while joining in service and as recorded in their service registers.
2. Since the question involved in both the matters is identical,
heard and are decided by way of this common order. The facts are
taken from W.P.No.26246 of 2024.
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3. The petitioner appeared in National Eligibility cum Entrance
course. Respondent No.2 issued the prospectus/regulations for
authority quota for the Academic Year 2024-25. Clause E of said
4. The father of the petitioner has rendered his services in BSF
retirement w.e.f. 30.04.1997. The petitioner appeared for NEET
2022-23 and secured qualifying marks. In the previous
against 1% quota. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed W.P.No.41918 of
2022 before this Court. The said Writ Petition was disposed of on
and benefit of reservation as set out in the Rules will be extended.
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Writ Petition was disposed of on 28.11.2022 (Annexure P-6).
5. Since in both the present Writ Petitions the Rules of 2007
6. The principal ground of challenge to the aforesaid provisions
of Central Armed Police Force ('CAPF'). This is reflected in Official
Memorandum ('O.M.'), dated 18.03.2011 (Annexure P-10).
Personnel as ex-CAPF Personnel. The impugned Rules whereby
in law.
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7. Sri A. Venkatesh, learned Senior Counsel and Sri K. Sridhar,
learned counsel representing Sri P. Sri Harsha Reddy, learned
the matters connected therewith. Section 4 of the BSF Act clearly
the security of borders of India. Thus, for all practical purposes
BSF is an Armed Force of the country. BSF, as name suggests
hardship and sacrifice their lives. Thus, depriving the children of
8. The next submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioners is based on O.M. dated 23.11.2012 (Annexure P-11).
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the ex-service men of the Defence Forces. Although, in paragraph
'shall'. Thus, the State Government is under an obligation to
Court in Tummala Supriya v. National Medical Commission 1
the purpose of MBBS course in the session 2024-25. After having
10. It is submitted that in the previous round of litigation in
W.P.Nos.16563 of 2024 and batch, decided on 29.08.2024.
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"Learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the 2nd
respondent had informed this Court that the children of
Border Security Force are also to be considered under the
category of 'Children of Armed Personnel' and the benefit of
reservation has been set out in the Rules and therefore the
same would be extended to the petitioner."
11. In view of candid statement made in the previous round, the
State is not justified in depriving the petitioners from the fruits of
1% reservation. In support of aforesaid submission, learned
Senior Counsel for the petitioners relied upon the judgment of the
Supreme Court in D.S. Nakara v. Union of India 2 and recent
judgment of Supreme Court in Union of India v. Justice (Retd.)
Raj Rahul Garg 3. It is submitted that the respondents have
created an artificial classification/distinction amongst the Armed
Force Personnel and Central Armed Police Force Personnel, which
cannot sustain judicial scrutiny on the constitutional principle.
Learned Senior Counsel also highlighted the fact that in various
other courses, the Government of Telangana gave reservation to
both i.e., children of Armed Force Personnel and CAPF Personnel.
Stand of the Respondents:
12. Sri Mohammed Imran Khan, learned Additional Advocate
General, submits that the order of the Andhra Pradesh High Court
in Tummala Supriya (supra) is based on concession and no
(1983) 1 SCC 305
2024 SCC OnLine SC 321
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principle of law is laid down. Thus, the said order is of no
assistance to the petitioners. So far, order of this Court in
previous round in W.P.No.41918 of 2022 is concerned, it is urged
that this order is also based on the submission of the Special
Government Pleader appearing for respondent No.2. However,
after that Rules have been amended and therefore, this previous
order will not improve the case of the petitioner.
13. Sri Mohammed Imran Khan, learned Additional Advocate
General, for respondent Nos.1 to 3; Sri Gadi Praveen Kumar,
learned Deputy Solicitor General of India, for respondent No.5; Sri
Mahesh Raje, learned Government Pleader of Home, for
respondent No.4 and Sri S. Agastya Sharma and Sri B. Sree Rama
Krishna, learned counsel for un-official respondents, who are
children of Army, Navy and Air Force officers and next in merit to
the petitioners, opposed the prayer and took a common stand that
the BSF/Paramilitary Forces and main Armed Forces viz., Army,
Navy and Air Force are governed by different sets of Acts and
Rules. Their recruitment methods, conditions of service and pay
scales etc., are different. The Paramilitary Forces work under the
Ministry of Home, whereas the Armed Forces are governed by the
directions of Ministry of Defence. By placing reliance on the
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judgment of Delhi High Court in Viney Chaudhary v. Union of
India 4, it is urged that the policy decision for providing reservation
to the wards of ex-servicemen was upheld and for the same
reasons no interference is warranted.
