Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 3882 Tel
Judgement Date : 13 June, 2025
THE HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR JUKANTI
CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL No.626 OF 2014
% Dated:13.06.2025
# The United India Insurance Co. Ltd.,
Rep. by its Divisional Manager,
Crystal Plaza, Masabtank,
Hyderabad.
.. Appellant
And
Modugu Nagaraju, S/o. Ramulu, 27 yrs.,
Driver of Lorry, R/o. Bangarugadda,
Miryalaguda Town & Mandal,
Nalgonda Dist. & Other
.. Respondents
! Counsel for appellant : Mr. Srinivas Rao Vulta
^ Counsel for respondents : Mr. Viswanathanala Jagan Mohan
<GIST:
> HEAD NOTE:
? Cases referred
1. (2023) 8 SCC 217
2. SLP (Civil) No.25237 of 2023, dated 12.02.2025
3. (2017) 1 SCC 45
JAK, J
C.M.A.No.626_2014
2
THE HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR JUKANTI
CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL No.626 OF 2014
JUDGMENT:
Aggrieved by order, dated 03.03.2014, in E.C.No.128 of
2012 (NF) (New), [W.C.No.273 of 2006 (NF) (Old)] passed by the
Commissioner for Employees' Compensation and Deputy
Commissioner of Labour at Nalgonda, the present Civil
Miscellaneous Appeal is filed.
2. Heard Mr. Srinivas Rao Vulta, learned counsel for
appellant and Mr. Viswanathanala Jagan Mohan, learned
counsel for respondents.
3. Respondent No.2/applicant is the driver of a tanker lorry
bearing No.AP-09V-6012. The applicant was driving the tanker
lorry from Hyderabad to Vijayawada, when the lorry reached
outskirts of Yellagiri Village, on 11.05.2005, another lorry
bearing No.AP-16W-8694 came in opposite direction and
dashed the lorry of the applicant. As a result, the lorry turned
turtle and applicant received fracture of left foot, fracture of
left wrist with lower end of radius, laceration over left foot,
laceration over right eye brow, laceration over chin, abrasion JAK, J C.M.A.No.626_2014
over right medial prominence and abrasion over left thigh.
Immediately, the applicant was shifted to Osmania General
Hospital, Hyderabad and thereafter to Raksha Multispecialty
Hospital, Hyderabad, as in-patient. It is claimed that applicant
spent huge amounts towards treatment and is permanently
disabled to carry out the job of driver.
4. A case in Crime No.71 of 2005 came to be registered in
Choutuppal Police Station of Nalgonda District, under Sections
304-A, 338 and 337 of IPC. A compensation for an amount of
Rs.3,00,000/- was sought by the applicant against opposite
party Nos.1 and 2 jointly and severally. Opposite party No.1 is
the owner of the lorry and opposite party No.2 is the Insurance
Company Limited. The Commissioner, after considering the
evidence of PWs.1 to 3 and RW1 and taking into consideration
Exs.A1 to A7, Ex.B1 and Ex.C1, has arrived at a conclusion
that compensation amount of Rs.2,03,104/- be paid to the
applicant within 30 days from the date of the order, failing
which the amount shall carry interest @ 9% per annum from
the date of filing of the application till realization.
JAK, J C.M.A.No.626_2014
5. Challenging the said order, the appellant/Insurance
Company filed the present appeal.
6. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that there is
a discrepancy in the disability certificate issued by
Dr. V.Prashanth and the disability certificate issued by District
Medical Board, Nalgonda. Ex.A6 is the disability certificate
issued by Dr. V.Prashanth, stating that the disability
sustained by the applicant is 25%. That Ex.C1 is the original
disability certificate issued by the District Medical Board,
Nalgonda, stating that disability sustained by the applicant is
30%. Learned counsel further submitted that the
Commissioner erred in considering the disability of the
applicant as 30%, instead of 25%. It is further submitted that
applicant's driving license was valid from 13.11.2002 to
18.11.2003 and it was renewed from 19.04.2003 to
12.11.2006 and further it was renewed from 13.02.2007 to
12.02.2010. Learned counsel stated that accident took place
on 11.05.2005 and that the applicant could not have renewed
the license, if he sustained an injury with physical disability of
30%.
