Telangana High Court
M. Jagadishwar vs M.Bharathi And 4 Others on 28 May, 2025
Author: T. Vinod Kumar
Bench: T.Vinod Kumar, P.Sree Sudha
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE T. VINOD KUMAR
AND
THE HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE P. SREE SUDHA
WRIT PETITION No. 13192 of 2010
&
CONTEMPT CASE No. 232 of 2022
COMMON ORDER:
(Per Hon'ble Sri Justice T. Vinod Kumar)
Since, the issue involved in this Writ Petition and the
Contempt Case are inter-connected both the matters are being
disposed of by this common order.
2. The Writ Petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, is filed by the petitioners, with the following prayer:
It is therefore, prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased
to issue appropriate writ or order or direction more
particularly one in nature of Writ of Certiorari calling the
records in LGA.No.13/2008 dated 18.01.2010 passed by
Special Court Under A.P.Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act
Hyderabad, setting aside the Judgment and decree in LGA.No.
13/2008, dated 18.01.2010, on the file of Special Court Under
A.P.Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act Hyderabad and also the
Order and Decree dated 27.09.2007, passed by the Special
Tribunal Cum III Addl. Chief Judge, City Civil Court,
Hyderabad and consequently direct the Respondents 1 & 2 to
deliver the possession of the premises bearing H.No.1-7-553 to
556 admeasuring 216 Sq.yds situated at Zamistanpur,
Hyderabad to Petitioners and pass such other order or orders
this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the
circumstances of the case.
3. Petitioners in the Writ Petition are the petitioners/applicant
in the LGOP No.39 of 1997 and LGA No. 13 of 2008. The
Special Tribunal-Cum-III Additional Chief Judge, City Civil
Court, Hyderabad (in short 'Special Tribunal) in LGOP No.39 of
1997 vide order dt.27.09.2007 and the Special Court Under A.P.
Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act Hyderabad (for short 'Special
Court) in LGA No.13 of 2008 vide judgment dated 18.01.2010
held that the petitioners/appellants herein failed to prove the
respondents herein as 'land grabbers' and dismissed the same.
Aggrieved by the order passed by the Special Court in LGA
No.13 of 2008, the present Writ Petition is filed.
4. It is the case of the petitioners that, their father M.
Shankaraiah was the absolute owner and possessor of the subject
property bearing No.1-7-553 to 556 admeasuring 216 Sq Yds
situated at Zamisthanpur, Hyderabad, which was purchased vide
Registered Sale Deed dated 17.06.1970 from one M. Jagannatha
Swamy and N.Sarojanamma along with her sister viz.,
Anusuyamma.
5. Petitioners contend that, as on the date of Sale there were
tenants existing in the property and subsequent to the purchase of
the property, the father of the petitioners used to collect the rents
from tenants. When the tenants had defaulted in paying the
rents, he filed RC.Nos.181 to 187 of 1973, in the Court of Rent
Controller at Hyderabad. Subsequent to the death of M
Shankaraiah, the respondent Nos.1 & 2 i.e. legal heirs of the
vendors had illegally grabbed the property. Challenging the
illegal occupation of the subject property by the respondents, the
petitioners had filed LGOP. No.39 of 1997 before the Special
Tribunal.
6. Petitioners contend that, the Special Tribunal after
considering the evidence had erroneously dismissed the LGOP
No.39 of 1997 vide order dated 27.09.2007, contrary to the
contents of the Registered sale deed, Ex.A-l i.e. Original
Registered Sale Deed in favour of M Shankaraiah wherein it is
stated that the possession was delivered to M Shankaraiah as on
the date of execution of registered sale deed.
7. It is contended that, the respondent.No.2 produced the
Xerox and Carbon copy of Agreement of sale which had no
signatures of M Shankaraiah and it was concluded that on the
date of execution of sale deed itself, he had entered into
agreement of sale with the respondent No.2's father i.e.