14. Learned Additional Advocate General heavily relied on the
Order of Ministry of Defence dated 25.02.2025, to bolster the
submission that Paramilitary Forces cannot be equated with
Armed Forces and it is open to the Government to provide
reservation without affecting the existing reservation for the
Armed Forces category.
15. It was common stand that the personnel in Army, Navy and
Air Force are recruited at a young age of 17-21 years and they
serve for a short period of duration i.e., 5 to 15/20 years. They
are compulsorily discharged on completion of the terms of service
at young age of 35 to 40 years. Very few of them, who get
promotion to higher rank, get an increment of two years, on each
such promotion. In any case, most of them are retired, discharged
or released from the Army, Navy and Air Force in their middle age
of 40 to 50 years, whereas the personnel of CAPF i.e., CRPF, BSF,
2023 LawSuit(Del) 2255
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CISF, Assam Rifles, etc., serve till the age of superannuation of 60
years.
16. It is further contended that released, retired or discharged
personnel of Armed Forces have to strive hard for their re-
employment on release from Army, Navy and Air Force. Thus,
they are not in a position to provide proper parental guidance to
their children when it is most needed. On the other hand, since
CAPF Personnel serve till 60 years of service, they do not face such
crisis.
17. The reservation in hand, admittedly, is a horizontal
reservation. This reservation is provided only to the children of
Armed Forces and other dependents. The Paramilitary Force
cannot claim share as within 1% quota of seats. In support of this
submission, Sri S. Agastya Sharma and Sri B. Sree Rama Krishna,
learned counsel for un-official respondents, placed reliance on the
decision of the cabinet which is reflected in O.M. dated
18.03.2011, which distinguishes between Armed Forces of India
and Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF).
18. Learned Additional Advocate General placed reliance on the
Division Bench judgment of coordinate Bench in W.P.Nos.18674 of
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2023 and batch and urged that although in different context, the
impugned G.O.Ms.No.75, dated 04.07.2023 was not interfered
with.
19. The parties have confined their arguments to the extent
indicated above.
20. We have bestowed our anxious consideration on the rival
submissions and perused the record.
Findings:
21. Before dealing with rival contentions, it is apposite to
consider the Rules, which are being questioned. By way of
G.O.Ms.No.66, dated 29.07.2015, the Rules of 2007 were
amended by inserting the following provision:
"In the said rules for item (iv) of sub-rule (a) of rule (3), the
following shall be substituted namely:-
"1% for the Children of Ex-Servicemen and the Serving
Personnel of the three wings of the Defence service viz.,
Army, Navy and Air Force subject to the condition that the
said Ex-Servicemen etc., who are domiciled in Telangana
based on the Permanent address/Home town declared by
them while joining the service and as recorded in their
service register.""
22. The Rules of 2017 were introduced in supersession of earlier
Rules of 2007 by way of G.O.Ms.No.114, dated 05.07.2017. These
Rules of 2017 were amended by way of G.O.Ms.No.75, dated
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04.07.2023. In no uncertain terms, it was made clear that
horizontal reservation of 1% is confined to the children of CAP/ex-
servicemen to the extent of 1%. The relevant not reads thus:
"Note: The above reservation is applicable only to the
children of Ex Servicemen and Serving Personnel of the
three wings of the Armed Forces viz., Army, Navy and Air
Force who are domiciled in Telangana based on the
permanent address/home town declared by them while joining
the service and as recorded in their service register."
(Emphasis Supplied)
23. A conjoint reading of G.O.Ms.No.66 (Annexure-P1) and
G.O.Ms.No.75 leaves no room for any doubt that benefit of 1%
horizontal reservation is confined to the children of Armed Forces
viz., Army, Navy and Air Force.
24. The interesting conundrum in the instant case is whether
the petitioners/children of BSF Personnel are sailing in the same
boat. In other words, whether the children of CAPF Personnel can
be treated at par with the children of Army, Navy and Air Force.