JAK, J C.M.A.No.626_2014
7. Learned counsel contended that the Commissioner erred
in taking loss of earning capacity at 40% for the purpose of
compensation, when the certificate issued by Dr.V.Prashanth
reflects that the applicant sustained 25% physical disability.
It is also pointed out that the amount arrived at by the
Commissioner by fixing the minimum wages at Rs.3,931/- per
month for the purpose of calculating the loss of earning is not
proper. Hence, the compensation awarded is on the higher side
and that there are no merits in the order dated 03.03.2014,
passed in E.C.No.128 of 2012 (NF) (New), [W.C.No.273 of 2006
(NF) (Old)]. That the order passed is without application of
mind. Therefore, the said order is liable to be dismissed.
8. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents
submitted that the physical disability is unconnected to loss of
earning capacity. It is stated that disability certificate of 30%
issued by the competent District Medical Board (Nalgonda) is
marked as Ex.C1. That this certificate is considered by the
Commissioner and cannot be found fault with, as the
applicant sustained injury to the wrist and also to the left foot.
That for a driver, a fracture to left foot and left wrist affect the
driving ability. Therefore, 30% physical disability certificate JAK, J C.M.A.No.626_2014
issued by the District Medical Board, Nalgonda, and the
assessment of 40% loss of earning capacity for the purpose of
compensation cannot be said to be improper. It is further
submitted that for a driver, both left foot and left wrist have to
function at 100% capacity and any injury to them would affect
the driving ability. It is further submitted that renewing of
license does not in any way impact the compensation
assessment. It is lastly urged that the monthly wages fixed for
heavy vehicle driver employed in Public Motor Transport as on
the date of accident was rightly taken as Rs.3,931/- per
month. Hence, no interference is necessitated.
9. Heard learned counsels, perused the record and
considered the rival submissions.
10. It is not in dispute that on 11.05.2005, the applicant,
who is the driver of tanker lorry bearing No.AP-09V-6012, met
with an accident with another lorry bearing No.AP-16W-8694
on the outskirts of Yellagiri Village, and that applicant
sustained injuries. A case in Crime No.71 of 2005 was
registered.
JAK, J C.M.A.No.626_2014
11. There is no dispute with regard to the treatment
undergone by the applicant at Osmania General Hospital,
Hyderabad and Raksha Multispecialty Hospital, Hyderabad.
The dispute pertains to percentage of disability certificate
issued by Dr. V.Prashanth, stating that applicant sustained
disability of 25%, whereas, in the disability certificate issued
by the District Medical Board, Nalgonda, it is stated that
applicant sustained disability of 30%.
12. It is trite law that certificate issued by a competent
Medical Board prevails over a disability certificate issued by an
individual doctor, even if the doctor is an Orthopedic Surgeon.
The Medical Board is constituted for a specific purpose and it
is the duty of the Medical Board to assess the physical
disability after examining the injured. The assessment carried
out by a Medical Board is reflected in the certificate issued.
The certificate of the District Medical Board can be used for
purposes, such as application for leave or for employment
purposes and for such other purposes. Until and unless it is
shown that the certificate issued by the District Medical Board
is not proper, the certificate cannot be discarded. This Court
does not find any infirmity in the order, wherein Commissioner JAK, J C.M.A.No.626_2014
has considered disability certificate issued by the District
Medical Board, Nalgonda. As far as the loss of earning capacity
is considered, the Commissioner held it as 40%. This Court
cannot find fault with it, as both left foot and left wrist of the
applicant were injured and disabled.
13. With regard to the wages, the Commissioner fixed the
wages on the basis of minimum wages fixed by the
Government of Andhra Pradesh for the heavy vehicle driver
employed in Public Motor Transport. Therefore, this Court
cannot find fault with the same.
14. It is pertinent to note that except for the grievance of
percentage of disability and the loss of earning capacity, no
other point has been stressed upon. The Hon'ble Apex Court,
while dealing with the aspect of principle of functional
disability with respect to physical disability in Indra Bai v.
Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. and another 1, held as follows:
"23. Section 4(1)(b) of the Act, at the relevant time, read as under:-
"4. Amount of compensation.- (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the amount of compensation shall be as follows, namely:-
(2023) 8 SCC 217
JAK, J
C.M.A.No.626_2014
(a) * * *
(b) Where permanent an amount equal to sixty per cent of total disablement the monthly wages of the injured results from the injury employee multiplied by the relevant factor;
Or an amount of one lakh and forty thousand rupees, whichever is more;
Provided that the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, from time to time, enhance the amount of compensation mentioned in clauses (a) and (b).
Explanation I.-- For the purposes of clause (a) and clause
(b), "relevant factor", in relation to a workman means the factor specified in the second column of Schedule IV against the entry in the first column of that Schedule specifying the number of years which are the same as the completed years of the age of the workman on his last birthday immediately preceding the date on which the compensation fell due."
24. "Total disablement" is defined by section 2(1)(l) as follows:-
"total disablement" means such disablement, whether of a temporary or permanent nature, as incapacitates a workman for all work which he was capable of performing at the time of the accident resulting in such disablement:
Provided that permanent total disablement shall be deemed to result from every injury specified in Part I of Schedule I or from any combination of injuries specified in Part II thereof where the aggregate percentage of the loss of earning capacity, as specified in the said Part II against those injuries, amounts to one hundred per cent or more;"
25. In Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Srinivas Sabata and Another [reported in (1976) 1 SCC 289], decided by a four-Judge Bench of this Court, the injured workman was a carpenter by profession and by loss of left hand above the elbow, he was evidently rendered unfit for the work of carpentry and, therefore, the Commissioner awarded compensation by considering permanent disability as total i.e., 100%. The employer raised an argument that JAK, J C.M.A.No.626_2014
the injury did not result in permanent total disablement of the workman and therefore, the Commissioner committed a gross error of law in taking a view that there was total disablement. In that context, this Court held: -
"5. The expression "total disablement" has been defined in section 2(1)(l) of the Act as follows:
"total disablement" means such disablement, whether of a temporary or permanent nature, as incapacitates a workman for all work which he was capable of performing at the time of the accident resulting in such disablement."
It has not been disputed before us that the injury was of such a nature as to cause permanent disablement to the respondent, and the question for consideration is whether the disablement incapacitated the respondent for all work which he was capable of performing at the time of the accident. The Commissioner has examined the question and recorded his finding as follows:
"The injured workman in this case is carpenter by profession....By loss of the left hand above the elbow, he has evidently been rendered unfit for the work of carpenter as the work of carpentry cannot be done by one hand only."
This is obviously a reasonable and correct finding. Counsel for the appellant has not been able to assail it on any ground and it does not require to be corrected in this appeal."
26. In Chanappa Nagappa Muchalagoda v. Divisional Manager, New India Insurance Co. Ltd. [reported in (2020) 1 SCC 796], the issue that came for consideration before this Court was, whether a workman driver who, on account of injury on his leg, could neither stand for a long time nor fold his legs and was required to use a walking stick, and could not lift heavy objects, would be entitled for compensation by taking the disability as 100% or less, as per the medical opinion. Notably, in that case, the doctor had certified that the workman had suffered 37% disability in his whole body, and could not perform the work of a truck driver any longer. In that context, it was held:
"10. It is the admitted position that the appellant can no longer pursue his vocation as a driver of heavy vehicles. The medical evidence on record has corroborated his JAK, J C.M.A.No.626_2014
inability to stand for a long period of time, or even fold his legs. As a consequence, the appellant has got permanently incapacitated to pursue his vocation as a driver.
14. ..... As a consequence of the accident, the appellant has been incapacitated for life, since he can walk only with the help of a walking stick. He has lost the ability to work as a driver, as he would be disqualified from even getting a driving license. The prospect of securing any other manual labour job is not possible, since he would require the assistance of a person to ensure his mobility and manage his discomfort. As a consequence, the functional disability suffered by the Appellant must be assessed as 100%."
27. In light of the aforesaid decisions and the definition of the term "total disablement" as provided by clause (l) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Act, it is the functional disability and not just the physical disability which is the determining factor in assessing whether the claimant (i.e., workman) has incurred total disablement. Thus, if the disablement incurred in an accident incapacitates a workman for all work which he was capable of performing at the time of the accident resulting in such disablement, the disablement would be taken as total for the purposes of award of compensation under section 4(1)(b) of the Act regardless of the injury sustained being not one as specified in Part I of Schedule I of the Act. The proviso to clause (l) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Act does not dilute the import of the substantive clause. Rather, it adds to it by specifying categories wherein it shall be deemed that there is permanent total disablement.
