Telangana High Court
T. Prabhakar Rao vs The State Of Telangana on 2 May, 2025
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE J. SREENIVAS RAO
CRIMINAL PETITION No.4207 of 2025
ORDER:
This Criminal Petition is filed under Section 482 of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, 'BNSS') by
the petitioner/accused No.1, seeking anticipatory bail in PRC No.
260 of 2024 on the file of the XIV Additional Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, Hyderabad (Crime No. 243 of 2024 of Panjagutta
Police Station, registered for the offences punishable under
Sections 166, 409, 427, 201, 120(B) read with Section 34 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short 'IPC'), Section 3 of the
Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 (for short
'PDPP Act') and Sections 65, 66, 66(F)(1)(B)(2) and 70 of the
Information Technology Act, 2000 (for short 'I.T.Act').
2. The case of prosecution in brief is that on 10.03.2024 at
13.45 hours Sri D.Ramesh, Additional Superintendent of Police,
Special Investigation Branch (SIB), Telangana State, Hyderabad
lodged English written complaint in which he reported that
during his tenure, the accused person D.Praneeth Kumar @
Praneeth Rao joined SIB as an Inspector in 2018 and got
accelerated promotion as Deputy Superintendent of Police in
2023. He came to know that Praneeth Kumar occupied three
rooms, which were exclusively given to SOT along with 11
officers, 17 systems, 2 laptops, 3 hard disks, 8 pen drives and 2
phone numbers issued to Special Officers Team (SOT). They were
also given a dedicated leased line with internet connection
through which he developed profiles of unknown persons and
monitored the same clandestinely. During 2024, complainant
D.Ramesh noticed about the disappearance of records, both
physical and electronic form from SIB. On their enquiry, they
came to know that accused No.2 abused his official position and
used to always copy intelligence information into his personal
drives illegally most likely with the collusion of his unknown
associates in order to shield his criminal acts and also resorted
to erasing of the entire information by the way of removing hard
disks and destroying them. Further, the complainant stated that
on 4th December, 2023, accused No.2 turned off the Closed
Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras and destroyed old hard drives,
containing data gathered over the decades which clandestinely
obtained from him. He replaced the new hard drives in place of
old drives. Hence, the complainant requested for necessary
action against accused No.2 and others. Based on the said
complaint, the present crime was registered for the aforesaid
offences.
3. Heard Sri T.Niranjan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel,
representing Sri V.Surender Rao, learned counsel for the
petitioner and Sri Siddarth Luthra, learned Senior Counsel,
representing Sri Palle Nageshwara Rao, learned Public
Prosecutor appearing for the respondent-State.
4. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submitted that
the petitioner has not committed any offence, as alleged against
him, and the petitioner is a senior citizen, aged about 65 years
and retired as Inspector General of Police (IPS) in June, 2020
after completion of his unblemished service for a period of 30
years. After his superannuation, he discharged his duties as
Chief of Operations in SIB. The petitioner is having vast
experience of working in SIB even prior to 2014 and during his
tenure, his significant contribution in curtailing the left-wing
extremism and Islamic terroristic activities in the State and in
the country. The State and Central Government recognized his
services and he was awarded Indian Police Medal in 2012, Indian
Police Medal for Gallantry in 2016, President's Police Medal for
distinguished service in 2019 and Union Home Minister's Medal
for collection of top-quality intelligence inputs in 2019 while he
was working as Inspector General of Police in SIB. He was
falsely implicated in the present crime as accused No.1.
4.1. He further submitted that the police registered the
Crime No.243 of 2024 on 10.03.2024 based on the report lodged
by one D.Ramesh, Additional Superintendent of Police, SIB,
Hyderabad, who alleged to have reported the destruction of
certain official records and equipment in addition to erasing of
electronic data by one D.Praneeth Kumar, Deputy
Superintendent of Police, SIB, who was shown as accused along
with unknown other accused. He further submitted that there
are no allegations against the petitioner in the complaint dated
10.03.2024 and he was not made as an accused in the present
crime. Subsequently, the investigation agency filed memo dated
29.04.2024 before XIV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,
Hyderabad adding the petitioner as accused No.1.
4.2. He also submitted that the petitioner has submitted
his resignation on 04.12.2023 and on the very same day, the in-
charge Officer was appointed to the post of Chief of Operations in
SIB and his resignation was accepted on 11.12.2023. Even
before the petitioner was added as accused through memo dated
29.04.2024, he left India for his treatment.
4.3. He further submitted that the main accusation
against the petitioner is that while he worked as Inspector
General of Police/Chief of Operations in SIB along with accused
Nos.2 to 4, who are also working in SIB/Intelligence, developed
the profiles of several persons unauthorizedly to intercept their
telephonic communications etc., to help the then ruling party
and that accused No.4 was involved in illegal acts/omissions by
acting upon the information, which was collected by accused
Nos.2 to 4.
4.4. He further submitted that the only allegations made
in the complaint that the petitioner with collusion of other
accused destructed important and sensitive information is not
true and correct. The petitioner resigned to his post on
04.12.2023 and he left the office at 4-00 p.m. and on the very
same day another Officer was appointed in his place.
4.5. He further submitted that there is no direct evidence
of record linking the petitioner to the alleged crime and only
basing on the statement given by the SIB Officials, implicated the
petitioner as accused No.1. He also submitted that based on the
confessional statements given by the accused No.2, the petitioner
was implicated in the present crime as accused No.1 and the
same is not permissible under law.
