M/S. Indusind Bank Ltd, vs Rathlavathalivelu
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Telangana High Court

M/S. Indusind Bank Ltd, vs Rathlavathalivelu on 27 March, 2025

      HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE LAXMI NARAYANA ALISHETTY

                         I.A.No.3 of 2024
                              In/And
                    M.A.C.M.A.No.1486 OF 2024


COMMON ORDER:

This I.A.No.3 of 2024 is filed to condone the delay of 1048 days in

filing the Appeal challenging the judgment and decree dated 29.11.2019

in M.V.O.P.No.524 of 2013 passed by the Chairman-M.A.C.T.-cum-I

Additional District Judge, Mahabubnagar.

2. Heard Smt. Vedula Chitralekha, learned counsel for petitioners

and Sri Murtuza Ali Farooqi, learned counsel for respondents.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that respondent

Nos. 1 to 5 filed M.V.O.P.No.524 of 2013 on the file of the Chairman-

M.A.C.T.-cum-I Additional District Judge, Mahabubnagar, against the

petitioner herein claiming a sum of Rs.4,00,000/- towards compensation

on account of accident that took place on 18.09.2013. In the said

accident, respondent No.1, who is father of respondent No.2 and 3 and

son of respondent No.4 and 5, died on the spot. The Tribunal vide order

dated 29.11.2019 disposed of the M.V.O.P.No.524 2013 granting

compensation of Rs.10,49,200/-.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the Crime

vehicle was purchased by one Sri Md.Asif, on 15.03.2013 in a public LNA,J, IA.No.3 of 2024 In/And M.A.C.M.A. No.1486 of 2024

auction conducted by the petitioner-Bank and the vehicle was delivered

to him on 19.03.2013 after executing undertaking and also indemnity

bond in favour of the petitioner. Therefore, petitioner is not the owner

of the vehicle at the time of accident and is not liable to pay the

compensation. This aspect was not properly appreciated by the

Tribunal and erroneously fastened the liability on the petitioner.

5. In the application filed for condonation of the delay, it is

mentioned that the counsel for the petitioner filed copy application on

13.02.2020 and the same was received by the petitioner-bank on

20.02.2020. The said matter was handled by State legal Coordinator of

the appellant-Bank and the said coordinator abruptly left the services of

the bank due to which he did not handover the file to the counsel for

filing of the appeal, therefore, appeal could not be filed. It is further

contended that in the month of May of 2022, appellant-Bank observed

that no appeal was filed challenging the order dated 29.11.2019 and

immediately, the matter was entrusted to one of the Authorized

Officers of the Bank and therefore, delay of 1048 days occasioned in

filing the appeal.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that

Appellant-Bank is not liable to pay compensation as held by the

Tribunal, since the vehicle was auctioned and one Sri Mohd.Asif, LNA,J, IA.No.3 of 2024 In/And M.A.C.M.A. No.1486 of 2024

purchased the vehicle and however, he was not made a party to the

M.V.O.P. and that the petitioner has very good case on merits, and the

petitioner is likely to succeed in the appeal, therefore, prayed to allow

the application.

7. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent contended that the

petitioner-Bank filed E.P.No.106 of 2020 before the concerned court and

the petitioner has also appeared in the court in the said case on

06.09.2020, and further, Petitioner-Bank is actively pursuing the said

E.P. filed by the respondent Nos. 1 to 5. Therefore, contention of the

petitioner that it was not aware of the award passed by the Tribunal is

incorrect. Even otherwise, as per their own admission, the petitioner

came to know about non-filing of the appeal in the month of May, 2022,

however, appeal was filed on 13.09.2024, along with an application for

condonation of huge delay of 1048 days. Hence, the application is

devoid of merits and the same is liable to be dismissed as the approach

of the appellant is very causal in nature and has failed to explain the

inordinate delay in filing the appeal.

8. It is apt to examine the principles and parameters to be

considered for condonation of delay. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Union

of India and another v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his LR (SLP

(Civil) No.21096 of 2019 dated 03.04.2024), by referring the judgment of LNA,J, IA.No.3 of 2024 In/And M.A.C.M.A. No.1486 of 2024

the same Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of

Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Others [(2013) 12 SCC 649], held that

"delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial

justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party".

9. In Basawaraj and another v. Special Land Acquisition

Officer 1, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:

"11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201] .)

12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.

15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation,

2013 (14) SCC 81 LNA,J, IA.No.3 of 2024 In/And M.A.C.M.A. No.1486 of 2024

the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."