28. In Mohd. Nasir (supra), which has been relied by the High Court, the workman was a cleaner. He had suffered fracture in the leg. It was held that such injury would not amount to permanent loss of the use of the entire leg. Hence, the disablement was found partial and not total.
29. In Mubasir Ahmed (supra), another decision relied by the High Court, the matter did not relate to injuries specified in Schedule I and, as such, it was observed that the case was covered by Section 4(1)(c)(ii) of the Act. However, in that case, the Court at no stage examined whether the disablement in question had incapacitated the workman from performing all work which he was capable of performing at the time of the accident resulting in such disablement. In other words, the Court had no occasion to examine the true import of the term "total JAK, J C.M.A.No.626_2014
disablement" as defined by Section 2(1)(l) of the Act. Therefore, in our view, the decision in Mubasir Ahmed (supra) was wrongly applied by the High Court.
30. In the instant case, on the basis of medical certificate provided by the Board, the Commissioner found the appellant unfit for labour inasmuch as there was complete loss of grip in the appellant's left hand. Prior to the accident, the appellant worked as a loading/unloading labourer. Even if she could use her right hand, the crux is whether she could be considered suitable for performing her task as a loading/unloading labourer. Such a task is ordinarily performed by using both hands. There is no material on record from which it could be inferred that the appellant was skilled to perform any kind of job by use of one hand. It is also not a case where the appellant had the skill to perform her job by using machines which the appellant could operate by using one hand. In such circumstances, when the Board had certified that the appellant was rendered unfit for labour, there was no perversity in the decision of the Commissioner in awarding compensation by treating the disability as total on account of her functional disability. Consequently, no question of law, much less a substantial one, arose for consideration by the High Court so as to allow the appeal in exercise of power under Section 30 of the Act. In our considered view, the High Court erred in partly setting aside the order of the Commissioner and assessing the disability as 40% instead of 100%, as assessed by the Commissioner."
15. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Pappu Singh v. National
Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr., [(SLP (Civil) No.25237 of 2023), dated
12.02.2025], has reiterated the position of law that functional
disability caused due to injury shall be considered while awarding
compensation.
16. In the present set of facts, the Commissioner awarded a
compensation of Rs.2,03,104/- (Rupees Two lakhs three thousand
and one hundred and four only) for the injuries sustained JAK, J C.M.A.No.626_2014
(fractures) i.e., the physical disability of 30% and thereby the
functional disability as 40%. The District Medical Board has
certified physical disability at 30%. This disability definitely
incapacitates the workman i.e., a driver of bus in performing his
functions as a driver. This Court does not find any infirmity in the
Commissioner arriving at the functional disability as 40%.
17. The Hon'ble Apex Court, while dealing with the scheme of the
Workmen's Compensation Act in Golla Rajanna and Others v.
Divisional Manager and Another 2, held as follows:
"10. Under the scheme of the Act, the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner is the last authority on facts. The Parliament has thought it fit to restrict the scope of the appeal only to substantial questions of law, being a welfare legislation. Unfortunately, the High Court has missed this crucial question of limited jurisdiction and has ventured to re-appreciate the evidence and recorded its own findings on percentage of disability for which also there is no basis. The whole exercise made by the High Court is not within the competence of the High Court under Section 30 of the Act."
18. In the facts and circumstances of the case, no question
of law, much less a substantial one, arises for consideration.
On this ground too, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is liable to
be dismissed.
19. For reasons aforesaid, this Court does not find any
infirmity or illegality in the order, dated 03.03.2014, in
(2017) 1 SCC 45 JAK, J C.M.A.No.626_2014
E.C.No.128 of 2012 (NF) (New), [W.C.No.273 of 2006 (NF) (Old)]
passed by the Commissioner for Employees' Compensation
and Deputy Commissioner of Labour at Nalgonda. The appeal
is devoid of merits and is liable to be dismissed.
20. Accordingly, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is dismissed.
No order as to costs.
Miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand
closed.
___________________________ ANIL KUMAR JUKANTI, J Date: 13.06.2025
Note:- L.R. copy be marked.
(B/o) Kgk
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