4.6. He further submitted that the allegations made in the
complaint that the petitioner has destructed the sensitive
information of SIB and the product of hard work of hundreds of
police officers is lost, is absolutely false. Any destruction of
interception records was always done following due process
prescribed in SOP of Department of Telegraphs communicated by
Ministry of Home Affairs as confirmed in the affidavits filed by
the Union Home Secretary and Principal Secretary of Home,
Government of Telangana. He further submitted that
deletion/erasing the interception records was at the instance of
the competent authority only and the petitioner has nothing to
do with the said destruction. As on the date of destruction, the
petitioner has resigned the said post and the same was done
subsequently. With an intention to implicate the petitioner as
accused, it was alleged that the destruction of the records was
done at the instance of the petitioner and the same is not true
and correct.
4.7. As per the provisions of The Indian Telegraph, 1885
and Indian Telegraphic Rules, 1951, (for short 'the Rules') only
the Review Committee is having the power to intercept the
telephonic messages. As per Rule 419-A of sub-Rule 17 of the
Rules, the Review Committee is having power to issue necessary
directions and as per Rule 18 of the Rules, the Review Committee
has to issue directions for interception and to delete the
messages by the relevant competent authority and the
authorized security only. The petitioner is not having any
authority or competency to delete or destroy the intercepted
messages. As per the norms of the Review Committee, the
Committee has to conduct meeting for every six months and the
said Committee has to conduct meeting in the month of January,
2024, however, the same was pre-poned to 02.12.2023. Whereas
the petitioner resigned to his post on 04.12.2023. On the very
same day, he left the office at 4-00 p.m. and another Officer was
appointed and taken charge on the very same day. The alleged
destruction is subsequent to his resignation. It clearly shows
that the alleged destructions are at the instructions given by the
Review Committee.
4.8. Admittedly, the petitioner has already resigned his
post on 04.12.2023 and on the very same day, in-charge officer
was appointed and the resignation was accepted on 11.12.2023
and the record further reveals that the alleged destruction of
data was done, subsequent to the Review Committee meeting on
02.12.2023. Hence, the ingredients of Sections 166, 409, 427,
201, 120(B) read with Section 34 of IPC, Section 3 of PDPP Act
and Sections 65, 66, 66(F)(1)(B)(2) and 70 of the Information
Technology Act, 2000 are not attracted against the petitioner.
4.9. He further submitted that the Government issued
G.O.Rt.No.1671, General Administration (Special.B) Department,
dated 19.12.2023, wherein one Smt.B.Sumathi, IPS was
transferred and posted as Deputy Inspector General of Police,
SIB, Intelligence in the existing vacancy. He further submitted
that upon the letter dated 06.12.2023 issued by the Nodal
Officer, Reliance Jio Info Communications Limited, to
Smt.B.Sumathi, IPS, Deputy Inspector General of Police, wherein
it was stated that they have receipt request letters from legal
interception of Mobile/IMEI/ILD numbers and they sought
authenticity of the said letter. Thereafter, the complaint was
lodged by LW.1-D.Ramesh, Additional Superintendent of Police,
SIB, on 10.03.2024 against accused No.2 and others. In the said
complaint, there are no specific allegations against the petitioner
and he was made as accused No.1 based on the confessional
statement of accused No.2.
4.10. He further submitted that new Government came into
existence on 07.12.2023 and after lapse of more than three
months, the alleged complaint was filed on 10.03.2024 and
basing on the same, the present crime was registered with an
oblique motive. He further submitted that LW.69 filed memo
before the Court below implicating the petitioner as well as
accused No.6 on 29.04.2024, basing on the statement given by
LW.2, who in her statement stated about the promotion of the
petitioner. LW.3 in his statement stated that as per the
instructions of accused No.2, out of 50 new hard disks, they
used 36 hard disks to replace the hard disks of 17 computers
and two laptops of accused No.2's SOT, 7 computer systems of
accused No.4, Addl. S.P. team, 8 computer systems of CAT, one
system of social media lab and one system of CC/PA of
Prabhakar Rao (A1) under the instructions of accused No.2 on
04.12.2023. On the same day, they were made to remove 26
hard disks from the main server of SIB and replaced the same
with 7 new hard disks. Basing on the statements given by LWs.2
to 4, 7, 14, 15, 17, 19, 21, 22, 23, which were recorded by the
police under Section 161 of Cr.P.C., the petitioner is an accused
and the said statements are inadmissible into evidence.
4.11. He further submitted that the petitioner is not a
member in the Review Committee. Solely based on the Review
Committee proposals, the destruction has taken place. The
petitioner is no way concerned with the interception done on the
instructions of the Revenue Committee. In the absence of any
report from the Review Committee, the allegation against the
petitioner that on his instructions only, the other officers
destructed the data, is not reliable according to the provisions of
the Indian Telegraph Act and Rules made there under.
4.12 He further submitted that the Investigating Officers
after completion of investigation filed charge sheet and the same
was numbered as PRC No.260 of 2024 on the file of the XIV
Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad. The
petitioner is ready and willing to come to India and to cooperate
with the investigation. He also submitted that the very same
allegations are levelled against accused No.6, who approached
this Court and filed anticipatory bail application and the same
was dismissed. Aggrieved by the same, accused No.6 had
approached the Hon'ble Apex Court and filed SLP, wherein the
Hon'ble Apex Court granted interim protection to accused No.6 to
come back India and accused Nos.1 and 6 were stand on the
very same footing. Therefore, the petitioner is also entitled for
the same order.