10. From a reading of the aforesaid observations, it is clear that the

Hon'ble Apex Court at paras-11 and 12 of the judgment interpreted

the expression "sufficient cause" and at para-15 summarized the law

with regard to the issue of limitation.

11. In Postmaster General and others vs. Living Media India

Limited and another 2, Hon'ble Apex Court having considered catena

of decisions, including Pundlik Jalam Patil (dead) by LRs. Vs.

Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project and another 3, held

as hereunder:

"17....... The evidence on record suggests neglect of its own right for long time in preferring appeals. The court cannot enquire into belated and stale claims on the ground of equity. Delay defeats equity. The court helps those who are vigilant and "do not slumber over their rights".

(2012) 3 SCC 563

(2008) 17 SC 448 LNA,J, IA.No.3 of 2024 In/And M.A.C.M.A. No.1486 of 2024

and observed that taking very lenient view in condoning the delay, particularly, on the part of the Government and Government Undertaking, would not be proper and observed as under:-

"29. It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.

30. Public interest undoubtedly is a paramount consideration in exercising the courts' discretion wherever conferred upon it by the relevant statutes. Pursuing stale claims and multiplicity of proceedings in no manner subserves public interest. Prompt and timely payment of compensation to the landlosers facilitating their rehabilitation/resettlement is equally an integral part of public policy. Public interest demands that the State or the beneficiary of acquisition, as the case may be, should not be allowed to indulge in any act to unsettle the settled legal rights accrued in law by resorting to avoidable litigation unless the claimants are guilty of deriving benefit to which they are otherwise not entitled, in any fraudulent manner. One should not forget the basic fact that what is acquired is not the land but the livelihood of the landlosers. These public interest parameters ought to be kept in mind by the courts while exercising the discretion dealing with the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Dragging the landlosers to courts of law years after the termination of legal proceedings would not serve any public interest. Settled rights cannot be lightly interfered with by condoning inordinate delay without there being any proper explanation of such delay on the ground of involvement of public revenue. It serves no public interest."

12. In Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources

Department) rep.by Executive Engineer vs. Borse Brothers LNA,J, IA.No.3 of 2024 In/And M.A.C.M.A. No.1486 of 2024

Engineers and Contractors Private Limited 4, Hon'ble Supreme

Court held as under:

"63. ...... In a fit case in which a party has otherwise acted bona fide and not in a negligent manner, a short delay beyond such period can, in the discretion of the court, be condoned, always bearing in mind that the other side of the picture is that the opposite party may have acquired both in equity and justice, what may now be lost by the first party's inaction, negligence or laches."

13. From the aforesaid judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court, it is

well settled that condonation of delay is not a matter of right and

unless sufficient and plausible reasons are shown, the delay cannot

be condoned. While condoning the delay, the Courts should also see

the substantial rights accrued to the opposite party and also the

passage of considerable time.

14. Condonation of delay is not a matter of routine, more so when

there is huge inordinate delay and, therefore, the petitioner ought to

have offered detailed, cogent reasons, plausible explanation for such

inordinate delay. The reasons stated in the affidavit are vague,

unsatisfactory and does not inspire the confidence of this Court.

Therefore, it is not a fit case to condone the inordinate delay of 1048

days in filing the M.A.C.M.A.

15. A perusal of the record would disclose that award was passed

on 29.11.2019 and whereas, appeal was filed on 13.09.2024 with

inordinate delay of 1048 days and the delay has not been properly

(2021) 6 SCC 460 LNA,J, IA.No.3 of 2024 In/And M.A.C.M.A. No.1486 of 2024

explained by the Petitioner-Bank. The reasons assigned by the

petitioner-Bank for condonation of delay does not inspire the

confidence of this court and more so, when the Petitioner-Bank is

aware of filing E.P., and petitioner was also represented by counsel in

the said E.P. and as such, the petitioner cannot say that they came to

know about non-filing of the appeal only in the month of May, 2022.

Therefore, there are clear laches and default on the part of the

Petitioner-Bank in filing the appeal.

16. In view of the foregoing reasons and legal position and as no

plausible and convincing reasons are shown for condonation of

inordinate delay of 1048 days in filing Second Appeal, I.A.No.3 of

2024 is liable to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed.

Consequently, the M.A.C.M.A. also stands dismissed. There shall be

no order as to costs.

Pending miscellaneous applications if any shall stand closed.

__________________________________ LAXMI NARAYANA ALISHETTY,J Date: 27.03.2025 tssb