Jagannatha Swamy. Thus, the Special Tribunal by considering
the aforesaid evidence observed that the possession was not
delivered to the petitioner's father i.e. M Shankaraiah.
8. The petitioners contend that, the Special Tribunal grossly
erred in accepting the said evidence which is against the contents
of the sale deed and thereby erred in accepting the document viz.
Ex.B-1 i.e. Original Receipt dated 12.12.1975, which was
allegedly executed by the father of the petitioner. It is also
contended that the Court below did not consider the recitals of
the Sale Deed executed by the father of respondent No.2 in
correct perspective with regard to delivery of possession made in
favour of the father of the petitioners.
9. Petitioners contend that, the respondent Nos.1 and 2 on
01.05.2019 with an intention to change the nature of the property
and in order to cause severe loss to the petitioners had
demolished the entire structures existing in the subject property.
Consequently, the petitioners filed I.A. No.1 of 2019 in W.P.
No.13192 of 2010 seeking a direction restraining the respondents
not to make any constructions in the subject premises, to which
the Respondents Nos.1 & 2 through an undertaking stated that
they are only demolishing an already existing old building,
which is in a dilapidated condition and asserted that they will not
make any constructions over the subject property. The High
Court recording the same by its order dated 10.07.2019 disposed
the interlocutory application.
10. The petitioners contend that, the respondents Nos.1&2
however, alienated the subject property to the respondent Nos.3
to 7 by different sale deeds. Consequently, the petitioners filed
I.A. No.2 of 2020 seeking a direction not to alienate the subject
properties to third parties, and the petitioners also filed another
interlocutory application vide I.A No.3 of 2020 seeking to
implead the purchasers i.e. respondent Nos.5 and 6. This Court
by an interim order dated 08.06.2021 directed the respondent No.
7 herein not to alienate the subject property. However, the
respondents started constructions in the subject property which is
in clear violation of the undertaking given by the Respondents
Nos.1 & 2.
11. It is further contended that, the respondents Nos.1 & 2 in
order to avoid the contempt proceedings had alienated the
subject property to the newly impleaded respondents.
Consequently, the petitioners herein filed I.A. No.4 of 2020
seeking to direct the respondents not to make any constructions,
and this Court by an interim order dated 19.07.2021 directed the
respondents not to make any constructions or structures in the
subject property premises.
12. The petitioners contend that, intentionally all the
respondents are making constructions in the subject property in
violation of the order dated 19.07.2021 passed in I.A. No.4 of
2020, which amounts to contempt of Court punishable under
Sections 10 to 12 of the Act.
13. Per Contra, the respondent No.2 contends that, Jagannatha
swamy is the owner of the subject property who purchased the
same along with his two sisters i.e. Sarojanamma and
Anasuyamma wherein the respondent No.1's father was holding
1/8th share and Jagannatha swamy purchased undivided share of
1/4th from Anasuyamma vide Registered Sale Deed dated
30.04.1968.
14. It is further contended that, in June 1970 Jagannatha swamy
and Sarojanamma borrowed Rs.6000/- from M Shankaraiah i.e.
the father of the petitioners, who obtained Registered Sale Deed
dated 17.06.1970 towards security and also executed
contemporaneous agreement on the same day in favour of
Sarojanamma and another, and even after full discharge of the
debt, the Sale Deed was not returned and also never acted upon.
Subsequently, Jagannatha swamy i.e. the father of the respondent
No.2 and Sarojanamma continued in possession of the property
which later devolved upon the respondents herein.
15. Respondents further contend that, in a criminal case vide
C.C. No.7 of 1979, M Shankaraiah gave evidence and stated that
Jagannatha swamy and Sarojanamma are the owners of the
subject property and further stated that the respondents had been
in possession for a statutory period and also acquired title by
adverse possession. Therefore, it is contended that the
petitioner's father is not the owner of the subject property.
Consideration by Special Court:
16. Basing on the respective contentions, the Special Court had
framed the following issues for consideration: -
i. Whether the petitioners were ever in possession of the petition
schedule property?
ii. Whether Ex.A-1 sale transaction was nominal and was never acted
upon by the parties thereto?
iii. Whether the respondents are land grabbers as defined under Section
2(d) of the Act?