4.13. In support of his Contentions, he relied upon the
following Judgments:
1. Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and Others v. State
of Punjab 1;
2. Smt. Parisha Trivedi and another v. State of
Chhattisgarh (MCRCA No. 944 of 2024);
3. N. Raghavender v. State of Andhra Pradesh, CBI 2;
4. Sushila Aggarwal and others v. State (NCT of
Delhi) and Another 3; and
5. Common Cause v. Union of India 4
5. Sri Siddarth Luthra, learned Senior Counsel appearing for
respondent State, submitted that the petitioner has committed a
grave offence and a crime was registered on 10.03.2024. The
petitioner booked tickets to go to USA on 07.05.2024, however, it
was pre-poned and he left India on 11.03.2024. Since
1 (1980) 2 SCC 565
2 (2021) 18 SCC 70
(2020) 5 SCC 1
(1999) 6 SCC 667
11.03.2024, the petitioner was absconding. The petitioner
conspired along with other accused on 04.12.2023 and switched
off CCTV cameras, removed 36 hard disks from the SOT, CAT
and another team systems and replaced them with new hard
disks, subsequently, they removed 26 hard disks and replaced
them with 7 new hard disks from the main server of SIB. Later
on all these hard disks, which contains the confidential data was
destroyed.
5.1. He further submitted that the petitioner is hale and
healthy and therefore, after his retirement he was appointed as
Chief of Operations (Intelligence), SIB, on 01.07.2022 and he
continued in the said post up to 04.12.2023. He has not filed
any documents in support of his contention that he is suffering
with tongue cancer. The documents which are filed by the
petitioner is prior to his appointment in the post of Chief of
Operations (Intelligence) SIB. There are specific allegations
levelled against the petitioner to attract the ingredients of Section
409 of the IPC. The witnesses specifically stated in their
statements, who are the subordinate officers, the role of the
petitioner. He further submitted that the petitioner is not having
passport and his passport was already revoked by the competent
authority on 02.04.2024 and the Investigating Officer has filed
application before the learned XIV Additional Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate for Trial of Communal Disturbances Control at
Nampally, Hyderabad for issuance of warrant of arrest and the
said application was allowed on 15.07.2024. The petitioner has
not questioned the said order and it became final. Further, the
Central Government had issued proclamation and also issued
Red Corner Notice on 10.03.2025.
5.2. He further submitted that the allegations made by the
petitioner that the Investigating Officer has not issued notice
under Section 41-A of the Cr.P.C. to the petitioner does not arise
on the ground that crime was registered on 10.03.2024, the
petitioner left India on 11.03.2024 itself and as per the
provisions of the Cr.P.C., Section 41-A of the Cr.P.C., notice has
to be issued to the accused person directly. In that view of the
matter, the Investigating Officer has issued the notice under
Section 91 of the Cr.P.C. on 19.04.2024 to the son of the
petitioner directing him to furnish the particulars of the
petitioner. Pursuant to the same, the son of the petitioner has
given reply. After that the Investigating Officer, issued another
notice to the son of the petitioner on 24.04.2024 directing him to
provide correct travel details.
5.3. He further submitted that the Investigating Officer
has issued notice under Section 91 of the Cr.P.C. on 19.04.2024
to the son of the petitioner and he has issued reply on
20.04.2024, however, he has not enclosed any documents
regarding the alleged health condition of the petitioner.
Thereafter, the petitioner has filed a memo on 07.05.2024. He
also submitted that as per the Scan report dated 25.03.2024
given by the Doctors in U.S.A., it reveals that his Nasopharynx,
oropharynx, hypopharynx as well as the larynx are normal and
he is having some dental problems. The concerned Doctor, who
treated the petitioner, had issued certificate on 08.12.2004 and
as per the said certificate, the petitioner is fit, hale and healthy.
The petitioner filed this criminal petition seeking anticipatory
bail basing on his health condition and the same is not
permissible under law, especially the petitioner is absconding
and not cooperating with the investigation more than one year.
5.4. He further submitted that LW.1 specifically stated in
his. statement about the tenure and role of the petitioner.
Similarly, LW.2 along with LWs.3, 5, 14 and 32 also specifically
deposed the role of the petitioner in the present crime. The
petitioner is not entitled to claim the benefit, which was given in
favour of accused No.6 and accused No.6 is a private person,
whereas the petitioner is arrayed as accused No.1 and he is a
public servant. At the instance of the petitioner, entire
information belonging to the State of Telangana was destroyed
and facilitated to the political party intentionally. The petitioner
intentionally committed the offence of intercepting the telephonic
communications of several people and destroyed the confidential
and sensitive information that has been collected by the Police
Department over a decade. Hence, the petitioner is not entitled
for grant of bail.
5.5. In support of his contention, he relied upon the
following judgments:
1. Serious Fraud Investigation Office v Aditya Sarada 5;
2. Srikant Upadhyay and Others v State of Bihar 6;
3. Prem Shankar Prasad v. State of Bihar 7;
4. Lavesh v. State (NCT of Delhi) 8,
5. Tarsem Lal v. Enforcement Directorate 9; and
2025 SCC OnLine SC 764
2024 SCC OnLine 282
(2022) 14 SCC 516
(2012) 8 SCC 730
(2024) 7 SCC 61
6. Hyeoksoo Son, Authorized Representative for
Deachang Seat Automotive Pvt.Ltd v Moon June
Seok and Another 10;
6. Sri T. Niranjan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioner, by way of reply submitted that the petitioner has
undergone three surgeries and he is suffering with cancer. He
further submitted that the petitioner filed appeal before the Chief
Passport Officer, New Delhi, on 10.04.2025 questioning the
revocation of his passport and the said appeal is pending.
