. The requirement of obtaining internal

approvals, is a matter entirely within the control of the

appellants and cannot be put forth as a ground for condoning

an inordinate delay.

iv) That the merits of the case cannot be taken into consideration

while deciding an application for condonation of delay. The

scope of inquiry at this stage is confined to the existence of

"sufficient cause" for the delay, and the strength or otherwise of

the case on merits is wholly irrelevant. It is urged that the

absence of a satisfactory explanation covering the entire period

of delay, the application is liable to be dismissed.

9. We have taken note of the respective contentions urged and

perused the material on record.

Consideration by this Court

10. The fundamental question that falls for consideration before

this Court is whether the appellants have made out any "sufficient

cause" for condoning the inordinate delay of 250 days in preferring

the present writ appeal against the order dated 24.01.2025 passed in

W.P.No.30349 of 2023.

11. It is trite that though Courts are inclined to adopt a liberal and

pragmatic approach in matters of condonation of delay, such

discretion is not excessive. The party seeking condonation must

demonstrate that the delay was neither intentional nor due to

negligence, and must furnish a reasonable, cogent and satisfactory

explanation covering the entire period of delay. The expression

"sufficient cause" cannot be construed in a routine or mechanical

manner.

12. On a careful consideration of the material on record, we are of

the considered view that the explanation offered by the appellants

falls short of the legal requirement of "sufficient cause", for the

following reasons:

i) The chronology furnished by the appellants is wholly

inadequate, as the order under challenge was passed on

24.01.2025, the appellants claim to have received a copy thereof

on 12.04.2025. It is stated that a note was initiated on

28.04.2025 and approval was obtained on 19.06.2025.

However, the appeal came to be filed only on 07.01.2026. There

is a substantial and unexplained gap of more than six months

between June, 2025 and January, 2026. The affidavit filed in

support of the application is conspicuously silent as to the

steps taken during this period. There is no explanation

whatsoever for the delay in presentation of the appeal. Such

lack of diligence and absence of material particulars is fatal to

the application.

ii) The explanation sought to be offered on the ground of

administrative processing and obtaining approvals within the

appellants-Company cannot, by itself, constitute sufficient

cause. It is well settled that internal procedural requirements or

movement of files within a department are internal matters of

the appellants and cannot be treated as a valid justification for

condoning an inordinate delay, in the absence of a specific and

satisfactory explanation for each stage. A public sector

undertaking is expected to act with due promptitude and

cannot claim any special indulgence in this regard. As held by

the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Postmaster General v. Living

Media India Ltd. 1, delays attributed merely to impersonal

administrative procedures, movement of files, or bureaucratic

processes cannot be accepted as sufficient cause. In the

absence of a reasonable, satisfactory, and bona fide explanation

for the delay, the routine plea of procedural red tape or

pendency of files for prolonged periods does not merit

acceptance.

iii) The delay in the present case is inordinate as the appellants

have approached this Court after a lapse of more than eleven

months from the date of the impugned order. Meanwhile, the

respondent, who is nearing superannuation, would have

legitimately expected implementation of the order passed in his

favour directing pay parity. Entertaining such a belated

challenge would not only unsettle the rights accrued to the

respondent but would also undermine the principle of finality of

litigation.

iv) The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants with

regard to the merits of the case does not merit consideration at

this stage. The issue of condonation of delay stands on an

(2012) 3 SCC 563

independent footing. It is well settled that the merits of the case

cannot be a substitute for explaining the delay. It is pertinent to

note that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v.

Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy2

while reiterating the view taken in Vedabai v. Shantaram

Baburao Patil 3 has held that the consideration of prejudice

caused to the other side will be a relevant factor in the

condonation of delay, when the delay is inordinate in nature.

Conclusion

13. For the foregoing reasons, this Court is of the considered view

that the appellants have failed to establish any "sufficient cause" for

condonation of the inordinate and unexplained delay of 250 days in

filing the writ appeal.

14. Accordingly, I.A.No.1 of 2026 is dismissed and the Writ Appeal

is dismissed.

As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, pending if any, stand

closed. No costs.

_______________________________ APARESH KUMAR SINGH, CJ

______________________________ G.M.MOHIUDDIN,J Date: 09.04.2026 szt

(2013) 12 SCC 649

(2001) 9 SCC 106