17. Before the Special Tribunal, the petitioners got themselves
examined as PW-1 & 2 and got marked documents i.e. Exs.A-1
to 7. On behalf of the respondents, RWs-1 to 3 were examined
and got marked documents Ex. B-1 to 26.
18. The documents relevant for ascertaining the facts of the
case would be the i) Registered Sale Deed dated 17.06.1970 in
favour of M Shankaraiah marked as Ex.A-1; ii) Property Tax
Receipts paid to MCH, Hyderabad marked as Ex.A-2, iii)
Registered Sale Deed dated 30.04.1968 executed by
Anasuyamma in favour of M Jagannatha Swamy marked as
Ex.A-3; iv) Original Receipt dated 12.12.1975 executed by M
Shankaraiah marked as Ex.B-1 and v) Certified Copy of
Judgment in CC No.7 of 1979 marked as Ex.B2.
The Special Court in LGA No. 13 of 2008 basing on the oral
and documentary evidence adduced on both sides and having
regard to the points for consideration had observed as under:
I. Para-8:....The LGOP was filed in December 1996. The time gap
between the date of filing of LGOP and the date of Ex.A-2 being
more than 6 years it would not render any assistance to the
petitioners to prove their possession from the date of Ex.A-1
(17-06-1970) to the date of alleged dispossession in 1986.
II. Para-9:.....Ex.B-2 is the CC of Judgment in C.C. No.7/1979 on
the file of X Metropolitan Magistrate, Secunderabad filed by
Shankaraiah against Jagannathaswamy and Sarojanamma
alleging that they were inducing and collecting rents from the
tenants of the petition schedule property, suppressing the fact
that they sold the petition schedule land to the complainant
(Shankaraiah) and causing wrongful loss to him. The said C.C.
ended in acquittal. The fact that it is alleged specifically that
Jagannathswamy and Sarojanamma were collecting the rentals
must be taken note of as admission on the part of Shankaraiah
that Jagannathaswamy and Sarojanamma were in possession of
the property.Ex.B-3 is the original electricity bill dated
18/6/1997, Ex.B-4 is the property tax receipt dated 14/8/1996
for the period 1/4/1975 to 31/3/1996 and Ex.B-5 is the water bill
dated 15/12/1997 relating to the petition schedule property
which would afford proof of possession of the respondents.
III. Para-10:.....RW-2 claims to have resided in a portion of the
petition schedule property for 25 years where after he shifted to
Seetharamnagar, Malkajgiri. He used to pay rent of Rs.14/-
initially, which was later enhanced gradually to Rs.300/- by the
time of his vacating the premises. ... Thus, it goes without
dispute that he was the tenant in the premises for quite a long
period. He says that he paid the rents to Jagannathaswamy.
R.W.3 claims to be a neighbour to the petition schedule
property. He says that all the tenants used to pay the rents to
Jagannathaswamy till he died in the year 1981. Thus, it can be
seen that in C.C.7/1979 Late Shankaraiah admitted that
Jagannatha-swamy and Sarojanamma were collecting rents
from the 7 tenants. Ex.B-3 to B-5 and the evidence of R.Ws.2 &
3 firmly go to show that it was Jagannathswamy, who was in
possession of the property......The petitioners could not
establish that they were in possession of the property at any
point of time much less till 1986.
IV. Para-12:....The fact that Shankaraiah himself filed a Crl. Case
against Jagannathswamy and Sarojanamma is proof positive to
show that the applicants were never in possession of the
same..... NeitherShankaraiah nor the petitioners till the LGOP
was filed before lower court in December 1996 made any
attempt to recover possession of the petition schedule property
from June 1970. Thus, they kept silent for more than 26 years.