Hence, the contention raised by the learned Senior Counsel for
the respondent that the petitioner has not taken any steps
questioning the revocation of the passport is not true and
correct.
6.1. He further submitted that the petitioner filed a Memo
before the XIV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,
Hyderabad in PRC No.260 of 2024 explaining the reasons for his
visit to USA and urged the Court to consider the same. However,
the Court below without considering the same, issued Non-
Bailable Warrant against the petitioner on 15.07.2024 and also
issued Red Corner Notice on 10.03.2024.
2025 SCC OnLine 759
6.2. He further submitted that the petitioner has worked
as Sub Divisional Officer from 1993 to 1999 of highly extremist
affected and challenging sub-divisions in Telangana at Jagitial,
Mancherial, Nalgonda and Saroornagar Districts. On promotion
as Additional Superintendent of Police, he worked as Additional
Superintendent of Police Operations at Nalgonda and effectively
contained extremist activities in the District. In 2001-2003 he
assumed charge of Additional Deputy Commissioner of Police
(Traffic), Hyderabad City and undertook several initiatives in
traffic regulations and management. In the year 2003 he got
promotion as Superintendent of Police and he worked in Special
Intelligence Branch and turned out outstanding work and won
appreciation of all senior officials and Government and brought
laurels in the department till 2007. From 2009 to 2013, the
petitioner as Superintendent of Police in the Special Intelligence
Branch for the second term and turned out outstanding results
in containing extremist activities in Telangana and from 2013 to
2015, he contributed richly in bringing out reforms in the
functioning of police and building cordial police. The petitioner
promoted as Deputy Inspector General in the year 2015 took
charge as Joint Commissioner Crimes, Hyderabad city and
successfully contained organized crime in both economic
offences and cyber crimes till 2016. In 2016 he worked as DIG,
Intelligence, in Warangal Range and later worked as DIG,
Intelligent, Telangana State. On 14.03.2018, the petitioner was
transferred and posted as DIG, SIB (Intelligence), Telangana
State holding full Additional Charge of DIG, Intelligence,
Telangana State. On 24.04.2019, on promotion the petitioner
took charge as Inspector General of Police, SIB Intelligence. On
01.07.2022, he took charge as Chief of Operations, SIB
(Intelligence) till resignation on 04.12.2023. The petitioner
rendered his unblemished service of 30 years in the interests of
the State.
6.3. As per the provisions of Rule 419(A)(17) of the Indian
Telegraph Rules, 1951, records of interception orders and
messages should be destroyed every six months, unless required
for functional purposes and this decision has to be taken by the
Review Committee only. On 29.11.2023, the Telangana State
Government, Home Department has issued proceedings to pre-
pone the Review Committee meeting. Basing on the said
instructions only, the Review Committee conducted meeting on
02.12.2023 and basing on the same, the destruction of the data
has taken place subsequent to resignation of the petitioner. It is
alleged that the destruction of data was done at the instigation of
the petitioner but he is not having any authority to issue such
instructions to the subordinates to the intercept and destruct the
data.
6.4. He further submitted that accused No.6 filed Memo
before the Sessions Judge that the confessional statement
recorded by the Investigating Officer is a concocted document
and the same is being retracted. The petitioner went to USA for
taking treatment and not for any other purpose and the
petitioner voluntarily intending to come to India and he is ready
and willing to cooperate with the investigation and also abide by
the conditions, which are going to be imposed by this Court.
6.5. He further submitted that the judgments which are
relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for respondent No.1
are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case and
those judgments are relating to the offences under the Prevention
of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and the same are not applicable
to the IPC offences. Similarly, the ingredients of Section 409 of
the IPC are also not applicable to the petitioner.
6.6. In support of his contention, he relied upon the
following judgments:
1. Sidhartha Vashisht Alias Manu Shrama v. State (NCT
of Delhi) 11 and
2. Harendra Rai v. State of Bihar and others 12,
7. Sri Palle Nageshwar Rao, learned Public Prosecutor,
submitted that the petitioner was appointed as Inspector General
of Police. After his retirement on superannuation, he was
appointed as Chief of Operations, SIB, Intelligence on
01.07.2020 contrary to the India Police Service Cadre Rules,
1954 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules') He further submitted
that according to Rule 7 of the Rules, for making any temporary
appointment, only appointment should be not exceeded for three
months. However, the petitioner was initially appointed in the
said post for a period of three years and subsequently, it was
extended. The said appointment itself is contrary to the Rules.
7.1. He further submitted that the petitioner has taken an
undue advantage of his official position and he along with other
accused committed the offence of intercepting the telephonic
communications and destruction of hard disks that contained
11 (2010) 6 SCC 1
12 (2023) 13 SCC 563
crucial information. The petitioner is absconding ever since the
date of registration of this crime and against him Non-Bailable
Warrant and Red Corner notice were also issued and extradition
application has been filed by the Investigating Officer on
06.01.2025. He further submitted that the Special Chief
Secretary to Government of Telangana, Home Department has
filed detailed counter in Suo Motu W.P.No.2 of 2025 about the
role of the petitioner and the petitioner is not entitled to seek for
grant of anticipatory bail merely basing on his health conditions
and on the ground of violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of
India.