Ancillary legal question is whether classification made by the
respondents between children of Armed Forces and CAPF
Personnel is a reasonable classification or not and whether there
exists any intelligible differentia for the same, more-so, when the
respondents have given the benefit of reservation in different
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courses in Telangana to both children of Armed Forces as well as
children of CAPF.
25. Litmus test on this aspect was laid down way back in
Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v. Union of India 5. This principle was
reiterated by the Constitution Bench in Budhan Choudhry v.
State of Bihar 6. Relevant portion reads thus:
"5. ...It is now well-established that while Article 14 forbids
class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for
the purposes of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test
of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled,
namely, (i) that the classification must be founded on an
intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things
that are grouped together from others left out of the group and
(ii) that that differentia must have a rational relation to the
object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The
classification may be founded on different bases; namely,
geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the
like. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between
the basis of classification and the object of the Act under
consideration. It is also well established by the decisions of
this Court that Article 14 condemns discrimination not only
by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure. The
contention now put forward as to the invalidity of the trial of
the appellants has, therefore to be tested in the light of the
principles so laid down in the decisions of this Court."
(Emphasis Supplied)
26. This principle is consistently followed in A.P. Dairy
Development Corporation Federation v. B. Narasimha Reddy 7
and Amandeep Singh Saran v. State of Chattisgarh 8.
1950 SCC 833
(1954) 2 SCC 791
(2011) 9 SCC 286
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27. Thus, to examine the legality of classification, two conditions
must be satisfied. First, there must be an intelligible differentia
which distinguishes persons grouped together from other left out
of the group. The phrase intelligible differentia means difference
capable of being understood (See State of West Bengal v. Anwar
Ali Sarka 9). Second, the differentia must have a rationale relation
to the object sought to be achieved by the law, that is, the basis of
classification must have a nexus with the object of classification
(See Indra Sawhney v. Union of India 10; State of Kerala v. N.M.
Thomas 11; Ram Krishna Dalmia v. S.R. Tendolkar 12 and
Bhudhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar 13).
28. The aforesaid litmus test still holds the field in view of recent
Seven Judge Bench judgment of Supreme Court in State of
Punjab v. Davinder Singh 14.
29. Needless to emphasize that the Supreme Court laid down the
said tests while interpreting Article 14 of the Constitution. This
Article talks about 'equality before the law and equal protection of
(2024) 6 SCC 541
(1952) 1 SCC 1
1992 Supp (3) SCC 217
(1976) 2 SCC 310
1958 SCC OnLine SC 6
(1954) 2 SCC 791
(2025) 1 SCC 1
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the laws'. However, both are different in content and sweep (See
Indra Sawhney(supra)). Equality before law does not mean that
the same law must apply to everyone. It provides that same law
should apply to those who are similarly situated (see
GauriShanker v. Union of India 15). Likewise, the expression
'equal protection of law' envisages that among equals, laws must
be equally administered. Equality, thus, by no stretch of
imagination, can entail sameness. There must be a parity of
treatment under parity of conditions (see Indra Sawhney(supra)).
30. If the present matter is tested on the envil of aforesaid
principles, it will be clear like noon day that admittedly, the
personnel engaged by Army, Navy and Air Force are governed by
different set of Acts/Rules and their service conditions are
different than the service conditions of BSF/CAPF personnel. The
tenure of service of Army, Navy and Air Force personnel is
different than the BSF personnel.
31. The O.M. in document No.I-45020/2/2011-Pers-II, dated
18.03.2011 shows that CAPF and Armed Forces of the Union are
two different classes. Pertinently, the stand taken in the counter
of respondents that service conditions and tenure of services of
(1994) 6 SCC 349
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Armed Force Personnel and CAPF Personnel are different, could
not be rebutted by the petitioners. The only submission
strenuously advanced by the learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioners is based on Section 4 of the BSF Act. However, this is
no more res integra that if method of recruitment and service
conditions are different, a different classification or sub-
classification does not infringe equality clause as enshrined in
Article 14 of the Constitution.