This conduct of theirs coupled with the above facts renders
assistance in coming to the inference that the plea of the
respondents that Ex.A-1 was executed as security for the debt
incurred by Jagannathaswamywas true. The sale consideration
under Ex.A-1 is Rs.6000/-. The pleadings of the respondents and
the evidence of R.W.1 are categorical in saying that, Ex.A-1 was
executed to serve as security for discharge of the debt of
Rs.6000/-.....In Ex.B-1 Late Shankaraiah clearly admitted about
Rs.6000/-debt owed by Jagannathswamy and Sarojarramma. A
reference is also made to an agreement dated 17th June 1970
executed in respect of the petition schedule property. Ex.A-1
sale deed is also dated 17/6/1970 and the sale consideration
was Rs.6000/-. In fact, P.W.1 was confronted with the Xerox
copy of the agreement dated 17/6/1970 and also Ex.B-1 receipt
and he denied the signatures therein standing in the name of his
father Shankaraiah. The original agreement must be in
possession of Shankaraiah only. However, since the document
was a Xerox copy and Shankaraiah died it appears that the
respondents gave up the idea of getting it marked in evidence.
We have compared the signatures of M.Shankaraiah obtaining
on Ex.B-1 with that of his signatures obtaining on the certified
photo copies of Vakalaths (Exs.B-13 to B-19) and certified
photo copies of petitions (Exs.B-6 to B-12) in the seven R.C.Cs.
Nos. 181 to 187/1973 on the file of Principal Rent Controller of
Hyderabad. Those photo signatures are very clear and fit for
comparison. The questioned signature on Ex.B-1 tallies with the
signatures obtaining in the above documents Exs.B-6 to B-19 in
all respects like formation of letters, alignment, speed slant etc.,
Under Ex.B-1 receipt an amount of Rs.5000/- was paid. Only an
amount of Rs.2500/- out of it was appropriated towards (partial)
discharge of debt of Rs.6000/-. If the respondents wanted to
press into service a forged receipt they would as well have filed
a forged receipt for the entire amount due instead of for
Rs.2500/-only. This would also probabalise the genuineness of
Ex.B-1 receipt. Thus, viewed from any angle Ex.B-1 can be held
to be true and genuine. As already stated the fact that the
Shankaraiah and the petitioners kept quite for more than 26
years would also support the plea of the respondents that only
as security for discharge of debt Ex.A-1 sale deed was executed
by Jagannathaswamy and Sarojanamma otherwise Late
Shankaraiah would not have kept quite so long and allowed
Jagannathaswamy to collect rentals. Thus, the very conduct of
the father of the petitioners and the petitioners also would fortify
our conclusion that Ex.A-1 was only a nominal sale deed and it
was never acted upon.
V. Para-13:....we hold that the petitioners were never in possession
of the petition schedule property and Ex.A-1 was a nominal sale
deed executed as security for the debt incurred by
Jagannathaswamy and Sarojanamma from Shankaraiah and it
was never acted upon by the parties thereto.
VI. Para-14:....Petitioners have failed to prove their possession of
the petition schedule property at any point of time after Ex.A-1
sale deed. Ex.A-1 being nominal and having not been acted
upon, Petitioners have no legal title to the property. Therefore,
it cannot be held that the respondents are land grabbers.
VII. Para-15: Both sides also referred to a decision of A.P. High
Court in Mohammad Vajahath Hussain @ Fasi Vs. Special
Court under A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act,
Hyderabad and another. 2007 (5) ALD 6 (D.B). In this case the
schedule property was described as house with appurtenant
land. The Division Bench held:
******
So what need be looked into is pleading. If the petition schedule
property has been described as building with appurtenant land,
Land Grabbing court will not have jurisdiction, but if it is
alleged that land is grabbed along with the existing super
structures or building thereon it will become the property in
dispute and this court will have jurisdiction.
VIII. Para-16:The learned counsel for the appellant has cited a ruling
of this Court rendered in Shantha BaiVs. Mohd. Iqbal 2000
ALD (LGC) 40 wherein it is held that building which is alleged
to have been grabbed does not fall within the definition of land
and the Special Court will have jurisdiction only in the case of
land or in a case where the land is grabbed and subsequently a
building was erected thereon.