7.2. In support of his contention, he relied upon the
judgment in P. Chidambaram supra, wherein the Hon'ble
Supreme Court held that the appellant contended that denial of
anticipatory bail, particularly when custodial interrogation is
unnecessary, violates the right to personal liberty under Article
21 of the Constitution. However, the Court, relying on State of
M.P. v. Ram Kishna Balothia, clarified that anticipatory bail
under Section 438 Cr.P.C. is a statutory right introduced in
1973, and not a fundamental right under Article 21. While
Section 438 aims to protect individuals from arbitrary arrest and
humiliation, it is not absolute. The Court highlighted the need to
balance personal liberty with the interest of effective
investigation, noting that refusal of anticipatory bail does not
inherently amount to a violation of Article 21. The Solicitor
General emphasized the investigative importance of custodial
interrogation, supported by precedents like State v. Anil Sharma,
where it was held that custodial interrogation is more effective
than questioning under the protection of anticipatory bail. The
Court reiterated that anticipatory bail should not impede the
discovery of material facts and that responsible use of custodial
interrogation is presumed unless proven otherwise.
8. Having considered the rival submissions made by the
respective parties and after perusal of the material available on
record, it reveals that basing on the complaint lodged by LW.1
D.Ramesh, Additional Superintendent of Police, SIB, Crime
No.243 of 2024 was registered on 10.03.2024 for the offences
under Sections 166, 409, 427, 201, 120(B) read with Section 34
of the IPC, Section 3 of the PDPP and Sections 65, 66,
66(F)(1)(B)(2) and 70 of the I.T.Act. The Investigating Officer
after conducting investigation filed charge sheet on 10.06.2024,
wherein there are specific allegations levelled against the
petitioner and other accused that they conspired with together
and illegally intercepted the telephonic communications of
several people to do wrongful gain and as per the instructions
given by the petitioner, accused Nos.2 and 3 along with few
technicians, removed and replaced 36 hard disks from SOT, CAT
and another team. Further they also removed 26 hard disks and
replaced 7 new hard disks from the main server of SIB. These
hard disks containing crucial and sensitive information that has
been gathered over a decade have been destroyed by them.
9. The record further reveals that the petitioner has submitted
resignation to the post of Chief of Operations SIB on 04.12.2023
and he booked tickets to travel Tirupathi on 08.03.2024 and he
proceeded to Thirputhi and from there to Chennai and he left to
USA on 11.03.2024.
10. The record further discloses that the prosecution filed
Memo seeking issuance of the Non-Bailable Warrant against the
petitioner and the learned XIV Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate at Nampally, Hyderabad, allowed the said application
on 15.07.2024. It is not in dispute that the petitioner has not
questioned the said order by recalling Non-Baiable Warrant and
the said order is in force.
11. It further reveals from the record that the passport issued
in favour of the petitioner was revoked by the competent
authority on 02.04.2024. Even according to the learned Senior
Counsel for the petitioner, on 10.04.2025 aggrieved by the
revocation of the passport, the petitioner filed appeal before the
appellate Court i.e., Chief Passport Officer, New Delhi. However,
the appellate authority has not passed any order and the same is
pending. Even according to the learned Public Prosecutor,
extradition request, which has been filed on 06.01.2025, is
pending for consideration.
12. The record further reveals that the Investigating Officer has
not issued notice under Section 41-A of the Cr.P.C., It is settled
law that the said notice has to be issued to the accused directly,
as per judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Satendra Kumar
Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation and another 13.
13. The record further reveals that when the petitioner was not
present, the Investigating Officer has issued notice under Section
91 of the Cr.P.C. to the son of the petitioner on 19.04.2024.
Pursuant to the same, the son of the petitioner as well the
petitioner has informed the Investigating Officer that the
(2024) 9 SCC 177
petitioner is intending to come back to India on or before
26.06.2024. However, the petitioner did not return to India.
14. Even according to the prosecution, the crucial part of the
investigation in this case is still pending and the presence of the
petitioner is very much required. Even according to the learned
counsel for the petitioner, the Home Secretary has issued orders
preponing the Review Committee meeting and in the said
meeting necessary directions were given to the concerned officers
to destruct the intercepted information. However, neither of the
parties has placed the said orders before this Court.
15. Even otherwise destruction of data has been done at the
instance of the petitioner by the other accused or as per the
instructions of the Review Committee, the same has to be
revealed during the course of investigation and also during the
course of trial. The record reveals that since 11.03.2024 the
petitioner is not available in India and investigation is pending.
16. In Sidhartha Vashisht Alias Manu Shrama supra, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the critical importance of
conducting fair and impartial investigations in the criminal
justice system. The Court further held that both the investigating
agency and the courts share the responsibility to ensure that
investigations do not infringe upon individual freedoms and are
free from bias. The court highlighted that investigations must be
thorough, systematic, and aligned with legal standards, rejecting
any reports that are unfair or contravene established legal
principles. The overarching principle established in this case is
that the integrity of the investigation is paramount, as it is
essential for upholding justice, protecting the rights of the
accused under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution, and
ensuring that no one is above the law, regardless of their position
or influence in society.
17. In Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia supra, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court held that the anticipatory bail under Section 438
of the Code of Criminal Procedure serves as protection against
arbitrary arrest, safeguarding individual liberty. The Court held
that the grant of anticipatory bail should not depend solely on
whether the accusation is made with mala fide intentions but
must take into account multiple factors such as the seriousness
of the charges, the risk of the accused fleeing, the possibility of
witness tampering, and the larger public interest. The Court
emphasized that the person seeking anticipatory bail is
presumed innocent and entitled to freedom, subject to
reasonable conditions imposed by the court. This ruling
highlights the need to carefully balance the rights of the
individual with the interests of justice when deciding anticipatory
bail applications.