32. In All India Station Masters' & Asstt. Station Masters'
Association v. Railways 16, the issue before a Constitution Bench
of the Supreme Court was whether 'Roadside Station Masters'
could be differentiated from Guards for the purpose of promotion
to the higher post of Station Masters. Answering the issue in the
affirmative, the Supreme Court opined that the Station Masters
and Guards did not form an integrated class since they were
recruited and trained separately. Thus, a distinction between the
two classes was held not to be violative of the equality code which
only requires the State to treat equals equally.
1959 SCC OnLine SC 83
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33. In Katyani Dayal Dayal v. Union of India 17, it was
poignantly held that Assistant Officers of Railway recruited
through a competitive examination and those who recruited on the
recommendation of the Unions Public Service Commission do not
form an integrated homogeneous class because the objects of
recruitment, the tenure and even the appointing authority are
different. As noted above, in the instant case also, the Act which
governs the services, the method of recruitment, the conditions of
services and tenure of Armed Forces and CAPF are different and
by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the Armed Forces
viz., Army, Navy and Air Force and BSF/CAPF forms a
homogenous class. Thus, it cannot be said that if 1% reservation
is confined to only three forces, it amounts to dividing a
homogeneous class and amounts to creating a class within same
class.
34. So far judgment of D.S. Nakara (supra) on which heavy
reliance is placed by petitioners, suffice to note that in recent
judgment in Davinder Singh (supra), the Seven Judge Bench
considered this judgment in D.S. Nakara (supra). It was noted
that in the case of D.S. Nakara (supra), the argument was that
(1980) 3 SCC 245
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those retiring before the designated date were a class, distinct
from those retiring after that date. In the backdrop of cut-off date,
the arguments were considered. Putting it differently, in D.S.
Nakara (supra), the Supreme Court questioned the rationale of
classifying the beneficiary class based on the date of retirement.
Here, the cut-off date is not an issue and hence, the judgment of
D.S. Nakara (supra) is of no help to the petitioners.
35. The next reliance was placed on the judgment of Supreme
Court in Justice (Retd.) Raj Rahul Garg (supra). This judgment
deals with claim for addition to the period during which
respondents therein served as a Judge of High Court to be added
to the length of her service as a Member of District Judiciary.
This judgment is not an authority for the purpose of deciding the
claim of present petitioners when they claim equality with
personnel of different forces governed by different set of Act/Rules
and service conditions.
36. So far, judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Tummala
Supriya (supra) is concerned, suffice it to say that, no principle of
law is laid down in this order. The order is passed based on the
statement of Special Government Pleader and hence, this order
cannot be a reason to examine the constitutional validity of the
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WP_26246_&_27045_2024
impugned Rules. Likewise, in the previous round of litigation, in
W.P.No.41918 of 2022, a concession was given by learned Special
Government Pleader in favour of the petitioners. Interestingly,
this matter was decided on 08.11.2022. Thereafter, by
G.O.Ms.No.75 with effect from 04.07.2023, the Rules of 2017 were
amended and aforesaid 'note' was specifically appended. Thus,
any concession or oral statement given prior to amendment in the
Rules will not cut any ice. In the previous round also, no principle
of law is laid down by this Court. Thus, these orders cannot be a
reason to declare the impugned Rules as ultra vires.
37. No doubt, in certain courses in the State of Telangana, the
Government in addition to children of Army, Navy and Air Force
provides reservation to the children of CAPF as well. However, the
courses are different. Such a decision to provide reservation is
based on expert opinions. Merely because in some courses
reservation is extended to both categories, neither equality
between the two is established nor any enforceable right, is
created in favour of the present petitioners. Both the categories
are different can be gathered from the recent order of Government,
which reads thus:
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"F. No. 13(4)/Court/2024/D(Res-II)
Government of India
Ministry of Defence
Department of Ex-Servicemen Welfare
Room No.231, B-Wing
Sena Bhawan, New Delhi
Dated: 25th Feb, 2025
To
Secretary
Directorate of Higher Education
Government of N.C.T. of Delhi
BTE Complex, Muni Maya Ram Marg, Pitampura, Delhi-34
Subject: Inter-se priority for reservation/preference to the wards
of Armed Forces Personnel by States/UTs for admission to
Medical/Professional/ Non-Professional Courses
Sir,
Please refer to Ministry of Defence, Department of Ex-
Servicemen Welfare letter No 6(1)/2017-Res-II dt 21.05.2018
(copy enclosed) regarding Inter-se priority for
reservation/preference to the wards of Armed Forces Personnel
by States/UTs for admission to Medical/Professional/ Non-
Professional Courses. The said policy was formulated with a view
to recognize and honour the sacrifices made by the Armed
Forces Personnel in the service of nation.