IX. Para-17: In the present case, the details of the property are
mentioned in column No.7, 8 and 9 as under:
7). Survey Number and Sub- H.No.1-7-553 to 556, Divisional
number. situated at Jamistanpur, Musheerabad.
8). ****
9). ****
It may be noted that as against column No.7 houses numbers are
given as 1-7-553 to 556. It evidently indicates that there are 4
houses or a single house bearing 4 house numbers in portions is
in existence. Even in Ex.A-1 sale deed the property is described
as house bearing Nos.1-7-553 to 556 (Old No.552/A, Block
No.7), situated at DayaraJamistanpura, Mushirabad
admeasuring 216 square yards. Therefore, what was purchased
under Ex.A-1 was house only, but not land. This is not the case
where the land is grabbed first and subsequently building was
erected thereon. Therefore, Applying both the above decisions, it
must be held that this Court has no jurisdiction.
19. The Special Court by applying the decisions of the
erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh in the case of
Mohammad Vajahath Hussain (Supra) and Shantha Bai
(Supra) recorded its finding as above and had held that, the
subject property purchased under Ex.A-1 was 'house' but not
'land' and it is not the case where the land is grabbed first and
subsequently building was erected. Thus, it held that it did not
had jurisdiction under the Act, and accordingly dismissed the
appeal.
20. Heard, Sri P.S.P. Suresh Kumar, learned Counsel for the
petitioners and Sri D. Jagadeeswar Reddy, learned Counsel for
respondent Nos.2, 5, 6, 8, 9 and 10, Sri M. Vishnuvardhan
Reddy, learned Counsel for respondent No.7, learned
Government Pleader for Assignment for respondent No.3 and 4
and perused the record.
21. It is to be noted that, the Special Tribunal on the evidence
adduced by both the parties had observed that, the respondents
had grabbed 'house' which was already in existence, and it is not
the case where respondents have grabbed the 'land' first upon
which have constructed a house thereon unauthorizedly, thus, it
held that the respondents are not the land grabbers under the Act.
22. The Special Tribunal, while deciding the question as to the
'land grabbing' had held that it is an activity of grabbing of any
'land' by a person or group of persons without any lawful
entitlement and with a view to take illegal possession of such
lands etc. and further held that 'land' includes right over the
land, benefits to arise out of land and buildings, structures and
other things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to
anything attached to earth. Accordingly, by placing reliance on
the decision in the case of Shantha Bai (Supra) wherein, it was
held that, building which is alleged to have been grabbed does
not fall within the definition of 'land' and the Special Court will
have jurisdiction only in case of 'land' or 'when the land is
grabbed subsequently building was erected there on', the Special
Tribunal gave a categorical finding that the house grabbed by the
respondents cannot be called as an act of land grabbing
23. Thus, the view taken by the Special Court is that if an
existing building itself is grabbed, the same will not fall within
the jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal or the Special Court and
if the land is grabbed thereafter the structures are raised, it may
fall within the jurisdiction of the same.
24. The Special Court by considering the documents marked as
Ex.A-1 had noted that the subject property alleged to be grabbed
is a 'house' but not 'land' and noted that as it is not the case
where the land is grabbed first and subsequently building was
erected thereon, the Special Court had no jurisdiction under the
Act. The Special Tribunal and Special Court took the aforesaid
view by placing reliance on the decision of this Court in
Mohammad Vajahath Hussain (Supra).
25. However, the decision of this Court in Mohammad
Vajahath Hussain (Supra) has been reversed by the Apex Court
in Safiya Bee v. Mohd. Vajahath Hussain1 wherein it was
observed as under:
11. The basic question to be considered is whether the High Court
was correct in holding that the Appellant's application under
Section 7A of the Act was not maintainable before the Special
(2011) 2 SCC 94
Tribunal "as the property in dispute was a building with its
appurtenant land". The Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing
(Prohibition) Act, 1982 was enacted to prohibit the activity of
land grabbing in the State of Andhra Pradesh and to provide for
matters connected therewith.....