18. In Smt. Parisha Trivedi supra, the High Court of
Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur held that the allegations of theft and
robbery against the petitioners related to an incident in 2016.
I affirmed that personal liberty is a fundamental right that must
be protected, and anticipatory bail should be granted more
liberally under Section 482 of the Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha
Sanhita, 2023, especially when there are reasonable grounds to
believe the accused will not abscond or misuse their liberty; the
court emphasized that unnecessary detention should be avoided
and bail granted with appropriate conditions to ensure the
accused's cooperation and fairness of the trial.
19. In N. Raghavender supra, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held
that in paragraph Nos. 48 and 49 reads as follows:
"48. No sooner are the two fundamental ingredients of
"criminal breach of trust" within the meaning of
Section 405 IPC proved, and if such criminal
breach is caused by a public servant or a banker,
merchant or agent, the said offence of criminal
breach of trust is punishable under Section 409
IPC, for which it is essential to prove that:
(i) The accused must be a public servant or a banker,
merchant or agent;
(ii) He/She must have been entrusted, in such
capacity, with property; and
(iii) He/She must have committed breach of trust in
respect of such property.
49. Accordingly, unless it is proved that the accused, a
public servant or a banker, etc. was "entrusted"
with the property which he is duty-bound to
account for and that such a person has committed
criminal breach of trust, Section 409IPC may not be
attracted. "Entrustment of property" is a wide and
generic expression. While the initial onus lies on
the prosecution to show that the property in
question was "entrusted" to the accused, it is not
necessary to prove further, the actual mode of
entrustment of the property or misappropriation
thereof. Where the "entrustment" is admitted by the
accused or has been established by the
prosecution, the burden then shifts on the accused
to prove that the obligation vis-à-vis the entrusted
property was carried out in a legally and
contractually acceptable manner."
20. In Sushila Aggarwal supra, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
held that in paragraph Nos.52.2 and 52.3 reads as follows:
"52.2. Grant of an order under Section 438(1) does
not per se hamper investigation of an offence; Sections
438(1)(i) and (ii) enjoin that an accused/applicant should
cooperate with investigation. Sibbia [Gurbaksh Singh
Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 SCC
(Cri) 465] also stated that courts can fashion appropriate
conditions governing bail, as well. One condition can be
that if the police makes out a case of likely recovery of
objects or discovery of facts under Section 27 (of the
Evidence Act, 1872), the accused may be taken into
custody. Given that there is no formal method prescribed
by Section 46 of the Code if recovery is made during a
statement (to the police) and pursuant to the accused
volunteering the fact, it would be a case of recovery
during "deemed arrest". (Para 19)
52.3. The accused is not obliged to make out a special
case for grant of anticipatory bail; reading an otherwise
wide power would fetter the court's discretion. Whenever
an application (for relief under Section 438) is moved,
discretion has to be always exercised judiciously, and
with caution, having regard to the facts of every case."
21. In Harendra Rai supra, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of
India held in paragraph No.123 reads as follows:
"123. Insofar as the Public Prosecutors are
concerned, a lot of comments have been made, not only
by this Court but also by the Law Commission,
highlighting the role and importance of a Public
Prosecutor. We may quote with profit the role of the
Prosecutors as stated in the 197th Law Commission of
India Report on Public Prosecutors' Appointments
(2006):
"The Prosecutor has a duty to the State, to the
accused and to the court. The Prosecutor is at all
times a minister of justice, though seldom so
described. It is not the duty of the prosecuting
counsel to secure a conviction, nor should any
prosecutor even feel pride or satisfaction in the mere
fact of success.""
22. In Common Cause supra, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held
in paragraph No.170, reads as follows:
"170. The expressions "entrusted with property" and
"with any dominion over property" used in Section 405
came to be considered by this Court in CBI v. Duncans
Agro Industries Ltd. [(1996) 5 SCC 591 : 1996 SCC (Cri)
1045 : AIR 1996 SC 2452] and the view earlier expressed
was reiterated. It was held that the expression "entrusted"
has wide and different implication in different contexts
and the expression "trust" has been used to denote
various kinds of relationships like trustee and beneficiary,
bailor and bailee, master and servant, pledger and pledge".
23. The judgments relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel
for the petitioner are not applicable to the facts and
circumstances of the case, as the violation of Articles 14 and 21
of the Constitution of India does not arise at this stage, since
there are serious allegations are levelled against the petitioner
and Non-Bailable Warrants are pending, Red Corner notice has
been issued and also the passport of the petitioner was revoked
and extradition request is also under consideration.
24. The judgment relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel
for the respondent in Tarsem Lal supra is not applicable to the
facts and circumstances of the case, as it relates to the offence
under PMLA Act. Insofar as the other judgment relied upon by
the learned Counsel for the respondent in Hyeoksoo Son
referred supra is also not applicable, as the said judgment was
filed by the complainant Company against the quashing of the
charge sheet and acquitting the accused.
25. In Serious Fraud Investigation Office supra, the Hon'ble
Apex Court held that :
"18. Now, so far as anticipatory bail is concerned, this
Court has consistently emphasized that anticipatory bail
should not be granted as a matter of routine, particularly
in serious economic offences, involving large-scale fraud,
public money, or complex financial crimes.