2. It has come to the notice of this Ministry that Directorate of
Higher Education, Government of NCT of Delhi is extending the
reservation benefits under this category to the wards of
paramilitary/police personnel as well. Consequently, this
Ministry has been receiving several representations from Armed
Forces regarding the dilution of the existing Defence quota.
3. In this regard, it is requested that the reservation/preference
under the Defence quota, as envisaged in the Ministry's letter
dated 21.05.2018, be maintained exclusively for the wards of
Armed Forces personnel. If the Government of NCT of Delhi
wishes to extend similar benefits to the wards of Paramilitary
forces personnel, a separate quota may kindly be introduced for
them without affecting the existing reservation for the Armed
Forces category.
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WP_26246_&_27045_2024
4. It is requested that necessary instruction be issued to ensure
adherence to the existing policy guidelines for Defence quota. A
line of confirmation on the action taken may be shared with this
Ministry at the earliest.
Yours Faithfully,
(Vinay Pratap Singh)
Under Secretary to the Govt. of India
Tele: 2301 2675"
(Emphasis Supplied)
38. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners while referring
to paragraph No.2 of the O.M. dated 23.11.2012 (Annexure P-
11) urged that the word 'may' must be read as 'shall', this O.M.
reads thus:
"NO. 27011/100/2012-R&W
Government of India
Ministry of Home Affairs
Police Division-II
[Resettlement and Welfare Directorate)
2 3 NOV 2012
North Block, New Delhi-01
Dated the, 23rd November, 2012
OFFICE MEMORANDUM
Subject:
Designating the retired Central Armed Police
Force (CAPF i.e. CRPE, BSF, CISE. ITBP and
SSB) personnel as "Ex-Central Armed Police
Force personnel (Ex-CAPF personnel).
There has a demand from various fora that the
retired Central Armed Police Force (CAPF) personnel may be
given the status of Ex-CAPF personnel. Accordingly a
proposal was sent to the Government for their
consideration. Cabinet Committee on Security has approved
the proposal of this Ministry to declare retired Central
Armed Police Force personnel from Central Reserve Police
Force (CRF), Border Security Force (BSF), Central
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Industrial Security Force (CISF), Indo-Tibetan Border
Police (ITBP) and Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB) as "Ex-
Central Armed Police Force personnel" (Ex-CAPF
personnel).
2. Based on such designation, the State/UT
Governments concerned may extend suitable benefits to
them on the lines of the benefits extended by the State/UT
Governments to the Ex-Servicemen of Defence Forces.
(Dinesh Mahur)
Director (Personnel)
Ph: 2309 2933"
(Emphasis Supplied)
39. A conjoint reading of the aforesaid O.M. and recent
order of Government in F.No.13/(4)/Court/2024/D (Res-II),
dated 25.02.2025, shows that these are administrative
orders/executive instructions. The legislative competence for
issuing the Rules is not called in question. No administrative
orders/executive instructions can be said to be binding de
hors the Rules. Thus, we are unable to persuade ourselves
with the line of argument of the learned Senior Counsel for
the petitioners that in O.M. dated 23.11.2012 directions
issued are in mandatory terms to provide reservation to ex-
CAPF Personnel wards.
40. In our judgment, the respondents have satisfied the
twin test. The classification is reasonable and based on
intelligible differentia. There is a clear object sought to be
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achieved to provide reservation of 1% seats to children of
Armed Forces i.e, Army, Navy and Air Force. The basis of
classification has a nexus with the object of the classification.
41. In view of forgoing analysis, the impugned Rules cannot
be said to be unconstitutional in nature infringing the
equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution.
Thus, both the petitions are dismissed and as a consequence,
the ad interim order stands vacated although, reluctantly.
There shall be no order as to costs. Miscellaneous
applications, if any pending, shall stand closed.
____________________
SUJOY PAUL, ACJ
____________________
RENUKA YARA, J
Date:18.03.2025
Note:
L.R. copy be marked
B/o.GVR/MYK