Section 2(c) defines 'land' as hereunder:
'land' includes rights in or over land, benefits to arise out of land
and buildings, structures and other things attached to the earth or
permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth
The above definition of 'land' makes it clear that the expression
'land' includes "buildings, structures and other things attached to
the earth". In view of such inclusive definition of 'land', grabbing
a building attached to the earth amounts to land grabbing for the
purposes of this Act. Hence, the High Court erred in holding that
the Act applies to the land but not to the buildings. The High
Court was clearly wrong in holding that "if an application is filed
seeking possession of building along with its appurtenant land,
because the building in question is in existence on the land and is
surrounded by the vacant land, it cannot be said that it is a case
of grabbing of land". In our view, if a building along with the
land on which it stands is the subject matter of the application
under Section 7A of the Act, such application is maintainable
before the Special Tribunal. The distinction drawn by the High
Court between "building with appurtenant land" and "land along
with building" is artificial and hyper-technical and it defeats the
very purpose of the legislation. In the light of the definition of
'land' under Section 2(c) of the Act, both the above descriptions
practically mean the same thing vis-�-vis 'land grabbing' and
there is no logic or justification for drawing a distinction between
them. Hence, the High Court erred in holding that the application
filed by the Appellant was not maintainable before the Special
Tribunal.
26. In view of the law declared by the Apex Court that, the Act
applies not only to the lands, but also to the buildings along with
the land on which stands is the subject matter of the application
under the Act.
27. The Special Court and Tribunal erred in holding that the
building alleged to have been grabbed does not fall within the
definition of 'land'. Further it also erred in holding that only
occupation of the open land and construction of a building
thereon can be treated as 'land grabbing' under the Act.
28. The Special Court on the authenticity of the Ex.B-1,
recorded as under:
"Para-12.....PW-1 was confronted with Xerox Copy of agreement
dated 17.06.1970 and Ex.B-1 receipt and he denied the signatures
therein standing in the name of his father Shankaraiah. The original
agreement must be in possession of Shankaraiah only. However,
since the document was a Xerox copy and Shanakariah died it
appears that the respondents gave up the idea of getting it marked in
evidence....".
The Special Court, however, while considering the evidence
placed before it, ought to have the document in question to the
forensic authorities to verify the correctness of the claim of the
petitioner/applicant, that the signatures of their father late. M.
Shankaraiah are forged, instead of itself comparing with the
signature on the certified copies of vakalat in RCC's filed
seeking eviction of tenants during his lifetime.
29. In the light of the above discussion, this Court is of the view
that the application filed by the petitioner under Section 7A of
the Act before the Special Tribunal was maintainable and that
the Special Tribunal and Special Court in appeal had jurisdiction
to adjudicate the dispute raised therein.
30. In view of this above, since, the LGOP No.39 of 1997 and
LGA No.13 of 2008 filed by the petitioner herein before the
Special Tribunal and Special Court are maintainable, the
impugned order of the Special Court dated 18.01.2008 in LGA
No.13 of 2008 and order of the Special Tribunal dated
27.09.2007 in LGOP No.39 of 1997 holding that the appeal and
petition are not maintainable cannot be sustained and are liable
to be set aside.
31. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is allowed and the order in
LGOP. No.39 of 1997 dated 27.09.2007 and LGA No.13 of 2008
dated 18.01.2010 are set aside and the matter is remitted back to
the Special Tribunal for consideration afresh.
32. It is made clear that the Special Tribunal may decide the
Land Grabbing Case uninfluenced by the findings recorded by
this Court.
33. In view of the order passed in W.P. No. 13192 of 2010, the
Contempt Case is closed. No order as to costs.
As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending if any shall
stand closed.
____________________
T. VINOD KUMAR, J
_________________
P.SREE SUDHA, J
Date: 28.05.2025
VSV/MRKR