23. In view of the above settled legal position, it is no more
res integra that economic offences constitute a class apart,
as they have deep rooted conspiracies involving huge loss
of public funds, and therefore such offences need to be
viewed seriously. They are considered as grave and serious
offences affecting the economy of the country as a whole
and thereby posing serious threats to the financial health
of the country. The law aids only the abiding and certainly
not its resistants. When after the investigation, a charge
sheet is submitted in the court, or in a complaint case,
summons or warrant is issued to the accused, he is bound
to submit himself to the authority of law. If he is creating
hindrances in the execution of warrants or is concealing
himself and does not submit to the authority of law, he
must not be granted the privilege of anticipatory bail,
particularly when the Court taking cognizance has found
him prima facie involved in serious economic offences or
heinous offences. In such cases when the court has reason
to believe that the person against whom the warrant has
been issued has absconded or is concealing himself so that
warrant could not be executed, the concerned court would
be perfectly justified in initiating the proclamation
proceedings against him under Section 82 Cr. P.C. The
High Courts should also consider the factum of issuance of
non-bailable warrants and initiation of proclamation
proceedings seriously and not casually, while considering
the anticipatory bail application of such accused.
27. In none of the impugned orders, the High Court has
bothered to look into the proceedings conducted, and the
detailed orders passed by the Special Court for securing
the presence of the Respondents - Accused. It cannot be
gainsaid that the judicial time of every court, even of
Magistrate's Court is as precious and valuable as that of
the High Courts and the Supreme Court. The accused are
duty bound to cooperate the trial courts in proceeding
further with the cases and bound to remain present in the
Court as and when required by the Court. Not allowing the
Courts to proceed further with the cases by avoiding
execution of summons or warrants, disobeying the orders
of the Court, and trying to delay the proceedings by hook or
crook, would certainly amount to interfering with and
causing obstruction in the administration of justice. As
held in Srikant Upadhay's case (supra), when warrant of
arrest is issued or proclamation proceedings are initiated,
the accused would not be entitled to invoke, except in
exceptional cases, the extraordinary power of the court to
grant anticipatory bail. Granting anticipatory bail is
certainly not the rule. The respondents-accused, who have
continuously avoided to follow the due process of law, by
avoiding attendance in the Court, by concealing themselves
and thereby attempting to derail the proceedings, would
not be entitled to the anticipatory bail. If the Rule of Law is
to prevail in the society, every person would have to abide
by the law, respect the law and follow the due process of
law."
26. The Hon'ble Apex has held that anticipatory bail is not to
be granted as a matter of course, particularly in cases involving
serious economic offences, large-scale fraud, misuse of public
funds, or complex financial crimes. Judicial time is deemed
equally valuable across all levels of the judiciary, including the
Magistrate's Court. Accused persons have a legal obligation to
cooperate with trial proceedings and appear before the court as
required. Avoidance of legal process such as evading service of
summons or warrants, disobeying court orders, or attempting to
delay proceedings constitutes obstruction of justice. When non-
bailable warrants or proclamation proceedings are initiated
against an accused, the grant of anticipatory bail is generally
impermissible, save for exceptional circumstances. Anticipatory
bail is an extraordinary remedy and not the norm. Respondents
who persistently evade the legal process and attempt to frustrate
judicial proceedings are not entitled to such relief. Upholding the
Rule of Law necessitates that all individuals comply with and
respect the legal process.
27. In Srikant Upadhyay supra, the Hon'ble Apex Court held
that :
"24. There can be no room for raising a contention that
when an application is filed for anticipatory bail, it cannot
be adjourned without passing an order of interim
protection. A bare perusal of Section 438 (1), Cr. P.C., would
reveal that taking into consideration the factors enumerated
thereunder the Court may either reject the application
forthwith or issue an interim order for the grant of
anticipatory bail. The proviso thereunder would reveal that
if the High Court or, the Court of Sessions, as the case may
be, did not pass an interim order under this Section or has
rejected the application for grant of anticipatory bail, it shall
be open to an officer in-charge of a police station to arrest
the person concerned without warrant, on the basis of the
accusation apprehended in such application. In view of the
proviso under Section 438(1), Cr. P.C., it cannot be
contended that if, at the stage of taking up the matter for
consideration, the Court is not rejecting the application, it is
bound to pass an interim order for the grant of anticipatory
bail. In short, nothing prevents the court from adjourning
such an application without passing an interim order. This
question was considered in detail by a Single Bench of the
High Court of Bombay, in the decision in Shrenik Jayantilal
Jain v. State of Maharashtra Through EOW Unit II,
Mumbai6 and answered as above and we are in agreement
with the view that in such cases, there will be no statutory
inhibition for arrest. Hence, the appellants cannot be heard
to contend that the application for anticipatory bail filed in
November, 2022 could not have been adjourned without
passing interim order. At any rate, the said application was
rejected on 04.04.2023. Pending the application for
anticipatory bail, in the absence of an interim protection, if
a police officer can arrest the accused concerned how can it
be contented that the court which issued summons on
account of non-obedience to comply with its order for
appearance and then issuing warrant of arrest cannot
proceed further in terms of the provisions under Section 82,
Cr. P.C., merely because of the pendency of an application
for anticipatory bail. If the said position is accepted the
same would be adopted as a ruse to escape from the impact
and consequences of issuance of warrant for arrest and also
from the issuance of proclamation under Section 82, Cr.
P.C., by filing successive applications for anticipatory bail.
In such circumstances, and in the absence of any statutory
prohibition and further, taking note of the position of law
which enables a police officer to arrest the applicant for
anticipatory bail if pending an application for anticipatory
bail the matter is adjourned but no interim order was
passed. We have no hesitation to answer the question posed
for consideration in the negative. In other words, it is made
clear that in the absence of any interim order, pendency of
an application for anticipatory bail shall not bar the Trial
Court in issuing/proceeding with steps for proclamation
and in taking steps under Section 83, Cr. P.C., in
accordance with law.
25. We have already held that the power to grant
anticipatory bail is an extraordinary power. Though in many
cases it was held that bail is said to be a rule, it cannot, by
any stretch of imagination, be said that anticipatory bail is
the rule. It cannot be the rule and the question of its grant
should be left to the cautious and judicious discretion by
the Court depending on the facts and circumstances of each
case. While called upon to exercise the said power, the
Court concerned has to be very cautious as the grant of
interim protection or protection to the accused in serious
cases may lead to miscarriage of justice and may hamper
the investigation to a great extent as it may sometimes lead
to tampering or distraction of the evidence. We shall not be
understood to have held that the Court shall not pass an
interim protection pending consideration of such application
as the Section is destined to safeguard the freedom of an
individual against unwarranted arrest and we say that such
orders shall be passed in eminently fit cases. At any rate,
when warrant of arrest or proclamation is issued, the
applicant is not entitled to invoke the extraordinary power.
Certainly, this will not deprive the power of the Court to
grant pre-arrest bail in extreme, exceptional cases in the
interest of justice. But then, person(s) continuously, defying
orders and keep absconding is not entitled to such grant."
28. From the above, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has reaffirmed
that anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. is an exceptional
relief intended to prevent undue harassment, not a routine
shield against lawful arrest. It held that the appellants' repeated
non-appearance and withdrawal of bail applications indicated a
deliberate attempt to evade the legal process, amounting to
'absconding' under Section 82 Cr.P.C. Consequently, such
conduct disqualifies them from seeking anticipatory bail. The
Court also clarified that the mere pendency of a bail application
does not preclude the prosecution from initiating proclamation
proceedings, thereby preventing abuse of process and undue
delay in the administration of justice.
29. In Prem Shankar Prasad supra, the Hon'ble Apex Court
held that
"10. It is required to be noted that after investigation a
charge-sheet has been filed against Respondent 2-accused
for the offences punishable under Sections 406, 420IPC
also. Thus it has been found that there is a prima facie
case against the accused. It has come on record that the
arrest warrant was issued by the learned Magistrate as far
back as on 19-12-2018 and thereafter proceedings under
Sections 82/83CrPC have been initiated pursuant to the
order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate
dated 10-1-2019. Only thereafter Respondent 2 moved an
application before the learned trial court for anticipatory
bail which came to be dismissed by the learned Additional
Sessions Judge, Saran, by a reasoned order.
10.2. Despite the above observations on merits and
despite the fact that it was brought to the notice of the
High Court that Respondent 2-accused is absconding and
even the proceedings under Sections 82/83CrPC have
been initiated as far back as on 10-1-2019, the High Court
has just ignored the aforesaid relevant aspects and has
granted anticipatory bail to Respondent 2-accused by
observing that the nature of accusation is arising out of a
business transaction. The specific allegations of cheating,
etc. which came to be considered by the learned Additional
Sessions Judge has not at all been considered by the High
Court. Even the High Court has just ignored the factum of
initiation of proceedings under Sections 82/83CrPC by
simply observing that "be that as it may". The aforesaid
relevant aspect on grant of anticipatory bail ought not to
have been ignored by the High Court and ought to have
been considered by the High Court very seriously and not
casually.
12. Even the observations made by the High Court while
granting the anticipatory bail to Respondent 2-accused
that the nature of accusation is arising out of a business
transaction and therefore the accused is entitled to the
anticipatory bail is concerned, the same cannot be
accepted. Even in the case of a business transaction also
there may be offences under the IPC more particularly
Sections 406, 420, 467, 468, etc. What is required to be
considered is the nature of allegation and the accusation
and not that the nature of accusation is arising out of a
business transaction. At this stage, it is required to be
noted that Respondent 2-accused has been charge-
sheeted for the offences punishable under Sections 406
and 420, etc. and a charge-sheet has been filed in the
court of the learned Magistrate Court."
30. The Supreme Court emphasized that while considering an
application for anticipatory bail, courts must assess the
seriousness of the allegations, the conduct of the accused, and
the nature of the offence. In this case, Respondent 2 was charge-
sheeted under Sections 406 and 420 IPC, an arrest warrant had
been issued, and proceedings under Sections 82/83 CrPC were
initiated demonstrating that the accused was absconding. The
Court reiterated the principle that anticipatory bail should not be
granted routinely or mechanically, especially where the accused
has evaded the legal process and the High Court for ignoring
these material facts and for erroneously relying on the nature of
the transaction being "business-related" without evaluating the
specific allegations of criminal breach of trust and cheating. It
held that even business transactions can give rise to offences
under the IPC and that the High Court's casual approach
undermined the settled principles governing the exercise of
discretion under Section 438 Cr.P.C.
31. Whether, at the instance of the petitioner, the subordinate
officers switched off the CCTV cameras, replaced the 36 old hard
disks with new hard disks, replacing 26 hard disks with 7 new
hard disks from SIB main server and destroyed the information
contained in the old hard disks; and whether these actions were
carried out basing on the instructions given by the Review
Committee or not, the said aspects need to be revealed during
the course of the investigation pertaining to the petitioner and
during the course of trial.
32. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of
the case as well as the gravity of the offence and plethora of the
judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court, this Court is of the
considered view that the petitioner is not entitled for grant of pre-
arrest bail and the same is liable to be dismissed.
33. Accordingly, the criminal petition is dismissed.
Miscellaneous applications, pending if any, shall stand
closed.
________________________
J.SREENIVAS RAO, J
Date: 02.05.2025
mar
